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ABSTRACT
The years immediately following the First World War were extremely 
important for the formulation of Britain's policy towards Egypt, a British 
Protectorate since 1914. In this connection, the years 1922 to 1925, the 
last years of Lord Allenby's tenure as Britain's High Commissioner in Egypt, 
were critical.
Allenby, who was appointed in 1919 in order to suppress nationalist- 
inspired rioting in Egypt, adopted a surprising policy of moderation. He soon 
forced the British government to unilaterally declare Egypt's independence in 
1922. This apparent success was followed by the adoption of a modern consti­
tution in Egypt and the British withdrawal from the entanglements of Egypt's 
administration. Still Allenby's career ended in seeming frustration in 
1925: negotiations between Britain and Egypt failed in 1924, to be followed
by the assassination of the British Governor General of the Sudan, Sir Lee
z'
Stack, and Allenby's harsh ultimatum to the Egyptian government in November 
1924 effectively reinstituting British control of Egypt's administration.
Allenby left Egypt in 1925 because of his sharp response to the disorders and 
his refusal, as in 1922, to accept the views of the British government in 
London. This rivalry between British policy-makers in Cairo and in London 
became the hallmark of British policy throughout this period.
The thesis attempts to answer some of the questions raised by the 
formulation of Britain's policy towards Egypt during the years 1922-1925, when 
an effort was made to regularise Anglo-Egyptian relations. Towards this 
end, there is an examination of the factors affecting Britain's policy in 
three related areas: the environment - the approaches and perceptions of
policy; the balance and tensions between the High Commissioner and his Residency 
staff in Cairo and the British government in London; and, finally, the 
interaction of these elements with events in Egypt, particularly the struggle 
between the nationalist forces, led by Zaghlul Pasha, and the Egyptian King,
Ahmad Fuad.
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INTRODUCTION
1INTRODUCTION
'Renounce - or monopolize - or share1'*': These words, written by Lord
Salisbury on e year before the British occupation of Egypt in 1883, sharply de­
fined the central dilemma of British policy towards Egypt. It was a dilemma 
that would concern British statesmen and diplomatists for nearly three-quarters 
of a century and would be resolved only by the final withdrawal of Britain's 
troops from Egypt in 1954.
The dilemma was indeed fascinating. The renunciation of control over Egypt 
would prevent Britain from becoming and then remaining entangled in Egyptian 
affairs and hostage to the variable fortunes of international diplomacy. Yet 
such a step might hazard British strategic and economic interests in the area.
The monopolization of control would, it was believed, assure British interests, 
but might invite the dangers of foreign entanglements. The sharing of control 
could conceivably involve Britain - whether in Europe or in Egypt - in the en­
tanglements hitherto avoided, while not really assuring the maintenance of vital 
interests.
If this dilemma was central at the start of Britain's occupation of Egypt 
in 1883, it was equally important in the years following the First World War.
A period of great complexity and sharp changes, this was a time in which Britain's 
leaders were forced, often much to their dismay, to reassess that country's 
imperial role and its relations with diverse sections of the Empire. The forces 
unleashed by the events, policies and pronouncements of the war years affected 
areas as distant and dissimilar as India and Ireland. Egypt, declared a Pro­
tectorate by Britain in 1914, did not remain untouched by the changes that followed 
once the discipline imposed by wartime needs and pressures had relaxed. It was 
at this point that Salisbury's dilemma - 'renounce - or monopolize - or share' - 
again became the focus of British policy.
European interest, generally, and British involvement in Egypt, specifically,
1. Salisbury to Sir Stafford Northcote, September 16, 1881, in Lady Gwendolen 
Cecil, The Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury (London, 1921), II, 331-2. 
Sections of the foregoing historical summary are based on the writer's 
Master's Thesis: Eugene Rothman, The Formulation of Britain's Policy Towards
Egypt, 1882-1887 (Columbia University, 1968).
2were the result of a variety of considerations. One writer noted that there
were four basic factors underlying European imperialism in the late nineteenth
century: economic interests; strategy and defence; national prestige; and,
1the movement of populations. In the case of Britain and Egypt, economic and 
political-strategic considerations were paramount and inter-related, providing 
the basis for policy.
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, British interest in Egypt 
was only occasional. But a few Englishmen lived there throughout the period 
and they left little mark on the country. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 
signalled a critical turning point in the British approach to the region, espec­
ially since the invasion affected by implication British interests in the more 
important Indian sub-continent. Hoskins describes the impact of these and sub­
sequent events:
 the well planned expedition of 1798 and later persistent efforts
on the part of both France and Russia to acquire control of one or 
another of the shorter routes £to IndiCl by which the feet of clay 
of the British colossus might be shattered taught thorough lessons.
Thus Egypt's strategic importance as a military route to the Far East 
became strikingly clear. British policy, however, was focussed on Egypt in a 
negative way and was really directed towards Constantinople and India. It sought 
not to control Egypt, but rather to prevent the introduction of hostile foreign 
forces, such as those of France. With the exceptions of the short and ill-fated 
Frazer expedition of 1807 and British intervention during the war of 1839 between 
Muhammad Ali, Pasha of Egypt, and Mahmud II, the Ottoman Sultan, British states­
men did not seriously consider direct or permanent action in Egypt. Instead, they 
hoped to secure the short route to India through Egypt by exercising influence 
over the local rulers of that country and by circumscribing French influence at 
the Sultan's court in Constantinople.
During the 1820's and 1830's Britain's economic and strategic interests in 
Egypt gained further impetus. The introduction of long-staple Jumel cotton in 
1821 became within time increasingly important to the textile interests in 
Lancashire. Even more significant, in the short-term, was the development of
1. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882- 
1914 (Princeton, 1966), pp. 8-9.
2. Halford Hoskins, British Routes to India (New York, 1928), p. 79.
3steamship communications between Egypt and India.
In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, technical improvements 
to the steamship permitted regular travel in the Mediterranean. Further develop- 
ments extended steamship routes to the Indian Ocean. After several false starts, 
the advantages of the England-Egypt-Bombay route over the Cape route was clearly 
proven. By 1836, steamers made monthly trial runs between Bombay and the Red Sea 
port of Suez. Five years, later, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company was making regular runs across the Indian Ocean, undeterred by the mon­
soons that had hampered sailing ships in earlier years.
The spread of steamship travel was paralleled in the 1840’s by the system­
atic improvement of Egypt’s internal communications in order to enable that 
country to fulfill its entrepot role. As a result, Britain's interests, while 
still directed towards India, became more closely linked to developments within 
Egypt. In addition to considerations of trade and transport routes to India, 
direct British economic interests in Egypt increased. After the end of the 
Egyptian-Ottoman war .of 1839, the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838 was 
extended to Egypt, opening the area to British commercial initiative. The effects 
of this were two-fold. In the first instance, there was increasing British 
economic and social penetration of Egypt, adversely affecting the stability of 
local Egyptian society and its economy. Second, British interests in Egypt 
began to affect the direction of Britain's 'Eastern' policy.
Egypt's growing strategic importance as the key to imperial communications 
was always Britain's paramount concern, taking precedence over any economic 
considerations. When these diverged, such as in the construction of the Suez 
Canal, strategic-political considerations prevailed. Despite the support of 
British commercial circles for the proposed canal, the government attempted to 
prevent its construction. This was based on the fear that a canal would invite 
European meddling in EgyptT nominally still part of the Ottoman Empire. Further­
more, such involvement might possibly lead to the partial dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire, perceived in London as a British prot^g^ and through whose
i
Imperial Court Britain could exercise influence to limit French activity.
1. For an analysis of British policy in this period, see: William L. Langer,
European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York, 1950), p. 79.
4After the completion of the Suez Canal, British policy towards Egypt was 
restricted to pressure and diplomatic action. This non-interventionist approach 
was maintained out/concern over the reactions of the European Powers, especially 
Russia, who might otherwise use the opportunity to attack the territorial in­
tegrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Royal Navy and the Ottoman Army served as 
the basis for the defence of British interests in the region.
There was, however, a slow but inexorable change to a policy of active 
British involvement. Growing British interest in Egypt’s economy, particularly 
its foreign debt, and Egypt's increasing economic and social instability were 
largely responsible for the change. This new approach towards policy was signalled 
by Disraeli’s purchase in 1875 of the Suez Canal Company shares held by Egypt's 
Khedive Ismail, and then by the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention of 
1878. In the case of the treaties, Britain showed its willingness to thwart 
Russian expansion in the Balkans at the expense of Ottoman territorial integrity 
and did not hesitate to bolster its own strategic interests in the Eastern Medi­
terranean by occupying Cyprus. Against this background of increasing interest 
and involvement in Egypt, William Gladstone, the 'Little Englander', and the 
Liberal Party came to power with the avowed policy of non-entanglement in 
foreign affairs.
The five years between 1882 and 1887 were crucial to the development of 
Britain's policy towards Egypt and the determination of its future direction. 
Despite Gladstone's previously declared policy of non-intervention in foreign 
affairs, this changed rapidly, funsettled conditions in Egypt and, then, the
Egyptian nationalist uprising led by Urabi Pasha in the early 1880's forced
Britain, concerned over the possible intervention by the other Powers, to invade 
Egypt in September 188^ ,. Gladstone justified his Government's dramatic re­
versal of policy in the following words:
The insecurity of the Canal, it is plain, d.oes not exhibit to us
the seat of the disease. The insecurity of the Canal is a symptom 
only, and the seat of the^disease is in the interior of Egypt and 
its anarchical condition.
1. W.E. Gladstone, July 24, 1882, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CCLXXII 
(1882), 1586.
5After the invasion of Egypt, Britain attempted to reconstruct Egyptian 
LpVse.
society,(shattered by the Urabi rebellion against the Khedive and his Turco- 
Egyptian administration, so that British interests would be secured and early 
withdrawal possible. Granville, Gladstone's Foreign Secretary, outlined the 
goals of this policy, known as 'rescue and retire,1 as: 'peace, order and
prosperity',* 'the stability of the Khedive's authority'; 'the judicious develop­
ment of self-government'; and, 'the fulfilment of obligations towards foreign 
powers.’ The approach that would be taken to realise these goals was des- 
cibed in Granville's famous despatch of January 3, 1883, whereby he informed 
the Powers of Europe that
...the position in which Her Majesty's Government are placed towards 
His Highness ^the Khedive| imposes upon them the duty of giving 
advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be 
established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the 
elements of stability and progress.^
The British, therefore, introduced to Egypt far-reaching fiscal and administrative
reforms that would assure the desired stability and permit the evolution of a
pro-British native elite to prevent 'the fabric we have raised from tumbling
3to the ground the moment our sustaining hand is withdrawn.' Advice and reform 
became the hallmarks of the British presence in Egypt, a presence that sought 
to maintain the reality of British control, while retaining the appearance of 
local autonomy.
Although Gladstone appears to have been sincere in his adherence to the 
policy of 'rescue and retire', he nevertheless failed to achieve his stated aims - 
reform and early withdrawal. Gladstone's Government was unable to deal effect­
ively with both the Egyptian question and the pressures of European diplomacy 
at the same time. This was the result of a split within Liberal ranks over the 
policy of 'rescue and retire', formulated on the grounds of perceived morality. 
Further complicating Britain's position in Egypt was France's denial of consent
1. Granville to Dufferin, November 3, 1882, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LXXXIII
(Accounts and Papers, Vol. XLVI) , Egypt Nc>I 2 (1883) , (C. -3462] , p. 15.
2. Granville to Het Majesty's Representative^ abroad, January 3, 1883, ibid.,
pp. 35-36. This memorandum was drafted on the advice of Lord Cromer.
3. Dufferin to Granville, February 6, 1883, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LXXXIII
(Accounts and Papers, Vol. XLVI) , Egypt No"! 6 (1883) , £c.-3529j , p. 83.
This is part of the Dufferin Report that established the guidelines for 
the British reconstruction of Egypt.
6necessary for administrative and fiscal changes in Egypt, the retention of 
nominal Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt, and, finally, Gladstone's inability to 
deal with Bismarck* Within Egypt, the difficulty of creating a sympathetic pro- 
British class of pashas and then the consequences of the Mahdi's rebellion in 
the Sudan ended hopes of an early British withdrawal.
After Lord Salisbury and the Conservatives formed a government in 1885, the 
policy of 'rescue and retire' was quietly abandoned. The altered international 
situation led to the acceptance by the British government of the long-term occu­
pation of Egypt. Britain, as a result of imperial expansion, lost the insular 
and protected position it had previously enjoyed. Egypt's importance to Britain 
increased as the latter's military supremacy declined. After 1885, the possi­
bility of an alliance by European Powers in opposition to Britain meant that 
Britain was no longer the undisputed mistress of the sea, the sole world power, 
and the only real colonial empire. As a result of the rise of serious rivals, 
control of Egypt now became vital to the well-being of the British Empire. 
However, a final attempt was made to resolve the Egyptian question between 1885 
and 1887. During this period, Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff sought to negotiate on 
behalf of his Government a solution with the Ottoman rulers that would be 
acceptable to Europe. Blocked in this effort by France, the British Government 
finally decided that withdrawal from Egypt was but a distant hope and the 'veiled 
protectorate1 began in earnest. In Salisbury's words: 'I see nothing for it
but to sit still and drift awhile.'^
Salisbury's drift lasted until the outbreak of the First World War, leaving 
Egypt in a vague and ill-defined limbo. Internally, European control of Egypt's 
finances ended and Britain re-established that country's administration on a 
firmer basis. These reforms, however, were mechanistic and did not attempt to 
affect the country's social fabric. One of the main reasons for this approach 
was the bitter memory of Britain's Indian experience and the subsequent Sepoy 
rebellion of 1857.
Externally,Egypt1s formal status also remained ill-defined. Before the
1. Salisbury to Lyons, July 20, 1887, in Lord Thomas W.L. Newton, Lord Lyons: 
A Record of British Diplomacy (London, 1913), II, 409.
7British occupation, Muhammad Ali, ruler of Egypt from 1805 until 1848, and his
heirs had achieved increasing autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman
Empire. After the occupation, Britain, for reasons of international diplomacy,
maintained the fiction of Ottoman sovereignty, the facade of Egyptian autonomy,
and the reality of British control through the British Agent and Consul General
in Cairo, the British Army, the British commander and officers of the Egyptian
Army, and British officials throughout the Egyptian administration. This policy,
devised by Granville, Dufferin and Cromer, Britain's representative in Egypt from
1883 until 1907, gave rise to a relationship between the two countries and a status
1
for Egypt that was described by contemporary jurists as 'peculiar and anomalous,'
2'too anomalous to admit of classification.1 The anomaly of control by Britain
3
and formal sovereignty shared between the Ottoman Sultan and the Egyptian Khedive 
survived until 1914.
There was some pressure for change from within Egypt, particularly after the 
incident at Denshaway in 1906, when a clash between Egyptian peasants and British 
officers on a pigeon hunt, aroused nationalist sentiments throughout the country.
On the surface, however, little changed. Cromer departed from Egypt in that 
same year and moderate British rule was instituted by his ailing successor, Sir 
Eldon Gorst, in the hope that this would secure native sympathies. Still, foreign 
acceptance of British control of Egypt after the Fashoda incident in 189^ and 
the 1904 Entente with France meant that Britain's position in Egypt was relatively 
stable. The start of the First World War strengthened British control and finally 
saw the end of the anomalous relationship when Britain declared Egypt a Protect­
orate in December 1914.
After the end of the war, the years spent by Field Marshal Allenby as British 
High Commissioner in Egypt, 1919-1925, were particularly important. In this 
connection, Allenby's last three years, from the unilateral declaration by Britain
1. Thomas J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (Boston, 1895), p. 71.
2. John Westlake, International Law (Cambridge, 1910), I, 27.
3. For the concept of shared sovereignty, see: Thomas E. Holland, Studies in
International Law (Oxford, 1898), p. 276. One jurist referred to Egypt as
a 'half-Sovereign State.' Lassa F.L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise 
(London, 1912), p. 123.
8of Egypt's independence on February 28, 1922, until Allenby's departure in June 
1925, were critical. Allenby was appointed Special High Commissioner for Egypt 
in March 1919, superseding Sir Reginald Wingate, in order to restore order to 
the country, torn by nationalist inspired rioting. He was appointed because of 
his fierce reputation and his record as a military commander in the East. How­
ever, he quickly adopted a surprisingly moderate policy of compromise. His approach 
was an attempt to blend the reality of power with the appearance of Egyptian 
independence so that Britain's vital interests were safeguarded. It was this policy 
that led Allenby to impose his will on Lloyd George's Government in London and 
force the unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence.
Despite this early success, followed by Egypt's adoption of a modern consti­
tution in 1923, tie end of British martial law imposed during tie war, and the 
British withdrawal from Egypt's internal administration, Allenby's career in Egypt 
ended in seeming frustration. The hope for a solution to Salisbury's dilemma 
through the negotiation of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty by Labour leader, Ramsay 
MacDonald, and Egyptian nationalist, Saad Zaghlul Pasha, friends and Prime Ministers 
of their respective countries in 1924, ended in a welter of recriminations.
Allenby, whose forcefulness led to his appointment in 1919 and the adoption of his 
policy in 1922, left Egypt in 1925 because of his harsh response to the anarchy 
and chaos unleashed by the nationalism he had permitted to develop. The fierce 
Allenby left because of growing concern in a never friendly Foreign Office that 
he was a weak and vacillating representative, who showed firmness only when dealing 
with the British Government.
In 1882, Lord Granville indicated the following goals of British policy in
Egypt: '...the three obj ects should be not to throw away the advantages we have
gained, to avoid any just accusation of having abandoned our pledges, and to enlist
1the sympathies of the Egyptians with us and not against us.' These goals con­
tinued to guide the British for the next forty years and were held dear by the 
British officials in Egypt and the Government in London from 1922 to 1925.
However, it was their translation into concrete and specific policies that resulted 
in frequent and bitter clashes between the British in Cairo and in London, and,
1. Granville to Harcourt, September 18, 1882, in Ronald Robinson and John
Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The' Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 
1961) , p.123.
■9
in the final analysis, it was the attempt to reconcile these possibly conflicting 
goals amidst the new realities of the post-war world that caused the apparent 
failure of Allenby's mission in Egypt.
The aim of this work is to answer some of the questions that have been 
raised by the formulation of Britain's policy towards Egypt during the years 
1922-1925, when once again there was an attempt to regularise Anglo-Egyptian 
relations so that British interests, pledges and support in Egypt could be recon­
ciled. Towards this end, there will be an examination of the factors affecting 
Britain's policy in three related areas: the environment - the approaches and
perceptions of policy? the balance and tensions between the High Commissioner 
and his Residency staff in Cairo and the British government in London; and, 
finally, the interaction of these elements with events in Egypt, particularly 
the struggle between the nationalist forces, led by Zaghlul Pasha, and the 
Egyptian King, Ahmad Fuad.
The basic questions which this work will seek to answer are how was British 
policy formulated in the crucial years immediately following the declaration 
of nominal Egyptian independence, why did the expectations for a final resolution 
of the Egyptian question end in failure, and to what extent did the differences 
between the British in Cairo and in London influence policy and affect its outcome? 
This somewhat artificial albeit useful framework of analysis - the environment 
of policy, the balance between Cairo and London, and the interaction of these 
with the course of events - will, it is hoped, provide the basis for understanding 
the origins and development of Britain's policy towards Egypt after the First 
World War.
PART ONE: THE ENVIRONMENT OF POLICY
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CHAPTER ONE: THE EMERGENCE OF CAIRO
British policy towards Egypt during the first years of her independence was 
ambiguous and at times confused. Rather than being the product of a clear pur­
suit of well-defined objectives, it was a reaction to events and processes often 
beyond the control of the British government in London.
However, not only was the substance of policy uncertain, but also the man­
ner in which it was conceived appeared confused. Britain's policy during Lord 
Allenby's tenure as High Commissioner in Cairo could no longer be considered in 
the usual unitary terms, that is, nominally formulated within the confines of 
Whitehall and executed by the government's representative in Egypt.
An element of bipolarity was increasingly introduced into policy formulation. 
The ascendance of London since World War I in the determination of policy slowly 
declined. At the same time, the British authorities in Cairo attained a position 
in policy formulation that approached and at times equalled that of London.
These two separate and often rival foci of power radically altered the mechanics 
of policy formulation for Egypt.
This development poses two questions the answers to which are vital to an 
understanding of the evolution of Britain's Egyptian policy. First, what were 
the circumstances that enabled the formation of rival foci of power in Cairo and 
London? Second, in what way was the determination of policy affected by the 
emergence of Cairo and these twin spheres of authority?
Allenby's Appointment as High Commissioner
The central figure within the British establishment in Egypt was the High
Commissioner. This position was created after the declaration of Great Britain's
1
protectorate over Egypt on December 19, 1914, and had a dual function. The 
High Commissioner represented Britain’s civil authority in Egypt and, at the same
1. Before the declaration of the protectorate the British representative in 
Egypt was the Agent and Consul-General who enjoyed only informal albeit 
immense authority. For details on the declaration of the protectorate and 
subsequent changes in Egypt, see: Lord Lloyd^George Ambrose!, Egypt Since
Cromer (London, 1933-4), I, 205ff.
11
time, he advised the British government, through the Foreign Office, of develop­
ments there. He was in theory a subordinate official without any independent 
locus standi. He was appointed by the authorities in Whitehall and generally 
subject to their will.
There was little divergence between theory and practice until the appointment 
of General Sir Edmund Hynman Allenby on March 20, 1919 as Special High Commissioner 
for Egypt and the Sudan. Within a few days of Allenby's appointment the exist­
ing relationship between the Foreign Office and the British representative in 
Egypt already begun to show signs of change. Eventually Allenby's authority 
as High Commissioner rivalled that enjoyed by Lord Cromer in the early days of 
the British occupation of Egypt. In order to understand the basis of Allenby's 
position in Egypt, it is necessary to consider the circumstances surrounding his 
appointment.
One of the earliest indications that Allenby had a part to play in the 
administration of the post-war Middle East came six weeks before the end of the 
1914-1918 war while Allenby was actively pursuing his campaign in Syria. Lord 
Curzon at the Foreign Office wrote to a colleague that if a Middle East depart­
ment were to be established in the Foreign Office, then Allenby should have a 
1role m  it. This role, however, was seen only in general terms and there was 
no sign at this stage that within a few months he would supersede the then High 
Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Reginald Wingate,
By January 1919, when Wingate's recall to London was being considered,
2Allenby was mentioned as a possible successor to the High Commissioner. However,
only a month before his appointment in Egypt, Allenby was still serving as
General Officer Commanding (G.O.C.) the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (E.E.F.) 
and as Commander-in-Chief of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (O.E.T.A.) 
in the Middle East. It was in this capacity that he was ordered to come to 
Paris to advise the British ministers at the Peace Conference since he could
1. Curzon to Lord Robert Cecil, September 29, 1918, BM, Cecil Papers, add.51077.
2. Robert Cecil wrote to Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, that 'I spoke to the
P.M. & suggested that if Wingate was recalled Allenby would be a suitable
successor. This he warmly approved & so did the C.I.G.S. to whom I mentioned 
it confidentially. But the P.M. wanted nothing done which would preclude 
Wingate's return to Egypt if that were decided on.' Cecil to Balfour, Janu­
ary 4, 1919, Balfour Papers, FO/800/215.
12
'speak with more authority about Syria, Palestine and Turkish questions generally 
than anybody else.'"'’
While the British government was occupied with the negotiations in Paris 
and Allenby was travelling to Europe, the political situation in Egypt deteriora­
ted. In the early part of the war Egypt enjoyed relative peace and prosperity.
Order was maintained by the British forces and by the judicious use of martial
law declared on November 2, 1914.
During the final years of the war, however, this peace was uneasy at best.
There was growing resentment over British wartime demands and impositions. Al­
though Britain had formally accepted 'exclusive responsibility for the defence 
2
of Egypt1 during the war, recruiting for the ancillary Labour Corps and Camel 
Transport Corps was instituted in 1917. Widespread collections in the provinces 
for the Red Cross Fund and attendant abuses added to local resentment. Further­
more, over the years the number of British officials serving in Egypt had 
increased. This resulted from the declaration of the protectorate which gave 
Britain a greater role in the country's administration. The rise in the number 
of officials was accompanied by a decline in their quality and this did little
3
to endear the protectorate or the 'protectors' to the Egyptians. The situation
at this point was volatile and little was required to translate aimless general
resentment into specific political unrest.
Within a week of the war's conclusion, a deputation of Egyptian nationalists
led by Sa'ad Zaghlul Pasha called on the British High Commissioner, Sir Reginald
4Wingate, on November 17, 1918. The deputation presented Wingate with a
1. P.H. Kerr to Lloyd George, February 28, 1919, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/89/2/34.
2. See the text of the Declaration of the Protectorate, Lloyd, op.cit., I, 376-9.
3. For details of the British administration of Egypt during the war and politi­
cal difficulties, see: Janice Terry, Sir Reginald Wingate as High Commis­
sioner in Egypt (Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1968), pp.77-114; and 
Lloyd, op.cit., I, 234-47. For criticism levelled against the quality of 
British officials during the war, see: Report of the Special Mission to
Egypt, March 3, 1920, FO/371/6295, pp.5-6.
4. This short description of the events leading up to the crisis of March 1919
is based largely on a paper prepared for the War Cabinet by Ronald Graham of
the Foreign Office: Rfpnald]]. G[raham]j., Note on the Unrest in Egypt,
162/6/5; and, Sir Reginald Wingate, Rough Note to Foreicrn Office, 3rd April, 
1919, SAD, Wingate Papers, 162/2.
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programme for Egypt's independence and requested permission to travel to Britain 
to confer with the British government. This request was curtly refused by the 
Foreign Office, now engaged in preparations for the Peace Conference. Then a 
similar request for permission to travel to London was made by the Egyptian 
Prime Minister, Husayn Rushdi Pasha. This, too, was refused and resulted in the 
resignation of the Egyptian government on December 5.
Disturbances quickly spread throughout Egypt. At the beginning of January 
1919 Wingate was directed to return to London to explain the situation to the 
Cabinet. Sir Milne Cheetham, Counsellor at the Residency, remained in Cairo as 
the Acting High Commissioner. Upon his arrival in London, Wingate urged that 
the nationalists be permitted to travel to Europe. Arthur Balfour, the British 
Foreign Secretary, considered these recommendations while in Paris and on Febru­
ary 26 agreed that the Egyptian ministerial delegation be permitted to come to 
London. Permission, however, was not extended to the nationalist deputation 
since it was feared that this would legitimise its unofficial standing and provide 
unwarranted sanction for its programme.
Ahmad Fuad, the Sultan of Egypt, was informed of Balfour's decision on
March 2. The Egyptian ministry, however, persisted in its resignation which was
accepted by the Sultan. Nevertheless the Residency in Cairo reported that the
situation was improving. It was believed that the nationalist camp was divided
and its popularity on the wane. Then, on March 6, Sir Milne Cheetham informed
the Foreign Office that Zaghlul was seeking to prevent the formation of a new
government. Moreover, the nationalists had warned the Sultan in ominous tones of
the consequences of following the advice of the Residency. The Sultan was shaken
by these veiled threats and Cheetham, together with his advisers, felt that
Zaghlul should be arrested and deported immediately. The arrest and deportation
of Zaghlul and three other nationalist leaders**" on March 7, according to one
observer, 'transformed Egypt from a scene of peace to a welter of anarchy and 
, 2rapine.'
This was the situation with which the British cabinet was faced only a few 
days before Allenby was due to arrive in Paris, Throughout the final stages of
1. These four soon came to be known as the 'Four Pashas'. They were Sa1 ad
Zaghlul, Ismail Sidqi, Muhammad Mahmud and Hamid al-Bassal.
2. R.G., op.cit., p.4.
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this crisis Sir Reginald Wingate to his dismay and later bitterness*** was relegated 
to a secondary role. With the rapid deterioration of the situation in Egypt,
Lord Curzon, who was at the Foreign Office in Balfour's absence, cabled him in 
Paris that:
Had Allenby been in Egypt I should have placed him in full charge.
But I understand that he arrives in Paris tomorrow and will not be 
free to return for a few days. Will you consult with him, as to 
steps to be taken.2
The situation in Egypt grew steadily worse and on March 17 Cheetham cabled 
that it had become necessary to abandon Upper Egypt and its inhabitants to the
3
rioters. Allenby appeared to be the only available figure who could deal with 
the uprising. Thoroughly alarmed by the situation, Curzon urged that Allenby's 
'business in Paris should be expedited and that he should be able to leave for
4
Egypt by the end of the week.' Allenby's military experience in the East and
1. Indicative of the British government's general loss of confidence in Wingate
were the comments of the powerful Conservative leader, Bonar Law, that 
'Wingate makes a poor impression and I would have no faith whatever in his 
judgment.' Bonar Law to Lloyd George, April 3, 1919, BLL, Lloyd George 
Papers, F/30/3/42. Wingate was extremely bitter over his relegation to a
secondary role and his eventual replacement by Allenby in October 1919. In
reply to Curzon's letters informing him of Allenby's permanent appointment as 
High Commissioner, Wingate wrote that 'I do not consider the reasons given in 
your official letter for my treatment are, in any sense, a justification for 
the manner in which I - as His Majesty's accredited Representative in Egypt - 
have been removed from my post.' Wingate to Curzon, October 4, 1919, SAD, 
Wingate Papers, 162/4. Wingate feared that the public would feel that "'poor
Wingate has been a failure - he did well in the past - Egypt was evidently
too much for him."1 Wingate to Milner, October 12, 1919, loc.cit. For some 
justification of these fears, see the leader in the Times, March 25, 1919.
2. Curzon to Balfour, March 16, 1919, Tel.No. 307, FO/371/3714.
3. Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 17, 1919, Tel.No. 403, FO/371/3714.
4. Curzon to Balfour, March 19,1919, Tel.No. 328, FO/371/3714. Throughout this
period there appears to have been a considerable gap between events in Egypt 
and the reaction to them in London. Several writers have noted that General 
Bulfin had the situation well in hand when Allenby arrived in Egypt on March 
25. See: Brian Gardner, Allenby (London, 1965), p.220; and, Lloyd, op.cit.,
I, 299-300. This gap was due to the fact that the telegraph wires had been 
cut by rioters causing delays in the receipt of messages in London.
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the belief that 'he was the kind of tough soldier, known to the army as "the
Bull", who would stand no nonsense,'1 made him seem ideally suited for the job.
Curzon was supported in this view by other senior members of the Foreign Office
who felt that Allenby's military background and his enormous personal prestige
2would enable him to cope with the situation where others had failed. Consequent­
ly on March 20, 191% Allenby began his journey to Cairo as the Special High 
Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan.
Allenby's Authority
From this schematic description of the events leading to Allenby's appoint­
ment, three major factors emerge indicating the source of his formidable authority 
from the outset of his tenure as High Commissioner.
In the first place Allenby's appointment came as a reaction to a situation 
which was believed to be completely out of hand. This meant that he was granted 
wide-ranging powers made very clear in the letter of appointment cabled to him 
while en route to Egypt:
You are directed to exercise supreme authority in all matters Military 
and Civil, to take all such measures as you consider necessary and ex­
pedient to restore law and order in those countries []Egypt and the 
Sudan]], and to order and administer in all matters as may be required 
by the necessity of maintaining the King's Protectorate over Egypt on 
a secure and equable basis.^
Given the circumstances of Allenby's appointment and the mandate that he had, the 
advice of the new British representative in Egypt would carry enormous weight and 
could only be ignored at great risk. Allenby was therefore afforded freedom of 
action which his immediate predecessors, such as McMahon and Wingate, appointed 
under different circumstances, did not enjoy.
The second reason for Allenby's great authority was his unique official
1. A. Duff Cooper ^Viscount Norwich]] , Old Men Forget: The Autobiography of
Duff Cooper (London, 1953), p.101. Duff Cooper, a member of the Foreign 
Office, soon joined the Egyptian Section of the Eastern Department.
2. Support in particular came from Lord Robert Cecil and Ronald Graham. Lt. 
Col. G.S. Symes to Wingate, March 12, 13 and 18, 1919, SAD, Wingate Papers, 
172/5. For the reasons given to Wingate, see: Balfour to Wingate, March
25, 1919, SAD, Wingate Papers, 237/3.
3. Curzon to Allenby, March 21, 1919, enclair, FO/371/3714.
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position within the British hierarchy in Egypt. When Allenby assumed the High 
Commissioner’s office he was not asked to relinquish his command of the British 
forces in Egypt, On the contrary, 'it was thought essential for the restoration 
of public order and the suppression of organised violence that full civil and 
military authority should be concentrated in the hand of a single individual.'^ 
Throughout the war authority in Egypt had been shared. The High Commissioner 
was charged with the civil administration of the country? the British military 
forces were directed and martial law was administered by the G.O.C. E.E.F. in 
Cairo. Although this partnership was amicable enough, it nonetheless detracted 
from the authority of the High Commissioner, especially when it was necessary to 
divert manpower and resources from civil to military needs. The amalgamation
of civil and military authority gave Allenby obvious power. It also increased
\
his standing vis-a-vis London since the advice of the High Commissioner now
automatically bore the imprimatur of the military authorities and could not be
easily gainsaid.
Finally, Allenby was chosen as the Special High Commissioner not because of
his reputation as a successful administrator or as a diplomatist who could deal
with a delicate political situation. He was appointed because of his enormous
personal prestige as a military commander, as the conqueror of Jerusalem. This
enhanced his official position enabling him to take whatever measures he felt
the situation required. In fact if there was any doubt about his appointment, it
was precisely because it was feared that he might turn out to be 'too fierce'
2
for Egypt.
1. Curzon to Wingate, October 2, 1919, SAD, Wingate Papers, 162/4.
2. Curzon to Balfour, March 29, 1919, Balfour Papers, FO/800/215. P.G. Elgood, 
an inspector in the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, wrote that 'there 
were some who questioned the wisdom, at so critical a point, in the rela­
tions of Great Britain with Egypt, of appointing a soldier to the post of 
High Commissioner.' P.G. Elgood, Egypt and the Army (London, 1924), p.350. 
Hardinge, the British ambassador in Paris, for this very reason opposed the 
appointment of a strong figure like Allenby because 'the necessity for a 
skilled diplomatist and administrator to deal with a very difficult and com­
plicated situation.' C.H. Hardinge, Old Diplomacy (London, 1947), p.234.
Cf. Sir Valentine Chirol, The Egyptian Problem (London, 1920), p.190. In 
Egypt, however, some believed that Allenby's appointment presaged a dramatic 
change in British policy. For example, one long-time resident wrote that: 
'England was in a quandc?^...A new policy should be tried. The man chosen 
to carry it into effect was Lord Allenby.' Mabel Caillard, A Lifetime in 
Egypt, 1876-1935 (London, 1935), p.211.
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For the authorities in London^Allenby1s personal reputation and official 
position were assets within the purely Egyptian context. However, in the event 
of conflict between Cairo and London, Allenby's standing would make him a 
formidable opponent.
Allenby's First Clash With London
When Allenby arrived in Cairo on March 25, 1919, his first step was to 
assert the authority that had been granted him. On the evening after his arrival 
he stated his intentions to a group of Egyptians assembled at the Residency:
First, to bring the present disturbances to an end.
Secondly, to make careful inquiry into all matters which have 
caused discontent in the country.
Thirdly, to redress such grievances as appear justifiable.!
Although the disturbances which had brought Allenby back to Egypt were by now
well under control, this was an unusually moderate approach for a general who
had been appointed because of his martial qualities.
It is true that Allenby's outward manner was almost a caricature of the
front-line general. It has been described by his admiring official biographer
2as often 'gruff and abrupt,' characteristics which may have contributed to his 
reputation for being inarticulate at conferences. His notorious temper and 
impatience added to the legend of Allenby, 1 the Bull,' and was the source of much 
of his difficulty when he fought in Europe during the war. Junior officers said 
of this descendant of Oliver Cromwell that 'to be told off...was like being 
blown from the muzzle of a gun which, however, when you regained the ground,
3
seemed to bear you no malice.' Allenby, however, was by no means the simple 
figure that his rough and ponderous demeanour might indicate. His victories in 
the East often overshadow the fact that he served for many years as a staff 
officer when he learned that preparation and caution are cardinal principles of
1. A.P. Wavell, Allenby in Egypt (London, 1943), p.43.
2. Ibid., p.16.
3. Sir Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London, 1945), p.256. Two of Allenby's 
biographers have pointed to his impatience and temper as the great flaws in 
his character. Later events in Egypt appear to bear this out. Gardner, op. 
cit., pp.77, 177; and, Wavell, op.cit., p.20.
18
command.^ In addition, although he did not hesitate to take strong measures if
he thought them appropriate, Allenby was not like those rigid generals of the
2
trenches to whom the excessive use of troops was second nature.
Finally, Allenby's one previous experience in civilian administration as 
head of the O.E.T.A. in the Middle East, indicates his approach in dealing with 
government authorities. While he demanded instant obedience from his subordi­
nates, he had no qualms about ignoring unacceptable instructions from his own 
superiors. A striking example of this was his open disregard of Foreign Office
3
directives regarding the implementation of the Balfour Declaration in Palestine. 
This should have been an indication of the attitude Allenby might adopt as High 
Commissioner in Egypt.
The first indication that Cairo and London might differ on the measures re­
quired for the pacification of Egypt became evident within a few days of 
Allenby's arrival. Since the disturbances were well under control, Allenby turned 
his attention to the political issue that had precipitated the riots: travel to
Britain by the nationalists. Its solution was the first test of strength between 
Allenby and the Foreign Office.
Curzon, who in effect was serving as Foreign Secretary, was from the start 
adamantly opposed to granting permission since this would be 'yielding to force
4
when persuasion had failed of its effect.1 After the outbreak of widespread
rioting, Wingate, now in London, also felt that the authorities in Egypt 'must
5on no account give way to the violence of the Nationalists.' However, in Egypt
1. In a note for a talk on his principles as a commander, the first on his list 
was 'thorough preparation,' Cited in Gardner, op.cit., p.195.
2. Allenby's willingness to be harsh when necessary can be seen in his later
comment to Wingate that 'the execution of the Mamour of Assiut has had a
really good effect.' Allenby to Wingate, June 22, 1919, SAD, Wingate Papers, 
151/5. On the other hand, his general reluctance to use force excessively
is seen in the delay in calling out troops in the Alexandria riots of 1921 
which he explained on the grounds of not wanting 1 to interfere with my troops 
unless the life, limb or interests of Europeans are in danger.' Allenby to 
his mother, May 21, 1921, cited in Wavell, op.cit.*, p.54.
3. For details of Allenby's approach during this period see the comments of
Major-General Sir Arthur Money, the Chief Administrator for O.E.T.A. Money 
to A.P. Wavell, December 27, 1936, STAC, Allenby Papers.
4. Curzon to Cheetham, March 17, 1919, Tel. No. 349, FO/371/3714. Also, see: 
Curzon to Balfour, March 16, 1919, Tel. No. 307, FO/371/3714.
5. Wingate Note, February 3, 1922, SAD, Wingate Papers, 162/1. Also, see:
Wingate to Hardinge, March 23, 1919, CUL, Hardinge Papers, Vol. 40; and,
Note by Wingate on Situation in Egypt, March 21, 1919, FO/371/3714.
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Sir Milne Cheetham, the British advisors and the military authorities believed
that permission 'is the only solution which in general estimate would be 
1successful.1 Thus when it was necessary for Allenby to adopt a course of action
he was confronted by the traditional divergence between London and Cairo based
on local considerations. Allenby chose the moderate course counselled by his 
advisors and opposed by London. In a cable that revealed his approach to the 
difficulties in Egypt, Allenby wrote on March 31:
I propose with your convenience to issue passports to any respec­
table Egyptians who may wish to visit Europe, without reference to
colour of their requirements...
I have shown I can repress agitation and action which I propose to 
take will have good effect.2
This telegram resulted in a flurry of cables to Balfour in Paris. With the 
support of senior Foreign Office officials, an agitated Curzon wrote to Balfour 
on April 1 that Allenby did not understand the situation and that his advice
3
should not be accepted. Balfour replied that the 'Prime Minister and I are of 
the opinion that (? as) Allenby was appointed Special High Commissioner of Egypt 
to deal with the situation there his advice cannot be disregarded.1 He then
added that 'it is important to avoid any appearance of mistrusting his present
4 5policy.' Although Curzon attempted to have the question reviewed, and sought
0
the support of Andrew Bonar Law, the dispute inevitably resolved in Allenby's
favour. On April 5, Allenby received formal confirmation that his policy had
been fully accepted together with an expression of the Prime Minister's confidence 
7
in his judgment.
1. Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 19, 1919, Tel. No. 408, FO/371/3714. For
other expressions of support see: Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 15, 1919,
Tel. No. 393, FO/371/3714.
2. Allenby to Foreign Office, March 31, 1919, Tel. No. 4-65 , FO/371/3714.
3. Curzon to Balfour, April 1, 1919, Balfour Papers, FO/80D/216.
4. Balfour to Curzon, April 2, 1919, Tel. No. 621, FO/371/3714.
5. Curzon to Balfour, April 3, 1919; and, Curzon to Balfour, April 4, 1919,
FO/80Q/216.
6. Bonar Law did not agree that 'Allenby's proposal is fatal.1 Bonar Law to
Balfour, April 3, 1919, Balfour Papers, FO/800/216. For details of the meet­
ing between Curzon, Ronald Graham, Wingate and Bonar Law, see: Bonar Law to
Lloyd George, April 4, 1919, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/30/3/42.
7. Foreign Office to Allenby, April 5, 1919, Tel. No. 427, FO/371/3714.
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Allenby's victory over the Foreign Office was strongly resented. The gene­
ral feeling was that they had been deceived by Allenby and his fearsome reputation.
Curzon wrote to the Prime Minister that 'Allenby's policy has landed us in a very
2
serious position.' He was supported in this attxtude by hxs staff at the 
Foreign Office.
The question, however, is not whether Allenby's was the correct policy but 
rather what it presaged. As a result of the circumstances surrounding the 
appointment of the Special High Commissioner and due to his personal standing,
Cairo began to emerge as a major factor in policy formulation. This test of 
strength pointed to Allenby's appreciation of his position and the approach he 
would often adopt regarding the Egyptian question. This first round was thus 
extremely important as it defined the lines of future contention and was an in­
dication of Cairo's position in relation to the authorities in London.
The British in Cairo; Hierarchy and Structure
Allenby was sent to Egypt in answer to pressing military needs. Still, his 
major function was essentially civil. This was both true before and after 
Britain's unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence on February 28, 1922.
His responsibilities were administrative and diplomatic. He dealt, within de­
fined limits and depending upon the circumstances, with internal Egyptian affairs. 
At the same time, he was charged with the formulation of general proposals and 
the implementation of British policy. In the execution of these duties, the 
composition, organisational structure, and attitudes of Allenby's staff were ex­
tremely important in determining his approach to London and to Egypt.
The British officials who assisted the High Commissioners in Egypt, and the 
British Consuls-General before them, did not constitute a monolithic organisation
1. Hardinge to Sir B. Lucknow, April 23, 1919, CUL, Hardinge Papers, Vol. 40.
Hardinge later wrote of Allenby that '... it was imagined by Lloyd George that 
in him he had found a strong man....No greater mistake was ever made.' Har­
dinge, loc. cit. There is some evidence that Allenby later regretted this 
particular instance of leniency on travel by the nationalists. Lord Milner 
wrote on December 28, 1919 in the diary of his Mission to Egypt that 'I 
found Allenby rather reluctant to take my suggestions as he argued, not with­
out force, that when he had shown clemency in the past it had been taken as 
a sign of weakness.' BLO, Milner Papers, Box 290/p.83.
2. Curzon to Lloyd George, April 15, 1919, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/12/1/16.
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with sharply drawn lines of authority and areas of responsibility. The High 
Commissioners advisors comprised several groups, some clearly defined and others 
amorphous. They had different origins, at times unrelated functions, and hence 
divergent modes of approach and operation. They were bound primarily in their 
service of Britain's interests and were headed, officially or otherwise, by the 
High Commissioner who stood at the apex of the local British hierarchy.
Generally speaking, the British officials could be divided into two broad 
groups: those formally attached to the office of the High Commissioner and col­
lectively known as ’the Residency1; and, those employed by the Egyptian govern­
ment as advisers to or officials in the various Egyptian ministries. Both
groups constituted the general body that assisted the High Commissioner in
1
carrying out his functions.
The more clearly defined group was the Residency staff. They were to some 
extent analogous with the staff that served in other British diplomatic or con­
sular missions. They were drawn from the ranks of the foreign service, often 
with previous diplomatic experience in other countries. Although their standing 
was diplomatic or consular, and their theoretical function was to assist the 
head of the Mission, their responsibilities went beyond this. To the extent 
that the sphere of authority of the British representative in Egypt exceeded that 
of an ordinary diplomatic representative, the duties of the Residency staff also 
exceeded those of their counterparts in other chanceries.
Sir Milne Cheetham broadly described the functions of the Residency offi­
cials during the tenure of two earlier consuls-general in the following words:
Both Lord Kitchener and Sir E. Gorst...encouraged their staff to 
deal with the affairs of the whole administration, as they were 
at one time or another referred to the Agency. A number of these 
affairs would indeed be treated almost entirely between the Coun­
sellor and the administrative official concerned, the result being 
submitted to the Consul-General in the form of a draft or verbal 
communication.2
1. Much of the material used in this discussion of the structure and develop­
ment of the British hierarchy in Egypt is taken from an unsigned and undated 
Residency memorandum found among the papers of Sir Reginald Wingate. From 
internal evidence it is clear that this ten-paged document was composed by 
Sir Milne Cheetham, the wartime Counsellor of the Residency, sometime in 
1917. (The document is hereafter referred to as the Cheetham Memorandum). 
Unsigned Memorandum, SAD, Wingate Papers, 151/1.
2. Cheetham Memorandum, pp.1-2.
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The Counsellor and the Head of the Chancery were the senior members of the 
official establishment. They were the avenues of approach to the British re­
presentative and had extensive authority. In the course of their work they 
'drafted nearly all the correspondence to the Foreign Office, wrote reports, in­
terviewed officials and other visitors.1'*’ Foreign Office officials who served
in the Residency enjoyed a degree of administrative authority unknown in other 
diplomatic missions and had functions that were largely inconsonant with their 
professional background. Nonetheless they remained by virtue of their training 
and experience members of a Service that had few roots in Egypt itself.
The second group assisting the High Commissioner consisted of the British 
officials in the Egyptian civil service. The origins of this group on the whole 
differed from those of the Residency staff, and the functions of its members, 
though related in general purpose to that of the official establishment, diverged 
in several important respects.
This group had its beginnings in the early days of the British occupation of
Egypt in 1882. At that time it was deemed necessary to import experts to re­
constitute many areas of Egypt's internal administration and to appoint advisers 
to supervise vital ministries such as Interior, Finance and Justice. The first
2
officials to arrive were Anglo-Indian civil servants brought to Egypt by Cromer. 
From 1902 onwards such positions were filled from the ranks of British univer- 
sities through the Appointments Committees at Oxford, Cambridge and Trinity/T*or
3
the Selection Board at the Ministry of Finance in Cairo. The ministerial advisers
1 • Ibid., p .2.
2. For details of the impact of the Anglo-Indian officials on Egypt see: Roger
Owen, 'The Influence of Lord Cromer's Indian Experience on British Policy in
Egypt, 1883-1907,' St. Anthony1s Papers, XVII (1965), pp.109-139.
3. For details, see: Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Services, Information to Can­
didates in Financial Adviser's Office, Cairo to Foreign Office, July 19, 1906,
FO/371/67? R.L. Tignor, The Modernization of Egypt and British Colonial Rule
in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, 1966), pp.l85ff; and, H.E. Bowman, Middle 
East Window (London, 1942), pp.38 and 109-10. Also, see the comments of
W. Allard who served in Egypt: W. Allard to A.L. Odell, November 29, 1967,
STAC, Allard Papers. For certain higher-ranking positions, such as some of 
the adviserships, and Under-Secretaryships, it was necessary at times to go 
outside the Egyptian civil service and find qualified appointees closely con­
nected with the British Foreign Office. Cheetham Memorandum, pp.8-9.
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were the most prominent members of this group. Next in importance were the 
permanent heads of the various departments, the Under-Secretaries, and then the 
various British officials employed in a technical capacity. The function of all 
the officials, at whatever level, was essentially administrative or executive.
They either ’advised1 the ministry or they held an executive position within it.
Though there was close cooperation between the two groups of British offi­
cials in resolving major administrative questions, often without reference to the 
relevant Egyptian ministers, they differed in their approach. The senior British 
members of the Egyptian civil service were inevitably influenced by their tech­
nical training and their experience in Egypt. Hence their frame of reference 
was far narrower than that of their compatriots in the Residency. A stable 
balance was maintained between these two groups because the three British repre­
sentatives in Egypt between 1882 and 1914 - Cromer, Gorst and Kitchener, had wide 
experience in Egyptian affairs or powerful personalities.
During the 1914-18 War the balance between the British officials and the 
Residency staff underwent a change to the detriment of the latter. The general 
reasons for the diminished importance of the Residency were given as 'the result 
of the war, of the diminution of civil business, of the dislocation of ordinary 
administrative relations and of the transfer of interest and activity to new and 
semi-militarized departments.1'*' There were, however, far more specific and 
immediate reasons for the need to rely more heavily on the British advisers and 
the officials in the Egyptian civil service.
The first signs of change in the organisation of the British hierarchy in
Egypt came a few months after Sir Henry McMahon was appointed High Commissioner
in December 1914. Unlike his predecessors, McMahon, who served for many years
2in India, had no knowledge of Egyptian affairs. Therefore he was forced to 
depend on his staff and advisers for local expertise, and turned for assistance 
mainly to the most experienced group of British officials in Egypt - the advisers.
1. Ibid., p .4.
2. Kitchener, then High Commissioner, was in London at the outbreak of war and 
was appointed Minister for War for the duration of hostilities. Since it was 
thought that the war would soon be over, Kitchener wanted to keep his posi­
tion in Egypt open and thus McMahon's appointment was only a stopgap measure. 
For details see: E. Kedourie, 'Saad Zaghlul and the British,1 St. Antony's 
Papers, XI (1961), p.144.
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Consequently, McMahon quickly decentralised Residency control of Egyptian affairs 
thus enhancing the position of the local British officials. This meant that
...the British heads of the various Ministries were in the future 
to be more completely responsible for the actions of their De­
partments. Reference to the High Commissioner was apparently to 
be ^ frequent and his control less personal and faasreaching than 
that of the Consuls-General who preceded him. In the case of 
correspondence with the Foreign Office it was laid down in one 
instance that matter to be forwarded should reach the Residency 
in its final form.^
The increased responsibilities of officials outside the High Commissioner’s
staff resulted in a drastic change in the work of the Residency staff who, until
then, had overall charge of Egyptian affairs. Members of the Residency now
found themselves relegated 'to clerical duties and registration, cyphering,
archives etc., and not expected to be interested in departmental business or in-
2formed of its details.1 Cheetham, the Residency Counsellor, complained that he 
was ’relegated to a distinctly more subordinate and less active post, and hence­
forth little informed of and hardly ever consulted with regard to issued^sicj 
of first class importance,1^  The same was true of the Chancery secretaries whose 
duties now were of a purely formal character with little real responsibility.
This meant that to a large extent the High Commissioner's local policy would be 
determined by advisers who were 'Egyptian' in their background rather than 
Foreign Office.
There are a number of other reasons for the rising importance of the British 
advisers and officials. These were relevant after the war as well.
In the first place, the Foreign Office staff at the Residency often served 
in Egypt for only short periods of time and were unable to acquire sufficient 
local experience in order to function effectively. This was a problem from the 
start of the British occupation and Ronald Storrs, the wartime Oriental Secretary 
in Cairo, noted that
Lord Cromer and succeeding Consuls General were assisted in their 
tasks by Diplomats from the Foreign Office endowed with varying 
degrees of zeal and ability; but these were wandering stars, at
1. Cheetham Memorandum, p .5.
3. Ibid., p .3
2. Ibid., p .1.
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any moment liable to shoot or be shot from the Egyptian firmament.
If this was a serious problem during the tenure of experienced men like Cromer
and his immediate successors, it posed insurmountable difficulties for McMahon.
This flaw in the Residency system was acknowledged even by those officials who
wished to return to the pre-war balance between advisers and Foreign Office 
2staff. The lack of Residency personnel with adequate local experience continued
to be a problem throughout the war and in the early post-war years. In fact
this was the reason that the Milner Mission later recommended the reorganisation
of the Residency, the chief aim of which ’should be to ensure continuity, and
the constant presence...of an adequate number of men of local knowledge and 
,3experience.1
Brief tenure, however, was not the only reason for the Residency system 
falling into disrepair. The second important factor was the poor organisation of 
work. There was no consistency in the allocation of issues to specific individu­
als. Residency officials were thus unable to familiarise themselves adequately 
with given local areas. The effect of this, according to Storrs, 'was sometimes
4
trying for the Residency; for the Administration it was maddening.' Sir 
Henry McMahon in testifying before the British Cabinet’s Egyptian Administration 
Committee in 1917 on the problems he faced, gave the reasons for turning to the 
British advisers and 'explained to the Committee the difficulties he himself en­
countered owing to the absence at the Residency of records and precedents, as
5
also the inexpert and transitory character of the official staff.’
There was little change with the appointment of Sir Reginald Wingate as High 
Commissioner at the end of 1916. Wihgate had had virtually no experience in Egypt.
1. Storrs, op.cit., pp.58-9; cf., Chirol, op.cit., pp.207-8.
2. Cheetham Memorandum, p.10. Also, see a paraphrase of Tel. No. 159 (undated)
from Cheetham to the Foreign Office on the need for experienced personnel in 
the senior Residency positions. SAD, Wingate Papers, 162/5.
3. Report of the Special Mission to Egypt, March 3, 1920, FO/371/3714, p.5.
4. Storrs, op.cit., p.143.
5. Draft Report of the Egyptian Administration Committee, October 1917, p.4, in
PCL, Storrs Papers, II/4. Storrs was the Committee Secretary.
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Most of his work had been in the Sudan where he had been Governor-General since 
1899. His ignorance of local Egyptian affairs was telling. According to one 
close observer, he was 'for all his knowledge, somewhat staggered by the depth 
and complexities of the eddies and cross currents of the Lower Nile.'^ By the 
time Wingate had arrived in Egypt the British advisers and officials had consoli­
dated their position and Wingate's term was marked by his unsuccessful attempt
2
to bring them under control.
When Allenby came to Egypt as Special High Commissioner, the process which
had begun with McMahon continued unabated. Initially the impact of the advisers
with their specialist knowledge and experience was great. Allenby's only previous
experience in civilian administration was during his command of the O.E.T.A. in
the Middle East and then only for a few months. His total lack of experience in
the internal organisation of Egypt, his wartime administration of martial law
notwithstanding, increased the need for expert assistance. Allenby's military
training did not present any obstacle to the delegation of executive authority.
In factpAllenby, the staff officer, was considered 'a delegator supreme' and the
extent to which he relied on his staff in wartime was at times a source of con-
3siderable surprise and some criticism.
Reliance on staff was not limited to military affairs alone but was charac­
teristic of Allenby's brief administration of civil affairs in Palestine. After 
Allenby's decision to disregard Foreign Office instructions regarding the 
Balfour Declaration, he gave his chief aide, General Money, what amounted to a 
carte blanche in the latter's dealings with London. Money later wrote that 'the 
Chief told me that he would sign any letter that I drafted for him; and that in
case of urgency I could send any cable in his name provided I sent him a copy 
4of it.'
1. Storrs to Ronald Graham, January 31, 1917, PCL, Storrs Papers, II/4.
2. Terry, op.cit., pp.119-33.
3. Gardner, op.cit., pp.202-3. Wavell, who was a member of Allenby's wartime
staff and later one of his aides in Egypt, made similar observations. 
Wavell, op.cit., p.21.
4. A. Money to A.P. Wavell, December 27, 1936, STAC, Allenby Papers.
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This approach continued in Egypt where Allenby relied on the local British 
officials for assistance in dealing with questions with which he was generally un­
familiar. This was facilitated by the fact that some of the advisers to whom he 
turned most frequently had served on his staff during the war. One example was 
Brigadier Gilbert Clayton who served as the Chief Political Officer of the E.E.F. 
under Allenby and as adviser to the Ministry of Interior in the crucial period 
leading up to the unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence. It was only 
natural that Allenby should turn to a man like Clayton in important matters rather
than to the staff of the Residency whom at first he in any case regarded as 'weak-
1
kneed blackcoats.' The disparity m  experience between the Residency staff and
2the British advisers and local officials also contributed to Allenby's approach.
As a result, most of the major proposals on British policy sent by the High
3
Commissioner to London before 1922 were initially formulated by the advisers.
For example, the idea for the concession of Egypt's formal independence by Great 
Britain, which Allenby demanded in early 1922, originated among the advisers and
1. Wavell, op.cit., p.56.
2. The experience of the ministerial advisers who served during Allenby's tenure 
as High Commissioner was enormous. A brief summary of the careers in Egypt 
of four of the more important advisers, such as Amos, Clayton, Dowson and 
Patterson, shows this clearly. M.S. Amos lived in Egypt as a child when his 
father was a Court of Appeal judge. Amos was on the Bench of the Cairo Native 
Court (1903) and the Native Court of Appeal (1906). He was the Director of 
the Khedival School of Law (1913-15), Acting Judicial Adviser (1917-19) and 
permanent Judicial Adviser (1919-25). DNB, 1931-40, pp.12-13. G .F . Clayton 
served under Kitchener in the Sudan (1898) and then joined the Egyptian army 
(1900). He was appointed assistant adjutant-general and private secretary to 
the Governor-General of the Sudan (1903). He was permanently transferred to 
the Sudan Government Service (1910) and then was Sudan Agent and Director of 
Intelligence in Cairo (1914). During the war Clayton was Director of Military 
Intelligence at GHQ in Egypt and later Chief Political Officer of the E.E.F. 
(1917). After the war he served as adviser to the Ministry of Interior 
(1919-22). DNB, 1922-30, pp.186-8. E.M. Dowson was in the Egyptian Service 
for twenty-two years. He was the Acting Financial Adviser and then Financial 
Adviser. Times, July 7, 1923. R.S. Patterson was a member of the Egyptian 
civil service for over twenty-years. He was the adviser to the Minister of
Interior. Times, July 7, 1923.
3. For examples of this, see: The memorandum on Egypt's future submitted by Amos
and Patterson in April 1921 and Allenby's support, Allenby to Curzon, April 
16, 1921, Desp. No. 311, FO/371/6295; the memorandum by Sir William Hayter, 
Legal Adviser to the Minister of Finance and Allenby's support, Allenby to 
Curzon, June 17, 1921, Desp. No. 530, FO/371/6298; and, Allenby's comments
on the Clayton memorandum of October 8, 1921, Allenby to Foreign Office, Octo­
ber 22, 1921, f(r> FO/371/6306.
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appears in a memorandum drafted by Dowson, Clayton and Patterson and Hayter. 
Furthermore, when Allenby was ordered to return to London in January 1922 at 
the height of the crisis over Egypt's independence, he was accompanied by his 
two most trusted advisers, Amos and Clayton.
Although the size and influence of the 'unofficial' British hierarchy 
declined after Egypt's independence, it would be a mistake to underestimate its 
impact on the High Commissioner in the important formative years when the foun­
dations of his future policy were laid. Cheetham was correct in fearing that in
the end this would result in the diminution of direct Foreign Office control over
2
Egyptian affairs. This, however, did not stem from total domination of Egypt's 
administration by non-Residency staff as much as from the eventual 'Egyptianisa- 
tion' of the Residency staff.
Much has been written about the ascendance of non-Residency staff and the 
consequent change of Cairo's total approach. This does not mean, though, that the 
attitudes of the Foreign Service officials in Cairo who internalised local per­
ceptions and those of the Foreign Office home establishment in London were congru­
ent. Although the divisions between the two at times may not have been as great 
as those between Residency and non-Residency staff, they nonetheless existed. In 
indicating the general nature of such a division, one observer tersely noted that 
'the Diplomatic Service...needed nationalizing and the Foreign Office internation-
3
alizing.1 Basically it was a question of where a given issue was considered, in 
Cairo or in London, With the passage of time this, too, inevitably lent impetus 
to the emergence of Cairo as an independent focus of power which, under the pre­
vailing circumstances, would rival London.
When all these factors are considered together, it becomes evident that the 
potential for a rival focus of power in Cairo indeed existed. That it emerged so 
rapidly during the Allenby years must, to a great extent, be ascribed to the rapid 
changes in Egypt imposing a policy of reaction on Britain, to Allenby's position 
and personality, and, finally, to the organisation and approach of his advisers 
and staff, all of which served as powerful catalytic agents in the determination 
of Cairo's role in policy formulation.
1. A draft copy of this memorandum is in the SAD, Clayton Papers, 470/14.
2. Cheetham Memorandum, pp.6-7.
3. Donald G. Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations (Syracuse, 
1961), p.208. |-or dQ,t-A11s o.VjOiAi (An=^l^L o P P k u c p S ,"Texry, <
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CHAPTER TWO: LONDON - THE PREOCCUPIED CENTRE
After the end of the 1914-18 War, the British government was faced with a 
tangled web of interests, pressures and altered circumstances. The Cabinet 
system that had evolved in the nineteenth century now had to cope with the com­
plexities of the post-war era. The Foreign Office, with its beginnings in a 
simpler age, had to deal with issues and crises that strained the 1918-1922 Lloyd 
George government - a coalition of unequal partners no longer united by wartime 
discipline. After the fall of the Lloyd George government, the political system 
was further tested by three general elections in as many years.
In addition, the cost of the war and the ensuing economic difficulties 
drained Britain’s resources. The rapid demobilisation that followed the war came 
precisely at a time when Britain was called upon to support an expanded peace­
time presence throughout the world. The crises and upheavals in Turkey, India, 
Europe and Ireland in the early 1920’s and then the preoccupation with European 
security taxed London's ability to deal effectively with all issues at the same 
time and compelled, naturally enough, the allocation of interest, priorities and 
resources.
It was at this juncture that the need for a solution to the Egyptian question 
became pressing. The way this issue was dealt with in London - whether by a 
preoccupied Cabinet or a changing Foreign Office - was necessarily different from 
the approach taken by the British in Cairo. This difference and the objective 
difficulties faced by the government in London left its mark on Egyptian policy 
and made its formulation a potential source of conflict between Cairo and London 
in the early post-war years.
1
The Context of Policy Formulation
The rapid demobilisation following the end of the war and the economic crisis
1. 'The context of policy formulation1 is similar to the term 'operational en­
vironment, ' used to indicate the factors that determine the limits of possible 
effective action, while the 'psychological environment1 deals with those fac­
tors, such as the perceptions, that affect the limits of possible decisions. 
Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making
(London, 1963), p.4.
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of the early 1920's had an implicit impact on molding British policy towards 
Egypt. Although demobilisation and economics did not dictate specific policy, 
they had the subtler effect of conditioning policy makers and limiting the options 
open to them.
Demobilisation of the armed forces began immediately after armistice. As a 
result of almost mutinous discontent over the early release of late recruits, 
Winston Churchill at the War Office increased the rate in January 1919 to nearly
10.000 men a day for a period of six months.^* Churchill planned to retain only
900.000 men out of the three and a half million in the Imperial Army. The army
was being reduced to nearly its peacetime size, yet its commitments had increased
in Silesia, the Rhine, Constantinople, Palestine, Iraq and especially Ireland.
This imposed severe limitations on the course of action the government could take
if the use of troops was required. The implications of this were recognised by
Curzon who told the Imperial Conference in 1923 that ’the world knows only too well
2
that when the war was over we disbanded our forces with almost undue alacrity.’
The government’s difficulties were also increased by the post-war economic 
crisis. By December 1921 the situation had become critical and severely strained 
the government's ability to maintain its costly commitments abroad. In answer to 
the growing call for the introduction of deflationary policies and for the reduc­
tion of public expenditure, the Geddes Committee on National Expenditure was struck 
to examine possible areas for economies.
The first two parts of the Committee's report were made public on February 10, 
31922. The sharpest reductions were called for in the Services. The general 
effect of the Committee's recommendations was that they further limited the options 
available to the Cabinet if troops were required anywhere for the implementation 
of policy. For Egypt, the Geddes Committee recommended a reduction in the seven 
infantry battalions stationed there to six, and in the areas from which reinforce­
ments could be quickly brought - Palestine and Malta - a reduction from a total
1. The figures on demobilisation have been taken from Charles Loch Mowat, Britain 
Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (London, 1968), pp.22-3; Winston S. Churchill,
The Aftermath, Vol. IV in The World Crisis (London, 1929), pp.53-6.
2. Lawrence J.L.E). [Marquis of) Zetland, The Life of Lord Curzon. (London,
1928), III, 242.
3. The following is based primarily on the first two sections of the Geddes Re­
port: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. Vol. IX (Reports from Commission­
ers , etc., Vol. Ill), (1922), ^Cmd.-1581] , 'First Interim Report of Committee 
on National Expenditure, December 14, 1921,' passim; and, ibid., Vond.-15 8 23 , 
'Second Interim Report, January 28, 1922,' passim.
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of six infantry battalions to three, and three cavalry battalions to two.
The report's implications for Egyptian policy were serious. The riots of
March 1919 and May 1921 indicated that the British military establishment was
adequate for normal garrison conditions but that it could not cope with serious
disturbances. In fact, in October 1921, the Cabinet was advised by its military
experts 'that in the event of an insurrection and of the Egyptian Army turning
2
against us a reinforcement of 24 battalions would be necessary.' Furthermore, 
the history of British rule since 1918 indicated that if an unpopular policy were 
adopted - such as the continuation of the Protectorate - it would have to be sup­
ported by bayonets. Economic conditions in Britain meant that these bayonets were 
no longer readily available in Cairo. This was impressed upon the Cabinet by the 
Geddes Committee only a few weeks before the confrontation with Allenby in Febru­
ary 1922 over Egypt's independence and no doubt left its mark on the government's 
ability to determine policy freely.
Another element affecting policy formulation for Egypt was government pre­
occupation elsewhere. Pressing issues in unrelated areas meant that delay and 
poor coordination often characterised consideration of the Egyptian question. 
Either the problem was neglected because of more urgent business in other areas 
or it was given only cursory attention. In any event, what was crucial in Cairo 
was at times only of secondary importance to London. In addition, the diverse 
factors, such as departmental and imperial interests, that affected policy formu­
lation by the British government played a far smaller role in the consideration 
of policy by the Residency in Cairo.
Delay over Egyptian policy became a common occurrence in the post-war era.
One of the precipitating causes of the 1918-19 crisis was the refusal of the
1. This reduction of cavalry forces affected Palestine as there was no cavalry
in Malta. No changes were recommended in the one cavalry battalion in Egypt.
2. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 85(21), November 3, 1921, FO/371/6307. Considera­
tions such as these led the British in Cairo to ask rhetorically: 'Are His
Majesty's Government prepared to provide the means for carrying through the 
policy which insistence on their present major reservations [in the negotia­
tions^ entails?' Selby to TyrnKll, October 1, 1921, FO/371/6306. For similar 
comments, see: Scott[Acting High Commissioned to Lindsay, September 20, 1921,
FO/371/6305; and, Scott to Curzon, October 10, 1921, Desp. No. 882, FO/371/ 
6306.
Foreign Office and the government to permit a ministerial delegation to come to 
London from Cairo. They were too preoccupied with preparations for the Peace 
Conference. Even after the outbreak of demonstrations in Egypt this tendency to 
delay consideration did not change. Wingate returned to London for consultations
on February 3, 1919 but 'was not received by Lord Curzon - to discuss the Egyptian
situation - till Monday the 1 7 t h . A l l e n b y  was no more fortunate in this respect
and when in England in October 1920 he wrote to his wife that
I am still hanging around waiting to be interviewed by the Cabinet.
So far I have received no summons. Now they will be busy with this 
coal strike, and will, I fear, have little time for other affairs.^
Another example of delay was the history of the Milner Mission. The sugges­
tion to send a mission to Egypt 'to investigate existing conditions...hear every 
party and report on future form of our Protectorate1 was made to Allenby on April
3
5, 1919. Although Allenby eventually concurred in the delay, the Mission only 
arrived in Egypt in December 1920 after the situation had seriously deteriorated. 
While some of the reasons given for the delay concerned Egypt, the others indicated 
the weight of non-Egyptian factors:
Slowness of restoration of order and good feeling in Egypt, possi­
bility of boycott or bad reception of Mission if it arrived pre­
maturely, unrest in Eastern world, and uncertainty as to decisions 
of Peace Conference, in respect both of Turkey and other Enemy 
Powers, are used as arguments for postponement to later period, 
when there may be greater stability in all these respects. It may 
also be difficult to get together representative and powerful 
mission in summer months.^
The manner in which the Cabinet dealt with the Mission's proposals is even
more revealing. The proposals which called for an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty instead of
the protectorate, were made public in August 1920. Yet on January 5, 1921, the
Cabinet was urged by Winston Churchill not to take any substantive decision for
5another six months. This approach was difficult to understand in Cairo and often 
caused irritation among the British officials there who asked 'when will the
1. Wingate Note (n.d.), SAD, Wingate Papers, 162/1.
2. Allenby to Lady Allenby, October 7, 1920, Gardner, op.cit., pp.233-4. For
other comments, see: Wavell, op.cit., p.53.
3. Foreign Office to Allenby, April 5, 1919, Tel. No. 427, FO/371/3714.
4. Curzon to Allenby, May 22, 1919, Private Tel., Curzon Papers, FO/800/153.
5. Cabinet Decisions, January 5, 1921, FO/371/6292.
British Govt, appreciate the situation in Egypt? and learn that platitudes thrown
1
at us here 30 years ago are not applicable now.1
In addition to delay, there was also a lack of adequate machinery for the
formulation of policy and the absence of clearly established procedures and central
2
responsibility for its supervision. Although the Foreign Office was theoretically 
responsible for Egyptian affairs, other departments such as the Colonial Office, 
the India Office and the War Office, had vested interests in the area. These were 
pressed vigorously inside and outside the Cabinet. The fact that there was no 
strictly enforced delimitation of authority resulted in an increase in inter­
departmental rivalry. This became so sharp that at times there appeared to be an
3
absence of unified policy.
The activities of Winston Churchill were particularly important in this re­
spect, Twice within six months as Colonial Secretary he publicly commented on the 
future status of Egypt in the most controversial terms. On the first occasion in
February 1921, he referred to Egypt as being 'within the elastic circle of the 
4British Empire.' This was before any decision had been reached on the Milner 
proposals regarding Egypt's future. On the second occasion he addressed the British 
Cotton Growing Association in Manchester shortly before the start of Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations on Egypt’s status. Churchill bluntly stated that he,
...did not think the time had yet come when the British armies 
should withdraw and be relegated to living on condensed water 
on the banks of the Suez Canal while the mobs of Cairo and 
Alexandria made short work of the European and foreign popula­
tions. ^
This open encroachment on Foreign Office interests had an immediate effect on 
public opinion in Egypt and Curzon condemned Churchill because,
1. E.S. Herbert Pasha to Wingate, December 4, 1919, SAD, Wingate Papers, 238/4.
2. For an analysis of the effects of this on British policy, throughout the Middle
East, see: Albert H. Hourani, Great Britain and the Arab World (London, 1946),
p.19.
3. For a description of divisions within the Cabinet over foreign policy, see:
D .C . Watt, Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British
Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1965), p.145.
4. Times, February 14, 1921. 5. Manchester Guardian, June 7, 1921.
...on two recent occasions yon have made public references to the 
Egyptian question (which does not lie in your department) which 
were without Cabinet authority, which in each case have evoked an 
immediate response from Egypt, and which have rendered the already 
difficult task of the Foreign Secretary there more difficult.1
These difficulties were increased by the seemingly haphazard manner in which 
decisions were reached or action was taken. For example, the circumstances sur­
rounding the Milner Mission and its Report illustrate a marked lack of government 
coordination when dealing with Egypt. All the evidence indicates that the Report 
was written without reference to the Cabinet or even to Curzon. Bonar Law, a
senior member of the Cabinet, wrote to Curzon that ’the whole of these Egyptian
2
proposals came to me as a great shock.1 Thomas Jones, Assistant Secretary to the 
Cabinet, noted in his diary on September 11, 1920
The P.M. turned to Egypt and asked Hardinge if Curzon knew anything 
about Milner's proposals for reform. Curzon, it appeared, had not 
been consulted nor had the P.M. nor B^onar^. L^aw]. nor Balfour.3
Curzon confirmed this at a meeting of the Imperial Cabinet in July 1921. He 
told the assembled Dominion leaders that 'I, myself, as Foreign Secretary, had 
only the dimmest idea of what was going on and I was a good deal surprised when I 
saw the[kilned Conclusions in the form they ultimately assumed.’^  Even more 
serious in terms of the orderly management of Cabinet policy was the surprisingly 
irregular manner in which the proposals appear to have been made public in August 
1920. Churchill, outraged by the absence of Cabinet approval, wrote to Lloyd 
George 1 it is astonishing that they should have been let out to the press and the
1. Curzon to Churchill, June 13, 1921, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/13/2/30. Even 
Lloyd George, no great admirer of Curzon, had to admit that such action was 
'most improper and dangerous'. Lloyd George to Curzon, June 14, 1921, Lord 
Beaverbrook\w.M. Aitken], The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George: And Great Was
the Fall Thereof (London, 1963), p.258. This support may have resulted from 
internal Cabinet intrigues. Lloyd George suspected Churchill of plotting 
against him with F.E. Smith and Beaverbrook, hence his unusual support of Cur­
zon. Frances Stevenson noted Lloyd George's concern about this in her diary 
entry of January 20, 1921. A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: A Diary by
Frances Stevenson (London, 1971), p.223. •
2. Bonar Law to Curzon, August 20, 1920, BLL, Bonar Law Papers, 101/4/8.
3. Thomas Jones, (Keith Middlemas, ed.) Whitehall Diaries, 1916-1925 (London,
1969), I, 121. This was confirmed by Duff Cooper’s entry in his diary on Aug­
ust 23, 1920: Duff Cooper, op.cit., p.102; and, also Zetland, op.cit., III,
246.
4. Stenographic Notes of a Meeting of Representatives of the United Kingdom, the
Dominions and India, July 6, 1921, p.5, FO/371/6301.
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public without the Cabinet having been consulted.'1 As a result of this lack of
coordination the British government found itself virtually committed to a course
. , 2of action it had little influence in determining.
The factors thus far mentioned had their origins basically in Britain. There
were, however, other factors that derived from the state of the Empire in the
post-war period. The position of the Dominions is a case in point. Prom the end
of the nineteenth century British colonies with large European populations had a
3
special standing. Participation in the war increased the Dominions' awareness
of their importance to Britain. London's recognition of this gave them separate
representation at the Peace Conference and shortly thereafter the right to negotiate
and ratify treaties independently.
Towards the end of the war the role of the Dominions in policy formulation
increased and eventually an expanded Imperial Cabinet was established serving as
4
the forerunner of later Imperial Conferences. After the Chanak crisis of 1922 
when the Dominions were nearly involved in a war in Anatolia, the calls for closer 
consultation increased and were heeded whenever possible. Such developments appear 
to have had an impact on the British government's operational freedom since it was
1. Churchill to Lloyd George, August 26, 1920, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/9/2/41. 
Churchill later claimed this as justification for his unauthorised Manchester 
speech in June 1921. In reply to Curzon's condemnation of that speech, he 
wrote: 'So far as Egypt is concerned, I claim a greater liberty. The Milner 
report was made public in August last, I understand with your acquiescence, 
without the Cabinet being consulted in any way...' Churchill to Curzon, June 
13, 1921, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/9/3/56.
2. On July 11, 1921, Curzon observed in Cabinet 'that Lord Milner's Commission.had 
so far prejudiced the situation, that the freedom of the Government in negotia­
tion was severely hampered.' Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 58(21), July 11, 1921, 
FO/371/6301.
3. For details of the development of the 'White' Dominions in this period, see:
Paul Knaplund, Britain, Commonwealth and Empire, 1905-1955 (London, 1956), 
pp.51-9.
4. For developments in this direction, see: Lloyd George to Walter Long (Colonial 
Office), December 12, 1916, cited in D.C. Watt, 'Imperial Defence Policy and 
Imperial Foreign Policy, 1911-1939, A Neglected Paradox?', Journ. of Common­
wealth Pol. Stud., I, 4 (May, 1963), p.268; and Long to Balfour, October 9,
1917, Balfour Papers, FO/800/207. imperialists accepted the grow­
ing influence of the Dominions and one leading figure, Egerton, wrote: 'The
day is past when British colonial policy mainly depended upon tendencies at work 
in the Mother Country. At present it is as much, or even more, directed by the 
movement of thought regarding it in the great Dominions.' Hugh E . Egerton, 
British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1922), p.21. See also,
Watt, op.cit., p.266ff.
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now necessary to take into account another appreciation of imperial interests 
based on a different constellation of political and geographical considerations.
Dominion concern in the area of Egyptian policy was related to specific 
interests. The one element that mitigated imperial influence on British policy 
was the fact that the interests in Egypt of countries like Australia and South 
Africa or New Zealand and Canada were not the same. Still Dominion views were 
another factor affecting the context of policy formulation. In the case of Aus­
tralia and New Zealand for whom security in the Pacific against Japan was increa­
singly important, concern was great. Their leaders had a definite point of view 
on Egypt and pressed it in no uncertain terms. W.M. Hughes, the Prime Minister 
of Australia, cabled his view to Lloyd George on December 18, 1920. While 
admitting that the Commonwealth officially 'has no standing in the matter1 of 
Egypt’s independence, nonetheless, and in view of the importance of the Suez Canal, 
he entered the 'most emphatic protest [at} handing control of Egypt to those
-r 1
elements...already conspiting Jsicj against the Empire.'
One curious sidelight at the sessions of the Imperial Cabinet in July 1921
also indicates the degree of British sensitivity to Dominion opinion. Massey, the
Prime Minister of New Zealand, commented on Curzon's inability to present concrete
proposals for the imminent Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Curzon quickly retorted
that, on the contrary, he could even circulate a draft treaty: 'I have drawn it
2up and I have got it.' Duff Cooper at the Foreign Office, however, noted in his 
diary that he spent the entire evening after the session preparing the draft that
3
Curzon had claimed was ready for circulation.
The strength of the Dominion position, whether official or not, is further 
illustrated by the Imperial Cabinet proceedings in July 1921. ■ Here Curzon attemp­
ted to defend British policy against the charge that there had been inadequate 
consultation on Egypt. Eventually it became necessary for the Prime Minister to 
intervene and promise that 'before we commit ourselves we are going to confer with
the Dominion Premiers and the Representatives of India, and that is what we are 
4
here for.'
1. Hughes to Lloyd George, December 19, 1920, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/28/3/47.
2* Stenographic Notes...July 6, 1921, p.11. FO/371/6301.
3. Duff Cooper, op.cit., p.103.
4. Stenographic Notes...July 6, 1921, p.15, FO/371/6301.
Egypt, India and Ireland
No discussion of the British government's difficulties in formulating policy 
towards Egypt would be complete without mention of the impact of the Irish 
'troubles' and the Indian nationalist disturbances in the post-war years. On the 
most elementary level, the coincidence of these two crises with the developing 
Egyptian question strained the Cabinet's ability to give adequate attention simul­
taneously to three issues of such magnitude. Therefore, whether knowingly or not, 
there was an understandable allocation of priorities with the inevitable result 
that more Cabinet time was allotted to one question at the expense of another.
A simple comparison of the number of times Egypt, India and Ireland were dis­
cussed in Cabinet in the critical year of 1921 roughly indicates the relative
1level of interest in each issue. During this year the Cabinet met ninety-three 
times. Egypt was discussed at eight meetings. Indian affairs were raised during 
twenty-four Cabinet sessions while Ireland was discussed on fifty-two separate 
occasions. Apparently the Egyptian question was considered either secondary when 
compared with India and Ireland or easier to resolve. In any case this resulted 
in a strikingly low level of Cabinet consideration and supervision of policy to­
wards Egypt. Furthermore, the quality of Cabinet attention may well have suffered 
because whenever Egypt was considered, it was in conjunction with or contiguous 
to India or Ireland or both. During the second half of 1921, when negotiations 
were held with an Egyptian delegation from July 13 to November 19, there was sur­
prisingly no appreciable change in this pattern of priorities. This may be ex­
plained by the fact that there were negotiations with an Irish delegation from 
October 11 to December 6. From July 11, when the Cabinet decided its position in
the Egyptian negotiations, until December 31, Egypt was raised in Cabinet only
2five times, India twelve times and Ireland twenty-nine.
1. 1921 was chosen for this comparison since it was a critical period for all 
three issues. With regard to Egypt, it was the year in which the Milner pro­
posals were considered, Anglo-Egyptians negotiations took place, and the con­
flict between Allenby and the Cabinet began. The comparison that follows is 
based on the table on p.33*
2. An interesting indication of Egypt's level of importance is seen in the com­
plete absence of any mention of the Egyptian crisis in the biography of Lloyd 
George by Thomas Jones, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet. Thomas Jones, 
Lloyd George (London, 1951), passim. For details of the government's preoccu­
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Aside from distracting attention from policy towards Egypt, India and Ireland 
had the more direct effect of indicating possible avenues of approach or preclu­
ding others. In the case of India, another 'Oriental' area troubled by nationalism, 
it was believed that ’like cause must produce like effect.'^ Also, since Egypt 
and India were generally seen in the same context and because of the large Muslim 
minority in the latter, events in the one were assumed to have ramifications in 
the other.
The common approach towards Egypt and India is seen in the attitude towards 
the problem of nationalism - perceived as the root cause of Britain's difficulties 
in both countries. A member of the Indian Civil Service described this as follows:
...we reasoned that Nationalism in both countries was nothing more 
than the heated rhetoric of a small talkative minority whose claims 
to represent the people were derived from nobody and whose theories 
fell on indifferent and even unwilling ears.^
When disturbances occurred in both regions in 1919, there was a tendency to assume
that the 'connection between Indian and Egyptian troubles seems one of more or less
3
common causes not of common instigation.'
The acceptance of this approach was widespread in government circles. The 
Prime Minister, when outlining his views on Egypt to the Cabinet on November 4, 1921, 
stated that 'broadly our attitude should be that which we had adopted towards
4
India.1 In this he was supported by Curzon, on whom the influence of India was 
particularly strong, and who saw even the particulars of a solution to the Egyptian 
question in Indian terms and experiences. When advocating a treaty with Egypt 
instead of the protectorate, Curzon saw this as a 'subordinate alliance1 similar
5
to those concluded with 'the Indian Princes a century ago.1
Some of the concrete measures taken in defining a policy also indicate the 
basic community of approach. In many respects the Milner Mission resembled the
1. Stanley Rice, ICS ret., 'Egypt and India: A Comparison,' Asiatic Rev., XVII,
(January, 1921), p.42.
2. Ibid., p.35.
3. Foreign Department, Simla to GOC, Cairo, April 29, 1919, Tel. No. 508-S, 
FO/141/521(8984).
4. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 86(21), November 4, 1921, FO/371/6307.
5. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 14, 1921, 
FO/371/6295.
Montagu-Chelmsford Mission sent to India to investigate constitutional reform
there. Although such a mission was not unprecedented, they shared the common aim
of ostensibly 'setting the feet of an Oriental people on the path of self- 
1Government.' Even the findings of these two missions in the area of the devolu-
2
tion of authority to local institutions, were superficially similar.
The second aspect of the influence of the British experience in India on 
Egyptian policy was the assumed interaction of events in the two countries, a be­
lief that was particularly strong during the 1914-18 war. This was based on the 
existence of a large Muslim minority in the Indian sub-continent, believed to be 
influenced by events in the Middle East, and on the traditional strategic and 
political interests of the Government of India in that region. This inter­
relationship was acknowledged during the search for suitable personnel for the 
Foreign Office Egyptian Section. At the time, Hardinge, the Permanent Under­
secretary, wrote that 'it would be of advantage to have as Assistant an official 
from the ijndianl. office]. who would keep the Dept- in very close touch with the
3
India Office.'
The belief that events in Egypt affected India and the reverse was accepted 
by the advocates as well as opponents of a 'liberal' policy. As early as December 
28, 1919, Milner wrote to Curzon from Egypt that the independence movement in Egypt
4
'will exercise a disturbing influence' on the British position in the entire 
Near East and in India and, therefore, policy should be coordinated. Curzon alluded 
to this relationship when he protested against Allenby's moderate policy in April 
1919 because this will 'have a repercussion that will extend far beyond the borders 
of Egypt and make itself felt in every oriental country for which we are responsi-
5
ble.' Opponents of a liberal solution, such as Churchill, also based opposition
6to the Milner proposals on their ramifications elsewhere. The acceptance of a link
1. Chirol, op.cit., p.261.
2. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. , (Reports from Commissioners, etc.
Vol. VIII), (1919),[C.-9109j, 'Joint Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms,1
passim. Interestingly, Curzon originally described the Mission to Egypt as 'a 
mission somewhat like Montagu's to India.1 Curzon to Balfour, March 29, 1919, 
Balfour Papers, FO/800/215.
3. Hardinge to Robert Cecil, August 20, 1918, BM, Balfour Papers, add.49478.
4. Milner to Curzon, December 28, 1919, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/39/1/52.
5. Curzon to Balfour, April 3, 1919, Tel. Confidential, Balfour Papers, FO/800/216
6. A remark to this effect was made by Churchill to Montagu on November 4, 1920 
and was noted by Cooper in his diary. Cooper, loc.cit.
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between Egypt and India was not restricted to the government but gained currency
1in the press and strengthened the tendency to view Egypt m  extra-regional terms.
This approach was further supported by the current trend to view the non-Dominion
sections of the Empire in a unitary frame of reference.
The final and perhaps most serious difficulty faced by the government was
the Irish question. The immediate impact of the Irish 'troubles' and the agreement
concluded on December 6, 1921 establishing the Irish Free State was to create a
political atmosphere in which it might be unwise to grant similar concessions to
Egypt. The Cabinet had already been weakened by the retirement of the ailing
Bonar Law in May 1921. The absence of this powerful figure from the government
2
front benches was a potential threat to the Coalition. Bonar Law's recovery and 
return to London in September 1921, as events in Ireland and Egypt were reaching 
a crucial stage, weakened the government's political position. He now hovered 
outside the government, an alternative figure to whom dissatisfied Unionists might
3
turn if Lloyd George and the Coalition faltered. Churchill later commented that 
the 'Irish Treaty and its circumstances were unforgivable by the most tenacious
4
elements in the Conservative Party.'
This growing uncertainty at a time when the Cabinet was considering its 
Egyptian policy meant that the government had to keep 'one eye upon Conservative
5
constituencies' lest serious offence be given. J.A. Spender, the Liberal editor 
of the Westminster Gazette and a member of the Milner Mission, afterwards wrote 
critically of what he saw as the Coalition's fears that a 'surrender to Egyptian 
nationalists' might be coupled with the Irish settlement by the government's Tory
1. For example, the Observer maintained in its editorial comment that waiting for 
the pressure of events to force concessions in Egypt 'would be a fatal encour­
agement to the working of Indian extremism.' Observer, February 12, 1922.
2. Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar
Law, 1858-1923 (London, 1955), p.424; and, Mowat, op.cit., p.11.
3. Of the 484 Members of Parliament who supported the Coalition, there were 338 
Conservatives, 136 Liberals, and 10 Labour and other supporters. Ibid., p.6.
4. Leopold M.S. Amery, My Political Life (London, 1953-55), II, 231. Amery was a
Conservative junior minister at the time. Also, see: £f .W. Smith], Earl of 
Birkenhead, FE, The Life and Times of F.E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead 
(London, 1959), pp.353ff. Also, see: Churchill, op.cit., IV, 307.
5, Daily News, February.10, 1922.
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supporter s. The fears that a liberal solution to the Egyptian problem would be
considered a betrayal were kept alive by the imperialist elements of the press.
The Daily Express, in particular, maintained an active campaign against con-
2
cessions throughout the period leading to Egypt's independence. Although the 
unorganised efforts of individual Members of Parliament or a limited press campaign 
could not force the adoption of a specific policy, they could have the effect of 
prescribing to some extent the limits within which policy was formulated.
Another aspect of Ireland's influence on British policy towards Egypt was the 
tremendous fear of once again becoming embroiled in 'troubles' because of a mis­
taken decision and having to bear the consequent cost in human and material 
resources. The psychological atmosphere engendered by the civil war in Ireland 
meant that everything - events, leaders and even institutions in Egypt - were seen 
in Irish terms. This was true at every level of the government from Cabinet 
Minister to Foreign Office officials, as well as every shade of the press.
This factor influenced those concerned with Egyptian policy from the Milner 
Mission through the declaration of Egypt's independence. Milner already in Egypt 
wrote to Curzon on January 12, 1920 that, if British policy was not effective, he
3
feared 'it will be something like the Irish situation all over again.' Curzon
dreaded the same possibility when it became evident in October 1921 that the
Egyptian negotiations were deadlocked. He wrote to his wife that 'I am sure we
4shall have an absolute rupture with another Ireland m  Egypt.1 H.A.L. Fisher, 
the President of the Board of Education and a member of the Cabinet1s Egypt Sub­
committee, took the analogy with Ireland even further when he wrote that 'All I 
am concerned with is to send Redmond jAdli] back with a good offer for fear that we 
may have to deal with a Michael Collins ^ aghlulj .1^  Zaghlul Pasha and the 
nationalist movement in Egypt were seen in a similar light by the Prime Minister's 
closest aide, Philip Kerr, who wrote that he tried to convince Adli to accept the 
British proposals for fear that 'Zaghlul will go Sinn Fein...Zaghlul will begin
1. J.A. Spender, Life, Journalism and Politics (London, 1927), II, 99.
2. The Express was the most vocal in linking an Egyptian settlement with the
Irish one. When Allenby returned to London in early 1922, the Express commen­
ted on his proposals: 'What terms should we have got out of Ireland under
thosejAllenby' s\ conditions? The same as we are likely to get out of Egypt. 
Lord Allenby carries his point - NONE.1 Daily Express, February 9, 1922.
3. Milner to Curzon, January 12, 1920, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 162.
4. Curzon to Lady Curzon, October 21, 1921, in Zetland, op.cit., III, 248.
5. Fisher to Lloyd George, October 28, 1921, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/16/7/72.
•4?
to create a Pan-Islamic-Sinn Fein machine.'1 Finally, in writing of the risks of
a repressive policy even John Murray and Duff Cooper of the Foreign Office
Egyptian Section resorted to the Irish metaphor and worried that 'we might end
by creating another Ireland without an Ulster, which would be a storm centre in
2
the Mediterranean and a perpetual menace to the Suez Canal.1 The press was equally
alive to the Irish analogies and Egypt was constantly referred to as 'that other
3
Ireland'. Demonstrations became the precursors of an oriental version of the
'troubles’, and in 1922 a leader was sought who might become 'Egypt's Michael
4
Collins.'
The cumulative effects of Ireland's influence left the British government on 
the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the political pressures precluded the 
easy acceptance of a compromise solution in Egypt. On the other hand, the fears 
of a recurrence of the 'troubles' worked in the direction of a conciliatory 
solution.
The Foreign Office and Curzon
The role of the Foreign Office, directly responsible for Egyptian affairs, 
was extremely important. The Office's position, interests and structure set it 
apart from the British establishment in Cairo. This was particularly significant 
in view of the increased authority of the High Commissioner and the Residency in 
the early post-war years.
Although the Cabinet as a whole approved general policy, it was the responsi­
bility of the Foreign Office to formulate and recommend, through the Secretary of 
State, specific policy on foreign affairs and to oversee its implementation. The 
situation, however, was not static. The relations between the Prime Minister and 
the Foreign Secretary, between other ministries and the Foreign Office, depended as
1. Kerr to Lloyd George, October 28, 1921, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/32/2/9.
2. Memorandum by A. Duff Cooper and John Murray, October 14, 1921,
FO/371/6305.
3. Manchester Guardian, January 2, 1922.
4. Daily News, February 3, 1922. The labour movement also adopted this terminolo­
gy. The Egypt Parliamentary Committee presented the Labour Party Conference
in June 1921 with a tract entitled Another Ireland (Text in? FO/371/6298),
while the Daily Herald, January 13, 1922, reported that 'the formation of an 
Egyptian Dail is a new possibility of the political situation.'
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much on personalities and circumstances as they did on constitutional theory and 
practice.'*' This was very much the case in the war years and immediately after­
wards. At the same time that Cairo was becoming a rival focus of power, the 
Foreign Office was undergoing a period of transition and a relative decline in 
influence.
The change in the position and structure of the Foreign Office began with its 
pre-war re-organisation and continued in the early war years under the then 
Secretary of State Sir Edward Grey. Given the nature of wartime decisions and the 
presence of powerful figures such as Kitchener, Churchill and Lloyd George in the 
Service Ministries and Treasury, the Foreign Office did not enjoy an unchallenged 
position in foreign affairs. Eventually, it shared much of its authority with the 
War Office and Admiralty, functioning primarily in a technical and advisory capa­
city. This trend was confirmed when Lloyd George became Prime Minister in 1916 
and the War Cabinet of Six was established to the exclusion of Arthur Balfour, the 
Foreign Secretary.2
The difference in age and temperament between Lloyd George and the older
Balfour accelerated the decline of the Foreign Office position. Balfour felt that
the Prime Minister had a right to intervene in the management of foreign relations
3
and willingly gave 'a free hand for the Little Man.' Organisational change in 
the government also contributed to the diminution of Foreign Office authority. The 
re-organisation of the War Cabinet Secretariat gave it wide powers of liaison and 
responsibility for memoranda and papers relevant to the Cabinet's activities, in­
cluding foreign affairs.
The establishment of the Prime Minister's private secretariat in the garden 
of his official residence was also an important development. The 'Garden Suburb* 
or the 'Downing Street Kindergarten', as it was known, became the means by which 
the Prime Minister was kept informed of all matters pertaining to the war effort
1. Leon Epstein, 'British Foreign Policy,' in R.C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Poli­
cy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. Jer., 1958), p.15; and, Ronald G. 
Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations (Syracuse, 1961),
pp.3-5, 134, 160; also, Zara Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 
(Cambridge, 1969), passim.
2. According to Balfour's niece and biographer, this did not diminish his autho­
rity since he could attend Cabinet meetings whenever he wished. This does 
not, however, take into account the effects of formal exclusion. Blanche
E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour, K.G., P.M., F.R.S. 
(London, 1936), II, 241-2.
3. Idem.
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and through which he could circumvent normal departmental channels. The private
secretariat and its leading figure, Philip Kerr, were particularly resented by
the officials of the Foreign Office where it was believed that they assisted Lloyd
1
George in concentrating the management of foreign affairs in his own hands.
Finally, the position of the Foreign Office was under increasing attack by 
those radical elements outside Whitehall who wished to curtail the authority of a 
Service called by John Bright 'a gigantic system of outdoor relief for the aris­
tocracy.' The claims about the nefarious role of 'secret diplomacy' and 'balance
of power' policies in the outbreak of the war, were the occasion for this cam- 
2
paign. This led to the establishment of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC) 
whose chief aim was to impose parliamentary restraints on the hitherto secret acti­
vities of the diplomatist. The acrimonious debates about the evils of the 'old 
diplomacy', the popularity of President Wilson's 'open diplomacy', and the horrors 
of the 1914-18 war all contributed to public misgivings about the position and 
functions of the Foreign Office. While their efforts can never be measured accu­
rately, there seems little doubt that they contributed to the environment in which 
the Foreign Office was undergoing serious change.
The end of the war and the shift of government interest to the diplomatic 
sphere emphasised the subtler changes of previous years. Lloyd George now had 
wider scope for individual activity. As a result of his relationship with Balfour,
1. Lord Hardinge, former Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office 
and then Ambassador to France. Cited in Hardinge, op.cit., p.180. For exam­
ple, Kerr was the British representative on the Committee of Three that consi­
dered the question of the Rhine as Germany's border. James Ramsay Butler,
Lord Lothian, 1882-1940 (London, 1960), p.71. Kerr also drafted Article XXII 
of the League of Nations Charter that dealt with mandates. Robert Cecil to 
Lloyd George, April 4, 1921, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/6/6/64.
2. E.D. Morel's Morocco in Diplomacy (London, 1912) was the earliest revelation 
of the 'sins' of secret diplomacy. Morel was one of the founders of the Union 
of Democratic Control (UDC) which was strongly supported by the Labour Party 
leadership. For a description of the post-war criticism of 'old diplomacy' 
and the difference between that and 'new diplomacy', see: Harold Nicolson,
Curzon, the Last Phase: A Study in Post-War Diplomacy (London, 1934), pp.51,
184ff. For details of the attack on the Foreign Office and its effects, see: 
G.A. Craig, 'The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain,' in 
G.A. Craig and F. Gilbert (edd.), The Diplomats, 191.9-1939 (Princeton, 1953), 
pp.17-25.
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the nature of post-war diplomacy and the general public atmosphere, Lloyd George
introduced a highly personal form of conference diplomacy. Thomas Jones of the
Cabinet Secretariat described the results: 'He personalized and dramatized
1
foreign affairs for the newly enfranchised millions.' Although this may well have 
been done, it did little to allay Foreign Office fears at what appeared to be a 
dramatic loss of position and authority. It was at this juncture and under these 
circumstances that Lord Curzon became the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs later receiving his appointment on October 28, 1919.
Curzon's arrival at the Foreign Office was greeted by the expectation that he 
would restore its position and give firm direction to foreign policy. Based on 
his experience as Salisbury's Under-Secretary from 1895-1898 and his term as Vice­
roy of India from 1898 to 1905, this was understandable. Curzon's expertise in
foreign and especially Eastern affairs was a commonplace. In addition, his out-
2
wardly imposing personality, the object of much humour, supported the belief that 
the authority of the Foreign Office would soon be increased. This impression, 
however, was mistaken and there was little change in its position under Curzon.
The fact that this paralleled the rise in Cairo's position was extremely important.
When Curzon assumed office he was bitter and often sick. In fact his health 
was at times so poor that it became necessary to have Balfour return to the Foreign 
Office temporarily in mid-1922 while Curzon convalesced. Aside from obvious phy­
sical difficulties, Curzon still bore the marks of 'those ten years of mortifica-
3
tion' that followed his resignation in India. Throughout his five years at the
4
Foreign Office he was ill and torn between 'the peace and freedom of retirement' 
and the goad of the everpresent ambition to end his career as Prime Minister re­
gardless of the cost. As Beaverbrook, an unsympathetic observer described it,
'his passion to become Prime Minister outstripped every other emotion in his
1. Jones, op.cit., p.179.
2. One example was the incident when Curzon, upon seeing British soldiers bathing, 
asked 'How is it that I have never been informed that the lower orders have 
such white skins?' Ronald Blythe, The Age of Illusions: England in the Twen­
ties and Thirties (London, 1963), p.8. For other tales, some apocryphal, see: 
Nicolson, op.cit., pp.44-8? and, Zetland, op.cit., III, 206.
3. Nicolson, op.cit., p.31.
4. Curzon to Sir George Cunningham, May 29, 1921, Zetland, op.cit., III, 254.
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chequered career. He would bite at any hook baited with hope of the highest 
office.1^
The situation that had existed under Balfour continued under Curzon. Foreign
Office officials complained that they had little real authority and that 'they
are not kept informed and do not themselves know what the Government's point of 
2
view is.1 Unlike Balfour, Curzon deeply resented Lloyd George's intervention m
foreign affairs and on one occasion complained to his wife that, 'Girlie, I am
getting very tired of working or trying to work with that man. He wants his Forn.
Sec. to be a valet almost a drudge and he has no regard for the conveniences or
3
civilities of official life.1
Curzon's inability to hold his ground against Lloyd George diminished not only 
the effectiveness of the Foreign Office but also his position within the Cabinet.
His colleagues were soon convinced that he 'would swallow anything rather than re-
4
linquish,' and thus firm advocacy of a particular policy by Curzon invariably rang 
false. The effects on Curzon were serious and after one meeting, Austen Chamberlain, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote that he had 'found him very depressed & dis-
5
turbed in mind, uneasy about his position, doubtful of his usefulness & influence.'
Curzon was depressed because of his 'feeling that the Prime Minister had more than
once treated him with scant courtesy - almost with contumely - in the presence of 
6his colleagues.' Whether Curzon refused to resign because of his sense of duty 
or because he feared the oblivion that might once again follow resignation, is
1. Beaverbrook, op.cit., p.45.
2. George Allardice Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference
and After, 1918-1923 (London, 1933), p.193.
3. Curzon to his wife, April 22, 1922. Beaverbrook, op.cit., p.251. Also on the
occasion of Lloyd George's appearance at the Genoa Conference alone, Curzon 
bitterly wrote: 'I hope that this will be the last of these fantastic gather­
ings which are really designed as a stage on which he is to perform.' Nicolson, 
op.cit., p.245. There has been much debate as to whether Lloyd George usurped 
Foreign Office prerogatives or stepped into the vacuum created by weak leader­
ship at that ministry. The latter, 'revisionist', view has been put forward 
most notably by Professor M.G. Fry in his work on Lloyd George's foreign policy.
M.G. Fry, The Education of a Statesman, Vol. I in Lloyd George and Foreign Poli­
cy, 1890-1945 (Toronto, 1976).
4. Nicolson, op.cit., p.33




unimportant here. What is important is that much of his intellect and forceful­
ness was wasted often because of his inability to make a decision or to press a 
decision with the necessary vigour.
The one field where Curzon might have provided a measure of effective leader­
ship was in Eastern affairs"'" because of his reputation and the fact that the East, 
with the exception of the Greco-Turkish conflict, had a low priority in Cabinet 
interest. However, here his own views and not extra-departmental interference 
prevented him from giving flexible and realistic direction to policy. Curzon, like 
his colleagues, was the product of a Victorian environment. This background de­
termined his attitudes towards the world and Britain's place in it. Curzon's later 
experiences in India only reinforced those attitudes. His views were by no means 
unique but rather represented the consensus. This too, no doubt, had a reinforcing 
effect.
Curzon's approach in 1919 to the role of Great Britain had not altered visibly
since he had earlier dedicated his Problems of the Far East to ’those who believe
that the British Empire is, under Providence, the greatest instrument for good that
2
the world has ever seen.1 Such imperialism appeared to be tempered with an amal­
gam of duty and service. Montagu, at the India Office, more cynically believed 
that Curzon's views had their basis in national self-interest alone and wrote to 
Balfour in a parody of Curzon's style:
And then there is the rounded Lord Curzon, who for historical reasons 
of which he alone is master, geographical considerations which he has 
peculiarly studied, finds reluctantly, much against his will, with 
very grave doubts, that it would be dangerous if any country in the 
world was left to itself, if any country in the world was left to the 
control of any other country but ourselves, and we must go there, as 
I have heard him say, 'for diplomatic, economic, strategic and tele­
graphic reasons.’3
Whichever was the basis of Curzon's imperial view, it had the same result: an
inability to grasp the nature of post-war changes. But then very few of his col­
leagues were any more far-sighted. Time had stood still for Curzon and, reflecting
1. This refers to those Eastern areas which came within the province of the 
Foreign Office, such as Egypt and Persia, but not the mandated countries which 
after 1921 were the responsibility of the Colonial Office.
2. George Nathaniel Curzon, Problems of the Far East (London, 1894).
3. Edwin Montagu to Balfour, December 20, 1918, BM, Balfour Papers, add. 49748.
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the consensus, he 'dreamt of creating a chain of vassal states stretching from
the Mediterranean to the Pamirs and protecting, not the Indian frontiers merely,
but our communications with our further frontiers.'^ An approach that viewed the
world solely in terms of protecting India1s borders and excluded all factors other
than the safety of imperial communications, prevented the formulation of a flexible
policy. One need only look at the humiliating aftermath of the 1919 Anglo-Persian
Treaty, for which Curzon proudly bore sole responsibility, in order to see the
consequences of this imperial view. A leader who, after the war and its cost to
Britain, could still think that 'the British flag has never flown over a more
2
powerful or more united empire? was hardly capable of formulating a flexible and
realistic policy even in his own sphere of interest - the East.
With regard to Egypt, Curzon1s pre-war imperial outlook, oriented towards 
Persia and India, created serious difficulties. It was obviously impossible for 
him to comprehend fully the nature of wartime changes in that country. In addition, 
since the basis of Curzon's approach differed from that of the local British
establishment, a divergence of views on the solution to the Egyptian problem would
eventually develop. These differences, coming as they did when the position of 
the British in Cairo was rising, left their resolution open to serious question.
There were also several specific factors that affected the management of 
Egyptian affairs and policy. Until the post-war period there was no organised body 
of experienced officials upon whom the Foreign Secretary could call for advice on
3
Egyptian matters. As a result of wartime administrative difficulties within Egypt
and the absence of any unit of the Foreign Office that could deal with them in an
organised fashion, the question of a special 'Egyptian Department' was raised.
The increasing complexity of Egyptian affairs gave rise to the feeling that 'the
tide of war has rolled towards the Middle East & East, and it is undeniable that
the situation in these quarters of the world requires closer attention than was the 
,4case a year ago.
1. Nicolson, op.cit., p.121.
2. Curzon, November 18, 1918 in 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), XXXII (1918),
{italics mine - E.R.J
3. For contemporary criticism of this situation and a comparison with conditions
in the India Office, see: Chirol, Egyptian Problem..., p.207ff.
4. Hardinge to Robert Cecil, August 20, 1918, BM, Balfour Papers, add. 49748.
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It was to deal with these aspects of the Egyptian question that the Egyptian
Administration Committee was constituted in 1917 by the War Cabinet under Curzon's
chairmanship. Although it was decided that a department to deal specifically with
Egypt should be established in the Foreign Office, this was not implemented until
after the war. Furthermore, the very principle of Foreign Office control of
Egyptian affairs was in question and during the war there had been a serious attempt
1
to detach Egypt from its supervision.
The establishment of the Egyptian Section within the Foreign Office Eastern
Department did contribute somewhat to the rationalisation of control and policy.
It did not, however, lay to rest the question of final departmental responsibility.
As late as 1921, Churchill, when accepting responsibility for Middle Eastern affairs
within the Colonial Office, proposed to Lloyd George that Egypt, "unless she ceases
to be administratively controlled by Great Britain,1 should be a Colonial Office 
2responsibility. Curzon secured a decision in his favour in February 1921 and 
wrote his wife:
...Then Cabinet 12-2, rather a long and worrying controversy between 
Winston & myself over the Middle East. He wants to grab everything 
into his new Dept., & to be a sort of Asiatic Forn. Secretary. I
absolutely declined to agree to this, & the P.M. took my side. But
it was hot fighting while it lasted.3
Although Churchill's claim was defeated it was not destroyed and created bitterness 
in the Cabinet. Beaverbrook later claimed that "Many years after Churchill told
me that he would have succeeded in seizing Egypt from Curzonfs clutches if the
4
Government had lived a little longer.’
After serious difficulties in finding qualified personnel, the Middle East
5Section was organised in 1919. It dealt with Egyptian affairs as they referred 
to the Foreign Office and, in the crucial period leading up to Egypt's independence,
1. For details of this episode which occurred while Wingate was in Egypt, see: 
Terry, op.cit., pp.128-31.
2. Churchill to Lloyd George, January 4, 1921, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/9/2/51.
3. Curzon to his wife, February 14, 1921. Beaverbrook, op.cit., p.41.
4• Ibid., p.40.
5. For details of these difficulties, see: Hardinge to Robert Cecil, August 20,
1918, BM, Balfour Papers, add. 49748. T. Loyd was the first head of the Egypt­
ian Department until his resignation in July 1919. For details of his service, 
see: Graham to Allenby, June 11, 1919, FO/141/436(7568/6).
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consisted of three officials: John R. Murray, A. Duff Cooper‘d and E.M.B. Ingrain.
Only Murray had any real experience in Egypt. He had been a member of the
Egyptian civil service for fourteen years and, before coming to London to head the
Egyptian Section, was Acting Secretary General at the Ministry of Finance. Duff
Cooper and Ingram were relatively inexperienced. The former came from the Foreign
Office Commercial Department and the latter had been the Assistant Secretary to 
the Milner Mission, Other officials who dealt with Egypt during most of Allenby's 
service there were Sir Ronald Lindsay, the Assistant Under Secretary of State, 
responsible for Eastern affairs, and Sir Eyre Crowe, the Permanent Under Secretary 
of State from 1920 until his death in 1925. Of the two, only Lindsay had extensive 
knowledge of the area, having served once as the powerful Acting Financial Adviser 
to the Egyptian government.
On the ordinary day-to-day level of Egyptian affairs there are indications
that 'Murray, being expert on the subject, was little interfered with by the higher
2
authorities who were inclined to accept his opinions.' However, on the larger 
issues of policy - precisely where Allenby1s advisers carried so much weight - there 
were acknowledged limits to the manner in which staff such as Murray or even Lind­
say could deal with them. Thus the organisational position of the Foreign Office 
'Egyptian' staff was relatively limited when compared to their counterparts in 
Cairo. The only occasion when 'specialist' staff did enjoy extensive influence 
and authority was when a Foreign Secretary was particularly inexperienced in the
3
relevant area and therefore leaned heavily on his advisers for assistance. In the 
case of Curzon and Eastern affairs, there was the definite assumption of expertise, 
both on his part and on the part of his aides.
Curzon's general approach to his role within the Foreign Office is a further 
indication of some of the limitations placed on his assistants. Curzon's position 
within the Foreign Office was the reverse of that in the Cabinet and he attempted 
to concentrate departmental activity in his own hands as far as possible. Accord­
ing to contemporary testimony, he generally found it difficult to delegate work to 
others. Vansittart, one of Curzon's secretaries, noted that 'when I wrote memo­
randa for him, he would go through the back papers to be sure that I had not made
1. A. Duff Cooper, later Viscount Norwich, left the Foreign Office in February 
1922.
2. Duff Cooper, op.cit., p.99.
3. Frankel, op.cit., pp.28-30.
52
1
a mistake.1 Another secretary, Pembroke Wicks, later commented that Curzon 'kept
a duplicate set of Cabinet papers and other official documents at Carlton House
2
Terrace, handling and sorting them and not using his secretaries.1 This only 
reinforced existing limitations and the contrast with Allenby's staff is quite 
remarkable.
Finally, the domestic environment naturally influenced officials dealing with 
Egypt in London. Career officials in the Foreign Office were relatively isolated 
from the pressures of domestic politics. However, while they may have been pro­
tected against immediate political pressures, their very existence within the 
domestic environment meant they could not avoid G>.'D5'c>\rbioc^  its attitudes and 
values to a far greater extent than was true of British officials active in the 
isolated and foreign environment of Egypt. Also, the very proximity of the Foreign 
Office home establishment to the political leadership increased their awareness 
of the domestic political factors limiting Cabinet options. The advice that was 
tendered by these officials invariably and correctly took these factors into con­
sideration and directed their approach to Egyptian policy. This element, however, 
was obviously less important for the British officials in Cairo.
Thus a tangled skein of interests, pressures and different structures created 
the context of potential differences Hbetween London and Cairo. This affected the 
methods of dealing with Egypt as well as the approach to policy formulation. With 
the emergence of Cairo and London’s increasing pre-occupation elsewhere, not only 
was the potential for disagreement present, but also Cairo had the power to pursue 
those differences. The future direction of Britain’s policy towards Egypt meant 
that the willingness of Allenby and his staff to make use of their authority as a 
rival focus of power would inevitably lead to such disagreement.
1. Lord ^ Robert Gilbert] Vansittart, The Mist Procession; The Autobiography of
Lord Vansittart (London, 1958), p.254.
2. Jones, Whitehall Diaries, I, 239. In his entry for June 4, 1921, Jones, the
Cabinet Secretary, described a meeting with Pembroke Wicks, one of Curzon’s
private secretaries. Wicks, a barrister, complained that he had had nothing
to do for two months except for being ’charged with the keeping of C.’s domes­
tic accounts for his various houses, paying servants’ wages, etc.’ Idem.
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CHAPTER THREE: SHARED PERCEPTI0NS - THE MOTIFS OF POLICY
From the start of the occupation of Egypt in 1882 British policy was based 
on the conviction that the interests of Britain and the Empire were linked inextric­
ably with Egypt. The Suez Canal, which lay at the crossroads of imperial communi­
cations, was seen by Englishman and foreigner alike as 'the spinal cord which
1
connects the backbone and the brain1 of Britain. Once this was accepted as axiom­
atic, the next stage was the construction of a policy which would ensure Britain's 
interests against native 'irresponsibility' and European 'meddling'.
The development of such a policy and its elaboration in the early twentieth 
century to meet altered circumstances required more than a simple awareness of self- 
interest. It involved an entire network of myths, beliefs, attitudes and prejudices, 
or in other words, a perceptual view of Egypt and its inhabitants, and the relation­
ship of England and the Englishman to Egypt and the Egyptian. This became the 
psychological environment which, together with Britain's given interests and exist­
ing circumstances, largely conditioned the atmosphere in which policy was determined.
The bases of the British perceptions of Egypt may well be called the leit­
motifs of policy. These were the various elements which consistently ran through the
opinions and judgments of those Englishmen concerned with or affected by the formu­
lation and execution of policy throughout the Anglo-Egyptian connection. These 
opinions and judgments in turn affected the more complex approaches to policy.
Motifs and Mythology of Policy
One of the most important elements in the overall British view of Egypt was a
2
tradition of paternalism. A system which engendered 'the habit of authority' in
one class and its acceptance by the other classes was transposed to a new context
with Britain's acquisition of overseas possessions and with the need to impose a 
system of or an attitude towards policy.
There were two distinct aspects to paternalism in British administration in the
1. Bismarck to Dr. Moritz Busch, in a conversation on June 8, 1882, in M, Busch,
Bismar^K* Some Secret Pages of His History (New York, 1928), II, 322.
2. A.P. Thornton, The Habit of Authority: Paternalism in British History (London,
1966), passim.
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nineteenth century. The one, based on the utilitarian evangelism of Bentham,
Cobden and Christian Non-Conformism of mid-Victorian England, was the reflection 
of an impulse to do good. Ethical concepts such as honour and mission played an 
important part in the belief that government, 'fired by moral zeal, could shape 
a society.1 No society could be more malleable, in British eyes, than the Eastern 
one and it was sentiments such as these that infused the early reformers of Egypt 
with such enthusiasm for the lot of the fallah.
The development of social and political Darwinism added a new dimension and 
complemented the earlier tradition of 'station'. In mid-Victorian England, an 
advanced industrial society, the capacity for enterprise was the measure of a 
people's place within the hierarchy of nations.^- With the British both determining 
and wielding the yardstick, it was inevitable that Britain be at the summit and the 
inhabitants of the East far below. These two elements were clearly present in the 
British approach to Egypt and, while not antipodean, coexisted only uneasily. But 
in time the ethical and hierarchical aspects of paternalism developed along separate 
and somewhat different lines.
Cromer ably synthesised the early view of what the Englishman ought to do in 
Egypt and his capacity to do this:
The special aptitude shown by Englishmen in the government of Oriental 
races pointed to England as the most effective and beneficent instru­
ment for the gradual introduction of European civilisation into Egypt.2
However, by the end of the 1914-18 war the strongly ethical content of England's 
paternalist impulse in Egypt largely disappeared. The need to protect threatened 
strategic interests in Egypt meant that ethical abstractions such as mission and 
duty became far less tenable. While Churchill could still write in 1921 that
I am not at all prepared to sit still and mute and watch the people 
of this country being slowly committed to the loss of this great and
1. Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p.2.
2. Earl of Cromer \sir Evelyn Baring], Modern Egypt (London, 1908), I, 328. Else­
where Cromer wrote: 'What should be the profession of faith of a sound but 
reasonable Imperialist?.... He will believe that, in the treatment of subject 
races, the methods of government practised by England, though sometimes open to 
legitimate criticism are superior, morally and economically, to those of any 
other nation...1 Earl of Cromer, 'The Government of Subject Races' in Politic­
al and Literary Essays 1908-1913 (London, 1913-16), I, 4.
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splendid monument of British administration, skill and energy,^
such language was largely confined to veteran foreign officials in Egypt who could
be forgiven their atavisms.
More and more those responsible for policy towards Egypt began to think that
it might be necessary for Britain to abandon 'the solicitude we have displayed for
40 years for the orderly conduct of Egyptian Domestic affairs' and contemplate the
possibility of what would happen if the 'Egyptians...demonstrate their*/kbility to
2
govern themselves.1 The emphasis slowly shifted from the question of whether the 
British should rule Egypt, with its ethical implications, to that of whether the
3
Egyptians could rule Egypt, with its political implications.
The element of hierarchy had a more tenacious existence. It was the English­
man's view of himself at the pinnacle of civilisation that Gladstone mocked so 
bitterly at the height of the Eastern debate in the Commons in 1877:
We are endowed with a superiority of character, a noble unselfishness, 
an inflexible integrity which other nations of the world are too slow 
to recognize; and they are stupid enough to think that we - superior 
beings that we are - are to be bound by the same vulgar rules that 
might be justly applicable to the ordinary sons of Adam.4
This attitude of superiority was particularly evident in Egypt and the Sudan where 
a large proportion of British officials was drawn directly from the universities, 
still an upper class preserve. One writer commented that 'The predominance of this 
group undoubtedly left its imprint...in the form of exclusiveness, a certain amount 
of racial arrogance, a feeling of noblesse oblige for the less fortunate classes,
5
a pride in accomplishment, and a sense of duty.'
It was from this superior stance that Egypt and its inhabitants were regarded.
1. Churchill to Curzon, June 13, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/9/3/56.
2. Lindsay Minute, October 15, 1921, FO/371/6205.
3. It is interesting to note that while these changes were taking place in the Bri­
tish view of Egypt, they did not occur to the same extent with respect to the 
Sudan. There 'Britain's binding obligations towards the people of the Soudan1, 
Daily Telegraph, May 6, 1922, were repeatedly reaffirmed in public and in pri­
vate. This may be explained perhaps by the putative level of the Sudan's devel­
opment and the fact that Britain1s control of that region was not as threatened 
as in Egypt. Benevolent paternalism could thus continue unabated.
4. Gladstone, May 7, 1877, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series CCXXXIV (1877), 415.
5. Tignor, op.cit., p.192.
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One of the most striking motifs was the image of the character and mentality of 
the Oriental for whose benefit the Englishman ruled. Lord Cromer's views are an 
excellent illustration of the general picture of the Egyptian. This composite 
figure is also interesting as an implicit commentary on the Englishman's view of 
himself in the East, According to Cromer
Want of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is 
...the main characteristic of the Oriental mind.
The mind of the Oriental...is eminently wanting in symmetry. His 
reasoning is of the most slipshod description.
...the grave and silent Easterner, devoid of energy and initiative, 
stagnant in mind, wanting in curiosity about matters which are new 
to him, careless of waste of time and patient under suffering.
...look at the fulsome flattery, which the Oriental will offer to 
his superior and expect to receive from his inferior...
...the ways of the Oriental are tortuous; his love of intrigue is 
inveterate....He reposes unlimited faith in his cunning...1
Thus from the very start of the Anglo-Egyptian connection the Egyptian was re­
garded as a backward, lazy, incompetent; an intriguing and cunning creature who 
thrived on false flattery which pandered to his vanity. Whether the roots of this
image are in the more generalised notion of the East or in the nature of the British
2
sources of knowledge of Egypt is difficult to tell. Whatever the case, the views 
held by Cromer were deeply imbedded in the British mind.
With the passage of time the Briton's opinions about his native proteges changed
but little. This was true of the British officials in Egypt, of the members of the
Foreign Office, and of the foreigners residing in Egypt. In the post-1919 period, 
when the need to consider an effective policy for Egypt became increasingly urgent, 
the image of the cunning, vain and indolent native remained essentially the same 
as it had been in Cromer's day.
This view of the Egyptian was shared at almost all levels. In particular, the
vanity of the natives and the need to pander to it is a constant theme in the
1. Cromer, Modern Egypt, II, 146-51.
2. Amin Bey, an Egyptian nationalist and Zaghlul's son-in-law, ascribes some Bri­
tish difficulties in this respect to the fact that for social reasons 'the 
British were sometimes dependent for their information on sources which, though 
Oriental, were not Egyptian.' Amin Youssef Bey, Independent Egypt (London, 
1940), p.10.
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documents of the period. Milner wrote that the ’vanity of the Egyptian upper class'
1
was ’one of their most naked characteristics.1 He was not alone in this belief.
John Murray/ head of the Egyptian Department at the Foreign Office, anticipated the
1921 Anglo-Egyptian negotiations with some dismay for ’as we are dealing with
Orientals the conversations are bound to be protracted.1 He added that ’the higher
the social status and political position of the British chairman the more will
2
Egyptian vanity be flattered. ’ Lindsay., Assistant Under-Secretary, strongly agreed
3
'that Egyptians are snobs.1 Curzon, particularly, was not immune to such views
and when Allenby suggested that it might be politic to confer the title of Majesty
on Sultan Ahmad Fuad, he noted that ’His Majesty of Afghanistan is bad enough, we
4do not need another Majesty in Egypt.1 Finally, Herbert Pasha, the Officer 
Commanding, Cairo, in attempting to convince his subordinates in the Egyptian army 
of the dangers involved in disorder, appealed to the interests of their 'class'
5
since ’this pleases their vanity.'
The low esteem in which the native was held had a powerful corollary in the 
fear that virtually every native harboured a violent hatred for Europeans and Chris­
tians and waited for the moment when he could destroy them. This was born of 
Britain's mid-nineteenth century Indian experience and reinforced by the Alexandria 
riots of 1882. Such was this fear that Cromer could use the bete noi2E of a fanati- 
cal native revolt to induce the British government in 1893 to reinforce the army
0
of occupation and strengthen British control contested by the then Khedive Abbas.
Cromer's action apparently had a conditioning effect on the British mind. Thus 
the riots of 1919 and 1921, resulting in great loss of European lives were a con­
firmation that Egypt's foreign residents continued to be the objects of native hatred. 
The ordinary British residents of Egypt were convinced that domestic quarrels 
ominously tended to take 'an anti-European turn' and that 'the assumption that...the
1. Entry for March 8, 1920 in Milner's Diary, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 290, 
pp.147-8.
2. Murray Minute, March 7, 1921, to Allenby to Curzon, March 5, 1921, Tel. No. 141, 
FO/371/6294.
3. Lindsay Minute, March 7, 1921, to ibid.
4. Curzon Minute, May 23, 1921, to Allenby to Curzon, May 22, 1921, Tel. No. 351,
FO/371/6334.
5. E.S. Herbert Pasha to Wingate, February 21, 1922, SAD, Wingate Papers, 240/1.
6. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations
(London, 1969), p.111.
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Egyptians had been trained to restrain their fanatical and anti-European tendencies
...has been proved up to the hilt to be a f a l l acy.'Far  more important, these
views gained wide currency among British officials both in Cairo and in London.
One important British official warned that Egyptian Muslims were 'extreme and anti-
2
foreign,' and counselled greater reliance on the Syrian element in Egypt.
The Military Court of Enquiry into the Alexandria riots of May 1921 stated the 
following in its conclusions:
The Court draws attention to a very important fact. Always there 
has existed in Egypt - at any rate among the lower classes - a 
fanatical hatred of Europeans. It has shown itself again and again.
In 1882 when Great Britain was forced to occupy the country; at 
Denshawai; in 1919; and now again in 1921. Whenever the Government 
has grown too weak to control this feeling; or whenever the people 
think it has grown too weak.^
The 1919 riots were an important factor in converting the more generalised
fears about the natives' hatred of Europeans into the highly specific imagery of
1882. These fears now took the form of a strong apprehension that events might
throw up a new Urabi who would lead a native rising against foreign control. This
was perhaps the most potent leit-motif of British thought about Egypt which was
ruled so uneasily after 1919. Events came to be viewed within this context and the
parallel between Zaghlul and Urabi was often repeated.
Patterson, then acting Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, warned Allenby
in April 1921, that the 'state of affairs has been described by those who remember
4it as closely similar to that prevailing just before the Arabi rebellion.1 In the 
same month Allenby was warned by the Egyptian Prime Minister, Adli Pasha, that the 
Wafd's influence over the Egyptian army - the base of the original Urabi's power - 
was increasing. Allenby made provision for the early dispatch to Egypt of elements
1. V.F. Naggiar (British Chamber of Commerce in Egypt) to Allenby, May 31, 1921 
in Allenby to Curzon, June 6, 1921, Desp. No. 493, FO/371/6297; and, W.E. 
Kingsford (British Union in Egypt) to Allenby, May 26, 1921 in Allenby to Cur­
zon, May 30, 1921, Desp. No. 459, FO/371/6296.
2. R. Greg to R. Furness, February 4, 1921, FO/371/ ^ ^^3. Syrians, who tc?
Egypt around the turn of the century, were considered more trustworthy because
they were an alien and often Christian element in Egyptian society.
3. Summary of the Report of the Military Court of Enquiry into the Alexandria 
Riots of May 1921, p.8 in Allenby to Curzon, July 5, 1921, Desp. No. 587, 
FO/371/6300.
4. Allenby to Curzon, April 30, 1921, Desp. No. 288, FO/371/6295.
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of Britain’s Mediterranean fleet because 'I believe that Zaghlul is in such an
exalted state of mind that it would not be beyond him to attempt a coup similar
1to that of Arabi Pasha.’ Keown Boyd, Oriental Secretary at the Residency and 
later the Director-General of the European Section in the Department of Public 
Security, wrote that Zaghlul, 'sooner or later, may start a sort of Communist [sic]
2
revolution, anti-European, anti-Turk, anti-Landed classes, pure Egyptian business.' 
The frequency with which the Urabi leit-motif recurs was too great to be mere
3
coincidence, and Allenby was deeply affected by it. He soon came to see in
Zaghlul Pasha the greatest threat to Britain's presence in Egypt and was firmly
convinced 'that in all probability Zaghlul will have to be banished from the coun-
4try for good as Arabi was.' This fear continued to preoccupy the British and it
is little wonder, therefore, that when Churchill pressed his opposition to a
liberal policy in Egypt, he reverted in Cabinet to the familiar spectre of the
5
slaughter of Europeans. In addition, he publicly warned that the 'mobs of Cairo 
and Alexandria* would make 'short work of the European and foreign populations.'^
Approaches: Cromerism and Neo-Cromerism
Built upon all these diverse and recurring themes were the two more complex and 
major approaches to policy which in turn eventually became a part of the overall 
British perception of Egypt. These approaches were what came to be known as 'Cromer- 
ism' and 'Milnerism'. Their particular prominence can be attributed to Cromer's
1. Allenby to Curzon, April 8, 1921, Tel. No. 223, FO/371/6294.
2. Keown Boyd to Col. Watson-, June 30, 1921, FO/371/6301.
3. Two striking examples are: 1Zaghloul no doubt relied on mob force throughout
the country under most favourable circumstances...primarily to overthrow the 
Cabinet and next the Dynasty a la Araby.' Excerpt of a letter from Major Ander­
son, Senior Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, June 6, 1921,
FO/371/6297; and, 'Today we have another Arabi, the tool of the older class of 
statesmen, who see in the new order of things a death-blow to their vested in­
terests...' E50, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Report, June 18, 1921, 
FO/371/6297.
4. Allenby made these comments to Sir Eyre Crowe on October 1, 1921, Crowe Minute, 
to Scott to Curzon, September 30, 1921, Tel. No. 565, FO/371/6305.
5. W.S. tijhurchillj. f The European Communities in Egypt, July 28, 1921, C.P.3171,
CAB/24/126.
6. Churchill in a speech to the British Cotton Growing Association, Times, June 7, 
1921.
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early success, his later unassailable authority and, in the case of Milnerism, to
the position of its author and the circumstances of its espousal.
The essence of Cromerism was the translation of the political dicta of Lord
Granville's despatch on British policy into a framework of administrative reality.
Nominal Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt and Great Power interest in the region to a
large extent imposed on Britain the need to adopt the indirect methods of a ’veiled 
1
protectorate1. Inspired by Cromer's concern about these external restrictions,
Granville's policy had two bases: Britain's 'giving advice1 to the nominal rulers
of Egypt, and insistence 'on the adoption of the policy they recommend1 to the
point, if necessary, of assuring 'that those Ministers and Governors who do not
2
follow this course should cease to hold their offices.1 The object was to secure 
'that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character
3
and possess the elements of stability.' Cromer interpreted this as a policy where-
4
by 'we do not govern Egypt, we only govern the governors of Egypt.'
The strategic interests that brought the British to Egypt made stability a
major concern of policy and this would of necessity lead to the attempt to recon-
struct Egypt's internal administration. At the time Britain's strategic interests
were not regarded as irreconcilable with the paternalist view that the Englishman
5
'came not as a conqueror, but in the familiar garb of a saviour of society.' 
Therefore, by 'governing the governors' Cromer was able to develop an administrative 
approach that suited Britain's interests in, as well as her current views about the 
East.
Cromer sought to ensure the prosperity of the peasants, 'for centuries past...
£
a subject race,' through the close supervision of the material aspects of their
1. Alfred Milner, England and Egypt (London, 1904), p.25.
2. Granville to Baring, January 4, 1883, Desp. No. 6, in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy 
in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record (New Jersey, 1956), 1,
pp.IS7-9. For details about this period, see: J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Re­
lations, 1800-1956 (London, 1965) 6<?e : Ti qg«cjk ‘
3. Granville, February 5, 1884, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CCLXXXIV (1884), 
30.
4. Cited in al-Sayyid, op.cit., p.68.
5. Cromer, op.cit., II, 123. It is interesting that according to Cromer 'one of 
the first qualifications necessary in order to play the part of a saviour of 
society is that the saviour should believe in himself and his mission.' Ibid., 
II, 124.
6. Cromer, op.cit., I, 328.
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society. On the other hand, he dealt with the formal government of Egypt through 
an ostensibly autonomous native elite amenable to British 'advice'. The result 
was that the Englishman 'would not annex Egypt, but he would do as much good to the 
country as if he had annexed it.’*5* Thus, from the start, the underlying principle 
of Cromerism as a policy was the harmonising of appearance and reality. From this 
the rest flowed naturally: ruling but not being seen to rule.
In time Cromerism became more than an administrative system. What had been a 
pragmatic policy constructed on the basis of the current political and diplomatic 
constellation as well as contemporary attitudes became for some a pervasive myth, 
overlaid with nostalgia for the simpler days, and an important factor in the approach 
to future policy formulation. Two .factors were responsible for this development: 
Cromer's unusual ability and the changes in Egypt.
The mystique surrounding the personality of 'the Lord', as Cromer was common­
ly known in Egypt, was especially powerful. According to Curzon he was 'a man...
2
with a remarkable gift, with that genius for ruling an Oriental country.1 Cromer 
became the prototype for the British proconsul in the East. Milner voiced the sen­
timents of most of his contemporaries when he wrote in 1890 that Cromer's 'unosten­
tatious supremacy is a real masterpiece of political management', and wondered
3
'whether we could possibly get on without him.'
The 1914-18 war transformed this admiration for Cromer and his genius into an 
admiration for the age of Cromer. Harry Boyle, Cromer's Oriental Secretary, wrote 
after his return to Cairo in 1921 that
The period during which Lord Cromer held the office of agent and 
consul-general in Egypt has passed into tradition as a sort of golden 
age. All the shortcomings of the regime are forgotten, and even men 
who were at the time antagonistic and hostile critics now profess the 
prevailing belief.^
The earlier system of indirect British rule was dislocated by the protectorate, 
while the exigencies of the war altered the relationship between Britain and Egypt 
that had hitherto existed. Egypt's nominal autonomy was replaced by openly declared
1. Ibid., II, 125.
2. Curzon, Stenographic Notes of a Meeting of Representatives of the United King­
dom, the Dominions and India, July 6, 1921, FO/371/6301.
3. Milner to Goschen, January 5, 1890, cited in al-Sayyid, op.cit., p.83.
4. Boyle to Vansittart, June 11, 1921, Enclosure 2, FO/371/6298.
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tutelage. The handful of capable inspectors who supervised Egypt’s development
and administration under the 'mufettish' system were overwhelmed by the influx of
large numbers of inexperienced officials. By 1919 British rule was more complex,
resented and uneasy than in the days of Cromer.
Faced with this new and disquieting situation, there was a desire to return to
the earlier 'Halcyon Days'. This was especially true among those who had served
1
in Egypt during 'the palmy days of the "Cromer Myth".1 Boyle, who returned to
Egypt after an absence of fourteen years, was representative of this group which
viewed the protectorate as an episode and wished to return to the informal but
effective rule of the late nineteenth century - to the old balance between appear-
2ance and reality.
Imperialist circles in London, especially those that gathered around the Sec­
retary of State for War, Winston Churchill, had a more pragmatic view of Cromerism. 
They believed that it was necessary to maintain 'British control over Egypt on a
footing more or less similar to that which had prevailed during the thirty-nine
3years of the British occupation.1 However, since this sentiment was centred in 
London there was little of the nostalgic attachment, prevalent among many British 
officials in Egypt, to the informal administrative system of pre-protectorate days. 
They accepted the need for strict Cromerian control for imperial reasons, but not 
the manner in which Cromer exercised this control. As a result these circles be­
lieved that the British position could only be maintained by continuing the protec-
4
torate which was seen as 'a solemn act of State' not to be easily revoked. The 
attraction of this view for Churchill was not the return to the mythical days of 
Cromer, but the practical assurance that Britain's position in Egypt would be 
maintained as before and that her imperial interests would continue to be protected.
1. Minute by Murray, June 23, 1921, to Boyle to Vansittart, June 11, 1921, 
FO/371/6298.
2. Boyle believed, like many other officials, that despite the changes in Egypt it 
was possible to return to the old system whereby the country was ruled by a 
small band of dedicated and capable officials. This was the gist of Boyle's 
long memorandum on British policy. Boyle to Vansittart, June 11, 1921, FO/371/ 
6298. Then, in his conversations with Foreign Office officials 'he advocated
a reversion pure & simple to what is called Cromerism.1 Lindsay Minute, June 
26, 1921 to ibid.
3. Allenby to Curzon, April 16, 1921, Desp. No. 311, FO/371/6295.
4. W.S. Churchill]. / Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War: The Egyptian
Proposals, August 24, 1920, C.P.1803, CAB/24/111.
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Approaches: Milnerism
The concession of form in order to retain the essence of power, the tradition­
al balance of Cromerism, leads to the discussion of its successor, Milnerism.
While Churchill and neo-Cromerites were attracted by the formal aspects of Cromer- 
ian control, it was Milner who attempted to reestablish - given the circumstances 
of the day - the spirit of Cromerism: the balance between appearance and reality.
The decision to send a mission of enquiry to Egypt to recommend measures which 
would end the post-war unrest and maintain the protectorate was taken shortly 
after Allenby1s appointment in March 1919. After months of delay, the Special 
Mission,1 headed by Lord Milner, the aging Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
arrived in Egypt in December 1919 and left in March 1920. From June to August 1920 
Milner held conversations in London with Zaghlul Pasha and members of the Egyptian 
delegation accompanying him.
The Mission's visit to Egypt and the London conversations resulted in a series 
of proposals. According to the Conclusions of the Report, these were made in an 
effort to effect 'a reconciliation of British and Egyptians' and, 'by giving scope 
to...[the] spirit of independence and to the increased capacity of the Egyptians to 
govern their own country, to win over the better elements of Nationalism and restore 
the spirit of good-will and cooperation between British and Egyptians in the work 
of Government.1^
The Mission proposed in its report that these aims should be realised through
negotiation of a treaty between Britain and Egypt. The independence and integrity
of Egypt would be guaranteed and she would be protected against foreign aggression.
In return, Britain would retain 'a certain measure of control for the protection of
3
British and foreign interests.'
The Mission left the details of such a treaty for a later stage but stated 
certain positions which ought not to be abandoned: the influence and prestige of
1. The members of the Milner Mission were: Sir Rennel Rodd, a former colleague of
Cromer and late ambassador to Rome; Gen. Sir John Maxwell who had served in 
E9YPb; Brigadier-General Sir Owen Thomas, a former Labour Member of Parliament 
and Boer War hero; J.A. Spender, Editor of the Westminster Gazette; and, Sir 
Cecil Hurst, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office.
2* General Conclusions of the Report of the Special Mission to Egypt, March 3,
1920 [hereafter Conclusions!; p. 2 in Milner to Curzon, May 17, 1920, FO/371/6295.
3. Idem.
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the British High Commissioner should be preserved, with the control of Egypt's 
foreign relations and the protection of foreign interests in Egypt vested in him; 
legislation affecting foreigners should be enacted only with the concurrence of the 
High Commissioner; Britain should continue to maintain an army in Egypt, determine 
its strength and disposition, and have access to Egypt's installations for commu­
nications; and, because of her responsibility for the interests of foreigners, 
Britain should have a degree of control over the Egyptian departments dealing with 
finance, justice and public security with the retention of at least two British ad­
visers. In return, Egypt would be granted the following concessions: within the
stated limitations, the Egyptian government would have full control over the coun­
try's internal administration; would be able to determine what positions, other 
than those specifically reserved by treaty, should be filled by British officials; 
and, would have the right to maintain non-political relations with foreign powers 
and to conclude commercial treaties with Britain's approval. Thus in the Conclu­
sions to its Report, the Milner Mission clearly departed from the principle of the 
protectorate and proposed in its place a bilateral contractual relationship provi­
ding a form of well-regulated independence for Egypt.
The Memorandum that Milner presented to Curzon in August 1920, following the 
conversations with Zaghlul, further departed from the existing formal British posit­
ion in Egypt. It specified the nature of the envisaged treaty relationship:
Britain would recognise 'the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy 
with representative institutions,1 while Egypt would grant Britain, in time of need, 
'all the assistance in her power.1'*' As in the original proposals, Britain would 
protect Egypt against aggression or foreign interference. A number of points enu­
merated in the Milner Memorandum went a good deal beyond the earlier proposals 
embodied in the Mission's Conclusions. The most important of these was the conces­
sion of the control of Egypt's foreign relations to the Egyptian government with 
the ambiguous condition that Egypt would not 'adopt in foreign countries an attitude 
which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great 
Britain.'^
These two sets of proposals provided the bare bones of Milnerism. Milnerism 
was important for several reasons. First, it was the last major attempt to formulate
1. Milner Memorandum, August 21, 1920 [hereafter Memorandum], p.l, FO/371/6295.
2. Idem.
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a general policy towards Egypt before the declaration of its independence in 1922.
Second, Milnerism added a new and often confusing dimension to British views on
Egypt because its essence was apparently so misunderstood. Finally, it became the
touchstone of future policy towards Egypt. Milner's more imperialist critics were
1
convinced that the Mission 'signed the surrender to Egyptian Nationalism' and
2
turned Britain into 'nothing more than well-wisher and privileged friend' to Egypt. 
This view was held by most historians who saw Milner as 'by no means a die-hard 
in respect to Anglo-Egyptian relations, but a statesman with liberal views in a
3
changing world' who 'did not look upon Egypt as part of the British Empire,' but
4
'believed that independence was the proper status for the country.'
These interpretations of Milnerism were based on two related sources: the
Milner Mission's innovative proposals and the activities of one of its more articu­
late members, J.A. Spender, the Liberal editor of the Westminster Gazette. The 
argument in support of Milner's liberalism was that initially he had been sent to 
find a solution to Britain's difficulties in Egypt within the framework of the pro­
tectorate. However, barely two weeks after arriving in Egypt, on December 27, 1919, 
the Mission changed its brief by declaring its aims to be the reconciliation of
'the aspirations of the Egyptian people with the special interests which Britain has
5m  Egypt.' Both the advocates and the opponents of Milnerism viewed this as one 
of the most significant moments in the Mission's activities determining the direc­
tion of its policy. Lord Lloyd, an implacable foe of Milnerism and Allenby's suc­
cessor as High Commissioner, wrote that this 'enormous concession,' meant that 'the
£
Mission tore up its own terms of reference.' With this act widely accepted as the
first indication of the Mission's true views, Milner's final recommendations to
the British government were inevitably placed within the neat liberal pattern pre­
pared for it.
This view of radical innovation received added impetus from the extensive and
1. Lloyd, op.cit., II, 47. 2. Ibid., II, 33.
3. John ,E. Wrench, Alfred Lord Milner: The Man of No Illusions, 1854-1925 (Lon­
don, 1958), p.362.
4. A.M. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics: A Study of Lord Milner in Opposition and
in Power (London, 1964), p.592. For similar views see, V. Halperin, Lord Mil­
ner and the Empire: The Evolution of British Imperialism (London, 1952),
pp.78ff.
5. Text in Gollin, op.cit., p.591. 6. Lloyd, op.cit., II, 15.
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extremely important activities of J.A. Spender who spent much time and energy in
advocating his understanding of the Mission's approach to Egyptian policy after
1
his return to England. Spender's polemical writings and memoirs were the first
version of the workings and motives of Milner and his Mission. It was these
accounts that formed the basis for much that was uncritically accepted about 
2Milnerism. His accounts, however, were more a reflection of his own partisan 
approach to the entire Egyptian question than a true picture of Milner's motives 
and the nature of his views. While Spender did not succeed immediately in the 
object of his advocacy, namely the adoption of Milnerism as Britain's policy, he 
succeeded admirably in convincing most people of Milner's presumed liberalism.
The question now arises whether Milnerism was in fact completely outside the 
sphere of previous policy or whether its components were based upon the traditional 
elements of the British approach to Egypt. The answer to this may be found in Lord 
Milner's conception of Egypt, his approach to the Special Mission and the manner in 
which he viewed its results.
Milner's career as an official in the Egyptian Ministry of Finance reveals
3
more or less orthodox views. His work, England in Egypt, first published in 1893, 
is an unexceptional statement of the period approach. The ensuing years saw little 
change in Milner's opinions about Egypt and its place within the British imperial 
scheme. In 1917, when the future of Egypt was. being considered by the Egyptian
1. For a detailed description of Spender's activities on behalf of a liberal solu­
tion to the Egyptian question, see the twelve-page note, Spender and Egypt, 
prepared by G.C. Delaney, the veteran Reuters correspondent in Cairo, for the 
biography of Spender by H. Wilson Harris, STAC, Delaney Papers, 1944. Also, 
see the articles on Egypt in the Westminster Gazette throughout the period.
2. For example, Spender's account of the December 1919 declaration and the motives 
behind it are accepted unquestioningly by Wrench, loc.cit., Halperin, loc.cit., 
and Gollin, loc.cit. The degree to which Spender served as a primary source 
can be seen from a comparison of the following passages: 1) Milner 'did not
share the vulgar opinion that Egypt was part of the British Empire, but held, 
on the contrary, [that] the restoration of her independence, subject to certain 
essential safeguards, was the logical and natural development of the occupation 
and our pledges in regard to it.' Spender, op.cit., p.91. 2) 'Milner, espec­
ially, believed that a settlement of some kind was necessary, for the sake of 
Britain's position in the Near East. Moreover, an old Egyptian official, he 
did not look upon Egypt as part of the British Empire. Subject to certain 
safeguards, he believed that independence was the proper status for the country.' 
Gollin, loc.cit. All the writers refer to Spender in their notes as a primary 
source.
3. Milner, op.cit., passim.
Administration Committee, Milner reflected the consensus and stated that
Unless we lose the war, Egypt will in future be as much part of the 
British Empire as India or Nigeria. Whether we proceed to annexa­
tion or, as I personally think better, we content ourselves with 
the form of a Protectorate, in either case we shall be virtually re­
sponsible for the good government of the whole vast territory from 
the Mediterranean to the headwaters of the Nile.*^
Once he had embarked on his Mission, Milner's approach to Egypt was charac­
terised by administrative pragmatism rather than by any great commitment to doctrin­
aire liberalism. After the widespread Egyptian boycott of the Mission it was the 
practical approach that led Milner to the conclusion that 'the agitation for "com­
plete independence" has swept right over the country,1 and 'is a serious danger,
2which by hook or by crook we must try to overcome.' The tenor of Milner's words
indicates that he did not contemplate an abject surrender to irresistible Wilsonian
principles, as Lloyd suggested, but was trying to come to terms realistically with
a people who 'are at the moment somewhat intoxicated with the new craze for "self- 
3
determination."1
It was against this background that the Mission took its first major step -
the declaration of December 27. Despite the great significance read into this early
act, Milner wrote in his diary on December 23, 1919, that the manifesto would be
issued primarily 'in order to remove the prejudice which has been excited against
4
it the Mission and to induce the Egyptians to come forward and discuss with it.' 
Milner not only appears to have had only practical considerations in mind at the 
time, but also seems largely unaware of the manifesto's possible repercussions in 
the future. Again he notes in his diary:
Visit to Allenby this morning at 10 & about an hour's conversation.
I showed him the proposed manifesto, to wh. he agreed, after a little 
hesitation. He was very anxious that he shd seem in any way to budge 
from 'the Protectorate'...But he was quite reconciled, when I pointed 
out to him that our manifesto in no way abandoned our position in 
this respect, but simply threw the door open to discussion.5
1. Milner, Memorandum, October 31, 1917, PCL, Storrs Papers, Box II, 4.
2. Milner to Lloyd George, December 28, 1919, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/39/1/52.
3. MQllne^* , Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies: The Egyptian
Proposals, September 16, 1920, C . P .1870, CAB/24/111[hereafter Egyptian Proposals].
4. Milner Diary, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 289, p.69.
5. Entry for December 26, 1919, Milner Diary, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 289, p.172.
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Once having faced this problem, Milner and the Mission set about defining in
a like manner the problems that confronted the British administration in Egypt.
From the documents of the period, two major factors appear to have taken on primary
importance: the Egyptians1 strong detestation of the language and implications of
the protectorate - a corollary to the ’craze for "self-determination’"; and, the
apparent breakdown of the longstanding collaboration between a local elite and the
British officials in Egypt. Both were closely related.
The first factor, Egyptian hatred of the very word 'protectorate', was of the
utmost importance. In its Arabic form, himaya, it literally meant protectorate or
patronage.'*' However, it also possessed the pejorative connotation of protection
extended to a subject people or race. This was by no means unknown to many English
observers whatever their views. Spender described the terms as 'a word notoriously
2
signifying a servile condition,1 while Valentine Chirol of the Times wrote that
the word 'in its Arabic form connoted a humiliating status of inferiority, JthatJ had
3come to stink in the nostrils of all Egyptians.1 P.G. Elgood, a British official 
in Egypt, noted that 'into the expression the Egyptians read a sinister and humili­
ating meaning, an intention on the part of England to indicate to the world his 
4inferiority.’
For these reasons Milner was convinced - on practical grounds - that to carry
on as before raised 'the prospect of the difficulties which the permanent hostility
5
of the Egyptian intelligentsia will create for us. This would become the greatest 
obstacle to continuing Britain’s traditional system of ruling through amenable 
native proteges and would result in the impossible situation where 'every act of
1. The concept of Himaya had a long history dating back to the pre-Islamic period 
when it meant the protection given for compensation by nomads to settled in­
habitants or travellers in territory controlled by them. In the mediaeval 
period this described the relationship between patron and client, similar to 
practices in Byzantium or the late Roman Empire. In the later Ottoman Empire 
the term Himaya referred to the non-Muslim communities who enjoyed the consular 
protection of the Powers. Thus the term began as a description of a relation­
ship of inequality and later was used in connection with 'inferior' non-Muslims. 
For details, see: Cl. Cahen and P.J. Vatikiotis, 'Himaya', in Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, III, 394-5.
2. J.A. Spender, "The Egyptian Problem," Qly Rev., 237 (April, 1922), p.418.
3. Sir Valentine Chirol, Occident and Orient (Chicago, 1924), pp.92-3.
4. P.G. Elgood, The Transit of Egypt (London, 1928), p.252.
5. Milner, Conclusions, p.2.
69
1authority which we exercise is liable to be challenged, and is in fact challenged-' 
Britain's problems appeared to centre uj^ o a the nominal relation in which Egypt 
stood to Britain and the manner in which this threatened the system of cooperative 
Anglo-Egyptian rule instituted in Cromer's day.
Milner's opinions of Egypt's place in the British imperial scheme should be 
viewed against this assessment of Britain's difficulties. Despite any claim by 
others to the contrary, Milner never strayed from the tenets of orthodoxy. He was 
fully convinced that
Egypt is now not only the road to our Eastern Empire, but has also 
become the road to the new territories under the British flag....It 
is truly the nodal point of our whole Imperial scheme.^
Milner further wrote that
...We want a military base in Egypt for our own imperial purposes 
...We want a strong foot-hold in Egypt as being a vital link in 
the chain of Empire. That is the only reason wh. we ever went 
there. We could not let Egypt fall into other hands.3
Milner's proposals for a new policy resulted from his assessment of Britain's 
position in Egypt and her interests there. If viewed within the context of the 
protectorate, Milnerism was indeed innovative. A bilateral treaty status was pro­
posed in place of the previous unilateral position of 'veiled protectorate' or 
later the open protectorate, and the emphasis of control was to be shifted from the 
country's internal administration to its external relations as they impinged on 
Britain's imperial interests. The important point here, however, with regard to the 
essence of Milnerism, is the motivation behind Milner's specific proposals and the 
manner in which he believed these would operate.
With regard to the formal status of ally proposed for Egypt, Milner firmly 
maintained that this was meant 'to give such rights as Great Britain may hereafter
possess in Egypt unquestionable legal basis in the deliberate consent of the Egypt- 
4ian people.' He postulated that in order to re-establish Anglo-Egyptian collabo­
ration, previously the basis of the British position, it would be necessary to con­
cede the facade of independence to retain the essence of power. This was an updated
1. Ibid., p .1. 2. Ibid., p .2.
3. Milner to Curzon, August 19, 1920, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 162.
4. Milner, Conclusions, p.l.
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version of Cromer's 'governing the governors' - the balance between appearance and 
reality. Milner expressed his belief in this balance on several occasions. He 
wrote that since the basis of British difficulties was 'our "administrative occu­
pation" of the country, our interference with all their domestic affairs,''*' it was 
necessary to find the means by which nationalism's vocal demands could be recon­
ciled with Britain's overriding interests.
The difficulty is to find a way of making Egypt's relation to Great 
Britain appear a more independent and dignified one that it ever 
really can be without our abandoning the degree of control which, in 
view of native incompetence and corruption, we are constrained to 
keep.2
Here Milner returned to Cromer's balance: the solution might be found in
The blessed word Emphasis adde^! 'independence' which will get us 
round many awkward corners just as the unfortunate word 'Protectorate' 
would make even Paradise unattractive to the Egyptians.3
Milner's reasoning here was quite clear. He believed that Egypt was the 'Clapham
Junction of the Empire, and so long as that station was, in fact, in British hands,
4
he could see no objection to Clapham ruling itself.'
Milner was quite aware that, within the framework of the protectorate, his
5
proposals constituted a 'more liberal plan,' yet he also believed that beyond this
'in a sense they really are a step backward, but to a more secure position than that
which we now occupy.'^ Here Milner was convinced - despite Lloyd George's later
remark that 'in the days of incipient decreptitude he had shown his readiness to
7surrender so much' - that 'even in my hey-day I should have regarded the proposed
1. Ibid., p .2.
2. Milner to Lloyd George, December 28, 1919, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/39/1/52.
3. Ibid., p.4. Milner adopted the approach of conceding appearance in order to
retain the essence of power even in his most controversial proposal - Egyptian 
control of foreign affairs. In the Cabinet of January 4, 1921 he stated: 'If
the Egyptians were given the appearance of controlling their own foreign affairs 
they would not bother about the substance, and the terms of the proposed Treaty 
absolutely precluded their having any foreign policy independent of Great Bri­
tain. ' Cabinet 1(21), CAB/23/24.
4. Milner to L.S. Amery in 1921. Cited in Halperin, op.cit., p.83. For similar
comments by Milner, see Conclusions, p.3.
5. Ibid., p.4. 6. Ibid., p.l.
7. Lloyd George to the Marquess of Reading, August 14, 1929, BLL, Lloyd George
Papers, G/16/10/4.
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concessions as just and politic, and as calculated to strengthen and not to weaken
1our Imperial position.1
Perhaps the best evidence in favour of the claim for Milnerism as the heir to 
the spirit of Cromerism may be found in a comment in the Mission's Conclusions that 
was not intended for publication:
In pursuing this policy we must take account of the sensitiveness of 
the Egyptians, of their self-importance and love of forms and phrases, 
and seek to give to the future status of Egypt the greatest appearance 
of independence compatible with the maintenance of the absolutely in­
dispensable minimum of British control.^
1. Milner, Conclusions, p.l.
2. This appeared in square brackets in Conclusions, p.2, and Milner wrote to Cur­
zon that those comments were extremely important and that 1 they ought to go 
forward with the rest...whatever may be done with the other parts of the memo­
randum, those bracketed passages should under no circumstances be published.1 
Milner to Curzon, May 17, 1920, Curzon Papers, FO/800/153.
PART TWO: CAIRO'S YEARS, 1922-1923
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS
...the political history of Egypt has been the history of the slow 
dissolution of the Granville despatch.!
With the despatch of the Milner Mission’s General Conclusions to Lord Curzon,
Britain's formal position in Egypt declined at an accelerated pace. Two years
elapsed, however, before the British government unilaterally granted independence
to Egypt in March 1922. Despite the appearance of activity, there is a measure of
truth in the observation that often 1 interest is not tantamount to policy and
2
activity does not constitute action.1
A review of the events intervening between the presentation of Milner's 
Report and the declaration of independence illustrates the difficulty and hesita­
tion that characterised the British attempt to formulate and implement a viable 
policy.
Prelude to Negotiations
The Milner Mission forwarded its conclusions to Lord Curzon in May 1920. At 
the end of August, Milner supplemented this with a memorandum incorporating the re­
sults of his conversations with Saad Zaghlul, the nationalist leader, as well as 
with Adli Pasha and other Egyptian government leaders who had come to London after
the boycott of the Mission in Egypt. This Memorandum and the Conclusions formed
3
the basis of Milner's solution for the Egyptian problem.
Although the Milner proposals had already been transmitted to the Residency, 
been released by the Egyptians to their press and been the subject of sharp comment
4
in Cabinet Papers, the actual texts were only formally submitted to the Cabinet
1. M.S. Amos, England and Egypt (Nottingham: Cust Foundation Lecture, 1929), p.10.
2. Frankel, op.cit., p.197.
3. For a detailed outline of Milner's proposals, see supra, pp.63-64.
4. For example, Churchill wrote a biting critique of Milner's scheme based on 'the
proposals which have been published in all the newspapers,1 but which had not 
yet been submitted to the Cabinet. W.S .Cjhurchill). , The Egyptian Proposals: 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, August 24, 1920, C.P. 1803, 
CAB/24/111.
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with Curzon1 s covering note on October 11, 1920.*'' Explaining that the Cabinet's 
adjournment had prevented their earlier submission, Curzon urged the serious con­
sideration of Milner's proposals. Although they had been formulated independently 
and did not commit the government, Curzon noted that the government was committed
by Allenby's pledge to the Sultan that a delegation would be appointed 'to discuss
2
the projected arrangement with llis Majesty's Government.' He therfore called for 
a decision on a British negotiating position, to be followed by an invitation to 
the Sultan to send a delegation to London for talks. Optimistic that this could 
be done quickly, Curzon asked Allenby to remain in England for an additional fort­
night so that he could return to Egypt with a proposal in hand.
Curzon's optimism was misplaced. No action was taken for months. Despite 
the urgency of the situation, the Cabinet was asked by Churchill and his supporters,
as late as January 4, 1921, to defer a decision in view of Dominion interest,
3
‘until after a discussion at the Imperial Cabinet next summer.'
Allenby, however, was concerned about the effects of further delay and, on
January 17, cabled a formula for an invitation to the Sultan to send a delegation
to London. Acknowledging that his formula, offering a 'treaty of alliance' if
Britain's 'special interests' were secured, 'admits us to abolition of protectorate
if negotiations prove successful,' Allenby believed that 'abolition is implied if
4
policy initiated by Lord Milner is to be pursued.' Therein lay the difficulty:
the Cabinet was still either unable or unwilling to decide whether Milner's policy
was indeed to be pursued. Curzon placed Allenby's formula before the Cabinet on
February 22 and called for action lest there be a recurrence of disturbances. Yet
5
doubts were expressed as to the urgency for action.' Allenby's formula was
accepted with one major revision: the term 'treaty of alliance' was replaced by
£
the vaguer word 'relationship'. There still was resistance to the notion of a 
treaty.
1. C[urzonj. of KjjsddlestonJ . , The Egyptian Proposals: Memorandum by the Secre­
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, October 11, 1920, FO/371/6295.
2. Ibid., p .8.
3. Cabinet Minutes, January 4, 1921, Cabinet 1(21), CAB/23/24.
4. Allenby to Curzon, January 17, 1921, Tel. No. 39, FO/371/6292.
5. Cabinet Minutes, February 22, 1921, Cabinet 9(21), CAB/23/24.
6. Curzon to Allenby, February 22, 1921, Tel. No. 119, FO/371/6292.
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Once an invitation had been extended to the Sultan, events in Egypt took on 
1increasing importance. As a result of the invitation, the caretaker Ministry 
of Affairs resigned and Adli Yakan Pasha formed a new government on March 18. Adli 
then appealed to Zaghlul, despite the latter's reservations about the Milner pro­
posals, to join in the forthcoming negotiations the results of which would be 
submitted for ratification to a newly-elected National Assembly. Adli further 
pledged not to take any far-reaching steps in anticipation of a new parliamentary 
regime. Adli's new government was given an enthusiastic reception and appeared to 
enjoy widespread support.
Zaghlul meanwhile informed Adli by cable from Paris that he would cooperate 
if four conditions were met: immediate abolition of the protectorate; Britain's
acceptance of Zaghlul's 'reserves' to the Milner proposals; an end to British 
martial law and censorship; and, finally, Zaghlul's appointment as president of 
the delegation to London with his supporters constituting a majority of that body. 
Zaghlul returned to Egypt on April 4 and received a tumultuous and extended welcome. 
It was apparent that the negotiation of an acceptable agreement would require 
Zaghlul's cooperation.
Negotiations between Zaghlul and Adli began shortly thereafter and continued 
for ten days. While the Ministry was unable to accept Zaghlul's first three de­
mands - since these could be accepted only by the British government - there 
appeared to be an identity of views on the nature of a satisfactory Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement. Zaghlul's insistence on the presidency of the delegation and a majority 
of its membership, however, caused the talks to break down. Since the Egyptian 
government would be responsible for the consequences of the talks, Adli was not 
willing to cede control over their direction in London.
At this point the Residency was apprehensive that events in Egypt might get
out of hand. As early as April 8 Allenby expressed concern that Zaghlul's 'exalted
2state of mind' raised the possibility of a coup 'similar to that of Arabi Pasha'.
He urged the despatch of warships. At the Foreign Office Murray discounted these 
fears, but Lindsay and Crowe were concerned that 'a single lunatic [zaghluij can so
1. For a detailed summary of events in the period between the despatch of an in' 
vitation and the Alexandria riots and for a Foreign Office appreciation of 
these events, see, Murray, Minute, May 24, 1921, FO/371/6296.
2. Allenby to Curzon, April 8, 1921, Tel. No. 223, FO/371/6294.
1
upset things.'
The situation in Egypt deteriorated after the end of the Adli-Zaghlul talks
on April 25. Allenby's fears about disturbances appeared justified. Wafdist
demonstrations were organised against Adli's government and at the same time some
moderates withdrew their support from Zaghlul. There were outbreaks in Tanta on
April 29. There were major disturbances in Cairo and Alexandria on May 20,
followed by violent anti-European rioting on May 22. The demonstrations resulted
in the loss of life and were finally suppressed by British troops. The delegation
2
to London was formed on May 10. Although the agitation and disturbances diminished 
before the delegation's departure for London, they nevertheless bode ill for any 
attempt to gain popular approval in Egypt for a negotiated settlement, no matter 
how liberal the terms. This was especially true in light of the British govern­
ment' s as yet unrevealed reluctance to make several major concessions.
A Negotiating Position: London
The Egyptian delegation's imminent arrival in London at the beginning of July 
forced a Cabinet decision on Britain's negotiating position. The avoidance of a 
decision was not due to the absence of definite views within the government, but 
rather the result of sharply divergent approaches in the Foreign Office, the 
Cabinet, the Dominions, and at the Residency, making a uniform position difficult 
to achieve. These opposing views, all having the identical aim of securing British 
interests in Egypt, clearly emerged in the months following the publication of the 
Milner Report. As was noted, the Milner scheme was the touchstone for policy. Xt 
was supported, attacked, modified, or served as the springboard for further con­
cessions; but in each case it was at the centre of policy consideration and it is 
within this context that the various approaches to policy must be viewed.
One of Curzon's biographers noted that Curzon supported Milner's proposals and 
'was anxious for its [the scheme'sj acceptance.'  ^ This, however, was not quite true.
1. Minutes by Murray, Lindsay and Crowe to Allenby to Curzon, April 8, 1921, Tel. 
No. 223, FO/371/6294.
2. Its more prominent members were Adli Pasha, the Prime Minister, Husayn Rushdi 
Pasha, the wartime Prime Minister, and Ismail Sidqi Pasha, one of the original 
members of the Wafd that called on Wingate.
3. Nicholson, op.cit., p.176.
Curzon’s first official comments on the scheme were in the memorandum he circulated
to the Cabinet on October 11, 1920. He gave the proposal only conditional support
and the conditions were by no means minor. Milner advocated the appearance of
independence for Egypt by granting her a large measure of domestic autonomy while
securing Britain's strategic interests through the retention of troops along the
Suez Canal. Curzon, however, was reluctant to concede autonomy to the Egyptians
in their internal affairs. Despite his formal acknowledgement of the Mission's
1
'great national and Imperial service,1 Curzon wrote to Balfour only two days later
that 'Milner's proposals...have filled me with a great deal of alarm....Consider
2
carefully whether we are so far compromised as to be unable to alter them.1 The
manner in which Curzon sought to modify these proposals is the key to his approach
to an Egyptian settlement.
Basically Curzon viewed a settlement within the polarity of what he termed
3
'the reality or the relics of British authority.' He was willing to grant nominal 
independence to Egypt - or he believed the Cabinet to be committed by events to 
some such concession - within a treaty relationship. However, goaded perhaps by 
Ctnrchill's biting criticism of the scheme, Curzon pressed the Cabinet to amend the 
Milner proposals in the areas of troop concentrations, internal controls and 
foreign relations.
Milner proposed that a British force be retained mainly 'for the protection of
4Imperial communications' with the secondary function of defending Egypt against 
attack. Such a force would be reduced and concentrated in the Canal Zone. Curzon, 
however, took a broader view of regional strategy. He felt that Britain's military 
establishment in Egypt could not be limited solely to the defence of the Canal or 
even of Egypt. It should be viewed as the pivot for wider regional operations with 
Egypt serving as a British place d'armes since 'the position of Egypt renders it 
the inevitable and indispensable centre of British military strategy and operations
5
in the Middle East.' But Curzon not only extended the concept of the defence of 
imperial communications outward, he also increased the potential British military
1. Curzon, The Egyptian Proposals..., p.2, FO/371/6295.
2. Curzon to Balfour, October 13, 1920, BM, Balfour Papers, add.48734.
3. Curzon, The Egyptian Proposals..., p.2, FO/371/6295.
4. Milner, Memorandum....
5. Curzon, The Egyptian Proposals..., p.3, FO/371/6295.
role within Egypt by raising the familiar spectre of 'a fanatical or racial rising 
1in Cairo,1 requiring the use of British troops for the protection of foreigners.
It was therefore inevitable that Curzon should call for ’a British force of limited
2
number to be placed both at Cairo and Alexandria,' despite Milner's warning that 
such a force might constitute a garrison and would be viewed by the Egyptians as a 
new army of occupation.
Curzon also believed that the principle underlying British policy since
Palmerston 'has been that we will not admit the interference of any foreign Power
3 . . . . .in Egypt.' From this premise flowed Curzon's vigorous opposition to the diminution
of the authority of the High Commissioner and his principal aides, the Judicial and
Financial Advisers to the Egyptian government, as proposed in the Milner Memorandum.
He feared that this would prevent the British representative from dealing with the
abuses of an inefficient native government. Nor would he be able to prevent other
foreign representatives from trying 'to settle their disputes with the Egyptian
4Government by independent action.' As a corrective, he supported the more restric­
tive language of the earlier Milner Conclusions which clearly specified the author­
ity of these officials in Egypt.
Finally, Curzon viewed Milner's concession to Egypt of control over her foreign
5
affairs with 'considerable anxiety.' Despite promises to the contrary, he feared 
the possibility of Egyptian intrigues in the capitals of Europe, and European, in 
particular French, intrigues in Cairo once Britain formally ceased to be the pro­
tecting as well as the occupying power in Egypt.
Curzon obviously disagreed with Milner's emphasis, namely, shifting the focus 
of British interest from internal control to a reduced military presence that would 
ensure the defence of imperial communications. Curzon's own views on the most 
suitable status for Egypt are in his memorandum of February 14, 1921, in which he 
advocated nominal independence for Egypt:
1. Idem. 2. Idem.
3. Ibid., pp.4-5.
4. Ibid., pp.5-6. Curzon told the Imperial Cabinet on July 5, 1921 that Milner 
proposed that 'British control of the Administration should only survive in the 
form of the appointment of a number of rather shadowy officials whose relations 
with the native Government were left somewhat obscure.' Stenographic Notes of 
Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India..., July 6, 1921, 
FO/372/6301.
5. Curzon, The Egyptian Proposals..., pp.5-6, FO/371/6295.
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...what we all have in view is that Egypt would remain inside 
rather than outside the British Imperial system. If the best 
way to do this is to drop the word protectorate and conclude 
a Treaty of Alliance with her as we did with the Indian Prin­
ces a century ago (their relation to us has indeed been 
commonly defined by the constitutional writers as one of 'sub­
ordinate alliance'), why not do it?l
Curzon's willingness to urge even minimal concessions upon the Cabinet may be
attributed to the premature publication of Milner's proposals and its acceptance in
Egypt as a British offer, continuing pressure from the Residency for action to
prevent a recurrence of disturbances, and his fear that if the Egyptian problem was
not settled 'we may find that a British Labour Party or Socialist Government...may
2
grant complete independence and sacrifice our position altogether.' This last con-
3
sideration moved others in the Cabinet as well.
Curzon's principal advisers at the Foreign Office adopted a similar although
4
somewhat more moderate approach. In part this may have been a result of the fact 
that they did not have to face Churchill's opposition in Cabinet. The views of the 
relevant members of the Foreign Office can be seen in their comments on the memo­
randum submitted by Harry Boyle calling for the restoration of the mechanics of 19th
5century Cromerism.
Commenting on Boyle's proposed reduction in the number of British officials in 
Egypt while restoring a system of rigorous British inspection, Murray noted that 
such reforms were largely incompatible and that perhaps Boyle 'hardly realises how 
greatly conditions have changed since the palmy days of the "Cromer Myth"
1. C[urzorj. of K[eddlestonj. , Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, February 14, 1921, FO/371/6295.
2. Idem.
3. For example, only two months later Austen Chamberlain expressed a similar but 
more generalised fear: 'I regard the growth of the Labour Party as a serious 
menace to the nation...because of its lack of experience, and, more seriously, 
because of its difference from every other Party in the House of Commons in 
being directed and controlled from outside Parliament, so that we find its lea­
ders unable to take the action which they know to be right.' Chamberlain to 
Cecil, April 26, 1921, BM, Cecil Papers, add.51078.
4. Commenting on the Egyptian Department's approach in October 1920, Duff Cooper 
noted that: 'Murray and I were strongly in favour of a settlement on these
[Milner' s3 lines and we doubtless said so. But there was a deep division in the 
Cabinet.' Duff Cooper, op.cit., p.102. Foreign Office documents, however, in­
dicate a much later conversion to Milnerism.
5. Boyle to Vansittart, June 11, 1921, FO/371/6298.
6. Murray, Minute, June 23, 1921, to ibid.
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Lindsay echoed this view about 'a reversion pure & simple to what is called
Cromerism,1 adding that ’Conceivably the remedies might be applied; but meanwhile
1the patient's condition has changed... and we have to strike out new lines.'
These 'new lines' were evident in the different Foreign Office proposals before 
the negotiations began. One example was the Draft Military Convention composed by 
Murray. This draft, which attempted to include the War Office's desiderata, pro­
vided for full access for British forces to all areas and facilities in Egypt if
2
the country was attacked or if there was a need to 'reinforce the civil authority.' 
In addition, there would be virtually no limitation on the size and distribution of 
British forces. These were to be determined on the basis of need. This stringent 
draft was approved by Lindsay who felt that opinion in England and abroad would 
support the British position:
With this sanction behind us I would be in favour of making the 
utmost concession to Egypt in other articles of the Treaty... and, 
even if such a treaty were signed and ratified, I should feel no 
anxiety, for we should then be back, not at Milnerism, but at the 
true characteristics of Cromerism, viz. a strong sanction in the 
shape of British troops, and a toleration of all but intolerable 
abuses.^
Within the sharply divided Cabinet, opinion ranged from outright advocacy of 
Milner's proposals to opposition to any concessions whatever. At one end of the 
spectrum was H.A.L. Fisher. Arguing that it would be dangerous 'to reject the con­
clusions of a body so influential in composition1 and that it would inflame Egypt­
ian opinion, he claimed that,
The Milner Report offers us all the essentials of a Protectorate 
without the name.... Egypt is a thoroughly foreign country. If 
she is allowed the symbols of nationality, she will acquiesce in 
the substance of a Protectorate.^
Fisher was convinced that the presence of British forces on the Canal and the 
pressure of the British Empire were adequate sanction, and he felt that Milner's
1. Lindsay, Minute, June 26, 1921, to ibid.
2. Murray, Draft Military Convention, June 22, 1921, FO/371/6207.
3. Lindsay, Minute, June 22, 1921, to ibid.
4. H.A.L. Fisher, The Case of Egypt, November 15, 1920, C.P. 2120, CAB/24/115.
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scheme struck the balance, sought by most, between appearance and reality in Egypt.
Edwin Montagu, at the India Office, viewed the proposals from two vantage 
points: their impact on Egypt, and their effect on India and the Mesopotamian region
in which his Office had a vital interest. While 'quite prepared to believe that 
Lord Milner's proposals are in every way suitable to the conditions of Egypt,'
Montagu was worried that such concessions and the negotiations with Zaghlul might 
encourage C-andiv to attempt to secure the same for India in a like fashion. He 
noted that ’the methods of the Milner proposals, contrasted with the methods of
1settlement of Indian affairs, has enormously increased our Indian difficulties.'
Montagu was viewed as a liberal in the Cabinet. He believed, according to Churchill,
2
that 'England should be the friend and head of the Moslem world1 - a belief that was 
in part motivated by India's huge Muslim minority. Nevertheless, concern over the 
way concessions might be granted Egypt led Montagu to hope, almost despairingly,
'that it may be possible to treat one part of the British Empire wholly separately
3
and without reference to the other parts.1
The most important and implacable opponent of any concessions was Winston
Churchill. The Secretary of State for War opposed the manner in which concessions
were to be made as well as their substance. In a heated memorandum, written only
hours after the publication of the Milner proposals, Churchill charged that 'the
cession of territory which had definitely been incorporated in the British Dominions
is...a matter which required the assent not only of the Cabinet, but of Crown and 
4
Parliament. As to the nature of the concessions, Churchill questioned whether
they were real or simply a manoeuvre. If the former, 'they mean we are giving up
Egypt.' but if the concessions are 'mere camouflage,' 'the Egyptian Nationalists must
5be very great simpletons if they let it rest there.1 The basis of Churchill.'s 
opposition was that
Their [Nationalists^ demand is for the effective and responsible 
control of their own country and the right to govern or misgovern 
it as they please. It is because this has never been accorded to
them, and can never be accorded to them while we remain in the
1. E.S. M[ontaguj. , Egypt, October 19, 1920, C.P. 2000, CAB/24/112.
2. Churchill, op.cit., p.392.
3. E.S.M., loc.cit.
4. W.S.C., The Egyptian Proposals..., August 24, 1920, C.P. 1803, CAB/24/111.
5. Idem.
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the country, that they are discontented. It is not the empty 
form of independence which they seek, but the reality. Is the 
British nation willing to concede that reality? If not, will 
the British resistance to concession of that reality be rendered 
more difficult or more easy by the concession of the form? I 
think it will be rendered vastly more difficult.1
This struck at the foundations of all the proposals for concession since it
was a denial of a possible balance between appearance and reality in Egypt's status.
Churchill believed that any concession of form must surely lead to a demand for its
substance. Echoing Montagu, he also felt that 'The repercussion of these proposals
and their model upon other parts of the British Empire may be even more serious than
2
their effect on Egypt.1 Churchill was particularly concerned about Ireland and 
India as he felt that this was a move away from 'the conception of the British 
Empire as a grouping of self-governing Dominions gathered together under the aegis 
of the Crown, developing under various degrees of responsibility within that 
circle.'^
Churchill's views were also shaped by a number of other factors. He spent part
of the war at the Admiralty and then was Minister of Munitions. In 1919 he moved
4to the War Office. By temperament and position he was the natural spokesman for 
the Service Ministries' viewpoint.
There was remarkable identity of views which persisted even after Churchill
5
became the Colonial Secretary. This most recent position confirmed Churchill's 
aggressive sense of Empire and his replacement by L. Worthington-Evans at the War 
Office gave him a willing ally in the Cabinet. Furthermore Churchill's appointment 
to the Colonial Office increased his interest in Egypt inasmuch as he hoped to bring
1. Idem. 2. Idem. 3. Idem.
4. Churchill believed in the vigorous use of force and on one occasion told Duff
Cooper that 'you could only make concessions to people you had beaten.' Duff
Cooper, op.cit., p.103.
5. For example, one memorandum circulated by the Air Force could have been written 
by Churchill. Commenting on the concession of nominal independence: '...is
there not more than a possibility that to get rid of British occupation, rather 
than the achievement of independence, may once more speedily become the plat­
form of Egyptian Nationalists of the future? For the present Lord Milner 
assures us that the extremists alone demand the complete removal of British 
troops: but who is to say that the future rule of the country may not be extre­
mist in tendency?' Air Force Memorandum on the Future Status of Egypt, February 
1921, FO/371/6297.
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Egyptian affairs within its orbit, an aim he pursued with characteristic vigor.
Finally, Churchill's views were no doubt influenced by his Manchester constituency
which would be adversely affected if Egyptian and Sudanese cotton were denied to
2
the mills of Lancashire by a change in Egypt's status. Thus Churchill became the 
most vocal opponent of change in Egypt and a source of particular dismay to some of 
his more moderate colleagues when he voiced his views outside the Cabinet.
Finally, during the period that preceded the arrival of the Egyptian delegation
Lloyd George appears to have stood somewhat aloof from the debate on a settlement.
3
Despite the usual flamboyant stories, he does not seem to have as yet taken a 
definite stand.
Lloyd George did give some indication of his views at the Imperial Cabinet on
July 6, 1921. The Prime Minister declared that the government was not bound by the
Milner scheme or the events surrounding it, but only by the text of the invitation
to the Sultan: 'We say the Protectorate is not a satisfactory method. That is all
4
we are committed to. We are therefore free.1 As to the difficulties in defining 
a new relationship with Egypt, Lloyd’-George raised three points:
The first thing you come up against: Is Egypt to get foreign
relations?....
The second point is: Foreign advisers - they (Egyptians^cannot
really run their show without having outside advice, they are
1. Beaverbrook writes of Churchill's struggle with Curzon over control of Egyptian 
affairs: 'Although Churchill's claim was defeated on February 4, 1921, it was
not destroyed. The quarrel over Egypt became a continuing event....Many years 
after Churchill told me that he would have succeeded in seizing Egypt from
Curzon's clutches if the Government had lived a little longer.' Beaverbrook,
loc.cit.
2. In a speech before the British Cotton Growing Association, June 6, 1921, which 
included the inflammatory statement about British armies being 'relegated to 
living upon condensed water on the banks of the Suez Canal while the mobs of 
Cairo and Alexandria made short work of the European and foreign populations,' 
Churchill also noted that changes in Egypt 'were matters of great consequence 
to Lancashire. Egyptian cotton was second only to that of the United States,
and superior in quality.' Manchester Guardian, June 7, 1921.
3. The most common was that when Adli finally arrived in London and called on 
Lloyd George, 'the British Prime Minister, professing to ignore the Egyptian 
demand for independence, pointed dramatically to a chair in the Imperial Con­
ference room which he "invited Egypt to occupy as a valued member of British 
commonwealth of nations."1 Chirol, Occident and Orient, p.95.
4. Stenographic Notes..., July 6, 1921, p.11, FO/371/6301.
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not sufficiently developed for it....
Then comes the third question....You have to protect your high­
way. It is a highway to Australia; it is a highway to the 
East. It is no use talking of Singapore if you cannot get to 
Singapore.1
Lloyd George's concern for the difficulties entailed in the Milner proposals
indicate the hard line he would take as the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations progressed.
This was confirmed by his personal view that the above points 'are three very
practical questions which go to the very root of the whole business, and upon those
2
three things I do not think we should give way.1
A Negotiating Position: Residency Alternatives
The Residency's approach towards policy was developing along somewhat different
lines. Ostensibly the differences between London and Cairo were tactical since both
ultimately sought to preserve Britain's vital interests. The difficulty lay in
defining these interests and the manner in which they could best be secured.
Allenby and his aides could support a policy in Cairo without the pressures that
Curzon, for example, might feel in London. In addition, Allenby, the 'man on the
spot1, directed his attention to the means of policy, emphasising the practical as-
3pects of its implementation rather than its formulation. His basic approach and 
how it was affected by his functions was clearly understood by Lindsay:
Lord Allenby has really two preoccupations; one, the ultimate 
future, as to which he is convinced that Milnerism is the only 
remedy; and the other and far more pressing one, the immediate 
future - how to keep Egypt quiet if negotiations fail or break 
down without calling on His Majesty's Government for a financial 
and military effort they must be unwilling to put forth.4
1. Ibid., pp.13-14. 2. Idem.
3. Milner noted in his diary that '...Allenby indeed seems neither to know nor to
care about the future status of Egypt - He regards himself as there to dis­
charge a definite temporary job, viz. - to "uphold the Protectorate"... and does
not bother his head about constitutional or strictly political questions.' Ent­
ry for March 8, 1920, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 290. On the other hand, Colonel 
Meinertzhagen, an aide to Allenby in Palestine, was able to write in his diary 
for January 1, 1920, that 'I had a long talk with Allenby last night and our 
talk drifted into the far future; he thought the dissolution of the British 
Empire inevitable as the people we rule become more educated.... 1 CRPO, Mein­
ertzhagen Diaries, Vol. 21, p.129.
4. Lindsay, Minute, April 29, 1921, Allenby to Curzon, April 16, 1921, Desp. No. 
311, FO/371/6295.
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Allenby's commitment to Milner's proposals, despite some initial hesitation,
was reported to Lloyd George as early as October 1920 by Hankey, the Cabinet
Secretary. Allenby 'thinks we are absolutely committed to the main features of
the scheme and that there is no getting away from it...1'*' The basis for this,
according to Allenby, was that despite British denials the Milner proposals 'were
from the first regarded by public opinion of Egypt in general as proposals which
2must eventually constitute a substantive offer by His Majesty's Government.'
Allenby's views, however, were based on more than just Egyptian public opinion. 
The assumption that Britain's primary interest in the area was strategic and that
this interest could essentially be secured by sea-power was the basis of 
Allenby's approach. Wave11, Allenby's aide in Egypt and later his biographer, 
commented that,
...it was his Allenby's firm conviction that our position in 
Egypt depended ultimately on our sea-power in the Mediterranean.
So long as that was maintained we could afford to make all rea­
sonable concessions to Egyptians, since we could control Egypt 
so long and so firmly as we controlled the Mediterranean.3
Another element in Allenby's approach was his appreciation of Britain's pecu­
liar position in Egypt. Despite the Protectorate, he and his advisers had no 
formal executive power, but instead ruled through Egyptian ministers. Thus without 
a native government there could be no orderly civilian rule but only the clumsy 
apparatus of martial law. Allenby believed that 'A Ministry was essential or the
1. M.P.A. Hankey to Lloyd George, October 22, 1920, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/24/3/18.
2. Allenby to Curzon, January 12, 1921, Tel. No. 2'X- , FO/371/6292.
3. Wavell, op.cit., pp.54-55. This was the conventional military wisdom of the
period. For example, one C.I.D. review noted that 'The maintenance of the 
superiority at sea of the naval forces of the British Empire over any combina­
tion of Powers liable to be arrayed against them must remain, as in the past, 
the basis of the system of Imperial Defence, for...by no other means can the 
integrity of the Empire and the security of British territory and trade be 
assured.' With regard to Egypt and British forces there, 'the force was kept 
at strength just sufficient to ensure the maintenance of internal order, and 
it was recognised that only in exceptional circumstances would it be available 
to resist invasion or raids from outside.1 Committee of Imperial Defence, Sur 
vey of the Naval, Military and Air Obligations of the British Empire, Note to
the Secretary, September 27, 1920, CID Paper 257-B, CAB/4/7.
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entire machinery was threatened with collapse.' A native government, however,
was predicated upon a cooperative native elite.
Within this context the British in Cairo tended to divide political Egypt into
two groups. One consisted 'of the landholding and official classes and the more
educated and older members of the professions,' and the other 'chiefly of the
Azharians, the students and the younger and less reflective members of the bar and
2
the other professions.' In order to maintain stability and to protect British in­
terests, Allenby attempted to support, through concessions, a stable and moderate 
pro-British pasha class from the first group since the latter was more volatile and 
in any event generally attached itself to Zaghlul. Much that Allenby did in the 
years that followed independence was in pursuit of this goal. A corollary to this 
policy of support was the continuing concern lest any elements disturb the political
equilibrium in Egypt, be it Zaghlul, in Allenby's view 'a man devoured of self- 
3
deceit,' or later the autocratic Fuad.
Despite his general approval of the Milner proposals, Allenby was aware that 
the talks might fail either because of opposition in England or because of unaccept­
able demands by the Egyptians. He therefore asked Amos and Patterson to investigate
whether it was possible to 'return to a system of government similar to that which
4prevailed during the many years Lord Cromer was in Egypt,' as some had suggested. 
The findings led Allenby to restate his support of Milner's approach because,
Western ideas of autonomy and self-government, not to speak of 
independence, to which the great war gave so considerable an 
impetus, have gained too strong a hold on all sections of the 
community in Egypt for it to be possible for us to return to old 
time methods, or to look to the administrative devices employed 
by Lord Cromer for precedents, to guide us in our future
1. Allenby, Report on Egypt for 1921, FO/371/7766. Wavell noted that Allenby 
'might be spoken of as an administrator; but in actual fact he was more often 
concerned with "minister-ing" Egypt than with administering it.' Wavell, op. 
cit., pp.49-50.
2. M.A. Amos, Memorandum, March 23, 1921, in Allenby to Curzon, April 16, 1921, 
Desp. No. 311, FO/371/6295. Amos here was discussing the division in Egypt in 
the event negotiations failed, but this division was standard.
3. Allenby to Mother, April 29, 1921, KAP.
4. Allenby to Curzon, April 16, 1921, Desp. No. 311, FO/371/6295.
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actions.1
The most important suggestion made by Allenby's advisers, particularly Amos, 
and forwarded to London with Allenby's approval, was the possibility of the uni­
lateral application of a scheme similar to Milner’s. Amos was convinced that 'any
policy resting on the idea of overcoming the nationalist sentiments of the mass of
2
people by measures of a purely economic kind is essentially chimerical.' He there­
fore advocated the unilateral imposition of a settlement if the London talks failed.
The Foreign Office reaction to this new approach was ambivalent. Murray was 
afraid that the concession of independence in this way would be seen as a sign of
weakness, but he admitted that despite the risks of the Amos plan ’I am unable to
3
suggest a more satisfactory solution.' Lindsay, however, strongly objected that
'the essence of Milnerism is its bilateral nature, and as we are contemplating a
position in which the Egyptians - the other party - will have run out, we cannot put
4Milnerism into operation alone.'
Yet it was specifically the concept of some form of temporary or permanent uni­
lateral action that was gaining ground at the Residency. On the eve of the nego­
tiations Allenby despatched Sir William Hayter's proposal for the imposition of a
Idem. That the British advisers actually adopted this position is not surpris­
ing. Milner, in December 1919, noted in his diary the following conversation 
with Sir Paul Harvey, the Financial Adviser: '...it was apparent that his lean­
ing was all in favour of handing more over to Native Control.' December 22, 
1919, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 289. Clayton, despite his advocacy of annexation 
in 1917 (see Note by Brigadier General Clayton on the Political Status of Egypt, 
July 22, 1917, in Lloyd, op.cit., I, 262-67), supported drastic change in 
Egypt's status by 1919. Gertrude Bell noted in her diary on September 29, 1919 
that 'In his [clayton' s\ view our object should now be to guard (a) imperial 
necessities in Egypt <b) international interests for which we had made ourselves 
responsible, and let all the rest go....If however we refuse to take very bold 
liberal measures we shall create in Egypt an Oriental Ireland.' E. Burgoyne, 
Gertrude Bell: From Her Personal Papers, 1914-1926 (London, 1958), II, 112-13.
2. Amos, Memorandum, March 23, 1921 in Allenby to Curzon, April 16, 1921, Desp.No. 
311, FO/371/6295. While disagreeing on some points, Patterson also believed 
concessions to native control to be vital. Noting Kitchener's policy of working 
through the natives, he wrote that it 'will be necessary for us...to carry his 
policy a step further, though on different lines.' Patterson, Memorandum,
April 2, 1921, in ibid.
3. Murray, Minute, April 29, 1921, to ibid.
4. Lindsay, Minute, April 29, 1921, to ibid.
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ten year modus vivendi in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Allenby now argued the strong
possibility of a breakdown and the need for an alternative policy which could be
1
enforced without preliminary agreement from the Egyptian side.
Negotiations
The Cabinet met to decide on its negotiating position only a few hours before 
the arrival of the Egyptian delegation in London on July 11. By then all recog­
nised the impossibility of withholding nominal independence from Egypt. Nevertheless
there was intense pressure inside and outside the Cabinet to restrict further con- 
2
cessions. The result was a retreat from the Milner Memorandum in the crucial areas 
of troop distribution, foreign relations, and the judicial and financial control of
3
Egypt’s internal affairs. On that same day Curzon predicted the failure of the
negotiations because the Egyptians 'are in such deadly terror of Zaghlul and his
4
extremists...that they will decline anything.'
The first session of the talks on July 13 disclosed the wide gap between the 
British and Egyptian positions. Curzon stated that 'Neither party were committed by 
the [MilnerJ Report or by anything that had gone before.'5 Britain was committed 
only by the language of the invitation to the Sultan. Adli Pasha, Prime Minister 
and President of the Egyptian delegation, countered Curzon's retreat from the Milner 
scheme by going beyond it and confirming his adherence to Zaghlul's "reserves": 
'...the delegation was bound to observe them, and intended to present them...in the
1. Allenby to Curzon, June 17, 1921, Desp. No. 530, FO/371/6298. Hayter, whose
Memorandum of June 5 was enclosed in the above Despatch, was Legal Adviser to
the Ministry of Finance and to the Residency.
2. Hughes of Australia and Massey of New Zealand were particularly vehement about 
this. See Stenographic Notes...July 6, 1921, passim and Stenographic Notes... 
July 11, 1921, passim in FO/371/6301. Within the Cabinet, Churchill, while
willing by now to concede nominal independence, wanted such strong treaty guar­
antees for all aspects of Britain's position in Egypt that he remarked: 'I am 
pretty sure that Adli Pasha and his delegation will not be able to agree to 
this.1 Stenographic Notes...July 6, 1921, p.17 in ibid.
3. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 58(21), July 11, 1921, CAB/23/26.
4* Stenographic Notes...July 11, 1921, p.2, FO/371/6301.
5• Minutes of the First Conference with the Egyptian Official Delegation held at
the Foreign Office, July 13, 1921, p.l, FO/371/6310.
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1
actual form m  which they had been drawn up.1
The two delegations met eight times during July and August. They discussed 
the formal abolition of the protectorate, conditions for the retention of British 
troops in Egypt, the conduct of Egypt's foreign affairs, the roles of the Financial 
and judicial Advisers, the substitution of British for international authority in 
capitulatory matters, compensation for foreign officials and the title of the High 
Commissioner.
By the end of August there was agreement only on the abolition of the protector-
2
ate, and a stalemate on everything else. In the matter of British troops: Curzon
called for their disposition in the interior with access to all facilities; the 
Egyptians insisted on their concentration near the Canal. On foreign affairs: Cur­
zon conceded an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs as had existed before 1914 
but, at the Cabinet's behest, so hedged this concession that it was meaningless.
Each country would be represented in the other’s capital by a High Commissioner, 
close consultation on foreign affairs would be required by treaty, Egypt would not 
conclude any agreement without prior discussion with Britain, and she would be repre­
sented abroad by British diplomats. Adli and the delegation rejected the title 
'High Commissioner' as a vestige of the protectorate and insisted on full freedom in 
foreign affairs, including the appointment of Ministers, provided that 'The Egyptian
Government will not enter into any political agreement with foreign Powers prejudi-
3
cial to Great Britain.1
In the other major area of contention, Britain's continued control of Egypt's 
administration: Curzon insisted on a Financial Commissioner who would inherit the
duties of the Commissioners of the Debt as well as oversee the budgets of the Mixed 
Courts and of the Financial and Judicial Commissioners and their staffs, and the 
payment of pensions and annuities to foreign officials. He would be kept fully in­
formed of all financial matters, with access to the Prime Minister and the Minister 
of Finance, and he would have an effective veto over external loans and the
1. Ibid., p .2.
2. A survey of the two positions, clause by clause, together with further conces­
sions proposed by Curzon to the Cabinet, is found in tabular form in Cabinet 
Minutes, Cabinet 85(21), Appendix, November 3, 1921, CAB/23/27.
3. Ibid.
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assignment of public revenue. The Egyptian delegation instead proposed the 
appointment of a British Commissioner of the Debt who could be consulted but with­
out 'power to intervene in the financial administration of the country.'^ Curzon 
similarly called for the appointment of a Judicial Commissioner to oversee the ad­
ministration of law as it affected foreigners and who would be kept informed by the 
relevant ministries. The Egyptians, in turn, proposed that for five years following 
the effective date of a treaty the Commandants of the Police in Cairo, Alexandria 
and Port Said be European.
The cause of the impasse was essentially a question of trust. The Egyptians 
believed that true independence should be based on the belief that a native adminis­
tration could successfully supervise the country's military, fiscal, judicial and 
foreign affairs. Curzon and his colleagues felt that Egypt had notyet earned un­
trammeled independence and that meanwhile its prerogatives should be reserved to
Britain because of her interests and obligations in the area. An angry Curzon con­
firmed this approach in his comment that:
The delegation seemed to assume that they had won their independence.
They had done nothing of the kind. His Majesty's Government were 
anxious to give it to them, but they had not won it by their own 
exertions.^
The impasse continued in London while agitation increased in Egypt due to 
Zaghlul's activities and a tour in September by British Labour Members of Parliament 
sympathetic to the Wafd. In light of this, Allenby who was in London urged that his 
policy of suppressing sources of instability while supporting sympathetic moderates 
be aggressively pursued. In this connection, he told Crowe,
that if we do not now break Zaghlul, he will break us and this is 
Zaghlul's object. The Egyptian government...are entitled to call
for our effective support and, if we do not give it, their!s and
the Sultan's days will be numbered.^
1. Ibid.
2. Minutes of the Fifth Conference with the Egyptian Official Delegation, held at
the Foreign Office, July 29, 1921, p.45, FO/371/6310.
3. Crowe, Minute, October 1, 1921, to Scott to Curzon, September 30, 1921, Tel. No.
565, FO/371/6305.
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While Allenby was advocating firm measures, the Residency sought a new or 
modified approach. Indications of this could be seen in the official and private 
correspondence from Cairo. A personal letter from Walford Selby, the First Secre­
tary, shows the direction of the developing approach. Selby saw two alternatives: 
either the imposition of policy by force or still greater concessions. Since the 
British public might object to harsh measures and because of the difficult economic 
situation in Britain, Selby noted that there might be a need to 'take the opportu­
nity proferred by the negotiations...to "get out" on the best terms we c a n . A s  
for the future, 'We won India through the initiative of a private company; I have
hopes we could still have considerable voice in the direction of Egyptian affairs
2
through those Englishmen who would remain behind.' Adopting Allenby's approach to
seapower, Selby felt that troops in the Canal area together with a British 'Monroe
Doctrine' for Egypt would be sufficient to provide strategic security in view of the
3
'British naval preponderance in the Mediterranean.'
Clayton, at the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, held similar views. Comment­
ing on Hayter's proposed modus vivendi, he called for the concentration of troops 
near the Canal. He argued that the object of a British force was to prevent exter­
nal aggression which, realistically, could come only from Europe after a major war 
had begun, preceded by preparations in Egypt and elsewhere. Given these circum­
stances and the inevitable military build-up in Egypt before the outbreak of war,
Clayton felt that 'it is not easy to see how the presence of a relatively small per-
• i4manent garrison in the interior of Egypt would greatly affect the issues, whereas
it would negate Egyptian independence and arouse local hostility. Clayton believed
that the deadlock might be ended by the creation of a well-organised force of
British constables who could better protect foreigners than an army in the interior.
This would also relieve the British government 'of a military commitment and a large
5
item of expenditure...1
1. Selby to Tyrrell, October 1, 1921, FO/371/6306. Scott, the Minister Plenipoten­
tiary and the Acting High Commissioner raised the same questions about Britain's 
ability to maintain a repressive policy by military means. Scott to Curzon, 
October 10, 1921, Desp. No. 882, FO/371/6306.
2. Selby to Tyrrell, October 1, 1921, FO/371/6306.
3. Ibid.




Allenby's cautious reactions to these suggestions indicate how rapidly the 
British officials in Cairo were in fact moving:
The future of the country depends on whether the Turkish aristocracy, 
with our support, can make good. This police force, if accepted, 
should be a strong weapon in their hands....We must first see if the 
Pasha class can establish a firm government; and we must slip gradu­
ally into the new constitution, taking no risks. We must be sure 
that the faction of Zaghlul is crushed before we move a man from 
Egypt.1
Both a letter from Scott, the Acting High Commissioner, and the Foreign Office
reactions show the developing views of those most closely connected with Egyptian 
2
affairs. Concerned that the activities of Zaghlul and the Labour delegation in 
Egypt would prevent Adli from reaching any agreement, Scott again raised the possi­
bility of unilateral British action. Noting Theodore Roosevelt's advice given 
twenty years earlier of 1 Either govern or get out,1 he was convinced that the 
British position had deteriorated during the two years of talk 1 and if we talk for
another year we shall be worse off still and may eventually be fired out, bag and
3baggage, with nothing to the credit side.' The alternatives were to adopt con­
cessions and enforce them or to withdraw to the Canal leaving Egypt internally inde­
pendent. If the former policy were adopted, Scott warned of chronic hostility and 
of the need for assurances that Ireland, finances or troop requirements elsewhere 
would not affect the British position in Egypt. Since such assurances could not be 
given, Scott advocated withdrawal to the Canal. He further advised that if this 
proposal, formulated together with Amos and Clayton, proved acceptable, it should be 
carried out before Adli1s departure from London rather than have Zaghlul force this 
move later.
At this point opinions in the Egyptian Department were becoming more flexible.
Duff Cooper noted in his diary that 'Murray and I are coming round to the view that
it is worth making far greater concessions than have yet been contemplated in order
4to secure an agreement with Egypt.' Reacting to Scott's proposal, they commented 
that Britain's goal was not to 'govern'. Her aim was a 'prosperous Egypt under a 
native Government which could be relied upon to look only to Great Britain for
1. Allenby Note to Foreign Office, October 22, 1921, FO/371/6306.
2. Scott to Lindsay, September 30, 1921, FO/371/6305.
3. Ibid.
4. Entry for October 12, 1921. Duff Cooper, op.cit., p.105.
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assistance, protection and advice^ to be achieved through mutual agreement.
The question remained: How to achieve mutual agreement? To this end, Murray
and Cooper outlined Britain’s irreducible requirements beyond which all else might 
be conceded: British forces at the Canal; troops in Alexandria for a specified
period only? a veto over foreign appointments to the Egyptian civil service; con­
tinuation of the status quo in the Sudan; compensation for foreign officials; an 
act of indemnity for the period of martial law; and, payment of the interest on 
the Ottoman loans secured by Egyptian tribute. If these were secured then a 
'Monroe Doctrine’ for Egypt would prevent interference.
The risk involved in this policy, according to its advocates, was its rejection 
by Adli. The concessions might thus become the basis for even more extreme demands 
by the Nationalists, while Britain would still have to rule Egypt by force of arms.
In addition, such concessions, if accepted, might lead to a decline in administra­
tive and public order in Egypt. Still there was a strong possibility that these 
concessions could lead to an agreement. Considering the dangers of wider concessions 
as opposed to the risk entailed in the failure of the London talks, the Egyptian
2
Department believed that 'Of the two, the former would seem the less formidable.'
Lindsay also favoured wider concessions. He nevertheless continued to oppose 
unilateral British action since it would require the 'wider and wider use of martial 
law until all authority will rest undisguisedly on British bayonets and what
3
government may exist will be merely what the Englishmen can provide.1 He was con­
vinced that conditions in England and Egypt ruled out repression which would lead 
to ultimate disaster. Fearing a breakdown of the negotiations, he supported Murray’s 
and Cooper's proposal since it 'safeguards our Imperial interests and our predomi-
4
nance m  Egypt as compared with other foreign powers.’
Curzon, apparently swayed by his advisers, proposed further concessions to the 
Cabinet on October 20. Based largely on the Murray-Cooper Memorandum of October 14, 
he urged the retention of British troops in the interior for one year, thereafter 
to be reviewed, and the granting to Egypt of the right to conduct her foreign affairs
1. A.D. Cooper and J. Murray, Memorandum: Egyptian Negotiations, October 14, 1921,
FO/371/6305.
2. Ibid.
3. R.C. LjjLndsayj. , Minute, October 15, 1921, FO/371/6305.
4. Ibid.
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through Egyptian ministers in close consultation with Britain. Britain's repre­
sentative in Cairo would be the only 'Ambassador' accredited to Egypt and would have
1
precedence over other foreign diplomats.
Impasse and Failure
Faced with strong objections in the Cabinet, Curzon displayed what one biogra-
2
pher called 'a surprising diffidence in pressing his views against opposition.'
This was, however, entirely in keeping with his general demeanour in the Cabinet, and, 
aware of the strength of the opposition, he gloomily wrote his wife that 'the 
Cabinet Jig) all much stiffer than I am in the matter, and I am sure we shall have an
3
absolute rupture with another Ireland in Egypt.1 Even more alarming was Lloyd
George's sudden intervention. Duff Cooper noted that the Prime Minister 'says it is
4
time he put his foot down somewhere and he has chosen Egypt for the operation.'
The Cabinet deferred a decision and appointed a sub-committee on Egypt consisting of 
Churchill, Worthington-Evans and H.A.L. Fisher, with Curzon in the chair.
The Cabinet Sub-Committee met on October 24, with Allenby present, to discuss 
the military situation and the prospects in Egypt if the talks failed. Churchill 
again expressed adamant opposition to any concessions on troops, while Curzon called 
for the transfer of most of the troops to the Canal Zone after the lapse of a peace­
ful year, with the remainder stationed in barracks several miles outside Cairo and 
Alexandria.
Allenby was curiously indecisive, reminiscent of his poor showing at wartime 
staff conferences/ which bode ill for his future relations with the Cabinet. Although 
he hedged on a withdrawal from the interior as proposed by Curzon, he did however 
comment that despite the likely failure of the negotiations 'the principle of inde-
5
pendence for Egypt should be acknowledged.'
1. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 81(21), October 29, 1921, CAB/23/27.
2. Zetland, . op.cit., III, 250.
3. Curzon to Lady Curzon, October 21, 1921, in ibid., p.248.
4. Entry in diary for October 21, 1921, Duff. Cooper, Loc.cit.
5. Cabinet Sub-Committee on the Situation in Egypt, Minutes, October 14, 1921, 
FO/371/6306.
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In the meantime the Residency continued to press for the unilateral imposition
1
of the concessions offered to Adli m  the event the talks broke down.
The Cabinet again discussed Curzon's proposals. Curzon noted that he made them 
reluctantly and only because his hand had been forced by the publication of the 
Milner Report. He justified them on the grounds that there would be no immediate 
reduction of troops and that in the future the Navy could protect the Canal. But the 
immediate risk of an uprising in Egypt because independence had not been granted was 
too great and would require an additional twenty-four battalions to suppress. Lloyd 
George forcefully intervened and noted that 'he had found himself committed to pro­
posals which he did not approve and he had been trying to extricate the Government
2
from the difficult situation in which it has been placed.' He opposed any real con­
cessions beyond those already agreed upon. Allenby again displayed little vigorous
3
support for concessions.
When the Cabinet met again the following day, November 4, after commenting on
the military situation, Allenby remarked that he favoured Curzon's proposals, but
incredibly diluted this support with the comment that 'he could not advise on this
4
point with confidence.' Lloyd George carried the Cabinet and further concessions 
were rejected. According to Duff Cooper, the one point on which all were agreed was
5
'their contempt for Allenby, who had apparently been very weak in the Cabinet.1
1. Scott to Curzon, October 27, 1921, Tel. No. , FO/371/6306.
2. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 85(21), November 3, 1921, CAB/23/27. By now even H.A.L.
Fisher, previously a 'Milnerite', was wavering. Torn between doubts about con­
cessions which he felt 'would appear to be a confession of weakness1 and the 
possibility of a break on the issue resulting in an Egyptian version of the Irish 
'troubles', Fisher wrote: 'All I am concerned with is to send Redmond back with
a good offer for fear that we may have to deal with a Michael Collins.' Fisher 
to Lloyd George, October 28, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/16/7/72.
3. Afterwards Duff Cooper noted in his diary, November 4, that 'Allenby thinks this 
[opposition to concessions] is disastrous. It is largely his fault for not having 
spoken up to Cabinet in favour of concessions.' Duff Cooper, loc. cit.
4. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 86(21), November 4, 1921, CAB/23/27.
5. Cooper heard the results of the Cabinet meeting at dinner with Montagu and Chur­
chill at Breccles on November 5. Duff Cooper, op.cit., p.106. As for Allenby's 
astonishing diffidence, Wavell commented on his 'comparative silence and in­
effectiveness at the periodical conferences of Army Commanders....He was not a 
ready debater? his mind, like a battleship, was powerful and weighty, but re­
quired space and time to turn or manoeuvre.' Wavell, op.cit., p.25. Allenby 
appeared to be temperamentally unsuited for the sharp and often superficial cut 
and thrust that characterised Cabinet discussion.
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A breakdown in the negotiations was now inevitable. The first session of the 
talks had revealed the distance between the two sides. Zaghlul1s continued in­
fluence in Egypt made it impossible for Adli to move from the 'reserves' to the 
Milner Memorandum, while the Cabinet decision of November 4 confirmed the inflexibi­
lity of the British position. On November 10 Curzon handed Adli the British draft 
convention formulated according to the Cabinet decision and Adli gave the anticipated 
Egyptian rejection to Curzon on November 15. Two days later Curzon cabled Allenby,
who had returned to Egypt, that the talks had failed and followed this with a long
1explanatory despatch on November 19.
After the failure of the talks, Whitehall took one final step. London's last
gesture, the consequences of which were unforeseen, was a note to the Sultan
delivered on December 3. The decision to send this note was reached at a Conference
of Ministers held on November 18 and attended by Lloyd George and every other major
2
Cabinet figure including Curzon.
The language and content of the Note humiliated the Egyptians. On the one hand, 
Egypt was reminded in magisterial tones that 'It is not wise for her people to over­
look these facts of Egypt's prosperity or forget to whom they are owed,' while, on 
the other hand, the Egyptians were sternly rebuked because the 'delegation made 
little practical advance towards recognition of the British Empire's just title...
exclusive rights and responsibilities' in the area of Egypt's administration, finances,
3judicial system and foreign relations. After noting that concessions would not be 
implemented 'without the consent and cooperation of the Egyptian nation,' that is, 
by agreement, it concluded with a lecture’ on the dangers of extreme nationalism:
His Majesty's Government do not consider that they would be consul­
ting Egypt's welfare by making concessions to agitation of this 
kind: and Egypt will make no progress until her responsible leaders
show the will and strength to put it down. The world is suffering 
in many places at the present time from the cult of a fanatical and 
purely disruptive type of nationalism. His Majesty's Government will 
set their f^ce against it as firmly in Egypt as elsewhere. Those who
1. Curzon to Allenby, November 17, 1921, Tel. No. 502, F0/371/6307; and, Curzon to
Allenby, November 19, 1921, Desp. No. 1255, C.P. 3505, CAB/24/131.
2. Present were Lloyd George, Curzon, Montagu, Worthington-Evans, Birkenhead, 
Churchill and Sir Robert Horne. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 92(21), December 12, 
1921, CAB/23/27.
3. Allenby to Sultan Ahmad Fuad, December 3, 1921, p.2, FO/371/6307.
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yield to it only make more necessary and so prolong the maintenance 
of those foreign sanctions which they denounce.^
According to most observers, the Note was an error of judgement, written in
the spirit of irritation and hectoring tone evident in the final session of the 
2
London talks. The Note's authorship was later disputed, presumably because of the
extreme hostility it unwittingly aroused in Egypt. Chirol, one of Lloyd George's
severest critics, claimed that the Note was 'drafted on the opposite side of
Downing Street and merely sent across to the Foreign Office for transmission to
3
Cairo over Lord Curzon's reluctant signature...' Curzon's biographer, Harold Nicol- 
son, similarly tried to absolve Curzon of responsibility, claiming that the Note
'had not even been drafted in the Foreign Office. The draft was prepared in the
4secretariat of Mr. Lloyd George.'
While it is true that Lloyd George played an active role in preparing the docu­
ment, Curzon did have a share of the responsibility for its contents. The decision 
to send a note was taken in the presence of both and the Cabinet Committee's formal 
resolution was that Curzon, 'in consultation with the Prime Minister,' should send
5
a policy statement to the Sultan. The actual composition of the Note appears to have 
been a joint effort with both Lloyd George and Curzon personally amending its langu- 
age. Not only was there little evident reluctance at the Foreign Office over the 
Note's transmission, but care was taken that it be presented on a Saturday 'thereby
7
ensuring the document's publication in the Sunday papers.'
1. Ibid.
2. Chirol called the Note 'notorious'. Chirol, 'Lloyd Georgian Foreign Policy,1 
Edin. Rev., 237 (Jan. 1923), p.4. On the other side of the political spectrum, 
George Lloyd noted that its only purpose seemed to be 'that of venting an undig­
nified but not unnatural irritation.1 Lloyd, op.cit., II, 51.
3. Chirol, loc. cit. 4. Nicolson, op.cit., pp.178-9.
5. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 92(21), December 12, 1921, CAB/23/27.
6. The following minute was attached to the amended draft: 'On leaving the F.O.
Sir Edward Grigg got the Prime Minister to read the draft letter of Lord Allenby
to the Sultan explaining to him the changes youjcurzonj desired. In these the
Prime Minister concurred, and in his turn he put forward a couple of amendments 
as shown in the annexed print.' R.C.LfindsavL to Curzon, November 23, 1921, 
FO/371/6307.
7. Curzon to Allenby, November 29, 1921, Tel. No. 517, FO/371/6308. This was on 
the advice of Murray and Crowe, Minutes, November 28, 1921 to Allenby to Curzon, 
November 28, 1921, Tel. No. 645, FO/371/6308.
While it was not the Note's purpose to confirm the rigidity of British policy, 
this was its major achievement and it increased Allenby's difficulties in adminis­
tering Egypt through a cooperative native ministry and maintaining order in the 
face of Zaghlul1s political activity.
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CHAPTER FIVE: INDEPENDENCE
Despite the finality of the breakdown of the London talks, the struggle be­
tween London and Cairo for control of British policy had only just begun. The 
first signs of this struggle were already evident two days after the Anglo- 
Egyptian talks ended in failure on November 15. These signs indicated the direction 
the struggle would take in the future.
Unilateralism and New Negotiaions
On November 17 Allenby cabled that the principal British advisers - Financial, 
Judicial, Interior and Education - were unanimous in the view that,
...a decision which does not admit principle of Egyptian independence 
and which maintains protectorate must entail serious risk of revolu­
tion throughout the country and in any case result in complete adminis­
trative chaos, rendering Government impossible.!
If the choice was the unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence or possible
disorder and chaos, Allenby's advisers supported independence in the strongest
terms, going so far as to state that if a contrary policy were adopted, '"they
cannot expect to retain the confidence of Egyptian Ministers or be able to render
2
useful service in the future.' This veiled threat to resign became an increasing­
ly important weapon in the disagreement over policy.
The Foreign Office exhibited surprise at this expression of the advisers' 
views which Allenby had forwarded to London with his tacit approval, since he had 
been a participant in the Cabinet discussions and was present when all major de­
cisions were made. Allenby was, therefore, directed to support government policy 
and 'to defend very ample concessions which they [Cabinet^ were prepared to make.1^
At the same time, there were contacts in Egypt to investigate the possibility
1. Allenby to Curzon, November 17, 1921, Tel. No. 629, FO/371/6307.
2. Ibid.
3. Curzon to Allenby, November 18, 1921, Tel. No. 503, FO/371/6307.
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of forming a new ministry. Allenby informed London on November 18 that Tharwat
Pasha, deputising for Adli as Prime Minister in the latter's absence, believed
Adli's resignation was inevitable. Tharwat was willing to form a government since
he believed that it was 'all-important to keep together supporters of Government,
in order to counter influence of Zaghloul. He {Tharwat^ is prepared to fight Zaghloul
to a finish, and is confident of s u c c e s s . T h e s e  were sentiments with which
Allenby had associated himself on many occasions.
Adli returned to Egypt on December 5 and Allenby cabled Curzon that as a
result of the December 3 Note he doubted whether a viable native government could
be maintained. Any ministry formed under existing conditions would be unstable and
2
'liable to drift without proper control on our part.1
In spite of the failure of the London talks, Allenby felt that Britain should
not hesitate to put into effect unilaterally the concessions previously offered 
as part of a treaty. While the December 3 Note seemed to rule out action without
Egypt's 'consent and cooperation,' Allenby and his advisers now believed that
amenable Egyptian leaders should be consulted to find the means necessary to imple­
ment the policy previously considered during the negotiations. Allenby therefore
requested permission to inform the Sultan, at his discretion, that the British 
government was prepared to implement the major provisions of the draft treaty. This 
would then serve as a programme for the present ministry or its successor. Not 
only would this ensure British interests and advance Egyptian independence, accord­
ing to Allenby, but it would also give the Egyptians responsibility for their own 
administration. This was one of Allenby's major concerns since,
No one conversant with recent developments in the administration 
of the country can remain blind to the great drawback under which 
we are labouring owing to prevailing system of dual obligation
which enables Ministry to secure the credit for all that is suc­
cessful in the administration of the country and to place the blame 
for mistakes, if they occur, on the shoulders of the British authori­
ties . 3
So the debate moved from the content of the concessions to the question of 
whether those concessions should be imposed unilaterally despite their earlier re­
jection by the Egyptian delegation.
1. Allenby to Curzon, November 18, 1921, Tel. No. 631, FO/371/6307.
2. Allenby to Curzon, December 5, 1921, Tel. No. 656, FO/371/6308.
3. Ibid.
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The Foreign Office, distant from the pressure of Egypt's day-to-day adminis­
tration, reacted sharply to Allenby's proposals. Murray was now unimpressed by 
Allenby's overriding concern for a stable administration and commented that his 
'proposal amounts in fact to giving away all that the Cabinet were with difficulty
induced to concede...and receiving nothing in return except the formation of a
. , 1 Government of whose stability or good faith we should have no guarantee.1 Crowe
noted that this proposal had been specifically rejected and 'If we did this now, we
2
should be stultifying ourselves absolutely.'
In addition to these considerations, Curzon also raised a domestic political
difficulty - Lloyd George's pledge that no action would be taken without the House
of Commons' approval. Curzon, in his minute to Allenby's cable, argued against
'precipitate action', preferring to wait for Parliament to reconvene in February,
by which time Ireland's likely incorporation into the Empire might have a salutary 
3effect on Egypt. He therefore informed Allenby that the question should be held
in abeyance and instead proposed a programme for an Egyptian government: maintain
order; enact indemnity legislation to' permit the end of martial law; return to
constitutional rule with elections? and, 'Egyptianise' the civil service. In
return Curzon held out the promise of more concessions after Egypt 'has proved her
4capacity for self-government.'
Allenby replied on December 11 to Curzon's restatement of the British position. 
His view was that the conditions of Curzon's programme, especially in the areas of 
public order and the termination of martial law, were either too vague or had al­
ready been conditionally promised by Allenby. In the strongest terms he urged 
London to commit itself publicly to a policy of independence to be vigorously pur­
sued in Parliament. The idea of a treaty 'must be definitely abandoned' since 'no 
Egyptian whatever his opinions may be, can put his signature to any document which
1. Murray Minute, 6.12.21 to ibid.
2. E.A.Cfrowej. , Minute, 6.12.21 to ibid.
3. C [urzo^. , Minute, 7.12.21 to ibid. As early as 1919 Curzon was critical of
Allenby's preoccupation with the formation of a native ministry to the exclu­
sion of larger issues: 'Allenby is misjudging the situation in its wider as­
pect, and that he believes the only thing to do is to get a native Ministry 
into power, whatever the price we have to pay for it.' Curzon to Balfour, 
April 1, 1919, Balfour Papers, FO/800/216.
4. Curzon to Allenby, December 8, 1921, Tel. No. 529, FO/371/6308.
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does not in his view involve complete independence.' After attempting to re­
assure Curzon about Egypt's ability to control her own foreign affairs, Allenby 
reverted to the key issue dividing the British in London and Cairo, namely, that
the 'Difficulties of British administration. under protectorate policy do not seem
2
to me to have received consideration they deserve.'
London reacted with hostility. Murray tartly observed that it was not really
necessary to give Allenby a conditional pledge of independence 'which he could
3then proceed to hawk round amongst potential Egyptian prime ministers.' Crowe
was confused by Allenby's earlier .behaviour in London and sharply enquired whether
'the telegram has been drafted and submitted to him by one of the officials who
have always favoured the undiluted Milner doctrine and who now want to make it
4impossible for H.M.G. to follow any other.' These sentiments, hostility towards 
Allenby and suspicion of a staff that presumed to encourage his stubborn opposition 
to Foreign Office policy, recurred frequently from this point on and coloured re­
lations between London and Cairo.
Allenby formally learned of Adli-'s resignation on December 11 when Tharwat, 
at the Sultan's suggestion, met Allenby and outlined his programme tor a new minis­
try. This entailed a rejection of the British note to Adli containing the draft
treaty, but recognition of the 'undertaking of the British government to terminate
5protectorate and to recognise Egypt as a sovereign state.' Egypt would then prove, 
through her good behaviour, that additional guarantees were not required to safe­
guard British interests. In addition, the new government would undertake to restore 
constitutional rule and would re-establish .a Ministry-for. Foreign Affairs. Allenby 
explained that Tharwat did not expect immediate independence but rather its pros­
pect in the near future. Tharwat made the formation of a new ministry conditional 
on BritcMn's approval of this programme which Allenby supported as an act of 
courage in view of general Egyptian resentment after the Note of December 3.^
1. Allenby to Curzon, December 11, 1921, Tel. No. 664, FO/371/6308.
2. Ibid. 3. Murray, Minute, 12.12.21, to ibid.
4. E.A.C JroweJ. , Minute, 12.12.21 to ibid.
5. Allenby to Curzon, December 12, 1921, Tel. No. 665, FO/371/6308.
6. Allenby to Curzon, December 12, 1921, Tel. No. 666, FO/371/6308.
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Curzon, in what was later described as 'drifting with a vengeance', accepted
the general lines of Tharwat's programme but stipulated that 'His Majesty's
Government have given no "undertaking1 to terminate protectorate...but merely
2
offered to do so as part of contract.' Without realizing that he was destroying 
the basis of the proposal he had accepted, Curzon asked Allenby to persuade 
Tharwat to substitute the word 'offer' for 'undertaking' in his programme. In a 
later cable dealing with Allenby's proposal for unilateral action, Curzon persis-
3
ted in his view that unilateralism was still 'quite unacceptable.' It is apparent 
that the Foreign Office and the Residency were working at cross-purposes. Curzon 
seemed to have believed that he was continuing the London talks at long distance, 
while Allenby was striking out in a new direction - the immediate undertaking of 
Egypt's independence.
Garbled reports in the British press concerning events in Egypt and the lack 
of news from Cairo since December-12 led Sir Eyre Crowe, in Curzon's absence at
4
Cannes, to make private enquiries from Allenby regarding developments m  Cairo.
The High Commissioner replied on December -20 that because of Adli's reluctance to
support his colleague, Tharwat, the latter would not form a government in spite
5
of the possibility of British assent to his programme. In order to counteract 
the effects of Wafd agitation and to strengthen Tharwat's nerve, Allenby also 
informed London of his decision to ban a public meeting scheduled by Zaghlul for 
December 23. If Zaghlul's activities could not be ended in this way, Allenby
g
grimly noted that 11 am ready to deal with him.1
1. Lloyd, op.cit., II, 54.
2. Curzon to Allenby, December 15, 1921, Tel. No. 534, FO/371/6308.
3 .  C u r z o n  t o  X>ecen\oe<- i c ,  131 * ,  ~Te\ . M o -  5 3 G  , F o /  3 7 / /
4. Crowe to Allenby, December 19, 1921, Private Tel., FO/371/6308.
5. Allenby later described the role played by Adli and the Sultan in preventing
Tharwat from forming a government: '...it transpired that he [Tharwat] had been
forbidden by the Sultan to disclose his programme in Egypt*-..He was specially 
embarrassed by denial of support.from Adli Pasha, who was still regarded as 
leader of the party..,' Allenby, Report on Egypt for the Year 1921, p.13, 
FO/371/7766. Gerald Delaney, long-time Reuters correspondent in Cairo, later 
wrote of Allenby's opinion of Adli in a private note to Wavell: 'Allenby was
wrong in describing Adly "as crooked as a ram's horn," but he was right when 
he referred to him as "the broken reed".' G. Delaney, Memorandum for General 
Sir Archibald Wavell, May 2, 1940, KAP.
6. Allenby to Crowe, December 20, 1921, no number, FO/371/6308.
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Circumstances forced Allenby to act on his threat. The decision to ban
Zaghlul's public meeting was followed by violence with one British soldier killed
and another wounded on December 20. As a result seven Wafd leaders were ordered
to their homes under police guard and banned from further political activities.
Zaghlul and a number of his associates openly defied Allenby who then ordered the
arrest of Zaghlul and three of his supporters and their deportation, preferably
to Ceylon, where Urabi was exiled after his defeat in 1882.^ Allenby was convinced
that 'With Zaghloul in the country peace and quiet could never be expected and no
2
progress could be made.1
Although the arrest and deportation of the Wafd leaders resulted in violence 
and strikes, the situation was quickly brought under control by Allenby's vigorous 
measures and soon Curzon would tersely note that 'We had got off more cheaply than
3
I had expected.' Allenby at this point was quietly confident about the prospects 
for the future upon which he expanded in a letter to his mother:
The arrest of Zaghloul caused a considerable flare-up; but the fire 
has now almost burnt out and I have great hopes for the future. I 
don't expect to be able to form another Ministry, for a week or so; 
but I am carrying on, for the time, without one.
It won't do to hurry things. I want stable and sound Ministry, 
when it comes.
All the best Egyptians are on my side; in reality, if not 
openly.
.1 am making no concessions to my opponents, but I am concilia­
tory to those who are inclined to be friendly; and I am on good 
terms with all our old supporters.^
Despite Allenby's confidence there still was no ministry and Egypt's volatile 
political atmosphere lent urgency to the search for a new government. During the
1. Allenby made it clear that he suggested Ceylon ■ because of its association with
Urabi. Allenby to Foreign Office, December 23, 1921, Tel. No. 680, FO/371/6308.
London had the same reaction. In reply to Montagu's letter of December 29,
1921, in which he expressed concern about Zaghlul's proximity to India and its 
large Muslim minority, Curzon explained the choice of Ceylon: 'The precedent
of Arabi Pasha was in everyone's mind.' Curzon to Montagu, December 30, 1921, 
Curzon Papers, FO/800/153.
2. Allenby to Foreign Office, December 23, 1921, Tel. No. 680, FO/371/6308.
3. Curzon to Lloyd George, 28.12.21, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/12/12/63.
4. Allenby to Mother, December 29, 1921, KAP.
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last week of December and the first week of January, Allenby, through Selby, 
investigated Adli's and Tharwat's terms for a new government. Collaboration was 
so close that Allenby's decision, similar to the one taken in 1919, to confer 
ministerial powers on the predominantly British under-secretaries was made at 
Tharwat's and Adli's suggestion.
The talks continued until January 12 when Allenby informed Curzon that Tharwat
had submitted a strong and representative list of Cabinet members and that a govern-
2ment programme had been agreed upon. Allenby therefore requested permission to 
present a note to the Sultan which would be made public with the formation of a 
ministry. The aim of the draft note would be to emphasise the conciliatory as­
pects of the December 3 note, end misrepresentation of the aims of the British draft 
treaty, explain British policy-towards Zaghlul, express the 'friendly intentions' 
of the British government, and accept the main points of Tharwat's programme, es­
pecially independence, while reserving for subsequent negotiations matters affecting 
Britain's vital interests.
Allenby's draft note consisted of thirteen paragraphs, the first nine of which 
explained the background of British policy, while the last four were based on the 
premise that the British government 'are prepared to recommend to British parlia­
ment, without waiting for conclusion of a treaty, abolition of protectorate and
3
recognition of Egypt as an independent sovereign state.' However, there would be 
reservations in the areas of (a) security of Imperial communications; (b) the 
defence of Egypt; (c) protection of foreign interests and minorities; and,
(d) the Sudan, Allenby asked that this draft letter be authorised without modifi­
cation since he shared his advisers' conviction 'that there is no other means of 
maintaining friendly disposition of those |favourableI political elements in Egypt 
...and of assuaging hostility of others, than to give this pledge regarding abolition
1. Selby later wrote in his memoirs that 'I had been the chief negotiator of that
momentous departure of policy in Egypt under Lord Allenby's instructions for a
treaty with Egypt.' Sir Walford Selby, Diplomatic Twilight, 1930-40 (London, 
1953), p.133. This is confirmed in Allenby to Curzon, December 27, 1921,
Tel. No. 692, F0/371/6309.
2. Allenby to Curzon, January 12, 1922, Tel. Nos. 17-18, FO/371/7730.
3. Allenby to Curzon, January 12, 1922, Tel. No. 19, FO/371/7730.
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1
of protectorate. I am equally convinced that this is the moment to give it.'
At this point, the members of the Foreign Office Egyptian Department supported
Allenby. Murray felt that a temporary euphoria had settled over Egypt and, if
ignored, such an opportunity would not return. However, as in 1918-19, Britain's
leaders were occupied elsewhere. Curzon was at Cannes and a delay in approving
Allenby's policy meant, according to Murray, that 'what would now.be regarded as
2a "beau geste" will be hailed as a symptom of weakness.' Lindsay was also im­
pressed by the urgency of the situation. Despite earlier rejection of Allenby's 
proposal, he preferred it to what he felt was the only alternative, the rapid
3
deteriorration of affairs in Egypt.
Crowe's comment provided the only dissenting note. He was harshly critical 
of Allenby's behaviour, believing that he 'is to blame for trying to rush H.M.G. 
in this way.' Furthermore, despite Crowe's reluctance to oppose 'those who speak 
with intimate knowledge of Egyptian conditions and Egyptian psychosis,' he opposed 
giving up Britain's only formal lever of power in Egypt and relying solely on the
4
use of military force. Allenby's cables were finally sent to Curzon and Crowe 
informed the High Commissioner that while an early decision would be sought, 'you 
will realise that with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign
5
Affairs at Cannes an immediate reply on so important a matter cannot be sent.'
Churchill, having seen copies of Allenby's cables, fiercely opposed his 
'feverish haste' and reminded Lloyd George of his parliamentary pledges on Egypt.
He added, no doubt with the Milner Report in mind, that 'I hope you will allow
1. Allenby to Curzon, January 12, 1922, Tel. No. 18, FO/371/7730. Allenby's op­
timism was based, in part, on his belief that the Wafd was breaking up. He 
informed Curzon of expected secessions on the same day. Allenby to Curzon, 
January 12, 19 22, Tel. No. 20, C.P. 3614, CAB/24/132. Allenby then privately 
cabled Curzon that 'I count on you to see that my proposals are accepted. If 
they go through I believe that we are far on the road to a settlement of 
Egyptian problem. If they are rejected I consider that finest opportunity 
that we have ever had will have been missed. I do not think that such an oppor 
tunity will occur again.' Allenby to Curzon, January 12, 1922, private and 
personal, Curzon Papers, FO/800/153.
2. Murray, Minute, January 13, 1922 to Allenby to Curzon, Tel. Nos. 17-20, Janu­
ary 12-13, 1922, FO/371/7730. This was supported by Duff Cooper, who noted in 
his diary, January 13: 'The situation looks really hopeful and a possible solu
tion seems in sight.' Duff Cooper, op. cit., p.106.
3. R.C. L[[indsay]. , Minute, January 13, 1922 to ibid.
4. E.A. C[rowe). , Minute, January 13, 1922 to ibid.
5. Crowe to Allenby, January 13, 1922, Tel. No. 12, FO/371/7730.
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the Cabinet to discuss the matter before any sanction is given to these new 
proposals.'1 Privately he continued to take every opportunity to express his
2
opposition and contempt for Allenby as an administrator as well as a soldier.
Throughout this period Allenby kept London informed about developments in
Egypt. On January 15, based on information obtained by Selby and Clayton, he cabled
encouraging news about developing unrest in the ranks of the Wafd and the promise
3
this held for a settlement. Nearly a week passed, however, and still no action 
was taken on Allenby1s request for authority to approach the Sultan along the lines 
indicated in his cables of January 12.
Allenby's Resignation and Recall
The Cabinet finally met on January 18 to discuss Allenby's proposals. Curzon 
presented his views in a memorandum which, in the first instance, was a characteris­
tic attempt to absolve him of responsibility for recent developments. He sharply 
reminded the Cabinet that 'my advice as to the form of treaty to be offered to Adly 
Pasha and the reply to be sent to the Sultan was not taken in November last,' and
he then noted that 'the Cabinet preferred to take a course which has been attended
4
with the very consequences which I then unavarlmgly predicted.' After examina­
tion of the events in Egypt and the implications, as he understood them, of Allenby1s 
proposals, Curzon stated that in view of all the factors, especially the opinions 
of his professional staff and his belief that the recent Irish settlement had en­
couraged the Egyptians, Allenby's advice should be accepted.
In Curzon's view this was a decision that required no decisive action making 
it especially attractive to him: '...the responsibility for the carrying out of
the suggested policy is one which we are not invited to assume ourselves to-day or
1. Churchill to Lloyd George, January 13, 1922, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/3.
2. A good example was a conversation with Colonel Meinertzhagen and T.E. Lawrence, 
which Meinertzhagen recorded in his diary on December 24, 1921. Churchill was 
reported to have said that Allenby was 'a "dud" General.... and that Allenby 
proved himself a weak and vacillating administrator in Egypt, devoid of policy 
or sense.' CRPO, Meinertzhagen Diaries, Vol. 22, p.110.
3. Allenby to Curzon, January 15, 1922, private and personal, FO/371/7730. This 
hope proved to be ephemeral.
4. c[urzonL of Kl[eddlestor^. , The Egyptian Question, January 16, 1922, C.P. 3616, 
CAB/24/132.
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tomorrow.' Curzon believed that the British government would only be required
to recommend Egypt's independence to Parliament: an Egyptian ministry would be
formed immediately, while Parliament would not meet for nearly a month.
Curzon maintained his support for Allenby during the Cabinet meeting and
warned that 'Here appeared to be a last chance of establishing an Egyptian Minis- 
2
try.' The Cabinet, however, was not easily swayed and the majority refused to
concede independence, viewed as the last bargaining counter for a treaty. It was
decided to adopt a time-honoured method of avoiding a decision by awaiting further
information - a device that in part underlay the original Milner Mission. In spite
of Curzon's warnings about 'the serious risks that would be incurred by delay,1 and
an implicit threat to resign since the Cabinet 'would be taking a false step which
he would be unable to defend in Parliament,' no decision was taken. Instead the
Cabinet would await the return of Austen Chamberlain, the Lord Privy Seal and
Leader of the House, as well as other absent ministers, and request that Allenby
send Clayton and another responsible official to London 'to give their view to the 
3
Cabinet.'
The Foreign Office officials were dismayed but informed Allenby of the Cabinet
. . 4decision and asked him to send Amos and Clayton to London. This would result in
a delay of several weeks and effectively end Allenby's hopes for a rapid and favour­
able solution of the Egyptian question. Curzon explained, in a personal cable to
Allenby, that he had 'had utmost difficulty at Cabinet this morning in urging your
5views, which I even backed with threat of personal resignation.' The Cabinet's 
reservations, according to Curzon, centred on the absence of guarantees that the 
proposed Egyptian government would accept Allenby's four reservations or his
1. Ibid.
2. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 2(22), January 18, 1922, CAB/23/29. He did moderate 
his support by calling for stronger Egyptian assurances on the reserved points.
3. Ibid.
4. Curzon to Allenby, January 18, 1922, Tel. No. 21, FO/371/7730. Duff Cooper 
noted in his diary, January 18, that the Cabinet 'failed miserably to come to 
any conclusion.' Lindsay thought 'the whole thing will remain in cold storage 
for the time being,' while'Murray thinks it [dela$ will be disastrous.' Duff 
Cooper, loc.cit.
5. Curzon to Allenby, January 18, 1922, Strictly Personal and Confidential, Curzon 
Papers, FO/800/153. This is somewhat of an overstatement if the Cabinet re­
cords are taken at face value. The threat of resignation at most appears to be 
implied. See, Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 2(22), January 18, 1922, CAB/23/29.
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interpretation of them. There was no way of knowing this until the protectorate 
had already been abolished. Curzon concluded with the promise that he would do 
his best to obtain favourable consideration of Allenby's proposals, adding the 
qualification that, 'you are aware, however, of the forces with which I have to 
contend.'1
Allenby, unconvinced by the Cabinet decision, immediately replied that all the 
issues had been thoroughly considered by him and his advisers and that the propo­
sals were his final advice. There was no point, therefore, .in the Cabinet hearing 
Amos and Clayton, but he did suggest that Selby, already on his way to London, be 
consulted upon arrival. If the proposals were accepted, Allenby noted in his 
latest rejoinder, this would provide the basis for a lasting settlement, but their
rejection would mean 'nothing but a rule of repression driving us to annexation of 
2
the country.T
Allenby again attempted at great length to explain his views, frequently re­
turning to the impossibility of ruling without the cooperation of moderate Egyptians 
and the extent to which speed was essential if the goodwill of that group was to be 
retained. He further assured Curzon, in a personal telegram on January 20, that
conversations with Tharwat and Sidqi Pasha, .a leading moderate politician, showed
3that they accepted his views on the reserved points. In fact, Sidqi and Tharwat 
had signed a proces verbal, binding on the individual but not on an Egyptian govern­
ment, which summarised the results of their conversations with Scott, Amos and R.A.
4Furness, the Acting Oriental Secretary at the Residency. It was agreed, among 
other things, that Allenby's consent would be required for foreign loans, the en­
gagement of senior officials in the Egyptian civil service, and officers in the
1. Curzon to Allenby, January 18, 1922, strictly personal and confidential, Curzon 
Papers, FO/800/153.
2. Allenby to Curzon, January 20,. 1922, Tel. No. 27, FO/371/7731.
3. Allenby to Curzon, January 20, 1922, personal, C.P.3643, CAB/24/132.
4. PROCES VERBAL d'une conversation entre S.E. Abdel Khalik Pacha Saroit, S.E.
Ismail Pacha Sidky, Mr. Ernest Scott, Mr. M.S. Amos & Mr. Furness a la Residence, 
le 20 janvier, 1922, FO/141/515. The main lines of the proces verbal seem to in­
dicate that this agreement was based largely on a memorandum by Amos which also
parallels Allenby1s proposals to the British government. Amos, Draft Convention
for the Termination of the Protectorate, in Dowson to Scott, January 15, 1922,
Clayton Papers, SAD/470/14.
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army and police. Allenby again sought to allay the Cabinet's fears and noted that
the sanction of the protectorate was in itself meaningless. The only real sanction
was Britain's military presence which would remain in any event. Meanwhile he
1
warned: 'the sands are running out.1
To further impress London with the seriousness of his intent, Allenby sent
Curzon a brief and blunt message on the same day, January 20: 'Situation admits of
2no delay, and if my advice is not accepted I shall resign.' Relations with the
Cabinet were now at a critical juncture. Curzon had at least implicitly threatened
resignation and now Allenby raised the same possibility. The extent to which these
threats were real and would be accepted as such by the Cabinet was the crucial issue.
Duff Cooper posed the questions this way: '...will Curzon, if Allenby's resignation
is accepted, resign too? He clearly should. Or on the other hand, will Winston
3and the Cabinet give way?1
The Cabinet met again on January 23 to consider further the situation. Curzon 
reviewed the events of the preceding few days and informed the Cabinet of Allenby's 
threat to resign if his advice was rejected. In the face of strong opposition, the 
Foreign Secretary retreated from his earlier support of Allenby. He now proposed 
an ingenious compromise between the positions of London and Cairo, namely, a treaty 
to be ratified by the British and Egyptian parliaments. The agreement of the British 
Parliament, however, would be contingent upon the satisfactory settlement of all 
points outstanding between the two countries.
Curzon no longer alluded to resignation and by now had retreated from support, 
in principle, of unilateral independence. In effect, he proposed in this way to 
return to the negotiations which had collapsed in November. The Foreign Secretary 
was more concerned with his political flank than with the situation in Egypt. He 
admitted that 'he was not very sanguine as to whether these proposals would be 
accepted; but from a parliamentary point of view they would not be seriously open
1. Allenby to Curzon, January 20, 1922, Personal, C.P.3643, CAB/24/132.
2. Ostensibly this was intended to strengthen Curzon's hand in his dealings with 
the Cabinet. Allenby to Curzon, January 20, 1922, Most Urgent, FO/371/153.
3. Diary entry for January 21, 1922, Duff Cooper, loc.cit.
1to attack.' This lack of political courage embittered relations between Curzon 
and Allenby and on another occasion led Austen Chamberlain to note derisively that 
' he ^ Curzon] is a funker and a bad man to go tiger-shooting with.'2
The Cabinet remained firm in its belief that the juridical position of Egypt 
should not be changed unilaterally. Lloyd George, Chamberlain, Sir Robert Horne, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Curzon, Churchill and H.A.L. Fisher were delegated to
consider a draft reply to Allenby's proposals and his threatened resignation. A
3 . . .telegram was approved and sent on January 24. It expressed the majority view and
adopted as its basis Curzon*s compromise proposed to the Cabinet the previous day.
Despite Cabinet opposition to Allenby's policy, he was asked to remain at his post.
Instead of accepting his advice, the Cabinet proposed to support a parliamentary
resolution to abolish the protectorate if agreement was reached on all reserved
points. As one close observer commented at the time: 'This is quite useless. It
amounts to saying that if a treaty is ever arrived at we promise to carry out one
4
side of it.' Curzon confided to Allenby that the Cabinet could not or would not 
go any further. He no longer spoke of his own resignation but now argued that,
The Govt have sought to pay full consideration to anxieties of your 
position and they now rely upon you to exert your utmost abilities 
to procure assent to their policy. I have argued your case with all 
my energy and power - but Cabinet will go no further.5
Allenby was concerned that the delay had already caused irreparable damage. In 
reply to the compromise offered in the government's cable of January 24, he again 
pressed acceptance of either his policy or his resignation. Since the British 
government seemed to him to be bent on destroying any chance for a friendly Egypt, 
he now asked that his resignation be formally tendered to the King because 'my 
opinions are well-known here and if the advice I have offered is rejected I cannot
1. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet3(22), January 23, 1922, CAB/23/29.
2. Chamberlain to Lloyd George, December 7, 1922., .BUL, Chamberlain Papers, 
AC/18/1/35. Wavell states that at one point Curzon informed Allenby that he 
would support him 'up to the point of resignation,' which was later explained 
as meaning 'up to but not including resignation.1 Wavell, op.cit., p.72.
3. Curzon to Allenby, January 24, 1922, Tel. No. 26, C.P.3647, CAB/24/132.
4. Diary entry for January 24, 1922, Duff Cooper, op.cit., p.108.
5. Curzon to Allenby, January 24, 1922, Private and Personal, FO/371/7730. This 
telegram was written in Curzon1s hand.
honourably remain.1
These exchanges drew the lines sharply between Allenby and the Cabinet: the
one pressed for a unilateral approach and the other for a bilateral one. The Cabinet 
was willing to negotiate but refused .to concede anything without prior agreement 
even at the risk that Allenby might, resign* Future policy would, apparently, be 
determined by which of the two would cause greater political embarrassment - con­
cession of Egypt's independence or Allenby*s resignation.
The struggle between Allenby and the Cabinet was not a simple one and was 
further complicated by the strong support - some might say, instigation - of his
advisers in Cairo. The earlier threat to resign in their November 17 memorandum on
2
Egypt's future was ncwclearly and forcefully repeated. In addition, Selby brought 
to London a telegram he had received at Marseilles from Allenby stating that, if 
Allenby's policy was rejected, all the major British advisers in Egypt would resign. 
Selby informed Duff Cooper of this immediately upon his arrival in London on January
3
22. Thus when the Cabinet met again on January 26 it was no longer a simple choice
between Allenby's resignation or acceptance of his Egyptian policy. If the Cabinet
persisted to the point of Allenby's resignation, they would have 'to carry out their
4policy with the whole of our instruments in Egypt gone.'
The Cabinet decided not to give in to the pressure of the advisers since this 
could not be defended in Parliament. Because of the administrative dislocation that
1. Allenby to Curzon, January 25, 1922, Tel. No. 31, FO/371/7730. There were in­
dications that some in the Cabinet, especially Churchill and his supporters, 
would not regret Allenby's resignation. T.E. Lawrence, commenting on Lord 
Lloyd's Egypt Since Cromer, wrote that 'Winston tried to get my consent to take 
Allenby's place and to accept his resignation at this moment.' T.E. Lawrence 
to G[eorgej. L^loydj. , September 30, 1934. David Garnett (ed.), The Letters of 
T.E. Lawrence (London, 1938), pp.819-20. Vansittart at the Foreign Office de­
nied that there was any substance in Lawrence's claim: 'The appointment lay
with Curzon. If Winston had ever foolishly proposed Lawrence I should have 
heard, for Curzon would have laughed him out of court, and the laughter would 
not have been kind.1 Vansittart, op.cit., p.
2. Amos now cabled Murray that 'We feel you should have advance information of in­
tended action of advisers.1 This referred to their resignation. Allenby to 
Curzon, January 26, 1922, Tel. No.^— , FO/371/7730.
3. Ibid. , and Duff Cooper, diary entry for January 22, 1922: 'He [selby]| showed me 
a telegram he had got from Allenby at Marseilles saying, all the advisers would 
resign too.' Duff Cooper, op.cit,. , p. 106. Apparently Duff Cooper heard too 
late to inform Curzon before the Cabinet.met, or Curzon knew and did not inform 
the Cabinet until the 26th of January.
4. Curzon's statement to the Cabinet. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet. 4(22), January 016, 
1922. CAB/23/29.
would attend their resignations, it was decided to bring pressure to bear upon the 
advisers, nominally members of the Egyptian civil service, to remain at their posts.
This call was to be made in the name of and for the sake of the welfare of the
, . 1 British Empire.
The situation regarding Allenby's resignation was different. Because Allenby
could no longer effectively represent British policy, he was to be recalled to
report upon the situation, at which time his resignation could be accepted. The
discussion that continued in the Cabinet on the following day, January 27, moved in
the same direction, with anger clearly expressed 'at the manner in which they jthe
Cabinet^had been kept in the dark as to his proceedings in the past six weeks, with
2
the result that they were suddenly confronted with what amounted to an ultimatum.' 
There was great bitterness at the presumption of Allenby and his advisers, and the 
decision to recall him and to issue a communique announcing this step was confirmed 
at this meeting. Allenby's resignation would not be accepted until he returned 
home.
3
The telegram of recall was sent on January 28. Allenby was taken to task on 
the grounds that although the original government policy had been formulated in 
consultation with him, after a long and uninformed lapse he had presented the Cabi­
net with an ultimatum that would mean the total surrender of the existing position.
In addition he had rigidly refused to consider the government's liberal proposals 
but simply repeated his ultimatum. Surprise was expressed at the sudden and extreme 
change in Egypt's political climate, a change which precluded any settlement save 
through the concession of independence. Since Allenby refused to send Clayton and 
Amos to London, he now was asked to return to England to report to the Cabinet before 
they could accept his resignation. There is little doubt that this telegram was
meant to chastise and humiliate Allenby for his stubborn refusal to comply with the
4
Cabinet's wishes. Furthermore, with one eye cast on the inevitable papers to be 
laid before Parliament explaining recent events in Egypt, it was a rather clever
1. Ibid., and Murray to Amos (drafted by Curzonj, in Curzon to Allenby, January 28, 
1922, Tel. No. 34, FO/371/7730.
2. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 5(22), January 27, 1922, CAB/23/29.
3. Curzon to Allenby, January 28, 1922, Tel. No. 32, C.P.3647, CAB/24/132.
4. Duff Cooper's entry in his diary, January 28: 'We have sent a very insulting 
telegram to Allenby, refusing to accept his resignation and telling him to come 
home. He has been ill-treated.' Duff Cooper, loc.cit.
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attempt to contrast the Cabinet's reasonableness with Allenby's intransigence.
Allenby's Return and the Struggle in London
Allenby now prepared for his return to England convinced that he would be re­
placed. He told Lord Northcliffe, his guest at the Residency, 'that he was probably 
not coming back to E g y p t . A  few days before Allenby left Egypt he spoke inform­
ally at a dinner in Northcliffe's honour. He explained his sentiments that had 
animated him since his return to Egypt and which would guide-him in his future 
association with that country. On that occasion he said,
...it was absurd to think that after 40 years we should scuttle out 
of the country at the bidding of the extremists. That it was fool­
ish to try and make a treaty - the value of treaties had been shown 
in the case of Persia. Gr. Britain was too big to condescend to 
treaties with the Egyptians. His policy was concessions without 
bargains. The B[ritishj. Gjovernmen^. had made certain promises (he 
had never made any) which it had got to fulfill. But they should 
be carried out without any quid pro quo. If you find a man down 
at your feet, you didn't say 'now let us make a bargain,' you 
allowed him to get up, with a threat that if he didn't behave him­
self, you would down him again.2
In Britain Allenby's recall was announced to the press on January 29. Accord­
ing to the Foreign Office communiqu^, Allenby was summoned home ostensibly 'to give
full information and advice' on the situation in Egypt and to report on the commu-
3nications that had passed between him and the Egyptian leaders. The language and
content of the communique was, however, equivocal and confusing. On the one hand
it sought to refute the impression that the government 'has abandoned or is about
to abandon her liberal attitude towards Egyptian aspir-ations,' while on the other
it reaffirmed Britain's refusal to grant independence to Egypt, without prior agree-
4ment on all vital issues.
The public response to this document reflected its confusing nature. The Daily 
Chronicle noted that the communique* 'does not represent any change in...policy,'
1. Alfred Viscount Northcliffe[a . HarmsworthJ, My Journey Round the World; 16 July 
1921-26 February 1922 (London, 1923), p.264.
2. jsir B. Hornsb^}, Note of Conversation with Lord A. , 2/2/22, STAC, Hornsby Papers, 
Box I/File II.
3. Times, January 30, 1922. 4. Ibid.
while the Manchester Guardian believed that 1 the whole Egyptian policy is to be 
1reconsidered.1 The Daily Express saw it as confirmation of 'Lord Curzon's
acceptance of the Churchill objections,' and the Daily Telegraph felt that this in-
2
dicated 'that the way of negotiation is still open.' The Westminster Gazette most
aptly summarized public mystification over the government's course: 'With such a
3
document before us we can only grope after the truth...'
Amidst this welter of speculation, Allenby returned to London together with
Amos and Clayton on Friday, February 10. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of
the Imperial General Staff, recorded his friend's reception: 'I met Allenby at
Victoria Station, 10.15 a.m. Philip Chetwode also there. No high Foreign Office
4official and no car to meet the Bull. It was a scandal.' Allenby, however, was
not put off by the cold reception and bluntly told his friends, including Selby,
5that 'I have not come home to argue...' He insisted on going directly to the 
Foreign Office to leave for printing and circulation a long despatch composed in 
Egypt and intended as a refutation of the charges levelled against him when he was 
recalled.
The outcome of the struggle between Allenby and London could not be predicted 
with any great measure of certainty because of the many factors affecting a govern­
ment decision.
To begin with, the first two sections of the Geddes Report of the Economy Com­
mittee had been released to the press on the very day Allenby returned home. The 
Committee recommended Service economies of £46.5 million and suggested that the 
military forces in Egypt and in the Middle East be reduced below current levels.^ 
But only three weeks earlier the General Staff had warned the Cabinet that if, as 
feared, nationalists succeeded in arousing the populace in Egypt because Britain 
had rejected the Milner Report, reinforcements of at least two.divisions and one 
cavalry brigade would be needed to maintain the British position and to protect
1. Daily Chronicle, January 30, 1922; Manchester Guardian, January 30, 1922.
2. Daily Express, January 30, .1922; Daily Telegraph, January 30, 1922.
3. Westminster Gazette, January 31, 1922.
4. Major-General Sir C.E. Callwell, Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, Bart., G.C.B., 
D.S.O.: His Life and Diaries (London., 1927), II, 325.
5. Diary entry for February 10, 1922, Extracts from the Wilson Diaries, KAP.
6. Cmd. 1581, 1582 in Times, February 11, 1922.
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European lives. The government was torn between the need for economies
and the potential need for more troops if Allenby's advice was again rejected.
Public and parliamentary reaction to possible developments in Egypt was also
a major consideration. There was the question posed by Sir Henry Wilson in a
conversation with Worthington-Evans: 'whether the Cabinet were prepared for the
odium of governing Egypt by force, if no Egyptian Cabinet can be formed except on
2
the platform of complete independence and full sovereign rights.' There is no 
record of any satisfactory reply having been given.
In addition, there was growing uncertainty about the government’s future. 
January and February 1922 was a period of serious unrest in the Unionist Party, the 
major partner in the coalition, over Lloyd George's election plans. It was also 
at this point, in February, that Andrew Bonar Law returned to active political life. 
This provided the Unionists with a possible alternative to Lloyd George's leader­
ship and further weakened the coalition's political base.
Another important factor was that the Egyptian question could not be quietly 
resolved in the government's favour. Allenby enjoyed strong support from various 
sections of the press such as the Times, the Observer, the Guardian and the North-
3
cliffe papers. His resignation and the reason for its acceptance was not an 
issue that could be glossed over easily since every major paper had reported that 
the High Commissioner had returned home prepared to resign if his advice was
4
rejected. Even a paper like the Daily Express which viciously attacked Allenby for 
returning from the East 'like Pompey with a demand that all his views should be
1. The paper was prepared by the Imperial General Staff and submitted by Wilson, 
CIGS, to the Secretary of State for War, Worthington-Evans, on January 10, 1922, 
and then to .the Cabinet. L. W[orthingtonj. -E[vansj. , Army Estimates, January 20, 
1922, C.P.3619, CAB/24/132.
2. Wilson's diary entry for January 27, 1922 in Callweli, op.cit., II, 322.
3. Examples of favourable press comment are in Times, February 8, 1922; Observer,
February 12, 1922; Daily Mail, February 4, 1922. Northcliffee, recently Allen­
by 's guest at the Residency, made a very strong statement in his support on 
February 5 and this was widely reported in the British press. Times, February 8, 
1922.
4. Some of the reports of Allenby's threats to resign are: Observer, February 12,
1922; Daily Chronicle, February 16, 1922? Daily Herald, February 13, 1922;
Manchester Guardian, February 14, 1922; Daily Express, February 15, 1922;
Daily News, February 10, 1922; Times, February 10, 1922.
approved, or with designs on the Imperial diadem,' tended to arouse passions 
rather than quieten them.
Finally, even if the government was willing to risk accepting Allenby's resig­
nation, it would have to face him in the House of Lords when it defended its policy 
in Parliament. Bland explanations or glib attempts to strengthen the government 
case would not be accepted passively. Thus, given Allenby's support among his ad­
visers, the publicity surrounding his recall, the general political situation and 
his personal position, the High Commissioner, as in March-April 1919, was in a 
powerful position in his conflict with London.
The first episode in the struggle in London began when Selby returned home.
Pressure was brought to bear on him when Curzon 'tried to induce\selby] ...to agree,
in a three hours' interview, to a telegram to Allenby which would have been a com-
2plete reversal of the policy Allenby was advocating.' The campaign began in earnest
when Allenby arrived in London with his twenty-nine paged despatch which sought to
3
answer the Foreign Office telegrams of January 24 and 28.
The despatch was meticulously composed, carefully marshalling documentary evi­
dence in support of Allenby's position - emphasising the more easily proven elements 
of his case while ingeniously explaining the weaker ones. Selby later described it 
as 'a fine piece of work and [it]really clinched the whole argument.'^
The despatch's main arguments were levelled against the Cabinet's two major
1. Daily Express, February 9, 1922. Chirol wrote at the time about the campaign 
against Allenby 'in newspapers reputed to be in close touch with certain members 
of the Cabinet.' Here he alluded to Churchill and the Express. V. Chirol, 
'Ending the Egyptian Deadlock,' Fort. Rev., III, (April, 1922), p.548. Wilson 
commented on this in his diary on January 30, 1922: 'the Govt, press are al­
ready commencing the same miserable cowardly campaign...' Extracts from the 
Wilson Diaries, KAP.
2. Selby to Harold Nicholson, Vienna, May 13, 1934, KAP. Selby wrote this letter 
to correct the erroneous description of events and of Curzon's role in them that 
appeared in Nicholson's Curzon, pp.180-2.
3. Allenby to Curzon, February 2, 1922, Despatch No. 81, FO/371/7731. [Hereafter: 
Feb. 2 Despatch..J .
4. Selby to Nicholson, Vienna, May 13, 1934, KAP. Everyone seemed bent on dis­
owning the despatch. Lloyd George at one point told Amos that 'He believed he 
was a very gifted writer,' to which Amos replied that 'he was not the author of 
any of the despatches.1 Memorandum.of a Conversation at 10 Downing Street, 
London, S.W.l on Wednesday, February 15th, 1922 at 11.00 a.m., S.40, CAB/23/35. 
This writer has been unable to uncover the real author. It may have been, on 
the basis of style, Scott or A. Clerk Kerr. The identity of the writer may have 
been kept secret because of possible damage to his career in the Foreign Office.
charges against Allenby: first, that Allenby had suddenly presented the Cabinet
with an ultimatum to change a policy that had been formulated after consultation 
with him; and, second, that despite the Cabinet's willingness to make great con­
cessions, Allenby had 'refused to support their liberal proposals in Egypt.'^
Allenby attempted to counter the first charge by restating the positions he 
had consistently taken throughout the period. The despatch emphasised Allenby's 
comments made as early as April 1921 in written communications on the need for an 
alternative policy, namely, the unilateral imposition of independence. It also 
noted his warnings about the impossibility of success if the substance of British 
concessions was less than that envisaged by Milner. Allenby's rather weak personal 
appearance in London and his participation in Cabinet discussions in Autumn 1921 
were explained by the argument that consultation on policy was by no means the same 
as responsibility for the policy finally adopted.
Furthermore, when he did urge the unilateral imposition of independence at a 
Cabinet sub-committee on October 24, his plea fell on deaf ears. Finally, with re­
spect to his reluctance to press his policy strongly on the Cabinet in early Novem­
ber 1921, Allenby noted that
I was there and then invited to formulate a policy, which I neces­
sarily refused to do, seeing that His Majesty's Government had been 
for some months in possession of my views and that I could not dic­
tate a policy in five minutes.2
The despatch then recounted Allenby's actions and communications after his re­
turn to Egypt on November 12. The aim, largely successful, was to demonstrate that 
there was a consistent progression in Allenby's approach as well as in events in 
Egypt rather than a precipitate change in either or both. The change that did occur
resulted from the December 3 Note to the Sultan which Allenby did not compose and
3of whose contents he was ignorant. Again, at the begining of December, Allenby 
urged independence as the means to end the impasse. He now repeated his views on 
the 'uselessness' of the Foreign Office proposals for a platform for a prospective
1. Feb. 2 Despatch..., p.4, FO/371/7731. 2. Ibid.
3. Allenby's comments here are somewhat misleading since his reaction to the
December 3 Note now had the benefit of hindsight. But at the time Allenby wrote 
his mother, December 5, that the Sultan 'accepted them [the papers] sensibly and 
pleasantly... I don't...anticipate any bad trouble.' Again on December 8, 'Egypt 
has taken the declaration by the British Government fairly quietly.' Allenby to 
Mother. December 5 and 8, 1921, KAP.
Egyptian ministry. Allenby refused to admit that he kept London in the dark about 
developments, despite Crowe's request for information in December. Instead he 
maintained that the direction of events leading to Zaghlul's arrest was clear. He 
simply waited for it to crystallise before reporting the details to London.
One of the despatch's major points was that Allenby's advocacy of the immediate 
declaration of independence was not the result of a violent change in Egypt's poli­
tical climate. On the contrary, because Allenby had successfully suppressed the 
activities of Zaghlul and his supporters, it was claimed, 'a momentarily stable 
situation' arose requiring a quick decision for its successful exploitation. Thus 
Allenby tried to refute the accusation that he had presented the government with a 
sudden ultimatum as a result of a dramatic turn for the worse in Egyptian opinion.
Finally, in answer to the claim that he 'refused to recommend..Jthe government's]
1
liberal proposals to the Sultan and to the Egyptian Authorities,' Allenby first 
examined the British proposals in order to gainsay their liberality. Then he remin­
ded the reader that, while he believed these proposals doomed to failure and could 
not himself accept responsibility for them, he nevertheless had expressed willing­
ness to present them to the Egyptians. It was at this point that Allenby was 
recalled. Allenby concludes this careful analysis of the background to his resig­
nation with the observation that his mission was to maintain the protectorate over 
Egypt:
I have done so; but I do not think it has the elements of durability 
and I have now advised its being brought to an end, as it was estab­
lished, by a unilateral declaration.2
Allenby's Victory: Egyptian Independence
Allenby's first personal encounter was his dramatic and heated meeting with 
Curzon on February 10, shortly after he had brought his despatch to the Foreign
3
Office. Allenby and Curzon argued for ninety minutes after the latter had read, to 
his mortification, part of Allenby's blunt despatch. This was not the kind of
1. Feb. 2 Despatch..., p.21, FO/371/7731. 2. Ibid.
3. This meeting is reconstructed from four sources: Selby's notes, KAP; Extracts
from Wilson Diaries, KAP; Curzon to Lloyd George, February 10, 1922, BLL,
Lloyd George Papers, F/13/3/6; and, an account given by an anonymous friend of
Allenby, possibly Selby, to Wavell, op.cit., pp.75-6.
document Cabinet ministers were accustomed to reading and Curzon questioned the
propriety of its circulation. At first he derisively asked who had really composed
the document and then, as Curzon later reported to Lloyd George, 'I urged him not
to ask me to circulate this Despatch which I thought would not help him. But he 
1
insisted...’ Allenby was not interested in Curzon1s or the Cabinet's sensibilities 
- he had not come to argue. Curzon soon learned that Allenby could not be moved:
I found the anticipated difficulty in dealing with him either by 
argument or by persuasion. He is unable to see any inconsistency 
in his own conduct or advice, regards himself as the Saviour of 
Egypt who has been cruelly and inexcusably turned down, declines, 
as ’a man of honour', to recede one iota from his position, and 
asks, as he has resigned, why we do not accept at once his resigna­
tion. ^
Allenby refused any compromise Curzon suggested. Curzon then expressed anxiety
to Lloyd George 'not from the loss of this particular agent (whose limitation we
know) but from the feeling that his loss will involve us in a struggle in Egypt
which we shall fight at every disadvantage, and we or others will not eventually 
3
win.1 Curzon finally asked Allenby to see Lloyd George, the only man who might yet
dissuade him from the course on which he had embarked. As Curzon plaintively wrote
4
to the Prime Minister: 'You may succeed where I failed.1 The next day Allenby
5
told Sir Henry Wilson that 'Curzon was almost crying.'
Allenby returned to the Foreign Office on Saturday, February 11, to ensure that 
the despatch had indeed been printed. Before he left for Felixstowe, he had a long 
talk with his friend Wilson, telling him that, 'if his terns were not agreed to heg
would resign.'
Curzon now attempted to influence Allenby through his supporters. He met Clay­
ton on Saturday evening and 'discussed at great length...the idea that the Sarwat 
Ministry if it accepts office should embody in their letter a declaration to the 
Sultan^of] assurances of the nature that we demand.'^ Clayton however refused to 
commit himself in Allenby's absence and, after discussing Curzon's proposals with
1. Curzon to Lloyd George, February 10, 1922, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/13/3/6.
2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.
5. Entry for February 11, 1922, Extracts from the Wilson Diaries, KAP.
6. Ibid.
7. Curzon to Lloyd George, February 13, 1922, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/13/3/7.
Amos, informed the Foreign Secretary on February 12, that,
I find it difficult...to suggest any formula which would serve your 
purpose and at the same time preserve the spirit of Lord Allenby's 
proposals, of which the essence is an unilateral declaration by His 
Majesty's Government, as opposed to a "bargain”.
At the same time Churchill was trying to shore up the weakening opposition to
Allenby's policy. Wilson wrote in his diary that 'Winston said that he would never
2
agree and would fight to the end. He said the Cabinet was evenly divided.'
Originally Allenby was to have met with Lloyd George on Monday, February 13, 
but again with apparent disregard for the urgency of the situation, a critical 
meeting was postponed. Although by now there was some doubt about the Cabinet's re­
solve, Allenby's was certainly never in question. He again spoke to Wilson at length 
on the evening of February 14. Allenby scheduled to see the Prime Minister on the
next day, said that 'he was going to put very plainly before him that he must choose
, 3at once between his advice and his resignation.1
Allenby and Lloyd George met a 11.00 a.m. on Wednesday, February 15. Also
present during these conversations were Curzon, Sir Edward Grigg, Lloyd George's
4
secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, Amos and Clayton. Lloyd George
began the conference by attempting to clarify the differences between Allenby and
the Cabinet so as to be sure that this was not a case of mere misunderstanding.
Allenby quickly made it clear that the differences were indeed basic: 'The point
at issue...was that Lord Curzon thought it was possible to make a bargain with an
5
Egyptian Government and he was convinced that it was not.' Allenby's justification 
of his position was 'that Great Britain was strong enough to allow Egypt to have
1. Clayton to Curzon, February 12, 1922, Clayton Papers, SAD/470/14.
2. Entry for February 12, 1922, Extracts from the Wilson Diaries, KAP.
3. Entry for February 14, 1922 in ibid.
4. The sources used for reconstructing the morning and evening conferences are:
1) MEMORANDUM of a CONVERSATION AT 10 Downing St., London, S.W.l on WEDNESDAY, 
FEBRUARY 15th, 1922 at 11.00 a.m., S.40, CAB/23/35[hereafter: Morning Conver­
sation. .J; 2) MEMORANDUM of a "CONVERSATION AT 10 Downing St.,' London, S.W.l 
on WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15th at 6.00 p.m., S.41, CAB/23/36[hereafter: Evening
Conversation..2; 3) Wavell, op.cit., pp.77-8; 4) Extracts from the Wilson
Diaries, KAP. The first two sources were apparently 'laundered' for Cabinet
consumption, while the last two reflect the views of Allenby's close friends and
supporters.
5. Morning Conversation..., p .2.
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independence. If this were done, Great Britain would still retain effective
guarantees in its army, its navy and its position in Egypt.
Curzon at this point began attacking Allenby's position and the fairness of
his account of the events of the previous weeks. Lloyd George quickly cut short
Curzon's complaints and turned to the government's position. This was that 'the
British Government did not intend to give up Egypt; that is to say: their special
2interests m  and control of the British Government over that country.' Essentially 
the difference between them, according to Lloyd George, was that the government was 
willing to abolish the protectorate but only after terms had been agreed upon, while 
Allenby would not wait for agreement, confident that the Egyptian reaction to the 
abolition of the protectorate would be to concede to Britain her vital interests in 
Egypt. Amos here intervened to correct Lloyd George and stated that Allenby's 
policy was not based on va<^ue hopes for good will but on the belief that the 'pro­
posed letter to the Sultan provided a modus vivendi which would preserve British
, 3interests intact.'
Eventually Lloyd George indicated the real problem, the different orientations 
underlying policy differences: Amos and Allenby 'had to deal with Egyptian opinion
4
and he and his colleagues had to deal with Parliament.' If the Prime Minister 
would present Allenby's Egyptian policy to Parliament, it would be rejected. Despite 
Amos’s assurances that the status quo in Egypt would be protected not by explicit 
references to it nor by the formal protectorate, but by the solid fact of the con­
tinued British occupation, Lloyd George remained unconvinced by the argument or its 
defensAbility. Independence, he believed, would inevitably change the status quo 
to Britain's detriment: '...every fez in Cairo would have been thrown into the air
and every Egyptian would have interpreted it as meaning that the British were to be
5cleared out of Egypt...' Instead, Lloyd George proposed that Allenby's represen­
tative meet with a government representative to compose a document that would clearly 
state exactly what was intended and how far Britain would go. The Egyptians would 
then have to accept this.
Allenby rejected this proposal out of hand. His draft letter to the Sultan was 
a carefully wrought instrument, formulated in concert with Tharwat and designed to 
maintain the delicate balance between the appearance of Egyptian independence, vital
1. Ibid., p .4.
4. Ibid., p.8
2. Ibid., p .6.
5. Ibid., p .10.
3. Ibid., p .7.
122
to the needs of Egyptian moderates, and the reality of British power, essential 
for the protection of British interests in Egypt. Allenby therefore told Lloyd 
George that since his commitment to the draft letter was well-known in Egypt, he 
would have to resign.
The Prime Minister, Curzon and Amos continued their argument over the effect­
iveness of the proces verbal signed by Tharwat and Sidqi. Throughout the discussion 
it was apparent that Cairo's need for a stable administration and London's desire 
for a politically palatable solution were incompatible. The meeting ended with 
Lloyd George's request that Amos commit to writing, for an evening meeting, the 
Residency position and the protection it would afford British interests. While 
Allenby did not object to this procedure, he repeated his desire to resign now that
his advice had been rejected again. Allenby was convinced that an impasse existed
1and that the 6.00 p.m. meeting would do little to resolve it.
There was, however, a marked difference in the atmosphere of the evening con­
ference. The conversations now dealt with actual points of policy rather than with 
its underlying rationale. Allenby's defence of British interests in Egypt were 
contained in paragraph thirteen of his draft letter to the Sultan. This outlined 
the four areas reserved for later negotiations. When the conversations resumed 
Allenby gave Lloyd George and Curzon a redraft of that paragraph, strengthening the 
wording and thereby explicitly maintaining the status quo on the reserved points.
The new wording noted that 'Pending the conclusion of an agreement the present
2
situation in regard to these questions will remain intact.1 This was intended to 
offset the criticisms voiced earlier in the day that both in fact and in appearance 
the status quo would be altered and Britain's position abandoned if Allenby's policy 
was adopted.
Despite Curzon's hesitation, Lloyd George felt that 'this paragraph provided
3
the basis of an understanding.' Still, since he wanted to frame procedure carefully 
with a clear declaration by the High Commissioner of the terms under which Egypt 
would be ruled, he had asked Grigg to draw up a rough declaration. It would be on 
the understanding of such a statement that an Egyptian government would take office, 
even if they obviously could not be expected to sign their assent to it. Allenby
1. Wilson wrote in his diary, February 15, that Allenby came to see him after the 
morning conversation: 'He told me an impasse had been reached...' Extracts
from the Wilson Diaries, KAP.
2. Evening Conversation..., p .2. 3. Ibid., p .3.
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again rejected any effort to tamper with the wording of his draft letter to the
Sultan or to change substantially the procedure he had proposed since it would
arouse suspicion. If the Prime Minister persisted, Allenby 'would have to insist
on the acceptance of his resignation which he had offered some weeks ago.'^"
At this point Lloyd George apparently realised that he could not win. He
'asked Lord Allenby, who said he had been patient for five weeks, to be patient for
five minutes more. He£Lloyd George\was doing his utmost to meet Lord Allenby's 
2
views.' Now all the Prime Minister wanted was some declaration of the means by 
which Egypt would be governed in the event a ministry could riot be formed. Allenby 
believed that a ministry would take office if the revised draft letter was adopted. 
Lloyd George still wanted a simple draft, based on paragraphs ten to thirteen of 
Allenby's letter to the Sultan, to present to the Cabinet and to defend in Parlia­
ment: 'There would be a very fierce resistance to the policy Lord Allenby proposed.
Certain sections would say that we were giving up Egypt, evacuating it, shewing
3the white feather, etc.' As a further concession, Lloyd George proposed using the 
first nine paragraphs of Allenby's draft letter as the basis of a new letter to the 
Sultan, while the last four paragrphs would serve as the declaration of Egypt's 
independence.
By thus separating the explanatory portion of Allenby's proposed document from
the actual terms of the new relationship wherein Egypt would be independent subject
to the four reserved points, Lloyd George could limit.parliamentary debate to the
more easily defensible short declaration. Since it was now merely a question of
tactics, with Allenby's policy adopted virtually in toto, the meeting ended with the
understanding that Allenby and his advisers would meet with Grigg and a Foreign Office
representative to draft the instrument of proclamation of Egypt's independence so
that it could be approved by the Cabinet on the evening of February 16. The struggle
between Cairo and London ended in almost total victory for Allenby; Egypt would
have its independence unilaterally declared by Britain^ with the four reserved
4points left for later negotiation.
The final stage in the dispute between London and Cairo consisted of the 
approval and implementation of the Allenby-Lloyd George understanding, on the one
1. Evening Conversation..., p .4.
2* Ibid., p.5. Wilson noted in his diary, February 15, that 'at 7.15...hejAllenby]
came to tell me that LG was in full retreat.' Extracts from Wilson Diaries, KAP.
3. Ibid., p.6. 4. See: Supra, p. 104.
hand, and the effort to cover up the extent of the Cabinet's retreat on the other.
This began at the Cabinet meeting on February 16. Lloyd George reviewed the
history of the dispute and tried to show that it was in fact Allenby who had been
forced to retreat. The Prime Minister, in his presentation, ignored the original
and major difference between the two sides, namely, whether to grant independence
before or after agreement. Instead he emphasised the relatively minor detail of
Allenby's strengthening the language of paragraph thirteen since the original, it
was claimed, did not secure the status quo. By stressing Allenby's 'retreat' on
this point, Lloyd George could disregard his own rout and commend the draft declara-
1
tion to the Cabinet. After some debate and apparent hesitation, the Cabinet approved 
the policy and procedures agreed upon the previous evening. Final details were con­
firmed at a meeting on February 20 at which Lloyd George, Curzon, Austen Chamberlain,
2
Allenby, Hankey and Grigg were present.
The next step in the government's defence of its new policy was Lloyd George's
statement to the Commons on February 28. Here he outlined the implications of the
declaration of Egypt's independence and tried to give the impression that the
initiative had been and still was in London's hands. Since no agreement with Egypt
was possible the British government had decided to take unilateral action, a step,
he assured the Commons, which enjoyed 'the whole-hearted support of Lord Allenby and
3
of the British officials of all ranks in the service of the Egyptian Government,' 
and he therefore called for its endorsement. As intended, Lloyd George was able to 
confine the debate to the short declaration and he did not discuss the letter to 
the Sultan in his statement.
The change in policy was well received in the British press. Almost all the 
major papers approved of Egyptian independence and, in particular, of Allenby's role 
in the reversal of earlier policy. Despite government efforts to foster a contrary
1. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 10(22), February 16, 1922, CAB/23/29, pp.2-4. Wavell
claims that Curzon tried to defeat the proposal in Cabinet and that after its
approval 'he spoke petulantly of "the stupidity of these soldiers."' Wavel, op. 
cit., p.78. There is no evidence to support this, however, in Cabinet Minutes.
2. For the final version of the letter to the Sultan and the declaration, see:
M.P.A. Hankey, Egypt, February 25, 1922, C.P. 3782, CAB/24/133. For the record 
of the meeting that approved the procedures and language, see: MEMORANDUM of a
MEETING at 10 Downing Street, London, S.W.l, on Monday, February 20th, 1922, at
12.0 noon in Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 14(22), March 2, 1922, CAB/23/29.
3. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, CLI, 271.
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impression, the Manchester Guardian could note with satisfaction that 'It is an
instance, not unique but rare, of the soldier on the spot having more vision and
perspective than the statesmen at home,' a statement widely echoed by others.^-
The final defence of government policy and the denial of the reality of its
retreat came in the debate on Egypt in the Commons on March 14. Austen Chamberlain,
as Leader of the House, opened the debate on the papers on Egypt that had been laid
2before the House. In an instance of almost incredible misrepresentation - one 
which would later affect relations between Allenby and Chamberlain when the latter 
became Foreign Secretary in 1924 - Chamberlain informed the House that Allenby's 
original policy would have surrendered Britain's entire position and all her in­
terests in Egypt. However, he continued, after Allenby's return,
I am glad to say that the moment we came together...all differences 
were removed. HejAllenby^agreed that it was essential that those 
British interests and obligations should be safeguarded as a part 
of the abolition of the Protectorate, and that they should not be 
left to the mercy of an agreement to be subsequently made.3
In any event, the new policy towards Egypt, its enunciation by Chamberlain 
and its reception in Parliament seemed cause for self-congratulations. Chamberlain 
wrote Lloyd George the next day that,
Egypt went very well yesterday afternoon. There was no challenge 
to our policy on the ground that our concessions went too far. The 
'Times' gives only an abbreviated account of my speech, but it will,
I think, be sufficient to show you that I made clear the nature of 
the difference between Allenby and ourselves. The point was very 
well received by our friends, including, perhaps especially, our 
'candid friends'.^
1. Manchester Guardian, March 1, 1922. For some other favourable press comments,
see: Daily Chronicle, March 1, 1922; Daily News, March 1, 1922; Daily Tele­
graph, March 2, 1922; Westminster Gazette, March 1, 1922; Times, February 
18, 1922.
2. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 'Egypt No.l', (1922), Vol. XXII \c.-159 £|. 
All the government papers were drafted with an eye to blurring the extent of 
its retreat. This was also true of the telegrams sent to the Dominions. See: 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors-General of the Dominions, 
February 27, 1922, FO/371/7732.
3. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, CLI, 2063. Wavell comments 
that Chamberlain may not have been aware of the extent of Lloyd George's re­
treat since he was not present at the conversations but only at the Cabinet 
meeting of February 16. Wavell, loc.cit.
4. Austen Chamberlain to Lloyd George, March 15, 1922, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/7/5/8.
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Congratulations may have been in order. Allenby indeed had obtained a policy 
of unilateral independence for Egypt and the government had been able to concede 
the point without appearing to have beaten too unseemly a retreat. Still, in 
Britain’s relations with Egypt and in London's ties with its representatives in 
Cairo, there was an inescapable feeling, as a writer later said of India, that:
Power had gone, and with it died the will that animates all faiths.
1. A.J, Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism, p.26.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE NEW APPROACH - DISENGAGEMENT AND RESTRICTION
Allenby returned to Cairo on February 28, 1922, the same day that Lloyd 
George proposed Egypt's independence to the British parliament. A new approach, 
whether in appearance or in fact, had been adopted. But, although Allenby had won 
a personal victory, the independence, such as it was, obtained for Egypt in London 
would soon become meaningless if its consequences were not dealt with in Cairo.
Indeed, the success or failure of this initiative would be determined in the short
run by the ability of the British authorities to deal with those consequences
within the parameters of the February declaration.
Disengagement in London and Cairo
After February 1922, the various pressures on the British government such as 
the unsettled domestic situation, foreign negotiations, and, especially at the end 
of the year, the Chanak crisis in Asia Minor, meant that internal Egyptian affairs 
continued to have a low priority in London. Throughout 1922, during the Lloyd 
George ministry as well as the ministry of his Conservative successor, Bonar Law, 
there was relativef ^interest in Egypt at the Cabinet level. In this period 
London did not initiate policy as much as it responded to events in Cairo and to 
Residency proposals.
Once Egypt's status had been defined in the early months of 1922, disinterest 
was tantamount to disengagement. This attitude also seems to have characterised 
Bonar Law's general approach to policy after he took office in November 1922. Re­
acting to the ferment of the Lloyd George years and especially to the war scare in 
Anatolia only a few months earlier, Bonar Law made domestic and foreign stability 
his party's keynote during the November 1922 general election. He set the theme 
of his government in the Conservative Party Manifesto, when he concluded that 'the
nation's first need...is, in every walk of life, to get on with its own work, with
1
the minimum of interference at home and disturbance abroad.'
1. Blake, op.cit., p.466.
In this atmosphere, Curzon and the Foreign Office appear to have enjoyed a
relatively free hand in Egyptian affairs. This was especially true under Bonar
Law. According to James Davidson, Bonar Law's Parliamentary Private Secretary,
in 1922-23, the Prime Minister thought 'Curzon a mountebank', but had 'to appoint
him his deputy because he had more experience than anyone else. He was a great
expert on foreign affairs, even if he was often very indecisive.'"*’
Nevertheless there was little Foreign Office direction over Egypt during the
period following independence. Beyond the general crisis atmosphere, pressure on
the coalition government in the last months of its life, and then the uncertain
2tenure of the ailing Bonar Law, Curzon was ill. From the end of May until the 
middle of July 1922, the Foreign Secretary was confined to his bed with a chronic­
ally weak back and leg as well as with an attack of phlebitis. Curzon was tempor­
arily replaced at the Foreign Office by Balfour. Thomas Jones described in his
diary on June 13, 1922 what ensued:
Grigg does the P.M.'s Foreign Office work and the P.M.'s activities 
in this direction are widely resented in and out of the F.O. Curzon
is away ill. Eyre Crowe's instructions from his chief are to carry
down the Curzon policy. Balfour goes to the F.O. He is in much closer
accord with the P.M. than Curzon is.^
It is little wonder that he began to fear that his replacement would become perma­
nent and quickly returned to the Foreign Office.
The Foreign Office approach to policy for Egypt was one of disengagement and 
reflected the general atmosphere of the day. Nearly a year after Egypt's indepen­
dence Murray wrote in retrospect that British policy 'was one of disentanglement.
That is to say, it was designed to shift on to Egyptian shoulders the responsibility
4for the conduct of Egyptian affairs.' With respect to the Residency, this meant
1. Robert Rhodes James, Memoirs of a Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson's Memoirs and
Papers, 1910-1937 (London, 1969), pp.147-8.
2. The temporary nature of the Bonar Law government may be seen from the fact that 
the Prime Minister was dissuaded only with difficulty from declaring at the out­
set that he would hold office for only one year. Blake, op.cit., p.464.
3. Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 201. Although obviously prejudiced, Austin Chamber- 
lain made similar comments about Curzon's ill-health and weakness during the 
Bonar Law government. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography
(London, 1968), p.126.
4. Murray, Memorandum, February 13, 1923, FO/371/8960.
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a great degree of freedom in policy formulation in Cairo. Owen Tweedy, the
liaison officer at the Residency, noted after a conversation with Murray and Ingram
at the Foreign Office on December 23, 1922, that 'what it came to he[Murray! said
JwaU that it was easier if policy were outlined in Cairo and communicated to the
Foreign Office for approval.''*" Thus initiative over developments remained with
the Residency in Cairo.
The basic context of policy formulation in the Residency was the preservation
of the status quo on the four reserved points and the maintenance of public order
in Egypt. The need to preserve the status quo stemmed from the conditional nature
of the February declaration and would remain so until there was a permanent Anglo-
2
Egyptian settlement. Public order was especially important since it affected the 
welfare of foreign interests and residents in Egypt and its absence was one of 
the reasons for the original British involvement in the region. The continuing 
British responsibility for the protection of foreign interests meant that public
3
order remained a vital British concern. In addition, progress towards a final 
settlement was predicated upon stability and order in Egypt.
Within this framework, the aim of the Residency was to retire from an active 
'ministering' role in Egyptian affairs and instead to become a watchful arbiter 
between factions such as the Palace, the Ministry and, at a later date, the Wafd 
opposition. This was translated into two areas of activity: disengagement from
local affairs as quickly as possible; and, assuring adoption of such measures and 
laws that would remove the final obstacles standing in the way of negotiations. It 
was necessary to complete in Cairo the work begun in London.
Consequences of Independence
The introduction of the symbolic aspects of Egypt's new status, the trappings
1. This conversation began on the topic of Foreign Office difficulties with Par­
liamentary Questions because of insufficient information and then moved to 
more general issues. Tweedy, Memorandum, 9/1/23, FO/141/484(278).
2. The importance of the status quo was the reason for the pre-independence 
Scott-Tharwat PROCES VERBAL, January 20, 1921, FO/141/515(14382 Pt.I).
3. For an analysis of British responsibility for public order developing from 
occupation, the protectorate, and the new doctrine of responsibility, see: 
Amos to Kerr, April 2% , 1922, FO/141/430(5512).
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of independence, was the first and most obvious step to be taken to demonstrate the
new approach adopted by the British. Ahmad Fuad was finally permitted on March 15
to assume the title of King instead of Sultan. Henceforth he would be styled 'His
1Majesty', an honorific rather abruptly denied him the previous year by Curzon.
In addition, the British king's birthday would no longer be a general public holi­
day in Egypt, and Egypt's ruler would not be required in future to call officially
on the High Commissioner - indicating a new order of precedence. Prayers for the
2
High Commissioner in English churches in Egypt also would be discontinued.
Another visible sign of Egypt's nominal independence was the fact that a com­
bined Annual Report for Egypt and the Sudan was now deemed inappropriate and its 
publication was suspended. For the first time since 1899 the report on the affairs 
of Egypt and the Sudan would be separated and a smaller report on the Sudan alone 
would be published. The aim was twofold according to Lindsay: 'By discontinuing
3
the one we mark a change; by continuing the other we emphasize no change. 1
The questions about the High Commissioner's status and title were not as 
straightforward and easily resolved. After taking office, Tharwat, the new Prime 
Minister, appealed to Allenby that the terms hitherto used for the High Commissioner 
and the Residency, Na'ib al-Malik £the King's Representative]and Par al-Himaya [the 
House of the Protectorate] respectively, be changed because of their unfortunate 
association with Egypt's previous status as a protectorate. Allenby readily agreed 
to substitute the terms al-Mandub al-Sami [the High Commissioner] and Par al-Mandub
1. The correspondence regarding Fuad's title is summarised in a letter from Van- 
sittart, Curzon's Private Secretary, to Capt. Clive Wigram, King George V's 
Private Secretary, March 13, 1922, FO/371/7732.
2. A series of ceremonial changes were initiated by Allenby and reported in Allen­
by to Curzon, March 14, 1922, Tel. No. 122, FO/371/7732. These changes were 
originally discussed in the London meeting of February 20, following Lloyd 
George's capitulation. Possibly the most significant of these changes in the 
Muslim East was the fact that prayers would no longer be said for the High 
Commissioner in English churches. This roughly corresponds to mentioning the 
ruler's name in the Khutba []sermon] in the Friday service in the Mosque, a sign 
of allegiance to the ruler. Hence the importance of the deletion of Allenby's 
name from the Christian Sunday service as a sign of Egypt's independence. 
'Khutba' , Encyclopaedia of Islam, *3.3*' v&kUr, fp .^ 8 0 "'^-
3. R.C.L[indsay3., Minute, April 7 to Curzon to Allenby, April 8 , 1922, Tel. No. 
114, FO/371/7766. The combined Annual Report was instituted by Cromer to in­
dicate the progress of the reforms and administration of Egypt and Sudan under 
Britain's tutelage.
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al-Sami [jthe High Commissioner's Residency] in their place.
Tharwat, however, wished to emphasize Egypt's new position even more dramatic­
ally and revived the proposal first raised by the Egyptian delegation during the 
1921 negotiations, namely, that Britain's representative in Egypt have the title of 
'Ambassador'. He called for the adoption of the terms Safir ^Ambassador]and 
Safora ^Embassy] and promised that only the British representative would enjoy this 
diplomatic rank. Tharwat urged its acceptance because it would indicate to Egypt 
and to the world 'the altered relation in which Egypt now stands to Great Britain.
Allenby was willing to agree even to this change because of Tharwat's assuran­
ces and the public benefit that would accrue to the new government, essentially 
Allenby's creature. Officials at the Foreign Office, however, took a completely
different position. They were not impressed with Tharwat's arguments and they
believed that 'Sarwat is weakening and trying to support himself by getting con-
2
cessions from us.' In any event, Curzon refused to permit the change of the High
Commissioner's title to Ambassador because of the difficulties this would entail
in the administration of martial law and because previously such a change 'was
3
expressly vetoed by the Cabinet.' It was soon apparent that, given the indeter­
minate and conditional nature of Egypt's new status, any issue beyond mere ceremony 
which involved the political and administrative consequences of independence could 
be resolved only with difficulty.
One area in which the Residency did move quickly was in the transfer of many 
aspects of domestic administration to native control. 'Egyptianisation' was believed 
to be the means for active disengagement from Egypt's internal affairs. The need 
for such a process was one of the reasons for and, then, a direct consequence of 
the February declaration. According to Allenby, 'It was intended that the declara­
tion of Egyptian independence should give definite impetus to the Egyptianisation
4
of Government Departments...'
This view was not a recent development, but was accepted in the Residency long
1. Allenby to Curzon, March 22, 1922, Tel. No. 134, FO/371/7732.
2. R.C.L ^ xndsay]]. , Minute, March 23, 1922, to ibid.
3. Curzon to Allenby, March 25, 1922, Tel. No. 102, FO/371/7732. This debate was
interesting since Curzon's emphasis on the administration of martial law by the 
High Commissioner, and Allenby's minimising of that function indicates their 
differing conceptions of the role of the High Commissioner.
4. Allenby to Curzon, September 30, 1922, Desp. No. 799, FO/371/7737.
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before the events of 1922. As early as September 1919, Clayton, one of Allenby's 
closest advisers, told Gertrude Bell in Iraq that 'He would leave the Egyptian 
Ministers without British advisers, but give the High Commissioner a British ad­
viser in each department.'1 The policy of 'Egyptianisation' was consistently 
advocated by the Residency until the final weeks of the protectorate. It was re­
flected in the letter Allenby proposed to send to the Sultan in January 1922 in 
which he declared that 'As to any desire to interfere in internal administration
of Egypt, His Majesty's Government have sufficiently stated and repeated that their
2
most ardent desire is to place in Egyptian hands conduction of their own affairs.'
After the declaration of independence, 'Egyptianisation' was vigourously pur­
sued. The first changes were in the functions of the British advisers to the
3various Egyptian ministries. In a notice sent on March 4, 1922 to the advisers 
and acting advisers, Allenby informed them that because of Egypt's new status and 
the need for responsible government, their positions would be re-defined:
In the course of years the tradition has grown up that the respon­
sibility of the Minister is shared by his adviser. But the time 
has come to recognize that in future the function of the adviser 
will be limited to giving advice to the Minister, who will be alone 
responsible for the decisions which he may judge it necessary to 
take.^
Furthermore, Allenby also anticipated the abolition of several adviserships and in 
this connection expressed 'full sympathy with the desire of the Egyptian Government 
to accelerate the replacement of Europeans by qualified Egyptians in official posi­
tions, and, in cases where qualified Egyptians are not at present available, to
5take the necessary measures without delay to prepare suitable candidates.'
1. Burgoyne, loc.cit. Clayton, with support from the other advisers, pressed this 
view on Allenby until independence. For example, see: Clayton, Memorandum,
January 1, 1922, SAD, Clayton Papers, 470/14.
2. Allenby to Curzon, January 12, 1922, Tel. No. 19, C.P. 3614, CAB/24/132.
3. The major advisers were Financial (established in 1883); Judicial (1891); In­
terior (1894); Public Works (1904); and, Public Instruction (1906). For the 
history and functions of the different advisers, see: J. Field, Minute, May 2,
1921, FO/371/6332.
4. Notice to Advisers in Allenby to Curzon, March 4, 1922, Desp. No. 146, FO/371/7732
5. Ibid. The first major advisership abolished was in the Ministry of Interior. 
Clayton advocated the abolition of his own position because he felt that it would 
be more logical to have a British Director of Public Security in the Ministry to 
protect foreign lives. Clayton to Residency, 11th April and 13th April, 1922,
SAD, Clayton Papers, 470/15, and Scott to Tharwat, May 14, 1922, FO/371/7793.
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The only advisers whose positions were not seriously affected were the Financial 
and Judicial Advisers insofar as their functions affected the preservation of the 
status quo.
Other visible signs of 'Egyptianisation1 were also quickly introduced. At the 
suggestion of E.M. Dowson, the Financial Adviser, the practice of selecting foreign 
officials through a Selection Board sitting annually in London was abolished. The 
retention of such a British dominated body 'under present conditions...would be 
difficult to defend,' and in any event it would soon lose its British character as 
a result of administrative changes.^
Perhaps one of the most important and possibly unforeseen effects of 'Egyptiani­
sation' was the change in the character of the British establishment in Cairo. 
Previously the British advisers and senior officials enjoyed immense influence in 
determining proposed policy in Cairo. 'Egyptianisation' changed this situation.
The influence of these officials decreased with the diminution of their responsibi­
lity or with the departure of figures such as Clayton after the abolition of his 
position. Only Amos and Dowson retained their former importance because their 
authority and position were not seriously impaired. In addition Amos' great perso­
nal influence with Allenby continued unchanged because of the length of his service 
in Egypt and his close association with the High Commissioner during all major 
crises since the war. In his central position as Judicial Adviser to the Egyptian 
government as well as the Residency legal adviser, Amos functioned in all spheres
of Egyptian affairs and his ideas served as the basis for many of the important
2
policy decisions made in Cairo.
Nevertheless, after 1922 Allenby, in general, began to rely more heavily for 
advice and assistance on the Residency staff. Within time they regained many of the 
functions and much of the authority they enjoyed before the First World War. The
1. Dowson to Chancery, April 18, 1922, FO/141/515(14382, Pt.I). Also, Dowson Cir­
cular Letter to Advisers at Ministries of Communications etc., March 25, 1922 
in ibid.
2. Amos was virtually a one man brainstrust. For example, Allenby's Desp. No. 836, 
October 5, 1922, outlining future policy was based almost verbatim on Amos to 
Residency, October 11, 1922, FO/141/516(14431, Pt.I); Amos was instrumental in 
drafting some of the articles in the 1923 Constitution, Furness to Kerr,
18/10/22 in ibid; or, Amos' note to Wiggin, Second Secretary, 30.11.22, on the 
need for a general survey of British powers, responsibilities and policy on 
foreign interests led to Allenby to MacDonald, July 28, 1924, Desp. No. 486, 
FO/141/452(16860).
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major figures to emerge from this group were Ernest S. Scott, the Minister Pleni­
potentiary and Acting High Commissioner in Allenby's absence; Archibald Clark-Kerr, 
Selby's successor as First Secretary at the Residency and author of many of Allenby's
political cables; and, Rota?n Furness, the Acting Oriental Secretary who was parti-
1
cularly important in advising Allenby on Egyptian affairs. Together with Amos, 
these officials were instrumental in developing policy in the eighteen month transi­
tional period that followed independence. They left their mark on those areas, a 
constitution, an act of indemnity so that martial law could be ended, and safeguards 
for foreign officials, deemed vital to regularisation and the start of negotiations 
for a final settlement.
Ironically the attempt to prepare Egypt for total British disengagement from 
its political and internal affairs meant that, in the short term, at least, Allenby
and the Residency would eventually have to play as active a part in Egyptian affairs
2
as before. Thus, in tones echoing Granville's Circular Memorandum of 1883, Amos
only six months after Egypt's independence, could write that it was the obligation
of King Fuad 'to direct his policy as not to embarass that of the British Govern-
3ment, and m  this respect to be guided by the advice of the British Government.'
Foreign Affairs: Egypt and Europe
One of the most important areas in which Egypt's new status was indicated was
that of foreign affairs. For example, Ernest Scott's letter of March 16 to the
representatives of the foreign powers in Cairo notified them that relations with the
Egyptian government 'would in future be conducted directly with the Egyptian Minister
4
for Foreign Affairs,' and to Egypt's right to accede to minor international
1. For examples of the functions of these officials, see: FO/141/516(14431, Pts I 
and II); and, FO/141/484 (278).
2. The relevant passage was: '...the position in which Her Majesty's Government
are placed towards His Highness the Khedive imposes upon them the duty of giving 
advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established 
shall be of a satisfactory character...' Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 
Granville to Her Majesty's Representative..., January 3, 1883, Egypt No.2 (1883) 
£c .-2563], pp.34-6.
3. Amos to Allenby, October 11, 1922, FO/141/430(5512, Pt.III).
4. Allenby to Curzon, March 16, 1922, Desp. No. 193, FO/371/7733.
135
conventions. Another example was Egypt's exclusion from the system of imperial
2
preferences in commerce. However, despite these formalities, it was quickly 
apparent that Britain felt that foreign affairs, generally, and the relation of 
Egypt to the European powers, specifically, was an issue of major significance.
The view was taken that it was imperative to outline the role of foreign powers in 
Egypt as well as define and, in actual fact, limit Egypt's position abroad.
The initial phase was the determination of what Britain considered to be an 
acceptable role for the foreign powers. This was seen in the development of an 
exclusionary doctrine to prevent the possibility of foreign meddling in Egypt and 
the assurance of the primacy of British interests in that country, actually a con­
tinuation of British policy in Egypt since the occupation of 1882.
Discussion of the role of foreign powers in Egypt began even before Lloyd
George's announcement of February 28. Murray, in a memorandum drafted on February
318, raised the questions of when and how the issue should be handled. He believed 
that Britain's objections to foreign interference should be made known to the 
powers at the same time that they were informed of Egypt's new status.
There were two possible ways of accomplishing this. The first course was to 
follow earlier British practice and have the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
announce in a broad public statement Britain's opposition to foreign intervention 
in an area in which she was vitally concerned. This had been done previously by 
Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on March 28, 1895 when there had been
4
rumours of a possible French expedition to the Sudan, as well as by Lord Lansdowne, 
on May 5, 1903, when he told the House of Lords that Britain would oppose the
5
establishment of any foreign naval base or fortified port in the Persian Gulf.
1. For example, Britain agreed to Egypt's accession to the International Opium
Convention of 1912: ’As Egypt is now a sovereign State she can accede to the
convention of her own will.' There was, however, total opposition to any 
Egyptian attempt to accede on behalf of the Sudan which, it was believed, would 
undermine the status quo. Curzon to Scott, April 24, 1922, Desp. No. 469, 
FO/141/451(14509) .
2. Again, there was one rule for Egypt and another for the Sudan which continued 
'to be treated as part of the British Empire for the purpose of Imperial Pre­
ference. ' D.G. Osborne to The Secretary, Custom House, London, April 20, 1922, 
FO/371/7766.
3. Murray, Memorandum, February 18, 1922, FO/371/7731.
4. Sir Edward Grey, March 28, 1895, Pari. Deb., 4th Series, XXXII"(1895), ‘ 352-3 . .
5. Lord Lansdowne, May 5, 1903, Pari. Deb., 4th Series, CXXI(1903), 1343-54.
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The second and preferred course, according to Murray, was to follow the American 
precedent of the more formal Monroe Doctrine whereby the American President, James 
Monroe, had warned the European powers in 1823 that the Americas were henceforth 
closed to European colonisation.^
Given the options open to the British government, Murray felt that any formal 
communication to the powers informing them of Egypt's new status should add
that having declared, and being desirous to maintain, the independence 
of Egypt, we could not view the intervention of any other power in the 
internal affairs of that country or any threat of aggression on her 
territory in any other light than the manifestation of an unfriendly 
d) sposition towards Great Britain.^
This memorandum provided the framework for discussions involving Cecil B.
Hurst, the Foreign Office Legal Adviser, Lindsay, Murray and Amos. Hurst and Lind-
3
say concurred with Murray's suggestions on February 20, and the memorandum then 
became the basis for a series of communications, such as the circular despatch of 
March 20 to Britain's representatives abroad. The despatch, after informing a 
number of foreign powers of the circumstances of Egypt's independence, explicitly 
limited and defined the role of those powers in Egypt:
The termination of the British protectorate over Egypt involves...no 
change in the status quo as regards the position of other Powers in 
Egypt itself.
The welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safe­
ty of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an 
essential British interest the special relations between itself and 
Egypt long recognised by other Governments. These special relations are 
defined in the declaration recognising Egypt as an independent sovereign 
state. His Majesty's Government have laid them down on matters in which 
the rights and interests of the British Empire are vitally involved, and 
will not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other Power.
In pursuance of this principle, they will regard as an unfriendly act any 
attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another power, and 
they will consider any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an 
act to be repelled with all the means at their command.^
1 .  James Monroe, c\Ve*V \n J.L. R\cka.cc\s>on tecO. l\ of c?P TVie
- . C t - SL£>.
2. Murray, Memorandum, February 18, 1922, FO/371/7731.
3. Cecil B. Hurst, Minute, February 20, 1920? and, R. C.L^indsa^Pj. , Minute, Febru­
ary 20, to ibid.
4. Curzon, Circular Despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Buenos Aires, etc., 
March 20, 1922, FO/371/7731.
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The response of many of the powers to Egypt's new status and the British 
’Monroe1 Doctrine was cautious but, on the whole, not hostile. The United States 
and Belgium, for example, were non-committal, while Austria declared ’its readiness 
to recognise these (vital British^interests at all times to the fullest degree.'1 
Italy, however, was immediately concerned about the general effect of Egyptian in­
dependence on her position in Tripoli and then about the 'vagueness' of the British
2doctrine where it touched upon the protection of foreign interests in Egypt. This 
vagueness was carefully cultivated by the British for diplomatic reasons. Lindsay 
on another occasion explained that
It is to our own interest to keep our declaration to the Powers 
as free as possible from all definitions & interpretations, which 
can only be trammels to us. Just as America won't allow any one to 
interpret the original Monroe Doctrine except herself, so we must 
keep in our own hands the interpretation of this Egyptian Declara­
tion, & not only that, but we must avoid making it any more definite 
than it is. Half the virtue of the Monroe Doctrine is its indefinite­
ness & the actual variability of meaning which America has allowed 
to appear in its application.
Therefore we must carefully avoid saying what we mean and when we 
have to reply to questions we must make our own answers as short and 
as unsatisfactory as is consonant with courtesy.3
Most of the difficulty over Egypt's new status and the singular nature of 
Anglo-Egyptian relations was caused by France. Because of the vague language of 
Curzon's note, the French colony in Egypt, and later the French government, apparent­
ly jumped to the conclusion that the British 'Monroe' Doctrine meant the abolition
of capitulations which were the foundation of the European powers' privileged commer-
4
cial and legal position in Egypt. The French then attempted to use the assumed
1. Akers Douglas to Curzon, April 7, 1922, Desp. No. 107, FO/371/7733. For the
attitudes of the other powers, see: Minutes by Murray, Lindsay, Crowe and Cur­
zon, March 27 to Hardinge to Curzon, March 23, 1922, Tel. No. 742, FO/371/7732.
2. Sir Ronald Graham, Ambassador to Rome, reported 'serious alarm in Italy' after
his meeting with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs on March 17. Graham 
to Curzon, March 18, 1922, Tel. No. 144, FO/371/7732. Concern over the
'vagueness' of the British doctrine was expressed by the Italian Ambassador to
London, de Martino, in an interview with Lindsay on April 24. Oliphant to
Scott, April 27, 1922, Desp. No. 483, FO/371/7733.
3. R.C.L [indsay]. , Minute, March 25 to Hardinge to Curzon, March 22, 1922, Tel.
No. 718, FO/371/7732.
4. Hardinge to Curzon, March 22, 1922, Tel. No. 718, FO/371/7732.
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abrogation of capitulatory rights as a means of forcing reciprocal British conces­
sions of similar rights in the French Zone of Morocco as well as for obtaining
1
British agreement with the French position on the Tangier question.
There was some doubt in the Foreign Office as to whether the French had indeed 
been misled by the language of Curzon's note. There was the feeling that they were 
attempting to use the opportunity to secure undeserved concessions. Murray commen­
ted that 'it is possible that this is a verbal threat of a renewal of the policy
2of p m - p n c k s  m  Egypt if we do not fall into line with their wishes in these matters. 1
Hardinge concluded the debate by informing Poincare that Britain acknowledged 'the
recognition by the French Government of the termination of the protectorate,' while
3dissociating such recognition from the capitulations or Tangier. Britain thus 
sought to pin down its major diplomatic rival in the region to an acceptance of the 
wide scope of British interests in Egypt and yet narrowly define the role of other 
powers in Egypt.
While Britain was limiting the position of European powers in Egypt, there was 
a parallel attempt to limit Egyptian diplomatic activity in Europe. This applied to 
Egyptian participation in a major international conference, such as the 1922 Lausanne 
Conference, as well as Egyptian membership in the League of Nations. In both cases, 
the basic approach was to give Egypt, if necessary, the appearance of participation 
while in fact offering her only a limited measure of diplomatic freedom.
The Lausanne Conference, which convened at the end of 1922, was called to re­
vise the 1920 Treaty of Sevres between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire. This 
treaty outlined the future of Turkey and the status and obligations of the Arab suc­
cessor states carved out of the Arab territory of the Ottoman Empire. After the 
Greek invasion of Anatolia in May 1919 and Kemal Ataturk1s rise to power, the Treaty 
of Sevres, which would have made Turkey into a minor European dependancy, became a
1. Poincare to Hardinge, March 22, 1922. Enclosure in Hardinge to Curzon, March
23, 1922, Tel. No. 742, FO/371/7732.
2. Murray, Minute, March 27 to Hardinge to Curzon, March 23, 1922, Tel. No. 722,
FO/371/7732. Lindsay, Crowe and Curzon in minutes of the same date, agreed 
with Murray's analysis.
3. Hardinge to Poincare, April 5, 1922. Enclosure in Hardinge to Curzon, April
5, 1922, Tel. No. 857, FO/371/7733.
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dead letter. Still there was a need to organise the Middle East in an acceptable 
framework and to resolve such questions as Turkey's future, nationality in and 
the status of the successor states, and the responsibility of these states for 
their share of the Ottoman Empire's enormous state debt. It was to these ends 
that the Lausanne Conference was convened.
With respect to Egypt, Articles 101-114 of the Treaty of Sevres were particu­
larly significant.*^* These dealt with the renunciation of Turkish rights in and 
title to Egypt (Article 101); recognition by Turkey that Britain would provide 
consular and diplomatic protection for Egyptian nationals (Article 107); renunci­
ation by Turkey in Britain's favour of responsibility for the neutrality of the 
Suez Canal as defined by the 1888 Constantinople Convention (Article 109); Turkish 
recognition of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium over the Sudan (Articles 113 and 114); 
regularisation of Turkish and Egyptian nationality problems (Articles 102, 103,
105 and 106); immunity for Egypt from liability vis a vis Turkey for acts committed 
during the war (Article 104); regularisation of commercial relations and tariffs 
between Turkey and Egypt (Article 108); the transfer of Turkish state property in 
Egypt to the Egyptian government (Article 110); and, finally, the assumption by 
Egypt of responsibility for the 1855, 1891 and 1894 Ottoman state loans hitherto 
secured on Egypt's tribute to the Ottoman Empire (Article 112).
As a result of altered conditions both in Turkey and in Egypt in 1922, the 
British government was mainly interested in revising and retaining those articles 
of the Sevres Treaty which affected Britain's vital interests. These fell into 
five major areas:2
i. The Turkish renunciation of all rights to Egypt and the Sudan 
carnbi^eA with recognition of Egypt's new status as an in­
dependent kingdom as defined by the British declaration of 
February 1922.
ii. The transfer of Turkish responsibility for the neutrality of 
the Suez Canal to Egypt with Britain as guarantor of Egypt's 
ability to afford the necessary protection.
iii. The treatment of Egypt on the same footing as the Allied Powers
1. For the details of the articles and their specific significance, see: E.M.B. 
Ingram, Egypt and the Treaty of Sevres, October 19, 1922, FO/371/7952.
2. This analysis is based on SUGGESTED REVISION OF ARTICLES IN TREATY OF SEVRES 
RELATING TO EGYPT, FO/371/7953. This was drafted sometime in October 1922 
after consultation with Tharwat Pasha and hence reflects Egyptian interests, 
such as the nationality clauses, as well.
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with respect to acts committed against Turkey during the war.
iv. The regularisation of Egyptian nationality and recognition of 
Egyptian naturalisation laws.
v. Egypt’s continuing obligation to service the Egyptian tribute 
loans as Egypt's responsibility for her portion of the Ottoman 
state debt.
Essentially the British government sought through a revised treaty to obtain 
Turkish and international recognition of Egypt's new status as defined by the 
British declaration - including the four reserved points, to assure British protec­
tion of the Suez Canal, and, finally, to secure continued interest payments to the 
European bondholders of the Egyptian portion of the Ottoman state debt, part of 
which was guaranteed by Britain.
While discussions over the substance of the revisions were taking place, ques­
tions arose about Egypt's association with the ongoing negotiations. Allenby 
suggested on March 23 that Egypt be a party to any new treaty since 'Abolition of 
Protectorate appears to me to deprive His Majesty's Government of adequate title to 
represent Egypt in the matter^ Allenby, on Amos's advice, was concerned with the 
impact of the negotiations within Egypt. He was afraid that any treaty concluded 
by Britain alone would not have the force of law in Egypt, particularly in the 
matters of nationality and the tribute loans.
The Foreign Office's initial response to Egyptian participation was negative.
Murray wrote that 'I can see neither any necessity for, nor any advantage in Egypt
being a party to a revised treaty of Sevres, and the argument adduced by Lord
2
Allenby...does not seem to have any weight.1 The Foreign Office consensus was that 
giving Egypt a voice in such negotiations, even if they affected her directly, 
could only be harmful. Oliphant, writing on Curzon's behalf, informed Allenby on 
April 10 that
There will, in all probability, be sufficient difficulty in reaching 
agreement as to the revision of the present text amongst the actual 
signatories, and these difficulties would be greatly increased by the 
intervention of Egypt whose delegates would certainly take strong ex­
ception to articles 113 and 114 ^regarding the Sudani and probably also
1. Allenby to Curzon, March 23, 1922, Tel. No. 136, FO/371/7732, which is a conden­
sation of Allenby to Curzon, March 18, 1922, Desp. No. 195, FO/371/7732, based 
on Amos to Allenby, March 12, 1922, enclosed in this Despatch.
2. Murray, Minute, 24.3.22, to ibid.
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article 112 IJthe tribute loans^j . ^
After months of complex negotiations on the substance of the revisions, it 
was decided by October 1922 that some form of Egyptian association with a new 
treaty was necessary. This was only because Egyptian accession was believed neces­
sary to guarantee British interests and to reassure the powers that the interests 
of the European bondholders would be secured. Allenby later explained that
The effects of this accession would have been to invest the unilateral 
declaration of the 28th February, 1922 with the force of a bilateral 
agreement between Great Britain and Egypt. With such an agreement His 
Majesty's Government could have afforded to regard the future relation­
ship of the two countries with equanimity, as treaty sanction would 
have been secured to the reservation for future settlement of the four 
questions described in the declaration as being vital to British in­
terests . ^
Egypt, however, would still not have any real role in the negotiations and would 
only accede to the treaty after it had been drafted.
Allenby continued to be concerned about the effects of excluding Egypt from 
European diplomacy. Although he admitted that there were dangers in widening the 
basis of the conference, he nevertheless cabled on October 17 that 'I must impress 
upon Your Lordship extreme inadvisability of appearing once again to seek to ex­
clude Egypt from an international conference at which its affairs are to be dis­
cussed, ' since this 'would be interpreted as casting doubt on genuineness of
3
Egyptian independence.1 But even Allenby, an advocate of Egyptian participation, 
was more interested in giving Egypt a visible role than a real one. In this 
connection, he proposed that an Egyptian delegation go to Lausanne only to sign 
a protocol of accession to the relevant clauses to satisfy Egyptian amour propre.
1. Oliphant to Allenby, April 10, 1922, Desp. No. 408, FO/371/7732. It is inter­
esting that Allenby received Treasury support over Egyptian participation in 
any arrangement. The Treasury, because of British guarantees for part of the 
loans, was interested In having Egypt formally committed to continued service 
of those loans. H.E. Fass (Treasury) to Malkin (Foreign Office), April 8, 
1922, FO/371/7733.
2. Allenby to MacDonald, February 23, 1924, Desp. No. 126, Egypt, Annual Report, 
1922, FO/371/10060.
3. Allenby to Curzon, October 17, 1922, Tel. No. 350, FO/371/7904. The dangers 
of widening the basis of the conference referred to Poincare's demand, as quid 
pro quo for Egyptian participation, that the French protectorates of Tunis and 
Morocco participate. Curzon to Allenby, October 24, 1922, FO/371/7952.
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This was especially important because of local agitation for a seat at the confer­
ence and Tharwat's request to that effect.^
The possibility of a separate treaty between Egypt and Turkey was raised and
then ruled out because of British concern over direct negotiations between the two
Muslim states. Finally a method was sought which would satisfy Britain's need for 
Egyptian agreement and at the same time limit Egypt's role in the Lausanne pro­
ceedings without this being too obvious. Further negotiations took place between
Allenby and Tharwat in order to arrive at a mutually satisfactory position in the
2form of a secret exchange of notes or letters.
Unfortunately,- just as a solution appeared possible, Tharwat's position weakened
and he had to retreat from his promise to exchange notes lest these become public
and destroy him politically. Instead he offered a personal letter guaranteeing
3
his loyalty at Lausanne and under these circumstances Curzon agreed. However, by 
the end of November 1922 Tharwat's government had fallen and with it went the 
delicate edifice constructed by the British assuring formal Egyptian acceptance of 
a revised treaty, while depriving her of a real voice in international affairs. 
Subsequent negotiations proved futile.
A similar effort was made to limit Egypt's position abroad and yet maintain 
the appearance of her independence when the possibility of an Egyptian application
to join the League of Nations arose. On September 29, 1922, Allenby informed London
4of discussions in local political circles of such a step and he requested advice.
In his reply, Curzon noted that the appearance of independence had to be sus­
tained because.
An attitude of opposition on the part of His Majesty's Government to­
wards the candidature of Egypt or an attempt to question her eligibility 
might not unnaturally be regarded by Egyptians as an admission that the 
independence conferred on their country by the termination of the 
British Protectorate was fictitious.5
1. Allenby to Curzon, October 17, 1922, Tel. No. 353, F0/371/7904.
2. Allenby to Curzon, October 29, 1922, Tel. No. 368, FO/371/7953.
3. Scott to Curzon, November 13, 1922, Tel. No. 396, and, Curzon to Allenby, 
November 15, 1922, Tel. No. 398, FO/371/7953.
4. Allenby to Curzon, September 29, 1922, Desp. No. 780, FO/371/7738.
5. Curzon to Allenby, October 19, 1922, Desp. No. 1283, FO/371/7738.
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Still, Curzon reminded Allenby that 'only fully self-governing States are 
eligible for membership and the League itself may hold that Egypt's full indepen­
dence cannot be regarded as acquired until the "reserved subjects" have been
1settled by agreement with Great Britain.' In the event of a successful Egyptian 
application, supported visibly by Britain, there was the likelihood that Egypt 
would then turn to the International Court of Justice to resolve disputes over the 
four reserved points. Then, 'the only course open to His Majesty's Government 
would be to contend that reference to any third party...is precluded by the terms
2with which the withdrawal of the British Protectorate was notified to the Powers.'
Again, as at Lausanne, Britain was willing eventually to support the appear­
ance of independence, while, in concrete terms, restricting Egypt's position abroad. 
In the case of membership in the League of Nations, even if Britain supported an 
Egyptian application, this would be meaningless because the scope of Egypt's 
activity abroad would be narrowly defined.
1. Idem. 2. Idem.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR DISENGAGEMENT - 1922-1923
The initial eighteen month period that followed Egypt's independence constituted 
a struggle by the British for disengagement from the country's internal affairs.
The three major objectives of the struggle were the establishment of a constitution­
al regime, the enactment of an indemnity law to enable the ending of martial law, 
and a settlement for foreign officials in the Egyptian civil service. These were 
essential to the success of Britain's new policy. Only after the regularisation of 
Egypt's political and administrative systems could negotiations for a final Anglo- 
Egyptian settlement be entertained seriously.
Objectives of Disengagement
The first and most important area of initial British interest was that of a 
constitutional regime for Egypt. The origins of the Residency's desire for a
■^CkjvrvA
representative and responsible government were Tin the pre-independence need to 
establish a broadly based regime that would free the High Commissioner from the onus 
of governing without local support. This was reflected in Allenby's draft letter 
to the Sultan in January 1922 in which the expectation of constitutional government 
was mentioned within the context of independence. Although reference to a constitu­
tion was eventually deleted, Amos noted months later that the Residency still felt 
'that the expectation of His Majesty's Government that a constitution would be in­
stituted was clearly indicated at the time, though no specific precepts were laid 
2
down.' After independence Residency interest in a constitution continued.
Some writers have argued that Allenby supported a constitution primarily as 
compensation to Tharwat for supporting him during the earlier struggle with London 
over independence. Since Allenby needed Tharwat's support in order to convince 
London that a unilaterally imposed policy was feasible, this 'committed him in turn
3
to support a constitution.'
1. Allenby to Curzon, January 12, 1922, Tel. No. 19, FO/371/7730.
2. Amos to Allenby, October 11, 1922, FO/141/430/5512 (Part 3).
3. E. Kedourie," The. 6ene^is cr? the C o ^ t : o S -  " in p .m . Holt (ed.),
Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt (London, 1968), p.349.
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While Allenby's Egyptian allies undoubtedly would benefit from a constitional 
regime that limited the authority of the Sovereign, this was by no means the only 
reason for Residency support. There was the deep-seated conviction in the Resi­
dency that 'British policy is bound up with the establishment of Parliamentary 
institutions in Egypt,1 because ’Only the passing of the Constitution will make it 
possible to begin the last stage towards accomplishment of H.M.G.'s policy’^  - a 
treaty with Egypt. It was believed that 'the opposite' party in any negotiations
precedent to a Treaty must be a Government representative of the majority of
2
Egyptian opinion.' As Allenby noted later, one of the main functions of the Tharwat
ministry was 'to elaborate a Constitution providing for Ministerial responsibility
to a Parliament whose creation was a necessary antecedent to any fruitful renewal
3
of negotiations with His Majesty's Government.'
Allenby's support for constitutionalism was also a logical consequence of his 
long-standing desire to create a sympathetic moderate elite that would ensure British 
interests while enabling him to suppress perceived elements of disorder, such as 
Zaghlul and his followers. Thus support for Tharwat and constitutionalism did not 
result merely from the need to repay past loyalty. It resulted from the conviction 
that support for Tharwat would strengthen the moderates on whom Allenby's hopes 
were pinned.
The second point that had to be resolved before a final settlement was possible 
was the abolition of British imposed and administered martial law. Instituted at 
the start of the war, it now became an impediment to the British position since it 
meant that British military authority was constantly invoked in Egypt's internal 
affairs. Although critics of British policy maintained 'that martial law is little 
else than an instrument by which we still impose our [British! will upon a country 
we have professed to make independent,' its application was far more complex:
British martial law in Egypt is in the nature of an Egyptian Defence 
of the Realm Act, and only by its help could the Egyptian Government, 
during an abnormal period, overcome, as it was obliged to overcome, 
its legislative weakness in the face of capitulatory privileges.
Martial law was thus used extensively for economic purposes, and
1. R. Fjurness]., 14/xjl922’], FO/141/430 (5512) (Pt. 3).
2. Ibid.
3. Allenby to Curzon, October 15, 1922, Desp. No. 836, FO/371/7738.
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economic conditions are not yet normal; it is through martial law 
that the import of sugar is controlled, and that landlords are pre­
vented from exacting exorbitant house-rents. No other means have 
yet been found of making foreign subjects contribute towards the 
provision of night-watchmen, or of regulating through passport con­
trol the admission of persons into Egypt. In other respects, martial 
law has supplemented the native Penal Code, of which a revision was 
compiled two years ago, but is now not yet entirely suitable.1
Thus the termination of martial law was vital for the disengag^ont of British
authority from Egypt's internal affairs. However, this complex and unpopular
mechanism, the object of much Egyptian resentment, could be ended only after the
enactment of an indemnity law. Since martial law is not recognised in civil law,
an indemnity act was needed to prevent legal proceedings on questions raised as a
result of actions taken under martial law. The drafting of indemnity laws began
2
in London and in Cairo before the 1921 Anglo-Egyptian negotiators but progress in 
this area was largely dependent on progress on a constitution. A generally accepted 
form of government and a system of legislation were required before the machinery 
of martial law could be dismantled.
The final area was the question of compensation for retiring or dismissed 
foreign officials, especially British, in the Egyptian civil service. The future of 
these officials had to be resolved because of the British government^ sense of 
obligation to them for their services to the Empire, the need to pacify the British 
community in Egypt and their supporters in England, and, in the case of non-British 
foreign officials, because of Britain’s commitment to secure foreign interests in 
Egypt. It should be added that although these officials generally entered the 
Egyptian civil service under British auspices, Britain viewed their future as an 
Egyptian responsibility.
The position of such officials was particularly important now because many were 
faced with unwilling retirement, resignation or dismissal since the conditions of 
their employment had changed with independence and the Residency was encouraging 
the process of Egyptianisation. Lord Lloyd, later one of the officials' strongest
1. Ibid.
2. Amos prepared a draft law in May 1921. Enclosed in Allenby to Curzon, June 9, 
1921, Desp. No. 503, FO/371/6336. The Foreign Office legal advisers proposed a 
modified draft law in August 1921. Enclosed in Lindsay to Scott, August 24, 
1921, Desp. No. , FO/371/6331.
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supporters, painted a bleak picture of their future:
...it was already clear that...they would be working now in condi­
tions entirely different from those for which they were recruited.
Their prospects of promotion were almost completely destroyed, 
since it was only natural that an unfettered Egyptian Government 
would fill vacancies with Egyptians. At the same time their autho­
rity over their subordinates would be impaired, because these 
latter would inevitably go behind their backs to the elected repre­
sentatives - a court of appeal which could hardly be expected to be 
impartial. ^
Although Lloyd1s views may have been somewhat extreme, they were shared by many
British officials. They had been asking continuously for an 'adequate' scheme of
compensation for pensionable and non-pensionable foreign civil servants which they
felt 1 should be made condition precedent to granting power to Egyptian government
2
to terminate or vary conditions of service.1 While the Residency was sympathetic 
to the Egyptianisation of the administration,..they were nevertheless aware of the
3
precarious position of Egypt's foreign officials. The realisation that this was 
caused by the shift in British policy which the Residency had advocated made it 
important that this issue also be resolved quickly during the transitional period 
following independence.
Tharwat, Fuad and Allenby (March-November 1922)
Ostensibly the reason for Britain's declaration of Egypt's independence and 
the debate between the British authorities in Cairo and London that had preceded it,
1. Lloyd, op.cit., II, 67-8.
2. Association of British Officials in Scott to Curzon, February 19, 1922, Tel. No. 
78, FO/371/7749. After independence, Major Gayer-Anderson, an official in the 
Ministry of Interior and later Allenby's Oriental Secretary, commented that 
'there has lately arisen great uneasiness amongst officials lest the main de­
mands of Egypt having now been granted without reserve, the advantageous "com­
pensation schemes" put forward to be embodied as part of an "agreement" between 
the two countries may go by the board.' Gayer-Anderson to Murray, A Note on 
the Compensation of British Officials, March 28, 1922, FO/371/7749.
3. In a memorandum written only weeks after independence, Furness commented on the 
ease with which the status quo on officials could be violated by the Egyptian 
government. Kerr, in a minute of April 24, 1922, noted that he and Dowson 
agreed fully. R. F^urness]]* to Kerr, April 4, 1922, FO/141/515(14382)(Pt. 1).
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was the need to create the political context that would assure Egypt's continued
administration by a native ministry.
As Allenby had anticipated, a new ministry was quickly formed after independence
1
without great difficulty. The Sultan summoned Tharwat to the palace on the day
of Allenby's return and he agreed to head a ministry whose declared aim would be a
2
'constitution m  accordance with the principle of modern public right.' Allenby
was indeed satisfied with the new ministry's spirit and he expressed this sentiment
3m  a cable to London: 'I find them all confident and ready to cooperate with me.'
Furthermore, Allenby himself looked to the future hopefully. He wrote to Viscount
Samuel, the British High Commissioner in Palestine, that 'Egypt has been behaving
4well, and I think that the new Ministry will work with us all right.'
However, despite Allenby's confidence, the position of Tharwat and his ministry 
was extremely vulnerable. Tharwat had undertaken the unpopular task of governing 
and establishing a system of government without broad public support or the open 
cooperation of any political faction in Egypt. Even Allenby later had to admit that 
the new ministry 'commanded no great personal popularity...were deprived of the 
active assistance of Adly Pasha, and the respect and prestige attaching to him, and 
of a group of able and rising men who were his partisans, and...were certain to
5
encounter the bitter hostility of the Zaghlulist and Watanist parties.'
Furthermore, Tharwat who would no doubt use a constitution to bolster his weak 
popular and political position, was caught between the King and the High Commissioner. 
Fuad, on the one hand, would try to retain and perhaps expand his authority, while 
Allenby, on the other hand, would seek, despite his sympathy for Tharwat, to pro­
tect what he considered important British interests. Without Adli's visible 
support and faced with strong political opposition, the future of Tharwat's declared 
programme was in question.6
1. For a report of events immediately following Allenby's return to Cairo, see: 
Allenby to Curzon, February 28, 1922, Tel. No. 93, FO/371/7732.
2. Tharwat to Fuad, March 1, 1922 in Egyptian Mail, March 2, 1922, cited in 
FO/371/7732.
3. Allenby to Curzon, March 1, 1922, Tel. No. 97, FO/371/773 2.
4. Allenby to Samuel, March 9,Vl922l, SAI, Samuel Papers, 100/1.
5. Allenby to Curzon, October 15, 1922, Desp. No. 836, FO/371/7738.
6. For a general survey of the political situation in Egypt at this time, see: 
P.J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (London, 1969), p.265ff.
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The early months after independence were marked by the activities of the
Constitutional Commission and it was during this period that the main lines of
contention began to appear. As promised, one of the ministry's first acts was to
establish the machinery for framing a constitution. Therefore, on April 3, Tharwat
appointed a broad-based Constitutional Commission of thirty leading Egyptians. The
Chairman of the Commission of Thirty was the respected former Prime Minister,
1
Husayn Rushdi Pasha.
Although the Commission was fairly well-balanced, albeit conservative in out­
look, it was immediately attacked by members of the still popular Wafd who called 
it lajnat al-ashqiya1 [commission of Criminals]. Zaghlul's followers maintained 
that a constitution should not be drafted by the Commission, their opponents'
creature, but should be the work of a constituent assembly which they believed they 
2
would control.
At the Commission's very first session, the debates focused on the central issue
of power and where it should reside. The basic questions of the King's authority
and the extent of the electoral franchise were referred for resolution to an inner
Subcommittee of Eighteen under Rushdi's chairmanship. The Commission was split
between the 'King's men' who favoured real authority for the monarch and those who
wanted him to enjoy only ceremonial powers. Rushdi and Tharwat1s moderate supporters
leaned towards a compromise which would give Fuad some power in order to realise
most of the Commission's aims. Despite the persistent and vigourous debates, by the
end of April the Residency believed that work on the constitution was progressing
3
well and that 'Sarwat Pasha continues optimistic and hopeful for the future.'
British satisfaction soon ended when the Commission began discussing the future 
of the Sudan. The British attitude towards the Sudan was quite different from their 
approach to Egypt. Having its roots in the period of the Sudan's reconquest, one 
author has commented that since -then
The British mistrust of Egyptian intentions and capabilities in the
1. For the establishment of the Commission as well as its composition, see:
Saroit, 'Note au Conseil des Ministres,' 3 avril 1922, La Bourse Egyptienne, 5 
avril 1922 in FO/371/7733.
2. For details of the political struggle surrounding the Constitutional Commission 
and its activities, see: Kedourie, op.cit., p.351ff.
3. Scott to Curzon, April 23, 1922, Desp. No. 311, FO/371/7733.
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Sudan which had been a factor in the drafting of the Condominium 
Agreement, had developed with years of successful rule into a sense 
of unique moral responsibility, a feeling that legal niceties apart, 
the Eritish administrators and the British government stood in a 
position of trusteeship towards the Sudanese.^
It was this combination of 'mistrust' and a sense of 'moral responsibility' 
that led British officials in Egypt to advocate the 'de-Egyptianisation' of the 
Sudan at the very same time that they supported Egyptian independence. Keown-Boyd, 
one of Allenby's close advisers, wrote with the approval of the Governor-General 
of the Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, that the forthcoming Milner Report should
...point out the absurdity of claims made by Egyptians to Egyptian 
Nationalism for the Sudan, stating at the same time how the Sudan 
differs in race, tradition and sympathy from Egypt, and showing 
that Egypt's only legitimate interests in the Sudan are the safe­
guarding of her water supply and the protection of her frontiers 
from external aggression.2
This view prevailed after independence as well.
It was therefore an unpleasant shock for the Residency to learn on May 8 that 
the Commission intended to add a clause to the constitution stating that Egypt and 
the Sudan were one country and the King of Egypt was sovereign of both. Allenby 
immediately called upon Tharwat to warn of British disapproval and that 'If such a
3
clause is put in constitution it may wreck whole agreement.' Tharwat promised 
to speak to the Commission, noting that its function was only advisory. In the mean­
time, Allenby attempted to suppress publication of the news of the Commission's
intentions, but it was too late because the information had already appeared on the
4
pages of al-Akhbar on that same day.
1. P.M. Holt, A History of the Sudan (London, 1963), pp.128-9.
2. Keown-Boyd to Allenby, March 14, 1920, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 161. Even staunch
British supporters of Egyptian nationalism, such as Valentine Chirol, the influ­
ential Times correspondent, balked at Egyptian claims to sovereignty over the 
Sudan: 'They^Egyptians] have, I submit, no right to claim it so long as we make
good to them the expenditure which they have contributed towards its reconquest, 
and also undertake to supply Egypt in future with the legitimate share of the 
waters of the White and Blue Nile essential to her esistence [sic]. ' V. Chirol to 
Gertrude Bell, March 1, 1920, Enclosed Memorandum, STAC, Chirol Papers.
3. Allenby to Curzon, May 8, 1922, Tel. No. 174, FO/371/7733.
4. Al-Akhbar published the Commission's decision as well as Rushdi's memorandum on
the Sudan prepared earlier for the Egyptian delegation in London. Al-Akhbar,
May 8, 1922 in Public Security Department, Report on the General Situation in 
Egypt, 4th to 10th May, 1922 in Allenby to Curzon, May 13, 1922, Desp. No. 376,
FO/371/7742.
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Allenby learned on May 9 that the resolution on the Sudan was the work of 
Rushdi's Subcommittee of Eighteen and not of the entire Commission. Previously 
Allenby had been under the impression that he had Tharwat1s support and thus repor­
ted to London that 'President of the Council fully shares view that commission 
would be acting improperly in incorporating in a draft constitution for Egypt a 
clause dealing with the Sudan. He is supported by Cabinet and by Adly Pasha and 
his admonition may be expected to have full weight with commission.'^  But apparently 
Tharwat and Adli could not oppose the Sudan clause lest they be attacked by their 
opponents for being British puppets. This appears to have been confirmed in an 
interview granted by Tharwat to al-Ahram on May 22. Tharwat reaffirmed his Ministry's 
approval of the work of the Egyptian delegation to London which served as the basis 
for the Sudan clause. He did concede, however, that 'whatever the point of view of
each side, no change should be made in the actual status quo until negotiations
2
had been both undertaken and completed.'
In addition to difficulties over a constitution, the early months of independence 
indicated that public order - despite Egypt's new status, martial law and Zaghlul's 
exile - could not be maintained easily as long as the outstanding issues remained 
unresolved. On May 24, W.F. Gunliffe Cave, a British inspector in the Cairo police, 
was murdered. London's strong reaction reflected outrage at the continuing attacks 
on the British in Egypt as well as traditional British apprehension over the senti­
ments of the local population. Curzon angrily cabled Allenby on May 26 that 'The 
impunity with which murderous assaults are committed clearly demonstrates the 
inadequacy of preventive measures,' and demanded Egyptian compensation for the victims
3
or their heirs. The Egyptian reply, disclaiming responsibility but offering ex 
gratia payments to the victims, meant that the absence of public order might compli­
cate Anglo-Egyptian relations in the coming months. It was in this period that 
Allenby, under pressure from London, and Tharwat, faced with opposition in Egypt, 
would try to arrive at a mutually satisfactory arrangement.
1. Allenby to Curzon, May 9, 1922, Tel. No. 176, FO/371/7733.
2. Al-Ahram, May 22, 1922, cited in Public Security Department, Report on the General 
Situation in Egypt, May 18th to May 24th, 1922 in Allenby to Curzon, May 28, 1922, 
Desp. No. 421, FO/371/7742. For an analysis of Tharwat's and Adli's considera­
tions, see: Kedourie, op.cit., pp.355-6.
3. Curzon to Allenby, May 26, 1922, Tel. No. 155, FO/371/7734.
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The difficulties continued into the summer months. The problems and disagree­
ments over a settlement for foreign officials became acute. British officials in 
the Egyptian civil service were extremely dissatisfied and felt that their interests 
and safety were threatened by Residency policy. Tweedy at the Residency warned that
A considerable section of the [British]community is obviously express­
ing itself in unguarded and extreme terms with regard to the attitude 
of the Residency in respect of the protection of British interests in 
this country. The main point [of their view]is that H.E. ^His Excellen­
cy, the High Commissioner] is being badly advised by Sir M. Amos in 
particular who has never been a popular official in the country.1
This sentiment was widespread and on June 8 an official at the Ministry of 
Interior sympathetic to the Residency, privately wrote Murray of the growing resent­
ment :
The general idea is that Sarwat leads Allenby by the nose and that the 
interests and safety of the English here are considered quite unimpor­
tant compared with the various diplomatic questions. Since Selby left, 
the Residency has, I think, lost touch to a great extent with the 
English community, and the feeling is that the Residency are more or 
less in with the natives and are ready to sacrifice the English to bol­
ster up Sarwat.2
3Officials at the Foreign Office were dismayed since this only reinforced their fears.
Allenby therefore quickly attempted to reach an agreement with Tharwat. He 
offered the Prime Minister a compromise on the foreign officials, based on an earlier 
Foreign Office proposal. Tharwat, however, declined because he felt that such a 
settlement should be part of a final Anglo-Egyptian agreement, and that the present 
Ministry needed a mandate from a parliament in order to undertake such obligations. 
Tharwat later explained that acceptance of Allenby's scheme would mean 'that he would 
certainly be assassinated,1 and in any event the Ministry would resign if pressed 
on this issue.^
1. O.M. T [weedy"]. to Kerr, June 3, 1922, FO/141/807(8013). Kerr agreed but was more
optimistic about the outcome: 'The British officials are a stiffnecked ungrate­
ful race, but I feel sure that they will change their tone when the effects of
H.E.'s action become apparent.' A.C. Kjerr']., June 3, 1922 in ibid.
2. R. Wellesley to J. Murray, June 8, 1922, FO/371/7734. Wellesley was the assist­
ant to the Director-General of the Department of Public Security.
3. Murray, Minute, 16.6.22 to Wellesley's letter, and, Balfour to Allenby, June 19, 
1922, Tel. No. 172, FO/371/7734.
4. Allenby to Balfour, June 8, 1922, Tel. No. 214, FO/371/7749. The proposed scheme 
of compensation drawn up by Judge Percival of Cairo is enclosed in Allenby to 
Balfour, June 18, 1922, Desp. No. 456, FO/371/7749.
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Allenby saw two alternatives: imposing his scheme and losing the Tharwat Min­
istry? or, accepting the Prime Minister’s assurances that individual cases would 
be dealt with generously as they arose. Despite the practical difficulties and the 
'disappointment and discontent amongst British and foreign officials' if the latter 
course were adopted, Allenby accepted the proferred assurances with his own promise 
that British officials 'may rest assured that their interests will not suffer in my 
h a n d s . P a c e d  with a choice between Tharwat's survival and the interests of 
British officials, Allenby apparently believed that this was no choice at all.
The Foreign Office, now temporarily headed by Balfour, did not agree with Allen­
by 's order of priorities and Lindsay noted: 'I'm not sure that a cabinet crisis in
2
Egypt would be particularly disastrous, though I should prefer not to have one.'
Even Balfour expressed fear that 'By yielding to Sarwat's desire to temporise
we shall encourage the Egyptian government to think that a mere threat of resignation
on their part is sufficient to induce His Majesty's Government to withdraw or at
3
least postpone unpopular demands.' Despite some regret over the possibility of
Tharwat's resignation, Allenby was urged, but not instructed to press the officials'
claims to compensation.
Allenby, however, disregarded London's suggestions and informed Balfour that,
given Tharwat's promise of generosity, he had agreed to the establishment of a small
4committee to deal with individual cases. Balfour was less than satisfied but had
little choice and agreed that Allenby's arrangement 'is probably best that could be
reached in present circumstances, but its least satisfactory feature is that is is
5unlikely to allay the apprehension of British officials.'
The division between the Residency and the Foreign Office became even more
apparent when the British press reported that nineteen foreign officials had been dis-
6missed by the Egyptian government. Allenby explained the circumstances and rejected
1. Allenby to Balfour, June 8, 1922, Tel. No. 214, FO/371/7749.
2. R.C.L^Lndsay]., Minute, June 12, 1922, to Balfour to Allenby, June 14, 1922, Tel. 
No. 171, FO/371/7749.
3. Balfour to Allenby, June 14, 1922, Tel. No. 171, FO/371/7749.
4. Allenby to Balfour, June 19, 1922, Tel. No. 223, FO/371/7749.
5. Balfour to Allenby, June 24, 1922, Tel. No. 176, FO/371/7749.
6. For example, see: Morning Post, June 28, 1922.
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Balfour's request that pressure be applied openly on the Egyptian government. He
sternly warned Balfour 'that working arrangement reached between myself and Prime
Minister was confidential and that it is most important that it should remain so. 
Murray best described the difference between the Foreign Office and Residency 
approaches/ a difference with a long history and deep roots:
Our policy is that it is important to allay the anxieties of British 
and incidentally of foreign officials who feel themselves 'in the air' 
and fear that they will not be supported by His Majesty's Government.
If our object can be achieved without sacrificing Sarwat, whose fall
would not advance it, so much the better.
Lord Allenby on the other hand appears to reverse the order of impor­
tance. That is to say, he is determined not to drive Sarwat to resigna­
tion over the question though subject to that limitation he will do the 
best he can for British and foreign officials.2
For the meantime Allenby's order of importance carried the day.
Allenby's difficulties, however, increased because of the growing number of 
attacks on British officers and officials in Egypt. On July 15, Colonel Pigott of 
the A m y  Pay Corps was shot in Cairo. Both the Residency and the Foreign Office were 
alarmed by what they saw as an organised 'campaign of political crime against 
British officers and officials' and Tharwat was warned that unless action was taken
'the matter will be regarded by His Majesty's Government as one of very great
gravity.'^
Egyptian assurances and promises of compensation notwithstanding, the Residency 
took a grim view of the violence since Allenby's entire policy would be endangered 
by its continuation. Robm Furness quickly drew up a plan for the reorganisation of 
the Egyptian police and security agencies to enable them to deal more effectively 
with political crime. Responsibility for investigating such offences was transferred 
from the Cairo police and Parquet as well as from the British military authorities 
to the more reliable Public Security Department in the Ministry of Interior and its
1. Allenby to Balfour, July 1, 1922, Tel. No. 233, FO/371/7749.
2. Murray, Minute, 3.7.22 to Balfour to Allenby, July 6, 1922, Tel. No. 179, 
FO/371/7749.
3. Allenby to Balfour, July 22, 1922, Desp. No. 585, FO/371/7735. For Foreign
Office views, See: E.A.C[rowe*3*, July 17 to Allenby to Balfour, July 15, 1922,
Tel. No. 248; and, Balfour to Allenby, July 18, 1922, Tel. No. 191, FO/371/7735.
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Egyptian Director-General.^
Still the situation continued to deteriorate because the violence was caused
as much by political ferment as by ineffective police measures. At the end of
July the Wafd openly renewed its political activities. Claiming that Zaghlul was
seriously ill and had been mistreated in exile, the party's leadership condemned
Britain and Tharwat and called on Egyptians, in a manifesto issued on July 24, 'to
notify the civilized world by all means at your disposal, the expression of your
2anger and indignation...' Allenby considered the Wafd manifesto inflammatory and 
a direct incitement to violence. He therefore ordered under martial law the arrest 
of the seven signatories. Once again, British authority was invoked to maintain 
public order.
The seven Wafd leaders were expeditiously tried and convicted. The death sen­
tence was imposed and then commuted to penal servitude and a heavy fine. But 
public order had not been restored and pressure on Allenby increased. On the very 
day the Wafd leaders were sentenced, August 13, T.W. Brown of the Ministry of Agri­
culture was attacked. Curzon, having returned by now to the Foreign Office, was 
outraged and protested that
It seems that English are being shot at or assassinated simply because 
they are English and incident cannot fail greatly to increase the 
uneasiness of British officials in Egypt, whose faith in Sarwat's 
willingness and ability to safeguard their position will not be streng­
thened by the failure of the Government to prevent perpetration of 
these political crimes.^
Further arrests were ordered by Allenby, but matters were now getting out of 
hand. The British press protested the violence and the use of martial law to sup­
press it, the Egyptian government appeared to be dragging its feet on compensation 
to some of the victims, and Curzon called for the seizure of a revenue-earning branch
1. R.F[urness]. to Allenby, July 15, 1922, FO/141/430(5500/14). Furness' suggest­
ions were quickly implemented and then served as the basis, almost verbatim, for
Allenby's long report to London. Allenby to Balfour, July 24, 1922, Desp. No. 
594, FO/371/7736.
2. Enclosure in Allenby to Balfour, July 29, 1922, Desp. No. 611, FO/371/7736.
3. Curzon to Allenby, August 16, 1922, Tel. No. 209, FO/371/7736.
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1of the Egyptian administration to ensure adequate compensation. Allenby, at this 
point, still resisted taking any step that would endanger the Tharwat ministry.
He was convinced that nothing would be accomplished by forcing Tharwat out of office, 
especially since
We have made considerable progress towards a good understanding with 
Egypt and are gaining support of those whose opinions are really 
sound. They would come more into the open if sure of us but such 
action as is suggested in your telegram (n o . 210] revenue seizure would 
give them impression that liberal policy declared by His Majesty's 
Government was insincere. No Egyptian could support it. It would 
put sharp and sudden check on progress of His Majesty's Government's 
policy in Egypt and might ruin any chance of our coming to friendly 
understanding.2
Murray drily observed that 'Lord Allenby's attitude is much what I expected what it 
3
would be...'
Despite Allenbyfs persistent optimism, the most dangerous and uncontrollable 
element was the King and his intrigues against the Tharwat ministry. This was a re­
sult of the attempts of the Constitutional Commission to institute a limited monarchy 
in Egypt, and Fuad's intrigues to prevent this thereby threatening stability and 
encouraging the opposition parties.
However much the draft constitution was a compromise, its very conception con­
stituted a serious limitation on the King's authority. Having come to power at the
4
age of forty-eight, after years of political and actual exile, Fuad did not intend to 
concede.
/Tiis newly-acquired authority for the liberal principle of constitutionalism or for 
Tharwat's political benefit. The King did not hide his displeasure at the direction 
taken by the Commission and in August frankly told Allenby that it 'was behaving
1. For the attitudes of the press, see the following leading articles: 'Our Duty
to Egypt,' Daily News, August 17, 1922; 'The Confusion in Egypt,' Manchester 
Guardian, August 26, 1922; 'The Burden of Egypt,' Times, August 14, 1922' and,
'The Situation in Egypt,' Westminster Gazette, August 19, 1922. For the differ­
ences over compensation to victims, see: Allenby to Curzon, August 14, 1922,
Desp. No. 1097, FO/371/7736. For the suggested seizure of a source of revenue, 
see: Curzon to Allenby, August 16, 1922, Tel. No. 210, FO/371/7736.
2. Allenby to Curzon, August 18, 1922, Tel. No. 289, FO/371/7736.
3. Murray, Minute, 19.8.22, to Allenby to Curzon, August 18, 1922, Tel. No. 289,
FO/371/7736.
4. For a sympathetic biography of Ahmad Fuad, see: Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, Fuad,
King of Egypt (London, 1936).
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foolishly in selecting the most liberal articles they could find from the Constitu­
tions of different countries, and preparing a Constitution far too advanced to be 
appropriate to Egypt? such a Constitution would prove unworkable, and could only 
be altered by events of revolutionary nature.1^  Gerald Delaney, the long-time resi­
dent Reuters correspondent and frequent Residency informant, later reported similar 
comments:
The King is dissatisfied with the Constitution that has been drafted.
He calls it a 'Bolshevistic Constitution' because it 'enables the people 
to choose a Ministry everyday.' He says it is not wise to give the 
people privileges before 'we know the sort of people who are going to be 
elected to Parliament.' 'But if the country is going to have a Bolshevis­
tic Constitution' he says, 'then I am quite willing if I have the privi­
lege of a Lenin. And if it is to be a Republican Constitution, then I 
am quite willing if I have the privileges of the President of the U.S.A.'2
In the meantime, as long as the constitution was not yet written and promulgated,
Fuad had great prestige and much authority which he did not hesitate to exercise to
3
undermine Tharwat's position before it became too late. Throughout August intrigues 
were carried out against Tharwat through palace officials such as the Grand Chamber- 
lain Said Dhu-l-Fiqar Pasha. Messages were sent to Allenby and the King held 
audiences for the purpose of expressing his intense displeasure with the Prime Minis­
ter. The reasons were Tharwat's failure to notify Fuad about the arrest of the 
Wafd leadership, Tharwat's intention to suppress the pro-Wafd French language paper, 
Liberte, and, ostensibly, his inability to maintain public order. As a sign of 
dissatisfaction, the King refused to convene the Council of Ministers thereby hamper­
ing government activity. At one point Fuad was about to dismiss Tharwat because of 
a minor dispute and was barely dissuaded by Allenby who warned that such action, 
immediately after the arrest of the Wafd leadership, would dangerously enhance Wafd 
prestige. The conflict between the King and his Prime Minister continued for the 
rest of the summer and an open clash appeared inevitable.
1. Allenby to Curzon, August 8, 1922, Desp. No. 640, FO/371/7736.
2. G. Delaney to the Residency, 14/X/22 in FO/141/505(13584). For the Residency's
views on Delaney's reliability as an informant, see: Kerr to H.E. [AllenbyJ,
May 2, 1922 in ibid.
3. The account of Fuad's intrigues and his involvement of the British is based on
Allenby to Curzon, August 8, 1922, Desp. No. 640, and Allenby to Curzon, August 
21, 1922, Desp. No. 671, FO/371/7736.
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The final stage in the life of the Tharwat ministry came in the late autumn.
All the forces working against the ministry since it took office in March 1922 
coalesced and led to its fall. This was made possible by Tharwat's lack of political
support. The apparently well-founded charges of poor administration and favouritism
made the regime still more unpopular. Even Allenby was forced to admit that
There is...ground for discontent with the Sarwat Ministry which 
seems to me to have ample justification. Partly with a view to in­
creasing their personal popularity and obtaining political support,
and partly, I suppose, owing to a prevalent reluctance to deny the 
demands of relatives and proteges, they have made a great number of 
highly arbitrary appointments and promotions. Though some of these 
may bring them political advantage and provide convenient channels 
for the exercise of power, there can be no doubt that in earning the 
tiifnks of one man they have increased the resentment of fifty, and, 
that, while they have become unpopular among their officials, they 
have not established at large the respect which accompanies a repu­
tation for fairness.1
The renewed debate over the Sudan clauses in the draft constitiilon further in­
creased the ministry's vulnerability. In mid-October the draft was nearing comple­
tion and reports soon reached London, through the Times, that it would include the
Constitutional Commission's earlier recommendations on the King's title and the
2Sudan. Curzon quickly protested and asked Allenby for clarification. The High 
Commissioner, in the meantime, had entered into conversations with Tharwat and 
optimistically informed London that 'Sarwat has expressed himself as perfectly 
willing to omit former article ^ king1s title\and suitable modifications or even omis­
sion of latter jstatus of SudanJare under discussion.'^
Still the copy of the draft constitution that Allenby received unofficially in 
October confirmed Curzon's fears about the inclusion of clauses detrimental to 
British interests. The most contentious of these were Chapter I, sub-section'I, 
which gave Fuad the title 'King of Egypt and the Sudan’ and Article 8, section IV, 
describing the Sudan as an integral part of Egypt, although subject to a special
1. Allenby to Curzon, October 15, 1922, Desp. No. 836, FO/371/7738.
2. Curzon to Allenby, October 25, 1922, Tel. No. 272, FO/371/7738. The report upon 
which this telegram is based is Times, October 23, 1922. In view of earlier 
complaints about the lack of information from Cairo, it is interesting that 
Allenby had a copy of the draft constitution at least a week before the report 
appeared in the Times. See: Allenby to Curzon, May 5, 1923, Desp. No. 295, 
FO/371/8962.
3. Allenby to Curzon, October 26, 1922, Tel. No. 367, FO/371/7738.
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1administration. Yet Allenby still believed that the offending sections 'will be
2
either omitted or satisfactorily amended before the Constitution is promulgated.1
The King, meanwhile, carried on an almost overt campaign against the Tharwat
ministry. After the failure to establish a Court or Conservative Party, Fuad
directed his attention to intrigues with the Wafd. His agent apparently was the
respected Tawfiq Nasim Pasha, a former Prime Minister and chief of the Royal Cabinet
3
since April 1922. Rumours began to spread about the King's differences with 
Tharwat over the release of Zaghlul from detention, the delegation to Lausanne, and, 
most important, concessions over the Sudan clauses. Allenby could no longer accept 
Fuad's protestations that he was merely meeting as King of Egypt will all sectors 
of the public, including Wafd representatives, and not intriguing against the 
ministry:
I hear on all hands that emissaries of the Palace proclaim pro-Zaghlulist 
sentiments and are in close touch with Zaghlulist newspapers; in a re­
cent issue of the Zaghlulist "Liberte", whose suspension by the Ministry 
was the chief immediate cause of a recent crisis, the photographs of the 
King and Mme Zaghlul appeared in conspicuous juxtaposition, and an evi­
dently inspired article congratulated His Majesty on the courage which he 
must have required in order, for political reasons, to have concealed so 
long from the people his real opinions.^
Fuad used every opportunity to make his displeasure public knowledge. Weeks of
open insults to the ministry left their mark. According to Allenby, it became 'the
subject of public comment and contributed to undermine the prestige of the Govern-
5ment and to affect the nerves of the Prime Minister.' Even the moderates could not 
swim against the tide of popular opinion, especially on the Sudan issue. On October 
31, Adli and his followers founded the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. Although 
they were firm in their adherence to the principle of constitutional government, Adli, 
in his inaugural address, felt the need to declare that
...any solution of the Sudan question leading to its separation from
1. A French translation of Tharwat's draft constitution is in FO/371/7738.
2. Allenby to Curzon, October 30, 1922, Desp. No. 867, FO/371/7738.
3. For details of Nasim's activities, based on a report by the United States Minis­
ter in Cairo, December 1, 1922, see: Kedourie, op.cit., pp.356-7. This is con­
firmed by Allenby to Curzon, October 15, 1922, Desp. No. 836, FO/371/7738.
4. Allenby to Curzon, October 15, 1922, Desp. No. 836, FO/371/7738.
5. Allenby to Curzon, May 5, 1923, Desp. No. 395, FO/371/8962.
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Egypt,, diminishing Egyptian rights in that territory, interfering 
with Egyptian suzerainty over it, or hindering Egypt from directing 
its (Egyptian] vital interests in the Sudan, would be a solution 
which not only no justice or friendliness, which should be the basis 
of the agreement, could justify, but which could never meet with the 
approval of the Egyptian people.1
Such a position appeared to preclude an acceptable solution to the difficulties 
over the Sudan clauses. The general criticism of the new party as a British tool 
and then the murder of two of its leaders prevented any softening of its position 
and it began to openly criticise the Ministry although not as harshly as other 
parties did.
The pressure of events, particularly Fuad's activities, led Allenby to consider 
the possibility of intervening forcefully, a course previously avoided. Although 
still not fully convinced that Fuad would dare to openly frustrate British policy 
by rejecting the constitution, Allenby prepared for that contingency. At the begin­
ning of November, the High Commissioner informed Curzon that if the King attempted 
to wreck the constitution, he would advise him against such action. Then, 'After
giving that advice, I conceive that it will be necessary to insist on its being 
2complied with.1 London responded favourably and for once the Foreign Office and
3
Residency approaches coincided.
Conditions, however, had become so bad and Tharwat's will to rule so weak, that 
no matter how forcefully the Residency intervened, the Ministry's condition was be­
yond repair. On November 26, Adli's Liberal Constitutionalist Party decided to 
withdraw all support from Tharwat if he gave in to Allenby on the Sudan clauses.
Two days later Tharwat informed Allenby of his intention to resign on November 30. 
Tharwat's reasons were his strained relations with the King and the inadvisability
of forcing Fuad to agree to a constitution which included concessions on the Sudan,
4
because Tharwat would then be accused of giving away half of Egypt. Allenby did
1. Enclosure in Allenby to Curzon, November 4, 1922, Desp. No. 882, FO/371/7739.
2. Allenby to Curzon, November 7, 1922, Tel. No. 383, FO/371/7738. Allenby was be­
ing pressed by his staff to take such action. Furness, discussing the King's
objections to a constitution in a long note, wrote 'that whatever degree of 
pressure may be necessary should be put upon the King to grant this Constitution.' 
R.F furness}. , 14/X/[l922] , FO/141/430 (5512) (Pt.3) .
3. Lindsay commented that 'Lord Allenby is exercising influence openly and wisely,
& I agree that he must continue to do so.' R.C.Lfindsay]., Nov., 8, Minute to 
Curzon to Allenby, November 7, 1922, Tel. No. 392, FO/371/7738.
4. Allenby to Curzon, November 28, 1922, Tel. No. 418, FO/371/7739.
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not try to dissuade the Prime Minister.
Only later did the Residency learn the immediate cause for Tharwat's hasty
resignation. On November 28, the Minister of Waqfs ^Religious Endowments] was
informed that the King intended to pray at the al-Azhar Mosque, a Wafd stronghold,
in the company of his Ministers on the following Friday. Since it was unusual for
the King to pray in public, further enquiries were made and it soon became known
that the Palace had organised a student demonstration for the occasion. In the
course of the demonstration Tharwat and Sidqi Pasha were to be beaten with sticks
as they left the Mosque. Upon hearing this, Tharwat immediately informed Allenby of
1
his decision to resign which he did on November 30.
Officials at the Foreign Office were furious and went so far as to raise the
possibility of the need 'to reconsider our whole attitude and policy towards Egypt,
and...that it may be desirable if not essential definitely to solve the question of
2
the Sudan by the annexation of that country.' Allenby, however, had no intention 
of so easily abandoning the course he had embarked upon in February. Instead of 
an open break, he sharply informed Tawfiq Nasim, who was now charged with forming a 
new government, that he regretted the fall of the Ministry, that no change was con­
templated in Britain's policy, that compensation for officials should proceed quickly, 
and, most important, that the British government 'would not acquiesce in delay in
3
establishment of a parliamentary regime.' As for the King, Allenby proposed 'to
throw upon him responsibility for situation created by fall of late Ministry and to
4
express my displeasure at his manoeuvres.'
1. Allenby to Curzon, May 5, 1923, Desp. No. 295, FO/371/8962. This is based on 
information obtained by Keown-Boyd at the Ministry of Interior. Keown-Boyd to 
Kerr, January 10, 1923, FO/141/484(278).
2. Murray, Minute, 29.11.22, to Allenby to Curzon, November 29, 1922, Tel. No. 419, 
FO/371/7739. This was also raised by Lindsay, R.C.LQLndsay]., Minute, Nov. 29, 
to ibid. In the end, Crowe, acting for Curzon, chose to have Fuad questioned on 
his intentions and asked Allenby to make it clear 'that the whole attitude of 
His Majesty's Government towards Egypt and the Sudan will depend upon the nature 
of his replies to these questions.' Crowe to Allenby, November 29, 1922, Tel. 
No. 411, FO/371/7739.
3. Allenby to Curzon, December 1, 1922, Tel. No. 420, FO/371/7739.
4. Ibid.
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Tawfiq Nasim and Fuad vs. Allenby (November 1922-February 1923)
After the fall of the Tharwat Ministry, the Residency viewed the developing 
political situation with concern. Given Fuad's approach, the appointment of Tawfiq 
Nasim as Prime Minister was seen as inevitable.
King Fuad's choice...was the logical sequel of the policy His Majesty 
had been pursuing with a view to provide himself with a Ministry that 
was willing to mould itself to his wishes and, by his association with 
the Zaghlulist party, to gain some measure of popular favour and to 
make his own position predominant.^
As for Nasim, Allenby believed that he 'was the ready instrument, if not the
2actual inspiration, of this policy.' Allenby did not question either the motives 
or the honesty of the new Prime Minister and credited him with serving what Nasim 
believed to be Egypt's best interests. Allenby also was convinced that Nasim did 
not have any real sympathy for the Wafd, but rather 'It seemed more probable that 
he conceived it to be in the interests of Egypt that the position of the Throne 
should be predominant, and that he shared the King's view as to the usefulness of
3
Zaghlulism as a means to that end.'
Still there was little doubt at the Residency that at this point strong ties
between the Palace, the Ministry and the Wafd did indeed exist. Nasim's early
activities appeared to confirm this assumption. His first public statement after
taking office was made to the Editor of the Liberte, a newspaper linked to the
Palace and the Wafd. Nasim was reported to have declared 'that the situation in
regard to the exiles and internees^Zaghlul and his associates}was inadmissible and 
4intolerable.' The Residency believed that the Prime Minister's subsequent denial 
was only half-hearted and unconvincing. In addition, on a number of public occa­
sions, notably during Fuad's visit to the al-Azhar Mosque, leading members of the 
Wafd were given great prominence.
Despite these developments and his openly expressed displeasure at recent events, 
the High Commissioner continued the policy of March 1922: The regularisation of
Egypt's internal affairs. Here there seemed to be some progress.
Issues that were not directly or conspicuously related to the internal political 
situation appeared more amenable to resolution. Thus within days of Nasim's
1. Allenby to Curzon, May 5, 1923, Desp. No. 296, FO/371/8962.
2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.
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appointment, Allenby reported progress over compensation in such terms that Murray
in London could comment that 'the compensation position question seems to be in a
1
fair way to solution...1 In fact, acting on Amos' advice, Allenby now began to
consider the question of how to limit the hiring of non-British foreign officials
2
in the Egyptian civil service.
At the same time, Allenby did not hesitate to take action in areas which he
considered vital to the safeguarding of British interests and to the maintenance of
the status quo. This could be seen in Allenby's intervention in the management of
the Egyptian State Railways to ensure their efficiency because 'they form important
3
part of imperial communications,' or his efforts to prevent the abolition of the
post of Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until now occupied by 
4Keown-Boyd.
When negotiations between the Residency and the Ministry touched upon more sen­
sitive matters, progress was virtually impossible. The negotiations over a mutually 
acceptable programme for the Egyptian delegation to Lausanne is an example of where 
the Ministry was faced with the kind of political difficulties that prevented sub­
stantial movement. Allenby was aware of these difficulties and was not unsympathetic 
when he later commented that:
1. Murray, Minute, 19.12.22, to Allenby to Curzon, December 9, 1922, Desp. No. 959, 
FO/371/8966. This optimism was also apparent in Allenby's reports to London.
See: Allenby to Curzon, December 20, 1922, Desp. No. 989, FO/371/8966.
2. Amos was particularly concerned. He wrote: 'Our principle object, it appears
to me, is to avoid foreign officials being made the outposts of serious diploma­
tic rivalry with ourselves in this country.' Amos to First Secretary, December 
28, 1922, FO/141/515(14382)(Pt. 1). As a result, Allenby urged London that only 
nationals of minor powers such as Belgium or Switzerland have access to impor­
tant positions. Curzon rejected this because of the difficulties an only partial­
ly exclusionary policy would create. For details, see: Allenby to Curzon, Janu­
ary 3, 1923, Tel. No. 10, and, Curzon to Allenby, January 8, 1923, Tel. No. 13, 
FO/371/8966.
3. This was based on the request by Blakeney, General Manager of the State Railways, 
that a supreme railway board with British representation be revived. Blakeney 
complained 'of obstructive and improper interference with his work on the part 
of Egyptian Under Secretary of State, with result that efficiency of Railways is 
now seriously threatened...' Allenby to Curzon, January 14, 1923, Tel. No. 23, 
FO/371/8959.
4. When Keown-Boyd resigned as Director-General, the Egyptian government was repor­
ted to be planning to abolish the position. Allenby requested and obtained the 
Prime Minister's reluctant agreement neither to abolish nor to fill the position 
without reference to him. Allenby to Curzon, January 20, 1923, Tel. No. 33 / 
FO/371/8966.
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It should...be admitted that the position of the Egyptian Govern­
ment at that time was one of some difficulty. Having come into office 
with avowedly Zaghlulist leanings, it was faced with a request to send 
an official delegation with a predetermined programme to Lausanne, 
where an unofficial Zaghlulist delegation was already installed, pledged 
to an extremist programme and fortified by the support of public opinion 
and a large body of the Egyptian press.1
However, one of the most serious problems, affecting all aspects of Anglo- 
Egyptian relations as well as the position of the Residency in the British community, 
was the ongoing attacks on the British in Egypt. Sir Thomas Rapp, the British vice- 
consul in Cairo, noted in his unpublished Memoirs that
The continuing insecurity and the uncertainty of the future was causing 
increasing bitterness among the British community and criticism of the 
High Commissioner, Lord Allenby, was becoming more vocal. The gossip 
of clubs, bars and drawing rooms held him to have been entirely miscast 
for his actual role. His prestige as a soldier, it was argued, had 
availed him nothing with the Egyptians since he had failed to assert 
himself as the dominant personality they expected.2
On December 7, Professor W. Newby Robson of the Cairo Law School, was assassi­
nated and his assailants escaped. Nasim was informed that as long as the attacks 
continued martial law would not be abolished. Allenby further insisted that an indem­
nity fixed by him be paid to the widow, British cavalry again patrol Cairo, demonstra­
tions be suppressed more rigorously, police strength and mobility be increased, and, 
finally, Allenby raised the possibility of closing Zaghlul's house and the Law School 
because they had become centres of agitation. Nasim accepted all Allenby’s demands
3
but asked that the closing of Zaghlul's house not be insisted upon.
Allenby, in his New Year's message, angrily condemned the 'campaign inJthe3 
press and elsewhere which has sought by lies to poison [the] minds of Egyptians against 
Great Britain and to foster feelings of hatred against Englishmen...' He warned 
publicly that
1. Allenby to Curzon, May 5, 1923, Desp. No. 296, FO/371/8962.
2. Although this accurately reflected the opinions of many British officials in Egypt 
Rapp believed that 'Much of this criticism was unfair and ill informed.' Sir 
Thomas Rapp, Memoirs (ms), STAC, Rapp Papers, pp. 31-2.
3. Allenby to Curzon, December 27, 1922, Tel. No. 445, FO/371/7740. Osborne, in 
Curzon's absence, replied that the reluctance to close Zaghlul's house, now be­
lieved to be a haven and centre for agitation, 'gives ground for apprenhension 
that the latter jNasim] or his sovereign King Fuad is seriously committed to the 
Zaghloulists.' Osborned favoured closure despite Nasim's plea. Osborne to Allen­
by, January 2, 1923, Desp. No. 7, FO/371/7740.
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Murderers and those who make a profession of engendering hatred 
where there should be friendship not only bring suffering upon 
innocent victims, their families and friends but may also cause 
disorder to their own compatriots. They are the worst enemies of 
their country.■*-
Additional measures, such as arming the British residents and increased police 
vigilance, were quickly adopted by the Ministry. Allenby, however, proposed that 
if the outrages continued further steps should be taken. In a despatch to London 
he urged that in this event a military governor be appointed for Cairo and Giza, 
Zaghlul1s house be closed and public meetings banned, a fine be levied on the dis­
trict in which the attack occurred, British forces carry out simultaneous arms
searches in Cairo, suspects and unwilling witnesses be sent to Kharga Oasis, and
2a scheme of compensation for relatives be imposed. The British were again being 
dragged into Egypt's internal affairs.
It was in this atmosphere that the struggle over the constitution took place. 
The context for the renewed conflict between the Residency and the Ministry was the 
altered relations between them. Allenby now did not feel constrained to give 
Nasim the same support he had given Tharwat. Nasim, on the other hand, took office 
as the King's man and all that that implied with respect to the King's authority 
under the constitution and the King's title to the Sudan. Fuad further complicated 
the situation by continuing his intrigues and repeatedly voicing dissatisfaction
1. Allenby to Curzon, January 1, 1923, Tel. No. 2, FO/371/8958. Also reported in 
Times, January 2, 1923. The responses to the outrages was almost unanimously 
condemnatory. For example, see the leader, 'The Egyptian Murders,' Daily 
Chronicle, January 2, 1923. Even Zaghlul in exile was forced to condemn them: 
'I deeply regret the recent outrages. I consider that they are against the in­
terests of my country, which abhors the terrorist system, whatever its source 
...and I associate myself with the recent protests made by my Wafd...members 
and other bodies and individuals of every class after hearing of the recent 
outrage...' Reported in the Times, January 15, 1923.
2. Allenby also examined the idea of a fine of E.250,000 but rejected it because: 
(a) Egypt was not an enemy country; (b) the enquiries into the murders were 
largely carried out by Englishmen; and, (c) a fine imposed on the government 
would have little or no effect on the general public. Allenby to Curzon, 
February 3, 1923, Desp. No. 64, FO/371/8960.
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with Allenby and his advisors.^
Once again the occasion for the constitutional crisis was the Sudan. In the 
middle of January, Nasim proposed a comprehensive formula to end the disagreement 
that had begun in the last months of the Tharwat ministry. He suggested the 
following text for inclusion in the constitution:
The present constitution is applicable in all Egyptian territory 
with the exception of Soudan.
The provision contained in preceTding paragraph must not be held 
to infringe rights of sovereignty or any other rights possessed by 
Egypt in Soudan.2
With respect to Fuad's title as King of Egypt and the Sudan, Nasim expressed the hope 
that the British would not press for its omission from the constitution.
At first Allenby was inclined to accept the proposed formula, but he was reluc­
tant to agree to Fuad's title. Still, if British intransigence were to provoke an 
inopportune rupture with the Ministry 'it might be well...to consider propriety of
acquiescing in adoption of title of "Sovere-ign of the Sudan" (which was borne by
3
ex-Khedrve) in addition to that of King of Egypt.’ However, in the event dramatic 
action against the Ministry was contemplated, Allenby recommended informing Nasim 
that adoption of his text would result in its formal and public rejection by the 
British government. Furthermore, since such action by the Ministry would imply an 
Egyptian repudiation of the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Convention, Britain 
should state that in future negotiations stipulations in that convention favouring 
Egypt might be disregarded.
In London, Murray and Lindsay believed that the Egyptian proposals went much too 
far and Curzon was astonished to know that Lord Allenby 'should even contemplate
1. Fuad was particularly bitter in his attacks on Allenby and those whom he thought
were the High Commissioner's supporters, such as Amos and Selby. On December 11,
1922, he was reported to have told a professor at Cairo University that 'Sir
Sheldon Amos, whom he {Fuad3 regarded as a dangerous and untrustworthy person, was
"leading Lord Allenby by the nose," whilst at the Foreign Office, Mr. Selby...was
most unwisely supporting Amos, and, he feared, creating difficulties.' Then on
January 21, the professor reported that Fuad had told him that 'It was...much to
be regretted that Lord Allenby allowed himself ky s -^r Sheldon Amos
and Mr. Kerr, intriguers both.' SIS Report No. — - , January 10, 1923,
FO/371/8967, and SIS Report No. S: } TWw.a'rtA 3l4 y ^ ^ 3  'w»
rn (=> -J




sanctioning the title "Sovereign of the Soudan" - which is quite inadmissable.1
Consequently, Curzon, with the approval of Bonar Law, informed Allenby that Nasim's
text was unacceptable because it would give rise to apprehensions in the Sudan and
'It will be regarded generally as indicative that His Majesty's Government are un-
2able to resist Egyptian pretensions in that country...' Instead Curzon proposed 
that two alternatives be presented to Nasim: either the inclusion in the constitution
of the following formulae -
The King shall have the title King of Egypt 
This provision is without prejudice to any rights which His 
Majesty may enjoy in the Sudan.
The present constitution is applicable to the Kingdom of 
Egypt.
This provision is without prejudice to any rights possessed 
by Egypt in the Sudan,3
or, failing that, to present and then publish a note to the Egyptian government con­
demning the constitution as an attempt to nullify the 1899 Convention and the 
declaration of February 1922 and warning that
...in the event of the Egyptian Government taking any action which 
in the opinion of His Majesty's Government is inconsistent with 
the status quo in the Sudan His Majesty's Government will consider 
themselves free to disregard said convention of 1899 and to resume 
complete liberty of action in regard to that country.4
Thus the Egyptian government would be faced with the choice of either accepting the 
British version of the status quo in the Sudan or jeopardising the 1899 Convention 
for titles and formulae that at present would be meaningless without British agree­
ment.
Meanwhile the Residency was coming quickly to the conclusion that Fuad, 'playing 
high for power and [with]hopes to attain his object through Tawfiq Nessim, backed by
1. C^urzon}., Minute, 16.1.23, to ibid. Also, see: Murray and R.C.L[indsay]], ,
Minutes, 15.1.23 and Jan. 15, to ibid. Other reactions were equally negative.
For example, Lord Stamfordham, the King's Secretary, wrote that 'King George 
hopes that whatever be the development of our policy in Egypt we shall never give 
up the Sudan.' Stamfordham to Crowe, January 15, 1923, FO/371/8959. Curzon fin­
ally vetoed any consideration of this title since the argument for it 'cannot be 
considered as having any serious relevancy to present situation...' Curzon to 
Allenby, January 19, 1923, Tel. No. 14, FO/371/8959.
2. Curzon to Allenby, January 18, 1923, Tel. No. 24, FO/371/8959.
3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.
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the Zaghlulists,' was the major obstacle to a satisfactory solution. The view held 
by a number of Allenby’s advisors was that ’For the moment progress is held up 
owing to the intrigue of the King and the machinations of the Zaghlulist party...' 
and that 'Beyond his power as a maintainer of order Nessim is...at the moment poli­
tically useless to us unless he receives a "mot d'ordre" from the King to be con- 
1ciliatory.' A firm stand on the Sudan, therefore, now appeared attractive. If the 
Ministry could be forced through the King to accede to British demands, it would earn 
Residency support as well as become unpopular with the Wafd. In the event of 
failure, Adli was always in the wings.
The Residency was further concerned by the Prime Minister's hesitation over pro­
mulgating an act of indemnity simultaneously with the constitution. Ostensibly 
Nasim was concerned that promulgating both at the same time would detract from the 
good political effect of a constitution. In addition, he was hesitant about promul­
gating an indemnity law until the end of martial law was in sight or, at least, 
until there was some significant act of amnesty by the British towards Egyptians im­
prisoned for political offences. Nasim therefore proposed the immediate promulgation 
of the constitution without reference to the act of indemnity, but that the latter 
should be promulgated before the constitution came into effect.
Allenby, however, was not convinced by Nasim's assurance that an act of indemnity 
would not be revised by a future parliament because it would be protected from par­
liamentary interference by the constitutional guarantee of the sanctity of internation­
al agreements. Although this position was correct legally, Allenby believed that 'as
time goes on Ministry will feel increasing rather than diminished hesitation in
2
committing themselves to an indemnity law without Parliament sanction.1
The general drift in all areas of the constitution was becoming worrisome. 
Throughout Nasim's term in office there were signs that amendments had been introduced 
greatly increasing the King's authority. According to reports, the clause stating 
that the nation was the source of authority was to be omitted; the King would have 
wide power in the distribution of honours; the King could dissolve the entire par­
liament and not merely the Chamber of Deputies; the King would control religious 
endowments; he could issue decree laws even while parliament was in session; and,
1. OMT^weedy]to Kerr, January 21, 1923, FO/141/484(278). Furness in a minute of the 
same date concurred, ibid.
2. Allenby to Curzon, January 23, 1923, FO/371/8959.
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there now would be much larger number of appointed Senators than before.'*’
Allenby was extremely disturbed by these developments and on a later date des­
cribed Fuad1s behaviour and intentions in grim terms:
Starting with double aim of ridding himself of a disagreeable 
ministry and arrogating power to himself, he has been obliged to 
put subservient ministry in office, and in default of other support 
to cajole Zaghloulists. They support him in hope that they will 
obtain return of Zaghloul, which he presumably does not want and 
which he forsees that we shall prevent, and he takes the opportunity 
of increasing his own power. Thus, while he has been compelled to 
show eagerness about constitution .in order to keep public opinion 
quiet and has focused attention on Sudan articles, he has changed 
draft in direction of giving more power to senate and creating in­
fluence by the Crown over that body. He has also revised statutes 
of all the Egyptian orders so as to place them in his personal 
grant and thus prepare for restoring the pernicious regime of per­
sonal bribery associated with Abbas Hilmi {the ex-Khedive] ...2
Therefore, because of the direction of events and the Foreign Office's refusal
to accept Tawfiq Nasim's formula, Allenby informed London that, in order to prevent
the promulgation of the present draft of the constitution, it would be necessary to
address a far sharper rebuke to the Egyptian ministry than previously considered.
Consequently, Allenby informed Nasim only of the Foreign Office proposals for the
amended Sudan clauses, but did not tell him of the contents of the note that would
be delivered if the present draft was promulgated.
On January 24, Nasim handed Allenby an unsigned note repeating Egypt's position
3on this question. The following evening Allenby warned Nasim that if the unsigned 
note constituted an expression of Egyptian intentions 'His Majesty's Government 
would regard it as unfriendly act and as attempt not only to denounce 1899 convention 
but also to repudiate February declaration and that consequently such a policy would
1. For details, see: Kedourie, op.cit., p.358ff.
2. Allenby to Curzon, January 25, 1923, Tel. No. 41, FO/371/8959. The Residency
believed that the eminence grise behind Fuad was Nasha'at Bey who was to play an 
important part in Palace intrigues in coming years: 1 It is now quite certain
that the greater part of our immediate troubles with the King as well as those 
that occurred during the Sarwat Ministry are due to Nashat Bey. This young man 
...has now a complete ascendancy over the King. It was he who first started the 
understanding between the Palace and the Zaghlulists....He has caused much dis- 
sention [sic] in the Palace itself and is well hated by Zulficar Pasha and Nessim 
Pasha.' Keown Boyd to Kerr, February 11, 1923, FO/141/584(13062), \j:his entire 
file deals with Nasha’at1s activities over the years].
3. The text of this note is in Allenby to Curzon, January 25, 1923, Tel. No. 40, 
FO/371/8959.
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be far-reaching.'^* Allenby then asked the Foreign Office for authority to give Fuad 
a note stating that Britain would not recognise the assumption of the title 'King 
of Egypt and the Sudan', that foreign governments would be so informed, and that such 
an act would be considered discourteous and unfriendly to the British leaving them 
free to reconsider policy with regard to the 1899 convention and the 1922 declaration. 
In addition, Allenby recommended that the note to Fuad explicitly and forcefully 
state that
...the King will forfeit amity of His Majesty's Government who have 
for some time past viewed with disquietude His Majesty's sustained 
efforts to arrogate to himself autocratic powers and bearing in mind 
evils of personal regime which brought about their intervention in 
Egypt in 1882, they will henceforth closely scrutinize His Majesty's 
personal acts.^
Fuad could not mistake the ominous and thinly veiled allusions to the British invasion 
of 1882 or to the deposition of the ex-Khedive because of his attitude towards Britain.
Allenby then decided that he would not permit Fuad to extricate himself from 
his difficulties by verbal assurances which he could then disregard in the future.
He, therefore, recommended that the King should be given a clear choice between two 
documents. If the King decided to promulgate the constitution as it now stood,
Allenby's proposed rebuke would be presented and published. If, on the other hand, 
the King acquiesced to the British demands, he should be forced to signify his agree­
ment by signing a statement which gave the British view of the conflict and ended in 
total surrender to the British demands:
His Majesty£the King of Egypt}...has authorised His Excellency the 
High Commissioner to transmit communication to His Britannic Majesty's 
Government in which His Majesty states that having taken representation 
of British Government into most serious consideration and being no less 
desirous than is British Government that establishment of constitutional 
institutions in Egypt should be accomplished without controversy, His
Majesty acquiesces in views of His Britannic Majesty's Government.3
To further make his threat credible, Allenby called for a display of naval and
marine force at Alexandria and Port Said. This was authorised by London on January
430, and Allenby's two texts were approved with only minor revisions.
1. Allenby to Curzon, January 25, 1923, Tel. No. 39, FO/371/8959.
2. Ibid.
3. Allenby to Curzon, January 26, 1923, Tel. No. 43, FO/371/8959.
4. Curzon to Allenby, January 30, 1923, Tel. No. 38, FO/371/8959.
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1The climax of the crisis began on the afternoon of Friday, February 2.
Allenby presented the King with the text of the two notes and warned him that he had 
until seven that evening to decide upon a course of action. Fuad pleaded for more 
time to meet with his Ministers. The deadline was extended until noon, Saturday, 
because it would be difficult to assemble the Ministry on a Friday. While Allenby 
was at the Palace, a member of the Residency unofficially presented the relevant 
portions of the two notes and Allenby's covering note to Nasim.
At seven, that same evening, Nasim called at the Residency and proposed compro­
mise formulae for the Sudan clauses:
1we- / v
Le titrefportera le Roi d'Egypte sera etabli apres que les delega­
tions autorisees auront fixe le statut definitif du Soudan.
La presente Constitution est applicable au Royaume d'Egypte.
Cette disposition ne porte aucune atteinte aux droits qu'a l'Egypte 
au Soudan.2
Allenby noted that the last formula was in effect a translation of Curzon's earlier 
text and he promised to submit the new proposals to London. He added, however, that 
he expected a favourable reply from Fuad before doing so.
The next morning, Saturday, February 3, Nasim returned to the Residency at ten 
and informed Allenby that the Ministry had accepted the formulae discussed the pre­
vious evening, but that the King had suggested that Mahmud Fakhri Pasha, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, sign the note of surrender. Allenby refused to let Fuad thus
dissociate himself from the crisis. Then, at noon, Allenby's deadline to the King, 
Robert Rolo, one of Fuad's confidants, came to the Residency to make the same request 
on behalf of the King. When Allenby again refused, Rolo asked for more time in
order to convince Fuad to sign the document. The deadline was extended until one-
thirty that afternoon. At about that time Mahmud Fakhri telephoned to request an 
appointment for himself and Nasim during the course of the day. Allenby angrily 
refused this since it would mean further delay and he told Fakhri that he must assume 
that Fuad was still reluctant to sign. Allenby therefore asked for a time at which 
the King would be prepared to receive another visit from him.
A half an hour later, Said Dhu-l-Fiqar Pasha, the King's Grand Chamberlain,
1. This account of the events of February 2-3 is based on a long despatch summari­
sing the climax of the conflict and including the relevant documents. Allenby 
to Curzon, February 11, 1923, Desp. No. 83, FO/371/9060.
2. Ibid.
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telephoned Allenby to make a last appeal that either Nasim or Fakhri be permitted 
to sign instead of Fuad. Allenby replied shortly that 'I had already allowed His 
Majesty a long respite, and that there were limits to my patience; if he[Fuad]per­
sisted in withholding his reply I should be obliged, to my regret, to inform.. .^ur-
-  1 
son)that he was unwilling to accede to the wishes of His Majesty's Government.1
Dhu-l-Fiqar Pasha then explained that the King was afraid that if he signed, the act 
would be unconstitutional. Allenby, however, was totally unconcerned with this prob­
lem and demanded an immediate decision. A short while later, Dhu-l-Fiqar telephoned 
from the Palace to tell Allenby that Fuad would sign the note and it would be de­
livered to Allenby at seven in the evening.
When the note was delivered as promised, Allenby discovered that there had been
a number of changes in the text. The most important was the redrafting of the final
sentence and the deletion of the significant phrase '...accepte les vues du Gouverne-
2
ment de Sa Majeste britannique.' Allenby refused to accept the altered version and 
corrected it by hand. He then demanded from Dhu-l-Fiqar that the note be recopied 
and signed by Fuad without delay.
The charade ended at nine when the Grand Chamberlain returned to the Residency 
with two documents. One was the corrected note signed by Fuad and the other was a 
letter from the Ministers agreeing to the inclusion of the new Sudan articles in the 
constitution. On receipt of these, Allenby cabled London urging that the new formu-
3
lae be accepted and he received approval on February 6 ending temporarily the 
crisis over the Sudan.
The cost of the crisis for Fuad was high. Not only was he humiliated by the 
manner in which he had to relinquish his pretensions, but the political alliances so 
carefully nurtured during Nasim's ministry now began to crumble. After the Palace 
and the Ministry were forced to capitulate over the Sudan, Nasim's resignation and 
its eventual acceptance were inevitable. The Ministry had taken office with the 
undeclared aim of assuring Fuad's position and authority by coming to an understanding 
with the more popular political factions in Egypt. The conflict over the Sudan re­
sulted in part from a desire to gain popularity in these quarters. Now that this had 
ended in failure, the Ministry could no longer serve the King's aims effectively and 
Nasim feared a public outcry over his capitulation. On February 5, the Prime Minister
1‘ Ikid- 2. Ibid.
3. Curzon to Allenby, February 6, 1923, Tel. No. 44, FO/371/8959.
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therefore wrote Fuad that 1 It [Ministry^ has... tendered its resignation before inscrib­
ing in the Constitution the words upon which, under the pressure of events, it had 
come to agreement with Your Majesty with a view to preserving the Throne and the 
rights of the Country at a most critical moment.'1 Fuad reluctantly accepted the 
Ministry's resignation five days later.
As for Allenby, although Fuad's intrigues had been thwarted and the status quo 
preserved, the British appeared no closer to their aim of a constitution than before. 
Instead events had pushed the Residency even further in the direction of open inter­
vention in Egypt's internal affairs, a situation which was to have ended with the 
declaration of February 1922.
Impasse and Solution (February-July 1923)
Recent events forced Allenby to continue playing an active role in Egyptian 
affairs. During the interview in which Fuad was told to accept Nasim's resignation, 
the Residency expressed pointed interest in the formation and character of a new 
ministry. Through the good offices of Rolo, Fuad was informed that 'Y.E.^Allenby] 
was willing to help H.M.|Fuad]in the formation of a new Cabinet, on the composition 
of which Y.E. ^ Allenby]would like to be consulted.
The period immediately following Nasim's resignation was occupied, therefore, 
by negotiations aimed at achieving this end. Figures such as Wahba, Rushdi, Mazlum, 
Muhammad Said and, eventually, Adli Pasha were consulted by Fuad. When most candi­
dates were rejected by the Residency because they were believed to be too amenable 
to Palace and/or Wafd influence, Allenby turned to the ever-present Adli.
Only weeks before Allenby had curtly dismissed Adli because 'he^Allenby] had little 
faith in him as a fighter, or a leader of a party. In an emergency he considered him
1. Situation Report, PSD, February 1-10, 1923, in Allenby to Curzon, February 17,
1923, Desp. No. 90, FO/371/8973. The Residency was involved in the acceptance of 
the resignation. Clark-Kerr reported to Allenby that 'I saw Mr. Rolo today and 
asked him to take on your behalf a message to the King to the effect that you did 
not think that there was anything to be gained by keeping Tewfik Nessim Ministry 
in office...' ACK[erjQ to H.E., February 6, 1923, FO/141/627(724) (Pt.II) .
2. ACK£err} to H.E., February 6, 1923, FO/141/627 (724) (Pt.II). It later transpired 
that Allenby was not fully consulted but approved the introduction of Rolo after 
the fact. ACK, 15/2/23, Minute, to ibid.
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1hopeless.' Now, however, in order to prevent further intrigues by Fuad, the Resi­
dency advised the King that Adli was the most suitable candidate. Still Allenby 
viewed an Adli ministry in an almost purely negative light. He was later to write
that 'The formation of a Government under Adly Pasha seemed to offer fewer disadvan-
2
tages than any other.' But since secret talks with Adli indicated that he was 
amenable to political compromise with the British, he was invited to form a ministry
3
on February 19.
With characteristic caution, some might say timidity, Adli did not accept Fuad's 
mandate immediately. Instead he tested public opinion to determine the Wafd's res­
ponse and the sincerity of Fuad's promise of co-operation. Attacks in the Wafd and 
Palace-influenced press made Adli even more cautious. As a result, Allenby sharply
warned Fuad 'that I should expect to see an immediate change of tone in the newspapers 
4in question.' The attacks quickly abated despite Fuad's protestations of innocence 
and, on March 1, Adli was again invited to form a ministry.
Once again Adli tested public opinion. He issued a statement outlining the 
policies his party would support if adopted by a new ministry. These were: removal
of British restrictions on Egyptian freedom of action over the Sudan clauses; aboli­
tion of martial law; and, the release of Zaghlul and other political internees in
5
the Seychelles or in Egypt. Secretly, Adli tried to reassure Allenby that he would
make satisfactory compromises on outstanding issues. While Allenby favoured this
solution to the present impasse, London took a rather dim view of Adli's promises as
6
'assurances which he may be unable to implement...'
Nevertheless, Allenby continued to be optimistic over prospects for a workable 
ministry. The one factor beyond his control, however, was the continued campaign of 
violence and Adli's response to it. On February 7, a British railway official was 
attacked. This was followed by stringent military and punitive measures against the 
quarter in which the attack occurred. Further disturbances took place and by the end
Minutes of a Meeting Held at the Residency on January 18, 1923, FO/141/484(278).
2. Allenby to Curzon, July 19, 1923, Desp. No. 488, FO/371/8962.
3. Allenby to Curzon, February 19, 1923, Tel. No. 71, FO/371/8960.
4. The papers referred to were La Libert^ and al-Balagh. Allenby to Curzon, July
19, 1923, Desp. No. 488, FO/371/8962.
5. Allenby to Curzon, March 1, 1923, Tel. No. 83, FO/371/8960.
6. Curzon to Allenby, March 3, 1923, Tel. No. 62, FO/371/8960.
175
of February Zaghlul1s house was closed. On March 1 five British soldiers and three
Egyptians were injured near the Cairo railway station. Five days later, one
Egyptian was killed and three British soldiers and one Egyptian were injured in a
bomb attack.'*' The campaign of violence was increasing in tempo and the harsh British
countermeasures left their mark in Cairo and in London.
One immediate result was that Adli's resolve weakened and Allenby had to inform
London that 'Adly has refused definitely to accept office recognizing martial law
2
cannot now be suspended.' The Foreign Office was thoroughly dismayed by the deteri­
oration of the situation in Egypt. All the fears and suspicions so evident in the 
months preceding the February declaration re-appeared. Allenby's advice, policies 
and competence were seriously questioned. After conversations with British members 
of the Egyptian civil service, Murray gloomily noted the failure of Allenby's 
approach: '...it looks as if the policy of conciliation and disentanglement initiated
a year ago has ended, or will shortly end, in Lord Allenby having to attempt to run
3the country by undisguised coercion.' Crowe was even sharper in his comments:
'...I fear we do not get proper advice on this point^of what policy to adopt]from the
4one quarter where we should naturally look for it, and that is Lord Allenby.1 Curzon
expressed open hostility to Allenby and implicitly questioned his ability to carry out
his functions: '...I cannot help thinking that with the present High Commissioner
5
we shall not make much progress.' These comments were similar in tone and content 
to those made during the disagreements over policy in 1919 and 1921/22. Curzon now 
sharply cabled Allenby that
.,.we are drifting into a position similar to that which existed
1. For statistics of casualties, trials, executions and other sentences resulting
from political crimes of violence, see: FO/141/583(9307). Also see, Thomas
Russell, A List of the Political Crimes Which Took Place Between the Years 1910
and 1946, STAC, Russell Papers. Russell gives the following breakdown of politi­
cal murders, attempted murders and known conspiracies to commit murder: 1919-22;
1920-17; 1921-3; 1922-22 (8 successful); 1923-9; and, 1924-1. Although Rus­
sell's figures show a decline in 1923 from the 1922 totals, this is somewhat mis­
leading. The campaign of violence which reached a peak around February-March 
1923, began in the second half of 1922. It would, therefore, be a more accurate 
reflection of the situation if figures were given for September 1922 to September 
1923 rather than for the calendar year.
2. Allenby to Curzon, March 5, 1923, Tel. No. 86, FO/371/8960.
3. Murray, Memorandum, March 6, 1923, FO/371/8960.
4. E.A.C^rowe]., Minute, March 6, to ibid.
5. C^urzon^., Minute, 6/3, to ibid.
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before your visit of last year, with the difference that while 
British government and British troops are still compelled to exert 
an influence which we then desired to diminish, the collapse of 
Egyptian administration makes this task one of enhanced difficulty 
and danger.^
He then called on Allenby either to return to London for consultations or, failing 
that, to render by cable a full accounting of the situation.
Allenby politely declined to return to London because he feared that this would 
cause a sensation in Egypt leading to speculation^about a change in British policy. 
Instead, he tried to reassure Curzon that the outrages seemed worse than they really
2
were and he urged that the British government maintain an 'attitude of imperturbability' 
In private, Allenby did not hesitate to express his general irritation with the
3
'panicky FO* and a clash between the British in Cairo and in London seemed possible, 
if not probable.
Since Allenby refused to return to London, a long cable was sent to Cairo asking
for his response to twenty questions. These ranged from the possibility of a new
4ministry to the reaction in Egypt if Fuad were forced to abdicate. The entire issue,
f—%
however, became academic when a day later, on March 14, Yah ya Ibrahim Pasha, Minister
v t*
of Education in the Nasim ministry, was invited by Fuad to form a neutral Ministry 
of Affairs that would not deal with political questions.
Although the new Prime Minister was politically an unknown quantity and was 
widely believed to be weak and unsuited for his position, Allenby immediately agreed 
to his forming a ministry. Despite some misgivings, particularly over the fact that 
most of the new ministers seemed to have been hand-picked by Fuad, Allenby was impressed 
by Yahl.ya Ibrahim's honesty and the sincerity of his desire to cooperate with the
1. Curzon to Allenby, March 8, 1923, Tel. No. 65, FO/371/8960.
2. Allenby to Curzon, March 10, 1923, Tel. No. 93, FO/371/8960.
3. One example of Allenby's growing irritation with the Foreign Office was his res­
ponse to the Foreign Office request that he cancel a visit to Transjordan. As a 
result he wrote Viscount Samuel, the High Commissioner in Palestine: 'I am
bitterly disappointed that I can't have the pleasure of coming to you; and I am 
amazed with the F.O. for putting their fingers, again, into my pie.
Things here are not as bad as they appear in the press, and I have capable men
to leave in charge; and the F.O. have no business to butt in, like this.'
Allenby to Samuel, 8 March, 1923, SAI, ^amuejl Papers. 100/1.
4. Curzon to Allenby, March 13, 1923, Tel. No. 68, FO/371/8960. For Allenby's re­
plies, see Allenby to Curzon, March 31, Tel. No. Ill, FO/371/8961.
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Residency.
Beyond this, the reaction to the Prime Minister ranged from mild hopefulness
to curt dismissal. Allenby, himself, was generally optimistic about any ministry
that enjoyed his support and bore the Residency's imprimatur. He, therefore, was
pleased that Yahya Ibrahim's 'attitude in regard to outstanding questions appears
2
generally satisfactory.1 Furness noted in this respect that
The present Ministry has, at any rate for the time being, the
support of H.E. and no doubt of the Palace. It is, I think, not a
bad Ministry of its class, but the class is second or third, and 
it must largely depend on that support.3
The Foreign Office, on the other hand, remained unconvinced about prospects for the
4
future and all Lindsay could say about the new ministry was: 'it's a poor lot.'
The new government, perhaps, could best be described as a relatively powerless body
that would mediate between the opposing interests of the Residency and the Palace
thereby preventing a bitter and public conflict between Allenby and Fuad.
From the start the Residency made it clear to Yahya that the activities of the
ministry even in purely administrative affairs would be closely watched. Furness
recommended that 'for safety's sake, it is desirable that the Ministry should continue
5to feel that we are giving them friendly attention.' Therefore, Kerr, with Allenby's
concurrence, saw Yahya on March 22 and informed him of the nature and extent of 
Residency interest in Egyptian affairs.
Yahya's response satisfied the Residency. In addition, the new Prime Minister 
informed Allenby during their first meeting that 'he would not content himself with 
the mere administration of affairs, but would endeavour to proceed with the promulga­
tion of the Constitution, the Electoral Law and the Indemnity Bill.'^ Yahya confirmed
1. Allenby to Curzon, July 19, 1923, Desp. No.' 492., PO/371/8962.
2. Allenby to Curzon, March 14, 1923, Tel. No. 95, FO/371/8960.
3. R.Fturnessl., to Kerr, Minute, 17/3(23), FO/141/484 (284) . Allenby commented in
a letter to Samuel that 'Our new Ministry is a tender plant; promising, but needs 
nursing.1 Allenby to Samuel, March 22, 1923, SAI, Samuel Papers, 100/1. Yahya 
was aware of his position and told a Times correspondent on March 25 that he 'was 
confident of the support of his King and the collaboration of the High Commission­
er, which in the present circumstances was essential to the successful execution
of what the Cabinet had before them.' Times, March 26, 1923.
4. R.C.L^indsay]., Minute, March 16, to Allenby to Curzon, March 16, 1923, Tel. No.
96, FO/371/8961.
5. R.F^urnessJ ., to Kerr, 17/3(23), FO/141/484.
6. Allenby to Curzon, July 19, 1923, Desp. No. 492, FO/371/8962.
this publicly in an interview with the Times correspondent and added that '...he did
not desire to retain office and he consented to fill the breach in order to assist
1his country m  a critical period.1
The first significant event after Yahya took office was Zaghlul’s release from
detention in Gibraltar. Some writers have assumed that Zaghlul was freed at Yahya's
2request or m  collusion with the new ministry. The evidence, however, indicates that 
the deterioration of Zaghlul's health and pressure on the Foreign Office and the Resi­
dency were primarily responsible for Zaghlul's release at the first favourable moment.
Originally Zaghlul and his associates were transported from Aden to the Sey­
chelles on February 28, 1922. Within a few months the deportees began to complain 
bitterly about the conditions of detention and the hazard to their health. With re­
spect to Zaghlul, they claimed in June 1922 that 'It is no longer for him, a question
3
of exile but one of life and death.' While this claim appears somewhat exaggerated, 
the Chief Medical Officer in the Seychelles reported that there were grounds for con-
4
cern about Zaghlul!s health. Allenby was worried about the impact Zaghlul's death
would have in Egypt, if its cause could be tied to his detention in the Seychelles.
Balfour, acting Foreign Secretary during Curzon's illness, shared Allenby's fears and
5the Foreign Office sought Colonial Office permission to move Zaghlul to Gibraltar. 
Zaghlul1s deteriorating health and growing concern in and out of the British Parlia­
ment made his transfer a certainty.^ Amidst much secrecy, Zaghlul arrived in Gibral­
tar on September 2, 1922.
■*■* Times, March 26, 1923.
2. Kedourie maintains that there is evidence of collusion and that Yahya sought and 
received Allenby's consent for Zaghlul's release during their first interview.
See, Kedourie, op.cit., p.361.
3. Memorial from deportees to B.P. Petrides, Administrator, Seychelles, June 9, 1922, 
in Allenby to Balfour, July 29, 1922, Desp. No. 608, FO/371/7736.
4. This report was cabled to Allenby on July 3. Allenby to Balfour, July 5, 1922, 
Tel. No. 236, FO/371/7734.
5. For Allenby's reaction, see: Allenby to Balfour, July 5, 1922, Tel. No. 237; for
London's agreement, see: Minutes by Murray, 6.7.22 and Oliphant to Colonial
Office, July 7, 1922, FO/371/7734.
6. For the decision to transfer Zaghlul, see: Balfour to Allenby, July 17, 1922,
Tel. No. 189; and, Allenby to Balfour, July 19, 1922, Tel. No. 253, FO/371/7735. 
At the time of the transfer there were requests from Milner for Zaghlul's trans­
fer on humanitarian grounds. Milner to Balfour, July 27, 1922, FO/371/7736 and 
Balfour to Milner, August 1, 1922, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 164.
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The pressure for Zaghlul's release did not abate in Egypt or in England.
While there was some improvement in his health, the Medical Officer in Gibraltar re­
ported that it 'was no more than the change from a critical condition to a precarious
2condition. He is like a man on the edge of a precipice....' By January 1923, even 
before the fall of Nasim's ministry, there was general agreement in Cairo that 
Zaghlul must be released 'on humanitarian grounds and on grounds of expediency', but 
that for obvious political reasons he should not be permitted to return to Egypt
3
immediately. Because of the Governor of Gibraltar's growing concern, the Foreign 
Office also moved in the direction of release which Allenby welcomed if Zaghlul could
4
be barred from Egypt. Allenby gave his approval on March 24 with the condition that
secrecy be maintained to avoid a rush in Egypt to claim credit for the release.
The response in Egypt to the announcement of Zaghlul1s release on March 30 was,
according to Allenby, on£of 'calm satisfaction', a sentiment also expressed by the 
5
British press. Most important, as far as political stability was concerned, 'while
1. There were ongoing calls for Zaghlul's release such as the leader that appeared 
in the Manchester Guardian, September 27, 1922.
2. This was a report by J.A.S. Lochhead, Medical Officer in Gibraltar in Orr, Acting
Governor of Gibraltar, to Allenby, December 11, 1922, FO/371/8963. Still there 
was resistance in London to Zaghlul's release. On January 2, 1923, Murray noted 
that because of Zaghlul's health 'there would be less danger in allowing him to 
leave Gibraltar and reside wherever he liked in Europe.' But Curzon, in turn, 
minuted on January 5: 1 Please leave well alone. There is no need for him to be
moved elsewhere in view of the fact that Gibraltar suits him so well.'
FO/371/8963.
3. A.C.K£err)., to Allenby, January 14, 1923, FO/141/484 (278) . This memorandum con­
tains a summary of a conversation between Kerr, Furness, Keown-Boyd and Amos in 
which all agreed that Zaghlul must be released at the first possible opportunity.
This was confirmed at a meeting in the Residency on January 18 with Allenby,
Scott, Dowson, Amos, Kerr, Keown-Boyd, Furness and Patrick present. Minutes of a 
Meeting Held at the Residency on January 18, 1923 and Amos to the First Secretary, 
January 19, 1923, FO/141/484(278).
4. On March 10, Smith-Dorrien, Governor of Gibraltar, reported that Zaghlul*s health
required his release. Smith-Dorrien to Duke of Devonshire, March 10, 1923, 
FO/371/8964. In the meantime pressure continued in the press, see: Westminster
Gazette, March 10, 1923 and Manchester Guardian, March 21, 1923; and, for pres­
sure in Parliament, see Macdonald's question to McNeill, March 16, 1923, 
FO/371/8964. On March 29, a letter calling for Zaghlul's release and signed by 
97 Members of Parliament appeared in the Times, March 29, 1923. However, later 
claims thatthis influenced the decision to release Zaghlul are untrue, since the 
decision had been made five days earlier.
5. Allenby to Curzon, April 14, 1923, Desp. No. 238, FO/371/8965. For the reaction 
of the British press, see: Manchester Guardian, April 2, 1923; Daily Herald,
April 2, 1923; Sunday Times, April 1, 1923.
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in effect he had not been consulted in the matter[of Zaghlul's releasej, Yehia Pasha
1was able to draw considerable political advantage from it.' Thus, although Yahya 
did not have a major role in this episode, there can be little doubt that Zaghlul's 
release only two weeks after the formation of a new ministry strengthened the position 
of the Prime Minister enabling him to act on issues such as the constitution and an 
electoral law.
During the weeks that followed, Allenby took an active and open part in attemp­
ting to restore the draft constitution to the pre-Nasim version. He had two major 
reasons for this approach:
Firstly, I did not consider that it was in keeping with the spirit of 
the policy of His Majesty's Government, as implied by the Declaration 
of the 28th February, that King Fuad should be allowed to arrogate un­
due prerogatives to himself. Secondly, in view of the manner in which 
public opinion had expressed itself, I apprehended that, in the event 
of the King carrying his point, the Constitution would be promulgated 
in a form which would not only make him and his Ministry very unpopular, 
but would also in all probability give rise to a constitutional struggle 
between the King and the people, and also possibly to an anti-monarchist 
movement.2
3
Although Allenby's assumptions have been questioned, this attitude nevertheless led 
to a continuous daily struggle over the constitution between the Palace and the Resi­
dency, with Yahya Ibrahim in the middle. The High Commissioner later wrote that
The position of the Prime Minister in this matter was one of some 
embarrassment. He was genuinely desirous of carrying out his declared 
intention to promulgate a democratic constitution, and in the realisation 
of this end he was greatly hampered by the obstinate insistence of King 
Fuad on the allocation of wide prerogatives to himself. I was in daily 
touch with Yehia Pasha at this time, and I learnt to appreciate his pow­
ers of resistance and his tact in the exercise of them, no less than the 
astuteness with which he fell back upon my support when His Majesty's 
demands became difficult of resistance.^
Basically the debate revolved around those clauses which increased the powers of 
the throne in areas such as dissolution of parliament, the conferring of promotions 
and honours, the granting of pardons, the appointment and dismissal of ministers and
1. Allenby to Curzon, July 19, 1923, Desp, No. 492, FO/371/8962.
2. Allenby to Curzon, April 23, 1923, Desp. No. 259, FO/371/8961.
3. Kedourie is one of Allenby's severest critics in this respect. Kedourie, op.cit.,
pp.359-60.
4. Allenby to Curzon, July 19, 1923, Desp. No. 492, FO/371/8962.
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diplomats, the number of appointed senators and financial control of Egypt's religious 
endowments.^  The pattern of the struggle was one of constant contact between the 
Residency and Yahya to determine the final form of the draft articles with Allenby 
then 'endeavouring by friendly advice to induce King to abandon them[.Nasim' s amend-
In the end, Allenby was once again compelled to impose his will. A veiled ulti­
matum was issued on April 19 to obtain the King's agreement to the desired changes. 
Kerr described the events:
For some time past H.E. has been giving the King advice in regard to 
the reactionary modifications introduced into the text of the consti­
tution, notably in regard to Articles 23, 36...41, 45 & 71 of the old 
text, until today the King had successfully evaded acceptance of
H.E.'s advice.
This morning however Mr. Rolo was sent to the King on H.E.'s behalf 
to tell H.M. that H.E. expected him to accept his advice and that fail­
ing an immediate reply in the affirmative H.E. would call personally on
H.M.
This demarche produced the desired result.
At 5 p.m. the Prime Minister came to the Residency & left the attached 
text which met with our requirements.^
The constitution was finally promulgated on April 19. It was the product of 
Allenby's desire to have a representative parliamentary system of government for Egypt 
and the King's stubborn struggle to preserve the rights he felt were due to the heir 
of Muhammad Ali, the founder of Egypt's ruling family. As a result, the constitution 
was a move in the direction of an ideal liberal regime - but still controlled by the 
monarchy; a document that was moderate in its application of radical principles.
4
Whether it was a workable system is another question entirely. An electoral law, the 
inevitable adjunct to a constitution was promulgated on April 30. This provided for
1. This refers to Articles 23, 38, 43, 49, 74, 153 of the draft constitution. For
the changes introduced by Nasim, see: Allenby to Curzon, April 23, 1923, Desp.
No. 259, FO/371/8962.
2. Allenby to Curzon, April 18, 1923, Tel. No. 119, FO/371/8961.
3. A.C.KferiJ., Minute, April 19, 1923, FO/141/516 (14431, Pt.I).
4. For a copy of the constitution, see: Helen M. Davis, Constitutions, Electoral
Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East (Durham, N.C., 1953),
pp. 26-46; and, Allenby to Curzon, April 23, 1923, Desp. No. 259, FO/371/8962. 
For an assessment of its value, see: J.M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in
Egypt (Tel Aviv, 1954), pp. 61-3; Kedourie, op.cit., pp. 354-61; and, Lloyd, 
op.cit., II, 75-6.
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universal male suffrage and indirect elections in two stages thereby achieving the
1first of Yahya's aims.
The response to the outcome of the constitutional struggle was more or less pre­
dictable. Allenby was extremely pleased that his efforts had borne fruit and he in­
formed Curzon that 'Broadly-speaking there has been a remarkable revulsion of feeling
towards us and situation appears to me to be better at present moment than it has been 
2for years past.1 London, on the other hand, was not as positive m  its reaction. 
Lindsay, at least, if given the option of an advanced democratic constitution or real
3
power for Fuad, would take neither; he would choose 'to depose Fuad.1 Perhaps the 
most significant response, in terms of the future, was Zaghlul's who declared from 
France: '...I feel strongly that the Constitution should be submitted to the people's
4
representatives and adopted by them, instead of being merely promulgated by the King.' 
In the meantime, however, the situation in Egypt was peaceful and by the end of May, 
Allenby was able to release a number of Wafd leaders imprisoned in August 1922 as well 
as Zaghlul's associates still exiled in the Seychelles.
After the promulgation of the constitution and the electoral law, Yahya quickly 
turned to the resolution of other outstanding issues - such as the act of indemnity, 
a prerequisite for the abolition of martial law. However, before any steps could be 
taken in this direction, it was first necessary to frame legislation that would fill 
the gaps in the Egyptian criminal code. This legislation, dealing mainly with public 
meetings, preventive detention and a state of siege, aroused tremendous opposition and 
'deprived the Prime Minister of much of the popularity he had gained by his earlier
5
successes.' Many claimed that the new ministry was now promulgating autocratic laws 
at the request of the Residency so that any new parliament would be faced with a
1. A copy of the Electoral Law No. 11 appears in Journal Officiel No. 46, April 30,
1923; Loi Electorale, Allenby to Curzon, May 1923, Desp. No. 293, FO/371/8961.
2. Allenby to Curzon, May 4, 1923, Tel. No. 133, FO/371/8961.
3. R.C.L[indsa^j. , Minute, May 9 to Allenby to Curzon, April 23, 1923, Desp. No. 259,
FO/371/8961. For examples of positive responses in the British press, see: Man­
chester Guardian, April 21, 1923; Daily Telegraph, April 23, 1923; and, West­
minster Gazette, April 21, 1923.
4. This was an interview given to the Daily News correspondent in France, Daily News, 
May 1, 1923.
5. Allenby to Curzon, July 19, 1923, Desp. No. 492, FO/371/8962.
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situation it was forced to accept.
Yahya nevertheless persisted in his policy and in early May proposed to Allenby 
that the act of indemnity be recognized by the two countries through an exchange of 
notes rather than by formal agreement as had been intended previously. He also sug­
gested that a committee with a British majority be established to review sentences
2imposed on Egyptians under the regime of martial law. Cecil Hurst, the Foreign Office 
legal adviser, agreed to the exchange of notes and Allenby recommended the acceptance 
of the proposed review committee since the power to pardon was a major attribute of 
sovereignty.^
Again, binding action, as proposed on the indemnity act, before the convening 
of an elected parliament was opposed in Egypt. There was also a good deal of resent­
ment over the British majority on the sentence review committee. Nevertheless 
negotiations over the details progressed so well that by July 4 Allenby was able to
inform Curzon that the indemnity law would be promulgated and the notes exchanged on
4the next day, July 5. Martial law would be abolished simultaneously and an amnesty 
would be declared for about 250 Egyptians sentenced to less than fifteen years im­
prisonment by military courts. To evident British relief, the indemnity law was
5
promulgated and martial law, in effect since December 1914, ended as planned.
The final issue that required resolution was that of compensation of foreign 
officials. Although an ad hoc Joint Anglo-Egyptian Committee had been set up on Decem­
ber 23, 1922 to deal with individual cases as they arose, there was little movement 
towards a general scheme of compensation for retiring officials. On January 21, 1923, 
Scott, the British Minister Plenipotentiary in Cairo, sent Tawfiq Nasim a comprehen­
sive proposal but this was quickly rejected, again, because of the fear of taking 
permanent action in anticipation of a new parliament. By the beginning of March, 
Allenby reported that 'The continued uncertainty as to the future has caused a
1. For details about the debate over the Assembly Law, see: Allenby to Curzon,
July 19, 1923, Desp. No. 486, FO/371/8962.
2. Allenby to Curzon, May 13, 1923, Desp. No. 214, FO/371/8962.
3. Cecil Hurst, Minute, May 24, 1923 to ibid.; and, Allenby to Curzon, June 7, 1923,
Tel. No. 168, FO/371/8962.
4. Allenby to Curzon, July 4, 1923, Tel. No. 195, FO/371/8962.
5. For the text of the Egyptian and British notes, the decrees of the Act of Indem­
nity and the sentence review committee, and Allenby's proclamation ending martial 
law, see: Allenby to Curzon, July 7, 1923, Desp. No. 459, FO/371/8962. For
examples of favourable press reactions in England, see: Daily Chronicle, July 6,
1923; and, Manchester Guardian, July 6, 1923.
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widespread feeling of discontent and is impairing the usefulness of the officials
while even those who at the outset had no thought of leaving the country are wavering.'
At the beginning of May, Allenby informed London that the atmosphere had changed
and that serious negotiations for a general settlement were taking place with Yahya.
He was, however, careful to note that there would be no attempt to connect the compen-
2
sation of officials with the indemnity act. Apparently Yahya's interest in a 
settlement was motivated by his desire for administrative reasons to prevent an 'in­
creasing number of foreign officials applying to leave' and he even asked that the
3
previous ad hoc arrangements be suspended. Draft proposals were presented by Piola 
Caselli, a legal adviser to the Egyptian government, which, in effect, were an elabo­
ration of proposals made by Amos, Judge Percival of the Mixed Courts, representatives 
of the Residency and the Central Committee of the Association of British Officials.
On June 28, Yahya convened a committee to compose the final draft of the compensation 
scheme. This committee consisted of Muhibb Pasha, Minister of Finance, Hafiz Hassan
4
Pasha, Minister of Waqfs, Piola Caselli, Amos and representatives of the Association 
of British Officials.
The negotiations in July were not as smooth as had been expected because of ob­
struction and delays by Muhibb Pasha who radically revised the draft scheme to the 
detriment of retiring officials. After four long and arduous negotiating sessions, 
agreement was reached because of Allenby's willingness to compromise. The larger dip­
lomatic and political context affected Allenby's approach and he explained to Curzon 
that 'These tactics by Muhibb Pasha naturally made it less easy than was anticipated 
to obtain the full advantages of the draft proposals, and, rather than risk a rupture,
which on one or two occasions appeared possible, it seemed advisable to give way in
5
part here and there.' Finally, on July 18, there was an exchange of notes between
1. Allenby to Curzon, March 9, 1923, Desp. No. 122, FO/371/8966.
2. Allenby to Curzon, May 5, 1923, Tel. Nos. 134, 135 and 136, FO/371/8966. Curzon
suggested just such a procedure to Allenby in Curzon to Allenby, May 2, 1923, 
Tel. No. 96, FO/371/8966.
3. Allenby to Curzon, June 8, 1923, Desp. No. 379, FO/371/8966.
4. Ahmad Ali Pasha was the previous Minister of Waqfs and was to be a member of the
committee. He resigned, however, because he opposed the scheme. For details, 
see: Allenby to Curzon, June 28, 1923, Desp. No. 430, FO/371/8966.
5. Allenby to Curzon, July 18, 1923, Desp. No. 484, FO/371/8966.
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Allenby and Ahmad Hishmat Pasha, the Minister of Justice, agreeing to the compensation
1
law as negotiated. On the next day, July 19, Law No. 28 of 1923 relating to the 
conditions of service, retirement and dismissal of foreign officials was promulgated. 
This ended, for the time being, an issue that had divided Egypt and Britain as well as 
Allenby and the Foreign Office since the beginning of negotiations for Egypt’s indepen­
dence.
Thus in less than eighteen stormy months Allenby's efforts to regularise Anglo-
Egyptian relations seem to have been crowned by success. Despite the misgivings and
often open hostility of his superiors in London, Allenby appeared to have completed
the mission he began when he left Egypt on February 2, 1922, uncertain whether he
would return as High Commissioner. By August 1923, Egypt had achieved a remarkable
degree of internal independence, some measure of formal sovereignty, a constitutional
system of government, an indemnity act and the abrogation of martial law, and, finally,
the settlement of the thorny issue of compensation for foreign officials. The loose
ends of independence had been tied up. It now seemed that the Residency's struggle
for disengagement from Egypt’s internal affairs had been concluded successfully with
little or no sacrifice of vital British interests. It was, therefore, understandable
that when Scott, acting for Allenby, summarised the state of political forces in Egypt
on the eve of Zaghlul's return, he could so so 'with satisfaction fa t*} .. .the extent to
which, during the past summer, the process of disengaging ourselves from the interplay
2
of these forces has been continued.1
The way appeared open for the regularisation of the political system, assuring 
stability and enabling the continued British withdrawal from Egypt's domestic affairs. 
Even Zaghlul and the Wafd no longer seemed as ominous as before. In fact, the British 
in Cairo seemed to believe that, if carefully managed, an equilibrium might be estab­
lished and maintained between the Palace and the Wafd, with the present Prime Minister 
remaining in office for the meantime. This might even permit eventually the conclu­
sion of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement on a permanent basis.
And yet a jarring note was soon heard from that very quarter that was being dis­
counted as a serious threat - the Wafd. On November 14, Zaghlul denied any change in
1. For the exchange of notes and the text of the Law, see: Law No. 28 of 1923, 
Government Press, Cairo, 1923, in FO/371/8967.
2. Scott to Curzon, September 14, 1923, Desp. No. 636, FO/371/8962.
his party's policies and declared that 'The Wafd was ready to conclude an agreement
with Great Britain on the basis of complete independence for Egypt and respect for
those British interests which did not conflict with Egyptian independence and were 
1
legitimate.'
How 'legitimate' British interests and 'Egyptian independence' were defined and 
reconciled by the various actors in the coming months would determine whether the poli 
cies followed by Allenby during the past two years had been realistic or mere chimera, 
and whether the future would see continued progress towards a settlement or a lapse 
into chaos.
1. Times, November 15, 1923.
PART THREE: LONDON'S YEARS, 1924-1925
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 'GREAT EXPECTATIONS' - MACDONALD AND ZAGHLUL
The year 1924 began with the promise of change: change in the Egyptian
political situation; change in the British government; and, most important, 
change in the complex network of relationships linking Britain and Egypt, the 
Foreign Office and Residency. A new ministry led by Zaghlul was to take office 
in Egypt and the Labour Party, with J. Ramsay MacDonald at its head, was about to 
form a government in Britain. Both would govern for the first time. Although 
they were unknown quantities with respect to the exercise of power, their state­
ments and public pronouncements indicated a rough identity of views about the 
future of Egypt and the nature of that country's permanent relations to Britain.
The ties of sympathy and friendship between Labour's leaders and the Wafd rein­
forced the anticipation of a new pattern of relations, some form of permanent 
Anglo-Egyptian settlement.
However, within a few months it was apparent that British policy, whether 
formulated in London or in Cairo, and Egyptian aspirations, as represented by the 
Wafd, were by no means identical. In fact, less than a year later hopes for a 
quick settlement had all by vanished and the 'great expectations' of early 1924 
seemed somehow to become the Micawber policy of 'waiting for something to turn up.' 
Even the re-emergence of London as a major focus of policy formulation did 
not alter this fact.
New Elements: Zaghlul, MacDonald and the Labour Government
On September 18, 1923 Zaghlul returned to Egypt after more than eighteen
months of exile. The welcome Zaghlul received was enthusiastic and he seemed
mellow in his first public statement making 'a moderate speech saying that he bore
no grudge against his old opponents and was prepared to be friendly with every- 
1body.’ The same spirit seemed to prevail during Zaghlul's first audience with
Fuad. According to one report, he gave 'repeated protestations of loyalty to His
2Majesty and fidelity to interests of the country.'
1. Scott to Curzon, September 18, 1923, Tel. No. 239, FO/371/8968.
2. Scott to Curzon, September 18, 1923, Tel. No. 240, FO/371/8968. Murray felt
that this report from a reliable source 'was edited in the palace for British
consumption.' Murray, Minute, 18.9.23 to ibid.
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The Residency was convinced throughout this period that the key to Fuad's
relations with Zaghlul was the former1s attempt to strike a balance between the
Wafd and his own supporters. Fuad thereby "appreciably fortified his position,
partly by holding close contact with elements of the Wafd, partly by introducing
1his supporters into several high administrative posts." Fuad’s later activities 
during the election campaign of winter 1923/24 were seen as crucial to its out­
come and to the political map of Egypt that was drawn after the elections.
Residency observers felt that it was difficult for Fuad to steer a middle 
course between groups such as the National Party and the Liberal-Constitutiona- 
lists, which he suspected of either Khedivist or republican sympathies, and 
Zaghlul, whom he once called 'a black bogeyman painted on every wall." Since 
Yahya had pledged to conduct the elections in complete neutrality, Fuad could 
surreptitiously attempt to influence their outcome and destroy the National Party
and the supporters of Adli and Tharwat. With respect to the Wafd, he was con-
2
vrnced that he could control Zaghlul through guile and flattery.
The campaign itself began so mildly that within a few days part of the press 
"confessed its inability to agree with Zaghlul"s programme of general forgive-
3
ness." The tempo of the campaign quickly increased. Zaghlul's main targets were 
his political opponents in Egypt, especially Adli and Tharwat, and the constitu­
tion and electoral law 'as products of unpatriotic minority and of intrigues of
. . 4Sarwat ministry."
It was soon clear that Zaghlul would obtain a very large majority. The 
Residency accepted this fact calmly. Furness wrote to London that "I have little
5doubt that it would be a good thing m  the long run for him to be Prime Minister." 
Still the major theme of Zaghlul"s campaign, al-istiqlal al-tamm jtotal indepen- 
dence], should have warned the Residency of the difficulties that lay ahead.
1. Scott to Curzon, September 14, 1923, Desp. No. 636, FO/371/8962.
2. Fuad made the following comment to Kerr: 'Saad is like a woman. You can win
him with a smile or a rose." Kerr to MacDonald, October 24, 1924, Desp. No. 
641, FO/371/10022.
3. This was al-Mahrussa. Cited in Scott to Curzon, September 23, 1923, Desp. No. 
664, FO/371/8963.
4. Scott to Curzon, September 30, 1923, Tel. No. 250, FO/371/8963.
5. Furness to Murray, October 14, 1923, FO/371/8963.
6. For a survey of parties and platforms during the 1923/24 election campaign, 
see: Landau, op.cit., pp.64ff.
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On January 7, Allenby left Cairo for a tour of the Sudan in order to be out
of Egypt during the ballotting scheduled for January 12. Kerr remained in
charge of the Residency. Almost immediately after the voting had taken place, it
became apparent that Zaghlul's victory had exceeded all expectations. Nearly 190
out of 214 Deputies were returned as Wafdists. All of Adli's supporters, except
Muhammad Mahmud Pasha, had been defeated and even the Prime Minister had not been
returned. The Residency responded with equanimity and events were permitted to
1follow their own course.
Yahya Ibrahim, described in October as 'a dear old man but very tired; he
2
requires contant comfort,1 now was inclined to resign almost immediately. This
was reinforced by Zaghlul1s statement to the Reuters' correspondent that 'if
3constitutional practice were followed, Yehia Pasha ought to resign.' In the 
meantime there was evidence that the King wished to retain Yahya in office until 
the assembly of Parliament. Thus Fuad would have a free hand in the selection of 
the nominated Senators in order to balance Zaghlul's overwhelming majority in 
the Chamber of Deputies. To this end Fuad tried to enlist Residency support for 
the continuation of the incumbent ministry, but Kerr refused to intervene and 
privately told Yahya on January 17 that 'he was taking the proper course in de-
4
cidmg to tender his resignation. '
After a week's hesitation in accepting Yahya's resignation, Fuad asked 
Zaghlul on January 27 to form a government. Kerr took the unusual step of calling 
on Zaghlul first and even the Foreign Office seemed satisfied with the new develop­
ments. Ingram, in Murray's absence, noted that 'if he [Zaghlullcan be saved from 
his followers...and if he can work in with the King and the Residency, there is
5
no reason to fear the worst from his advent to power.' Sir William Tyrrell, who 
had replaced Lindsay as Assistant Under Secretary of State responsible for Egypt, 
commented that 'The main struggle will be between-Zaghlul and the King: This
1. Even the British press took the election results calmly. For example, see
the leaders: 'Egypt's freedom', Daily Chronicle, January 15, 1924; and, 'The
Egyptian Parliament', Times, January 15, 1924.
2. Furness to Murray, October 14, 1923, FO/371/8963.
3. Kerr to MacDonald, February 3, 1924, Desp. No. 78, FO/371/10020.
4. Ibid.
5. E.M.B. Ingram, Minute, 28.1.24 to Kerr to MacDonald, January 27, 1924, Tel.
No. 33, FO/371/10020.
will be their affair and not ours.' The feeling seemed to be that once in 
power, Zaghlul would .become moderate and that his assumption of ministerial res­
ponsibility would permit movement towards a settlement. Even if this was not 
realised, there was relief over the fact that Britain was no longer an adversary 
in Egyptian politics but instead would serve as a referee observing the various 
sides manoeuvre for position.
Yet there were already indications that matters would not be so simple. 
Zaghlul1s letter accepting the office of Prime Minister struck a familiar note: 
'The elections have clearly shown the nation's unanimity and attachment to the. 
principles of the Wafd and the necessity for the country's enjoying its rights of
real independence in Egypt and the Sudan, with due respect to all foreign rights
2
not conflicting with that independence.' The question, however, remained: how
would 'foreign rights' and 'real independence' be reconciled?
Another new element in the ongoing Anglo-Egyptian relationship was the emer­
gence of the Labour government of 1924 with J. Ramsay MacDonald serving both as 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. The policies advocated in the past by this 
party and the positions on Egypt taken by its leader led to the expectation of 
new directions in British policy towards Egypt.
In May 1923 Andrew Bonar Law resigned because of ill-health and Stanley 
Baldwin, a relatively unknown member of the Conservative Cabinet, became Prime 
Minister. By December Baldwin called a general election over the issue of the 
imposition of protective tariffs. Although there was little change in the popular 
vote, there was a dramatic change in the composition of the House of Commons. The
final totals were: Conservatives - 259 members; Labour - 191; and, combined
3Liberals - 159.
1. W.T[yrf£ll] . , Minute, 28/1/[24] to ibid.
2. Kerr to MacDonald, February 3, 1924, Desp. No. 77, FO/371/10020; and, Times,
January 29, 1924.
3. The reasons for the changes were the smaller number of election agreements 
and the greater number of candidates standing for election. Previous totals 
were: Conservatives - 346; Labour - 144; and, Liberals - 117. The differ­
ences in the popular vote were: Conservatives lost 115,485 votes; Labour
gained 121,310; and, Liberals gained 186,109. The total votes cast were
more than 14 million. Carl F. Brand, The British Labour Party: A Short His­
tory (Stanford, 1964), p.95.
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If the Liberals, split into several factions, would support them, then 
Labour could form a government, albeit a minority one, for the first time in 
British parliamentary history. On December 18, Herbert Asquith, the former
wartime Prime Minister, signalled that support in a speech before all factions of 
the Liberal Parliamentary Party at the National Liberal Club: 1 If a Labour Govern­
ment is ever to be tried in this country, as it will sooner or later, it could 
hardly be tried under safer conditions.1 ^
From the general discussion of what Labour hoped to achieve as a minority 
government, four main points emerged: some legislative progress; a period of
apprenticeship for Labour leaders in government; the establishment of Labour as 
a major partner to the Conservatives in the British two-party system instead of 
the Liberals; and, finally, it was believed that 'the mere presence of Labour men
in the seats of the mighty would mean a new atmosphere in government, with incal-
2
culable good results.' In short, there was a desire to show Labour's responsi­
bility in government, even if there were some utopian undertones.
At the start, however, Labour was regarded as a party with a doctrinaire 
past rather than a pragmatic future, or, as one writer put it: 'Labour was still,
3
on the eve of its succession to office in 1924, a propagandist party.' This was
particularly noticeable in the area of foreign policy. According to many writers,
the party's foreign policy in the pre-1924 period was largely influenced by the
radical Union of Democratic Control (U.D.C.) which centred its activities on the
Independent Labour Party (I.L.P.) which in turn exercised great influence on the
4
formulation of the Labour Party's foreign programme. This was more a result of 
the prestige of the founders and early supporters of the U.D.C., such as Ramsay 
MacDonald, Arthur Ponsonby, Charles Trevelyan, Norman Angell, E.D. Morel and
1. H. Asquith, Memories and Reflections (London, 1928), II, 209.
2. Richard W. Lyman, The First Labour Government, 1924 (London, 1957), p.91.
3. Ibid., p.15. Similar observations about Labour generally are made by D.C. 
Somervell, 'The Twentieth Century', p.38; and, H.G. Nicholas, 'The Formula' 
tion of Party Policy', p.146 in S.D. Bailey (ed.), The British Party System 
(London, 1952).
4. For details on the activities and influence of the U.D.C., see: A.J.P. Tay
lor, The Troublemakers: Dissent over Foreign Policy: 1792-1939 (London,
1957), 132ff.; Craig and Gilbert, op.cit., pp. 23-4; Brand, op.cit., pp. 
60-1; Lyman, op.cit., p.l57ff.; and, Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democra­
tic Control, in British Politics during the First World War (Oxford, 1971),
passim.
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others, and their keen interest in foreign affairs, than of their numerical pre­
ponderance in the Labour Party. In any event, the attitudes of the U.D.C., with 
its antipathy for traditional policy and the 'old diplomacy1, affected the cen­
trist groups in the Labour Party and coloured the style and content of its 
platform.
The history of the Labour Party's policy on Egypt since the end of the First
World War reflected its general policy on imperial issues and gave rise to a
political tradition which it brought with it into office. Even before the end
of the War, elements within the party began to indicate their’ views on post-war
policy towards Egypt. At the Leeds Conference of June 3, 1917, the motion on
peace proposed by Philip Snowden, a close associate of MacDonald and Chancellor of
the Exchequer in 1924, was passed by the Conference. It declared that in areas
such as Egypt, the right of the people to determine their own destinies should be
1observed by all concerned.
This approach was quickly adopted by the party as a whole and at its 1919
Annual Conference, the resolution on Egypt condemned the deportation of the Wafd
leaders and demanded ’that the principle of self-determination be applied to the
2Government of Egypt.1 This was expanded by the 1920 Annual Conference which 
unanimously adopted George Lansbury's motion:
That the right of the Egyptian people to independent responsible 
government be fully recognised; and that British action in Egypt, 
whether for the protection of the Suez Canal, the administration 
of the Soudan, or otherwise, be limited to that which the respon­
sible Nationalist Government of Egypt may freely give its consent.3
Similar resolutions were adopted and statements made at the 1921 and 1922 
4Annual Conferences and a group of Labour M.P.'s began an active campaign on be­
half of Zaghlul and Egyptian independence. This was mainly through the vehicle
1. Brand, op.cit., p.45. This conference was sponsored by the I.L.P. and the 
British Socialist Party which together formed the United Socialist Council. 
With the support of Lansbury and the Daily Herald, they organised the Leeds 
Conference. The Labour Party and the T.U.C., however, refused to participate, 
so the left wing of the party was most strongly represented at Leeds.
2. Labour Party, Report of the 19 th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 25-27
3.
June 1919, p.172. 
Labour Party, Report of the 20th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 22-25
4.
June 1920, p.159. 
Labour Party, Report of the 21st Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 21-24
June 1921, p.146; and, Report of the 22nd Annual Conference of the Labour
Party, 27-30 June 1922, pp. 36-37.
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of the Egypt Parliamentary Committee which counted among its members most of
Labour's parliamentary leadership. They engaged in activities such as visits to
Egypt, public statements and pressure on the government of the day.’1'
The assumption of the offices of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in
January 1924 by MacDonald, one of the strongest supporters of Labour's Egyptian
policy, was particularly significant for future developments. From the start
there was concern that MacDonald would not be able to bear the burden of his two
offices. This concern ranged from King George V to Asquith whose support made
2
a Labour government possible. Within the Foreign Office there was a lack of con­
fidence in a man so closely associated with the advocates of a radical foreign 
policy in earlier years. Vansittart, Curzon's last Private Secretary, commented 
on the general apprehension:
The Foreign Office was less confident of the new Messiah who in the 
wilderness had voiced his contempt for 'hangers-on of the diplomatic 
classes' and traced Grey's troubles to his officials. We had also 
heard of him, with C.P. Trevelyan, Norman Angell, E.D. Morel and 
Arthur Ponsonby, in the fuddled Union of Democratic Control. He 
talked much nonsense during the war but little afterwards. In full 
Becoming MacDonald found human dust-storms not easily laid, though 
his novices wrote that 'he opened the windows of the Foreign Office, 
and let the fresh air of democracy flow in.'^
Although the main areas of concern in foreign affairs during 1924 were the 
normalisation of Anglo-Russian relations, reparations and the consequences of the 
French occupation of the Ruhr, and European security, the Egyptian question still 
needed a long-term solution. MacDonald brought with him a well-defined public 
position on this question. In addition to his previous participation in the acti­
vities of the Egypt Parliamentary Committee, MacDonald had also taken a clear 
personal stand long before coming to office.
1. For examples of pressure and statements, see: Members of the Egypt Parlia­
mentary Committee to Lloyd George, July 8, 1922, FO/371/7735; and, the letter 
signed by 97 M.P.'s in Times, March 29, 1923.
2. Harold Nicolson, King George the Fifth: His Life and Reign (London, 1952),
p.385. Asquith noted in his diary on February 15, 1924: 'Poor Ramsay - who
looks every day more and more like a ghost...and has taken on a burden far too 
heavy for a man, who is not composed... in equal proportions of iron and lea­
ther....' Asquith, op.cit., II, 110. Also, see: Bishop, op.cit., p.85; and,
Lyman, op.cit., p.230.
3. Vansittart, op.cit., pp. 323-3. Vansittart concludes the passage cited: 'He 
did nothing of the sort, but got down to work as to the manner born.'
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At the 1920 Annual Conference, MacDonald stated that he ’regarded the as­
piration of Egypt as a righteous one and called upon Great Britain to fulfill a
1pledge which she had given from time to time.1 A year later MacDonald travelled
to Egypt where he met and developed ties of friendship with leading members of
the nationalist movement. The trip resulted in a number of major articles in the
British press in February 1922 which condemned British policy as responsible for
inflaming native sentiment and called for an accommodation with and understanding
2
of Zaghlul as the only possible solution. Even after Egypt received nominal 
independence and six months before Labour’s rise to power, MacDonald in May and 
June 1923 outlined the policy that Labour would adopt once in office:
...MacDonald depicted how a Labour Government would salvage the situ­
ation. It would let the Egyptian people revise their constitution, 
invite Zaghlul and other exiles back to participate in the coming 
election and make certain it was a free one, restrict the limits of 
the Indemnity Act, and offer a treaty to the Egyptian Government de­
fining relationships and sealing the friendship of two independent 
nations.3
It is little wonder, therefore, that there was widespread anticipation of a 
change in British policy towards Egypt when Labour came into office. Zaghlul's 
son-in-law, Amin Yussuf, noted in this respect that
It is a curious fact that Zaghloul's accession to power in Egypt 
practically coincided with the accession of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald at 
the head of the first Labour Government in Great Britain. There can 
be little doubt that Zaghloul had high hopes of the Labour Government.
He was a personal friend of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. Labour Members had 
come to Egypt and actually assisted in the Nationalist campaigns. A 
large proportion of the Egypt Parliamentary Committee in England had 
been members of the Labour Party. A considerable section of the new 
British Cabinet were pledged almost as deeply as Zaghloul himself to 
the policy of the Wafd.4
1. Labour Party, 20th Annual Conference..., pp. 159-60.
2. For example, see MacDonald's articles: 'The Deadlock in Egypt', 'Lord Allen-
by's Mission', and 'Egypt as I found It', in Westminster Gazette, February 
10, 18, and March 3, 1922.
3 . Based on Socialist Review, May 1923, and New Leader, June 23, 1923. Cited 
in Benjamin Sacks, J. Ramsay MacDonald in Thought and Action (New Mexico,
1952), p.445.
4. Amin Yussuf, op.cit., pp. 113-14. Amin Yussuf was married to Zaghlul's niece, 
his adopted daughter, and was an anglophile because of his English rather 
than French education.
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The leaders of the Wafd were quick to acknowledge this coincidence.
Muhammad Said Pasha,& Wafdfcandidate for Prime Minister, stated in an
interview in al-Balagh that 'Zaghlul's presence at the head of the Egyptian
Cabinet and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's presence at the head of the British Cabinet
would be a happy coincidence which must not be missed.'"*- At the same time
Zaghlul congratulated MacDonald on his election success in very warm terms:
'Heartiest congratulations. Am sure this new era will be one of universal peace
and amity in general and of understanding and friendship between our country and
2yours in particular.'
The anticipation of change and hopes for success were strong indeed. It 
only remained to be seen whether, to paraphrase a nineteenth century parliamenta­
rian, the Labour Party in Office could be expected to carry out the policy of
3
the Labour Party Out of Office.
Altered Relationships: The Residency
After the initial successes of the Residency in 1923, relationships began to 
change and take on new shapes. The role of the Residency in the formulation of 
policy, its place in Egyptian politics, and, most significantly, its relationship 
to the main actors of the piece, Zaghlul in Cairo and MacDonald and the Foreign 
Office in London, began to change. While these changes occurred for different 
reasons and at varying rates, they all contributed to a new position and attitude 
on the part of Allenby and his establishment in Egypt.
Since independence there had been considerable change in the body of British 
officials that had served Allenby with its expertise. Beyond the large number of 
officials in the civil service who had retired or resigned after independence or 
after the promulgation of Law 28, some of the advisers had either left Egypt or 
were under increasing local pressure which made their positions difficult.
Shortly after independence Gilbert Clayton, one of Allenby1s most trusted aides, 
resigned as Adviser to the Ministry of Interior because he felt his position was
1. Cited in Morning Post, January 23, 1923.
2. Zaghlul to MacDonald, January 23, 1923, FO/371/10039.
3. This is based on O'Donnell's jibe at Gladstone's interference in Egyptian 
affairs in 1882. Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CCLXIX (1882), 1729.
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no longer viable in an independent Egypt. Dowson, the Financial Adviser, was 
replaced because of his wife's poor health and Sir Maurice Amos, Allenby's other 
close aide and the initiator of many of the Residency's policies, was reaching 
the end of his tenure as Judicial Adviser and would remain at his position in 
coming months with increasing difficulty.'*' By 1924 only the Financial and 
Judicial advisers remained at their posts.
The same process was going on within the Residency itself since the winter of 
1921/22. Walford Selby, First Secretary at the Residency, returned to London at 
the height of the crisis over independence. There were changes at the lower
2
levels as well and Owen Tweedy, at the Residency since 1919, would leave in 1924.
Perhaps the most serious loss to the Residency was the disgrace and recall of
Ernest Scott, the British Minister Plenipotentiary in Cairo.
Scott, who had been in Cairo since Allenby's appointment, became involved
in a dispute with Muhibb Pasha, the Minister of Finance in Yahya's ministry.
Muhibb, with a 'well deserved reputation for dishonest peculation and sharp prac-
3trees of all kinds,' had been a thorn in the side of the government and Residency 
since his appointment, apparently at the insistence of Fuad. During the summer 
of 1923 Yahya felt that Muhibb should be removed from his position because of 
illegal profiteering in the depressed cotton market. Scott intervened rather clum­
sily and engaged in a public dispute with Muhibb. The Foreign Office angrily
decided that Scott's poor judgement meant that his 'utility in Cairo has ceased
4
& he ought to be recalled.' Scott's disgrace further reduced the number of
1. Amos was under increasing pressure because of the central position he occu­
pied among Allenby1s advisers. In London, there was resentment at Amos'
comments over British policy and the influence he had. For example, after 
Amos privately spoke to a Labour M.P. in Egypt in 1923, Crowe noted: 'I am a
little astonished at the way in which Sir M. Amos without, so far as I know, 
any authority, expounds...what he considers the proper policy for HMG to 
adopt.' EAC {jrowe]}. , Minute, Ap. 5, Allenby to Curzon, March 24, 1923, Desp. 
No. 173, FO/371/8961. Curzon added: 'I think we should express some marked
surprise in a private letter to Lord Allenby at the performance of Sir M. 
Amos.' c[urzonJ., Minute, 6/4, to ibid. By mid-1924 Amos was having diffi­
culties with the Egyptian government because of his position and views.
2. For changes in the Residency staff, see: Foreign Office, Diplomatic Year
Book, 1919 through 1925.
3. ACKjerrJ., to H.E., March 15, 1923, FO/141/627(724)(Pt.II).
4. R.C.L jTindsay}* , Minute, August 20, 1923, to ibid.
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Allenby's supporters in Cairo and weakened his staff at the Residency.
This slow process of decline was abetted by the rise to power of MacDonald 
whose position as Prime Minister strengthened his authority as Foreign Secretary. 
Another factor was MacDonald's attitude towards Allenby, essentially one of sus­
picion. This gave further impetus to the hostility felt by many in the Foreign 
Office towards the Residency in Cairo.
MacDonald's animosity had its origins in his trip to Egypt in the early months 
of 1922. Because of the political situation in Egypt and the difficulties created 
by other Labour M.P.'s in Egypt, Allenby's advice was sought by London before a 
visa was issued to MacDonald.^ Allenby agreed to the issue of a visa but warned
that 'he(MacDonaldjmust not make speeches or take part in politics,' adding that
2
'Martial Law is in force and I shall not hesitate to employ it if necessary.' As 
a result MacDonald was granted a visa and imprudently told by the Foreign Office 
'that Lord Allenby has asked that owing to the present position of affairs in Egypt 
a condition should be imposed that during your stay in that country you should not
3
make speeches, nor take any part in politics.' Selby, MacDonald's Private Secre­
tary in 1924, described in later years the atmosphere at the Foreign Office:
...to my horror, I found the position with Ramsay MacDonald was not easy, 
since Ramsay MacDonald attributed to Allenby's actions certain limita­
tions on his visit to Egypt in 1921 which Ramsay MacDonald bitterly re­
sented.... It was in the early months of 1924 that I became vaguely aware 
of an atmosphere in London unfavourable to Allenby which caused me to re­
sist it. It may have arisen from all those critics of Allenby..
Allenby, for his part, was suspicious of MacDonald because of the latter's
activities and statements on Egypt. The bitter and, at times, vicious criticism
of Allenby and his policy that appeared on the pages of the Labour Party newspaper,
5
the Daily Herald, may have also affected relations. It was within this context
1. Foreign Office to Allenby, December 24, 1921, Tel. No. 546, FO/141/799(4081).
2. Allenby to Foreign Office, December 25, 1921, Tel. No. 688, FO/141/799(4081).
3. G.H. Villiers to MacDonald, January 3, 1922, FO/141/799(4081).
4. Selby to Wavell, November 15, 1939, KAP.
5. According to Wavell: 'The Prime Minister was inclined to regard the soldier 
(Allenby] as a heavy-handed reactionary...' Wavell, op.cit., p.107. Examples of 
the phrases and themes referring to Egypt that recur in the Daily Herald are: 
'riders to the sea'’[Allenby and aides], January 25, 1922; 'bully and persecute' 
and 'bayonet rule', February 6, 1922; 'blare and blaze of fine sentiments', 
March 1, 1922; 'His[Allenby] attempt to rule by a puppet Ministry', January 15, 
1923; 'the Military Dictator[Allenbyi February 13, 1923; 1Prussianism'[Allen- 
by's policies], March 7, 1923; and, 'barbarity of British policy', April 2, 
1923.
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of declining influence and new conditions in Egypt that Allenby and the Residency 
had to redefine their role and establish a modus vivendi with Zaghlul and the 
Wafd.
Given the existing situation Allenby and the Residency decided to maintain 
an attitude of disengagement from Egypt's internal political affairs. This was 
especially true since Fuad and Zaghlul were now seen as the two extremes in a 
rough, political equilibrium. Strict neutrality was maintained during the election 
campaign:
...the policy that has been followed has been to ignore Saad. No 
attention has been paid to the repeated overtures he and his follow­
ers have made in order to get in touch privately with us, since to 
have acquiesced would have been to recognise that he did in fact 
occupy the position he claimed. And Y.E. has stated that it was your 
intention to maintain this policy until Zaghlul acquired a new posi­
tion by success at the polls.^
Zaghlul's victory, however, meant that a new position had to be adopted. 
Despite the long history of antagonism between the Residency and Zaghlul, Kerr 
advised Allenby that some sort of r^prochement was necessary because
While it is essential that we should maintain our attitude of in­
dependence we should not remain mere spectators of what passes and 
thus, through detachment of events and ignorance of facts, be at a 
disadvantage when a Zaghlulist cabinet takes office and the time comes 
to establish official relations.2
Kerr, therefore, asked for permission to get in touch with Zaghlul and the Wafd 
privately if they were elected with a large majority while Allenby was in the 
Sudan.
The opportunity to exhibit Residency independence and establish contact with 
Zaghlul came after the elections when Fuad sought to enlist the Residency's assist­
ance in retaining Yahya as Prime Minister. Kerr refused to become involved and 
reported to London on January 15 that 'In order to prevent misunderstanding I have
3
taken steps privately to make Zaghlul aware of my attitude.1 This new Residency
1. A.C.K[err]. , to H.E., January 4, 1924, FO/141/484 (278) . This memo was the re­
sult of several meetings held at the Residency by Kerr, Amos, Furness, Tweedy 
and Patterson to discuss policy after Zaghlul's anticipated victory at the 
polls.
2. Ibid.
3. Kerr to Curzon, January 15, 1924, Tel. No. 21, FO/371/10020.
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approach was applauded at the Foreign Office as both 'wise & timely' and Tysitll
1
added 'Let Fuad & Zaghlul fight it out & we keep the ring.'
Personal contact with Zaghlul soon followed and on January .19 Kerr had a
two-hour long conversation with the Wafd leader. Zaghlul was nervous at first:
2'friendly but seems suspicious & inclined to fence.' Kerr believed that this 
first interview would clear the air and prepare the way for further contacts. On 
January 24, Kerr again saw Zaghlul, by now far less suspicious, and 'took occa­
sion to explain to him confidentially and in detail what our attitude has been in
3
regard to constitution and succeeded I think in dispelling his misconceptions.' 
Kerr's final gesture was to call on Zaghlul officially when he took office. He 
explained at length why he departed from usual practice and did not wait for 
Zaghlul to call on him first:
...I was influenced by the belief that, in view of what had happened 
in the past, Zaghlul Pasha would himself be reluctant to make the first 
official gesture of friendliness towards the Residency. It seemed to 
me to be important not to stand on any ceremony in this matter, or, in­
deed, even to allow it to become a subject of discussion or negotiation. 
Moreover, I thought it not unfitting thus to mark the change that had 
taken place in the political status of the new Government as compared 
with its predecessors, in virtue of its parliamentary character.4
Allenby adopted a similar approach when he returned to Egypt on February 21 
and immediately called on Zaghlul. Kerr summed up the results of that meeting in 
a letter to Tyrrell: *Saad and Lord Allenby have taken a great fancy to each other.
5
I was a little anxious about their first meeting, but it went with a flick.'
Still there were those who could not rid themselves of suspicion of Zaghlul
whom Austen Chamberlain later described as 'sly, scheming, corrupt and autocra- 
£
tic.' Some thought that Zaghlul was only playing a clever game and that the
1. W.TjVr^’li]. , Minute, 16/1, to Curzon to Allenby, January 17, 1924, Tel. No. 17, 
FO/371/10020.
2. Kerr to Curzon, January 21, 1924, Tel. No. 27, FO/371/10020.
3. Kerr to MacDonald, January 27, 1924, Tel. No. 33, FO/371/10020.
4. Kerr to MacDonald, February 3, 1924, Desp. No. 78, FO/371/10020. MacDonald
replied to this that: 'I have read your report with interest and desire to
convey to you an expression of my entire approval of your action, which re­
flects great credit on your tact and judgement.' MacDonald to Kerr, February 
15, 1924, Desp. No. 168, FO/371/10020.
5. Kerr to Tyrell, February 23, 1924, FO/371/10039.
6. sir Charles A. Petrie, The Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Austen Cham­
berlain (London, 1940), II, 341.
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raprochement between the British and the Wafd would end in disaster. Despite the 
friendliness, the gap between interests and aspirations was seen as too wide to 
bridge. Richard More, the Sudan Government Agent in Cairo, gloomily wrote to 
Selby that
... I cannot help thinking that the powers place far too much confidence 
in the smiles of Zaghloul. I cannot believe that such a savage old man 
can really lick our hands without meaning to bite on the first opportu­
nity. He is of course as clever as possible, and can bide his time.
In my opinion Archie Kerr is making a mistake that one has seen so often 
of trying to take on an Oriental, and such an Oriental, at his own game.
At present our policy is to give their head to any extent possible, 
and I cannot help thinking that we are overdoing it. They don't thank 
us, and of course only consider our concessions as signs of weakness.^
The forthcoming negotiations would tell who was correct.
Early Developments
The new atmosphere in Cairo and in London soon left its mark on developments
in Egypt. This could be seen in the release of political prisoners still serving
sentences imposed by British military courts under the old regime of martial law.
During Kerr's visit to Zaghlul to congratulate him upon his accession to
office, the new Egyptian Prime Minister 'expressed his desire to establish most
2cordial relations' and then referred to the remaining Egyptian prisoners. Zaghlul 
asked for the release of those sentenced for crimes against Egyptians and Egyptian 
public security, while those convicted of crimes against British or foreign sub­
jects would be unaffected. Since this meant waiving the British veto over the re­
lease of prisoners convicted under martial law, Kerr cabled Allenby in the Sudan 
for instructions.
Allenby was willing to go beyond Zaghlul's request and he expressed willing­
ness to release all Egyptian prisoners except six who were sentenced in the summer
3
of 1923 for conspiracy to murder British subjects. In forwarding Allenby's views
1. More to Selby, March 25, 1924, MacDonald Papers, FO/800/218. More was suspic­
ious of Zaghlul because of the friction between the Sudan government and the 
Egyptian government.
2. Kerr to MacDonald, January 31, 1924, Te. No. 36, FO/371/10039.
3. For a description of events see Tweedy to Wavell, March 4, 1938, KAP. As of 
July 1923 when martial law was abolished there were 450 prisoners undergoing 
sentences imposed by martial law. of these 288 were freed as a result of a 
general amnesty. The remaining 159 were people convicted of murder, attempted 
murder, bomb outrages, riot and arson. Kerr to MacDonald, February 1, 1924, 
Tel. No. 37, FO/371/10039.
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to London on February 5, Kerr asked for an early and positive reply because
I think a general atmosphere of friendliness is already being estab­
lished and nothing would do more to consolidate feelings of mutual con­
fidence so desirable as a preliminary to negotiations as this act of 
clemency on our part which would be an evident proof of our goodwill and 
help finally to dispel after effects of regime of martial law which was 
so distasteful to both sides.
At the same time Zaghlul contacted MacDonald in London. Aziz Izzat Pasha, 
the Egyptian Minister, called upon MacDonald with a note from Zaghlul urgently re­
questing the release of the prisoners since 'the Ministry were being subject to
2
a good deal of criticism in Egypt on the point.' This meeting had the desired 
effect and even before receipt of the Residency's views, MacDonald noted: 'I
agree to the release. I assume that Lord Allenby also agrees but in any event
3
they should be set free.' On February 7, the Egyptian Minister in London and the 
Residency in Cairo were informed that MacDonald had agreed to the release. Accor­
ding to Kerr, this was seen in Egypt as 'a triumph for Zaghlul Pasha, and afforded 
a welcome testimonial of the tardy realisation in British minds that in him they 
had to deal with a man who had the country behind him, and with whom the head of 
the British Government can negotiate on terms of equality and in a friendly 
spirit.
The next issue to be dealt with was that of negotiations and the opening of 
Egypt's parliament was its occasion. From the very beginning it was clear that 
both sides, in differing degrees, were interested in negotiations. According to 
one report, as early as mid-December 1923, Zaghlul told Fuad that 'negotiations 
with the British Government would be commenced as soon as possible after the open­
ing of Parliament, and would be pursued on the lines of the Wafd Programme of
5complete national independence.' The Residency, for its part, also contemplated 
the imminent prospect of negotiations and saw as its proper role the bringing 
together of London and Zaghlul for this purpose.
1. Kerr to MacDonald, February 5, 1924, Tel. No. 41, FO/371/10039.
2. Zaghlul to Izzat Pasha, February 5, 1924, FO/371/10039.
3. W. Selby, Minute, February 5, 1924, FO/371/10039. Lloyd is extremely criti­
cal of MacDonald's intervention and implicitly links it, mistakenly, with the
opening of the Egyptian parliament. Lloyd, op.cit., II, 82-3.
4. Kerr to MacDonald, February 16, 1924, Desp. No. 107, FO/371/10040.
5. SIS Report 4352./I, January 10, 1924, FO/371/10039.
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Therefore, on February 5, Tweedy proposed that Britain's message of con­
gratulations to the Egyptian government on the convening of Parliament 'should 
not contain mere expressions of goodwill and appreciation, but that it should 
register another step forward in the direction of the establishment of permanent
relations of amity between the two countries. These relations depend on the
1outcome of negotiations.' Fearing the possibility of a 'silly impasse' in which
for tactical reasons each side waited for the other to take the initiative,
Tweedy proposed that the 'message should be made the medium of a general invita-
2
tion to negotiate.'
Conditions in Egypt, Zaghlul's present strength and the Egyptian perception 
of a friendly Labour government made such a course desirable. This was especi­
ally true in view of the apparent eagerness of Fuad and Zaghlul to negotiate a
3
new relationship with Britain. With respect to the venue of negotiations, 
an issue of great importance, Kerr expressed the Residency view
that it would be politic to let us do all the spade work here.
Then Saad could make his gesture of going to London, but only to 
sign. This would greatly diminish the risk of a rupture in 
London, which would be disastrous - whereas we could rupt away 
quite happily here and no one would mind.^
London's view of negotiations differed somewhat from that of the Residency. 
The first public indication of the Labour government's attitude was MacDonald's 
statement in the House of Commons on February 25. In remarks that could just as 
easily have been made by Curzon, MacDonald indicated the orthodoxy and continuity 
of British policy despite the dramatic change in government. He informed Par­
liament that Britain still awaited word from Egypt on negotiations and that 'His
Majesty's present Government regard themselves as bound by the Declaration to
\5
Egypt of the 28th of February, 1922.
1. OMTjweedyjto Furness, February 15 [1924^ , FO/141/821 (17029) .
2. Ibid. For agreement in the Residency, see, Minutes by Kerr, 20/2/14 and 
Furness, 22/2/24 to ibid.
3. For Fuad's views, see Allenby's report of his first interview with the King 
after his return from the Sudan, Allenby to MacDonald, February 21, 1924, 
Tel. No. 50, FO/371/10039. For Zaghlul's views, see Kerr to TyrrgH, Febru­
ary 23, 1924, FO/371/10039.
4. Ibid.
5. Parliamentary Question, February 25, 1924, FO/371/10039. There were demon­
strations in Egypt as a result of these comments. Allenby to MacDonald, 
March 2, 1924, Desp. No. 142, FO/371/10039.
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The government's approach to the entire question was further expanded in
a personal letter from Tyrrell to Kerr on March 6. The letter was read and
corrected by MacDonald, constituting an authoritative albeit informal expression
of policy. Tyrrell, taking a long-range view of the initiative for talks,
their venue and contents, wrote that 'we should wait for the initiative in the
1matter to come from the Egyptian side.1 In addition, he felt that it was 
necessary to know Zaghlul's views and thereby assess prospects for success before 
serious talks could begin. This was crucial since 'It is unnecessary to empha­
sise the disastrous consequences which would follow from a breakdown of official
2
negotiations once they had been embarked upon.' Finally, the basic British 
desiderata of a separate regime for the Sudan and the continued presence of 
British troops in Egypt remained unchanged.
Movement towards negotiations quickened in early March with the imminent 
convening of the Egyptian Parliament. Kerr was informed by Zaghlul on March 7 
that Fuad, in his Speech from the Throne, 'would express the readiness of the 
Egyptian Government to begin negotiations with H.M. Govt, at an early date; and 
he suggested that Mr. MacDonald's message might be in the form of a reply to the
3
King's speech.1
A compromise was proposed on the basis of Tweedy*s earlier suggestion, namely, 
that simultaneous declarations of interest in negotiations be made by Egypt and 
Britain on the occasion of the opening of Parliament. At the same interview 
Kerr proposed to Zaghlul that the ground work for talks be laid in Cairo and an 
agreement signed in London. Zaghlul, however, was firm in his desire to negotiate 
only in London 'for he felt sure that if he were able to discuss the Egyptian 
question in person with Mr. MacDonald and men of all parties...he would be able
to convince them of reasonableness and his sincerity & that we have nothing to
. . 4lose by giving Egypt what she wanted.1
On March 9 Allenby informed MacDonald of the results of Kerr1s conversation
with Zaghlul. He recommended that a message be sent by MacDonald stating that
Egypt and Great Britain I am convinced are destined to be associa­
ted in a close and friendly relationship. It is our desire to see
1. TyVTell to Kerr, March 6, 1924, FO/371/10039.
2. Ibid.
3. ACKjerrj to HE, March 8/24, FO/141/821(17029)
4. Ibid.
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this relationship established upon lasting basis satisfactory to 
both countries and to this end His Majesty's Government are now 
and at all times ready to negotiate with Egyptian Government.1
London accepted this last suggestion since it 'does not seriously compromise
our position' and Allenby was informed that messages would be sent by the King
2
to Fuad and by MacDonald to Zaghlul along the lines suggested. With regard, 
however, to Zaghlul's desire to negotiate in London, Macdonald was uncompromising 
and cabled Cairo that
Proposal that forthcoming negotiations should take place in London 
does not commend itself to me and I fear that in making it Zaghlul 
Pasha is greatly underestimating the difficulties which will have 
to be overcome before any settlement is possible. I consider it 
essential that the whole ground covered by the negotiations should 
be thoroughly but unostentatiously explored in Cairo and complete 
agreement reached upon all important points before any date for 
the so-called official negotiations is even mentioned.^
Messages, however, were duly exchanged and the mutual desire to negotiate
was declared in an atmosphere of goodwill and congratulations that seemed to
4
characterise the early months of this period. Still, the serious questions of 
where negotiations would be held, their form and content were as yet unresolved.
Shortly after the opening of Parliament, the Residency returned to the 
question of negotiations. Essentially, the Residency continued to see itself as 
paving the way to talks between Zaghlul and MacDonald, its chief aim being to 
remove the obstacles standing between the two sides. Therefore once both dec­
lared a willingness to negotiate, Allenby and his advisers turned to the matter 
of the venue and formal invitation for the forthcoming talks. In this phase,
1. Allenby to MacDonald, March 9, 1924, Tel. No. 62, FO/371/10039.
2. For London's reaction, see: Murray, Minute, 10.3.24, and W.T[yrR2ll3.,
Minute, 10/3, to ibid. An indication of the Cabinet's role in formulating 
policy towards Egypt was the fact that here, as on other similar Egyptian 
questions, the Cabinet was informed by MacDonald of decisions after the fact 
rather than consulted beforehand. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 20(24), March 12, 
1924, CAB/23/47.
3. MacDonald to Allenby, March 13, 1924, Tel. No. 52, FO/371/10039.
4. For examples of the response in the British press, see: 'The New Egypt',
Manchester Guardian, March 17, 1924; and, 'The New Egyptian Parliament', 
Times, March 17, 1924.
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the Residency attempted to serve as an 'honest broker' between MacDonald and 
Zaghlul, negotiating, as it were, with both sides at the same time.
Originally the Residency and the Foreign Office agreed that substantive 
talks should take place in Cairo before formal signature of an agreement in Lon­
don. Since then, however, Zaghlul had expressed to Kerr his firm wish to 
negotiate directly with MacDonald. As a result, Tweedy proposed on March 18 that 
negotiations in London would be 'safer & more promising of success' because a 
refusal 'will be reminiscent of H.M.G.'s tactics in the winter 1918/19.'^
Keenly aware of local factors affecting the Residency's position, Tweedy justified
a sharp reversal of the Residency's previous approach because agitation in Par-
2
liament might force a harassed Zaghlul to take extreme political positions, and 
also because talks in Egypt could not be secret thereby subjecting Zaghlul to 
intense pressure. He concluded that 'The F.O. request[for talks in Cairc^ is
3
easily made but difficult to put into effect.'
According to Tweedy, there was much to commend London as the venue of talks.
First, to deny Zaghlul his express wish would destroy much of his recently
acquired confidence in British intentions. Second, 'Zaghlul trusts the Labour
party, but...does not trust the F.O. The Labour party is represented here by 
4the F.O.1 Third, if Zaghlul went to London, the storm centre would be removed
from Egypt. Finally, time was important 'as Egypt would be more amenable to
negotiations with a Labour Government than with a possible Liberal or Conservative 
,5successor.'
Furness agreed with Tweedy's views and urged that this case be made to 
London even though this 'is not likely to appeal to the F.O. so much as to our-g
selves.' Fear about the possible effects of the failure of talks in Cairo and 
apprehension about the volatile Egyptian situation weighed heavily on Residency
1. O.M.T^weedy]., 18/3/[24], FO/141/821(17029).
2. For example, Allenby reported that there was an uproar over the Sudan already 
on March 16. 'A section of the House insisted upon an amendment of the 
Minutes in order to place on official record the cries of "Long live the King 
of Egypt and the Soudan!" which had been raised during the reading of the 
King's' speech on the previous day.' Allenby to MacDonald, March 22, 1924, 
Desp. No. 189, FO/371/10040.
3. O.M.TQweedy^. , 18/3^243, FO/141/821 (17029) .
4* Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. R.F£urness] . , Minute, 19.3.24 to ibid.
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considerations and on March 29, Kerr, Amos, Furness and Tweedy recommended to
1
Allenby that the talks be held in London. Allenby accepted his advisers' views
and recommended to London on March 31 that Zaghlul be permitted to come to Lon-
2don for talks in June.
The Foreign Office accepted the Residency view only in part. Murray and
Tycstll saw some merit in Allenby's arguments but still felt that some preliminary
work had to be done in Cairo since they feared a repetition of the Adli nego-
3
tiations of 1921 and the dangerous consequences of failure. MacDonald agreed 
and noted that 'The Residency has changed its mind and we must accept its new 
decision. If Zag. could be made to talk informally on the two main points he 
might be approached. But to ask him formally to say what he expects will only
4
harden matters.' MacDonald then proposed a compromise between holding talks 
entirely in Cairo or in London. He agreed to hold substantive talks in London 
after Zaghlul had been informally sounded by Allenby in Cairo since
Until I have some indication that his aspirations do not conflict 
too hopelessly with our irreducible requirements regarding the 
Sudan and the defence of the Canal in particular I would be un­
willing to ask him to undertake negotiations in London.^
Amos, on leave in London, partially explained Foreign Office reluctance to have
1. ACK£errUto HE, March 29, 1924, FO/141/821(17029). There was disagreement at 
this meeting over prospects for success. Furness and Amos were pessimistic 
while Kerr would not make any predictions. Ibid. With respect to Residency 
fears over an explosion in Egypt in the near future, Keown-Boyd sent Kerr a 
letter on March 17 indicating that the present state was similar to that 
which preceded the outbreak in 1921. Patterson agreed. Kerr, however, was 
confident. ACKterr] to H.E., March 27, 1924, FO/141/484(278). Allenby accep­
ted Kerr's assessment and forwarded notes by Keown-Boyd and Patterson to Lon­
don with his own confident views. Allenby to MacDonald, April 12, 1924, Desp. 
Ho. 256, C.P.276(24), CAB/24/166.
2. Allenby to MacDonald, March 31, 1924, Tel. No. 83, FO/371/10040.
3. Murray, Minute, 1.4.24, and W . TQyrnall} . , Minute, 2.4.24 to ibid.
4. J.R.M£acDonald3., Minute, 8/4/24 to ibid.
5. MacDonald to Allenby, April 3, 1924, Tel. No. 67, FO/371/10040. This refusal
to hold talks in London also carried over to informal talks with Zaghlul’s
unofficial emmissary in London, Dr. Hamid Mahmud. Dr. Mahmud had been sent
to London by Zaghlul to begin early talks with MacDonald, his associates and
Labour leaders. After a number of meetings, Mahmud accepted the British re­
fusal to negotiate through him in London. For details, see: A.P[onsonby"}. ,
Memorandum, 2.4.1924, MacDonald Papers, FO/800/227; and A. Ponsonby, Minute, 
April 2, 1924, FO/371/10040; Ponsonby to Mahmud, April 8, 1924, FO/371/10040; 
and, A. Ponsonby, Memorandum, April 15, 1924, FO/371/10040.
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Zaghlul in London for political reasons. He informed Kerr that
I find Tyrrell opposed to allowing him to come, unless
the ground has first been cleared. His main reason is that 
S£aad_Il. Z[aghlul3. in London endeavouring to work on and with 
the I.L.P. [independent Labour Party] will excite great suspi­
cion in Parliament or the country, and therefore embarrass the 
P.M.1
In any event, the Residency response was one of intense disappointment to
2
'Mr. MacDonald's almost impossible instructions to hold informal talks in Cairo.' 
Kerr wanted to be able to inform Zaghlul that he could come to London and only 
then would it be possible to hold informal talks. Allenby agreed and rejected the 
Foreign Office comparison of the 1921 Adli conversations with the present situa­
tion. He felt that now Zaghlul and not Adli was at the centre and 'Besides, in 
the event of a breakdown, our position is safeguarded by the Declaration of
3February 28th, whereas, when the breakdown with Adli took place we had nothing.' 
Allenby, therefore, repeated his arguments in a cable to the Foreign Office and 
warned MacDonald of the danger of attempting to negotiate in Cairo before in­
viting Zaghlul to London or of predicating such an invitation upon prior agreement,
4
however informal, over troop dispositions and the future of the Sudan.
Once again the Foreign Office was faced with Residency reluctance, if not 
outright refusal, to follow explicit instructions. Tyr^ll very pointedly noted 
that 'These telegrams show very clearly that unless we are prepared to force 
the Residency to take any stand in these negotiations, we cannot expect assis­
tance from them and must resign ourselves to face the other alternative of nego-
5tiatrng with Zaghlul in London.' As a result, it was necessary to decide in 
principle whether an invitation could be issued to Zaghlul before any of the 
outstanding questions had been resolved. The decision was taken by MacDonald and 
on April 10 a personal letter was sent to Zaghlul in which the Egyptian Prime 
Minister was invited to London towards the end of June. MacDonald explained in
1. Amos to Kerr, March 31, 1924, FO/141/821(17029).
2. ACK[err] to HE, April 4, 1924, FO/141/821(17029).
3. Allenby, marginal notes to ibid.
4. Allenby to MacDonald, April 6, 1924, Tel. Nos. 86-87, FO/371/10040.
5. W.T[y^llU* r Minute, April 6, 1924, to ibid. Murray in a minute to the same 
cable sought to refute Allenby's arguments and stressed the danger in failure 
of talks in London. Murray, Minute, 8.4.24, to ibid.
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the letter that
I have carefully considered the manner in which these nego­
tiations should be conducted, as I am sincerely anxious that 
nothing should be left undone which might contribute to their 
successful outcome. It appears to me that a satisfactory solu­
tion of the principal questions at issue can only be reached 
as a result of personal discussion between ourselves.
The Residency had apparently carried the day.
Allenby, relieved by the invitation to Zaghlul, now asked to be 'authorised
to tell Zaghlul Pasha that a letter is on its way and to give him an idea of
its terms which I assume to be in a general sense conveyed in first paragraph of
your telegram and to avoid specific mention of controversial points that might
2discourage him.' However, by refusing to carry on preliminary talks before the 
invitation was extended, Allenby had largely isolated himself from the negotia­
ting process itself. MacDonald informed him that he could tell Zaghlul that a
letter was on its way but that he should not disclose its contents 'unless the
3
local situation makes it imperative.1 Allenby was then instructed to ascertain
informally Zaghlul's views on the Sudan and troops but 'On no account should you 
. . .  4initiate proposals.' MacDonald was attempting obviously to avoid a repetition 
of the events of 1921/22 when Allenby committed the government to a course of
action formulated in the Residency.
The refusal to give Allenby the authority he requested and the circumstances 
surrounding the contents of the letter to Zaghlul are indications of the diminu­
tion of Residency influence and the assertion of Foreign Office authority over 
the negotiations. With regard to the invitation, Allenby was neither consulted 
about its formulation nor informed of its contents when it was despatched to the 
Residency for delivery. Kerr commented on this strange procedure:
It [the invitation}has no covering despatch and we are sent no 
copy & inevitably Zaghlul is given the name Said instead of Saad.
1. MacDonald to Zaghlul, April 10, 1924, FO/371/10040.
2. Allenby to MacDonald, April 11, 1924, Tel. No. 94, FO/371/10040.
3. MacDonald to Allenby, April 14, 1924, Tel. No. 72, FO/371/10040.
4. Ibid. This sharp note was based on Murray's comments that Allenby should be
answered to the effect that 'the minimum requirements of HMG must be decided
by the Cabinet.' Murray, Minute, 12.4.24, to Allenby to MacDonald, April 11, 
1924, Tel. No. 94, FO/371/10040.
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It is a curious way of doing business not to let us have a 
copy of a document of such importance, but I do not see how we 
could protest without giving serious offence. We have the Sec­
retary of State's assurance that we rightly summarized his letter 
in presuming that it was an invitation in general terms & con­
tained no reference to points of controversy.-^
On April 19 Kerr delivered the invitation to Zaghlul who assumed it had been 
drafted in the Residency. Kerr then tried to draw the Egyptian Prime Minister 
out on the question of troops and the Sudan. Zaghlul assumed an extreme position 
on both issues calling for independence for and total withdrawal of
British troops from Egypt. Allenby, however, was not discouraged and informed 
London that the impression was 'that Zaghlul is deliberately stating his maximum
2
demands in the hope of getting indication of views of His Majesty's Government.’
He was convinced that there would be no change in Zaghlul1s attitude 'until I am 
able with your authority to indicate how far I think His Majesty's Government
3
might be prepared to meet any reasonable demands.' He did, however, reassure
MacDonald that 'care will of course be taken not to influence His Majesty's
4Government in any way.'
The Foreign Office strongly resisted this attempt to move the venue of 
negotiations back to Cairo. Murray again emphasized the importance of maintaining 
Cabinet authority over substantive issues. With regard to Allenby's request to 
discuss the limits of British policy, 'this course would be tantamount to conduct­
ing locally unofficial negotiations the onus of which the Residency appeared
5
anxious to shift to our shoulders.' Tyi'ft-ll tartly noted that 'In this matter of 
the conduct of negotiations with Zaghlul, the Cairo Residency seems to me to be 
as variable as the British climate....I do not think we need pay any more atten­
tion to Cairo's suggestions which are subject to such frequent and violent changes, 
and we had better therefore warn Lord Allenby...'^ Allenby was therefore in­
structed that if British policy was questioned by Zaghlul, 'you should confine
1. ACK^errjto HE, April 17, 1924, FO/141/821(17029). The Cabinet was in the same
position and was not informed formally of the invitation to Zaghlul.
2. Allenby to MacDonald, April 22, 1924, Tel. No. 109, FO/371/10040.
3. Allenby to MacDonald, April 22, 1924, Tel. No. 110, FO/371/10040.
4. Ibid.
5. Murray, Minute, April 23, 1924, to MacDonald to Allenby, April 30, 1924, Tel. 
No. 83, FO/371/10040.
6. W. T^ y'rf^ ll’]. , Minute, April 24, 1924, to ibid.
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yourself to stating that you reported at home his conversation with Mr. Kerr
on April 19th and are not authorised to discuss the matter further.'"^
However, somewhat abruptly and in the midst of signs of growing friction
between the Foreign Office and the Residency, the first stage, the background to
the talks, ended successfully with Zaghlul's acceptance on May 6 of MacDonald's 
2
invitation. Despite the increasing assertiveness of London in policy issues, 
from the Residency's point of view matters seemed to have come to their desired 
conclusion. There had been no impasse over the initiative for negotiations and 
Zaghlul had received an unconditional invitation to London. Allenby was quite 
optimistic about the future and he wrote to Hayter in London that 'the situation 
here, since S.Z. came to power, is looking better....Prospects for an agreement
3
are much brighter.' This, however, would be proven only by the talks themselves.
The Pinprick Policy
The actual negotiations were preceded by a period of manoeuvring by both 
sides in an apparent effort to obtain a tactical advantage. For London this 
meant an attempt to define the parameters of the forthcoming talks so that the 
reserved points would serve as their bases. Zaghlul, on the other hand, attempted 
to avoid being committed to the February declaration by negotiations. Against 
this background, he evolved a 'pin-prick policy' in which diplomatic and adminis­
trative pressure was applied in order to give him a freer hand at the bargaining 
table in London.
Manoeuvring began in earnest after MacDonald's statement in the Commons on
May 8 that the forthcoming negotiations were 'being undertaken in pursuance of a
4
policy already approved by Parliament.' This resulted in a storm in Egypt where
it was seen as an attempt to restrict the scope of discussion and to commit the
Egyptian government to the reserved points, a course which Zaghlul was forced to
5publicly repudiate.
1. Ibid.
2. Zaghlul to MacDonald, May 6, 1924, FO/371/10040.
3. Allenby to Hayter, May 6, jjL924), STAC, Hayter Papers.
4. J.R. MacDonald, May 8, 1924, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, CXCIII (1924^g
5. Allenby to MacDonald, May 11, 1924, Tel. No. 128, FO/371/10040.
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Allenby immediately sought an interview with Zaghlul during which the latter
expressed alarm at MacDonald's 'reiterated and in his opinion unnecessary allu-
1
sion to policy in February declaration.' In fact, Zaghlul, concerned by the
uproar in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies, sent a message to MacDonald through
Izzat Pasha in London that there would be no negotiations if his hands were tied
and that 'It should be clearly understood in that case that I shall resign 
2office.'
Although Allenby warned Zaghlul against threats of resignation, he was ob­
viously impressed by Zaghlul's difficulties and his apparent desire to negotiate. 
Allenby, therefore, reassured Zaghlul that while Britain would not depart from 
its policy, the negotiations would not be restricted. Zaghlul then asked for 
such reassurances in a private letter which he and Allenby proceeded to compose 
stating that the British government ’have no wish to restrict either basis or
scope of discussions, and will be ready to enter into a free exchange of opin- 
3ions.' Allenby recommended despatch of the letter since it would satisfy
Zaghlul, now apparently a major Residency concern, and because 'I do not think
. . 4that its wording would m  any way weaken your position...'
The Foreign Office, however, was not as impressed with Zaghlul's anxiety as
was Allenby. Murray believed that the proposed letter 'would be an error of
tactics at this state,1 since it 'would encourage him {zaghlulj to believe that he
has merely got to threaten resignation in order to induce the Residency to strain
every effort to persuade the Foreign Office to accede to whatever Zaghlul's de-
5
mands may for the moment be.' Crowe agreed and commented that 'Lord Allenby was 
not well-inspired in immediately coming forward with the definite proposal of
6the pre-conceived letter to Zaghlul, by which he has needlessly committed himself.' 
Instead it was decided that when Aziz Izzat Pasha met with MacDonald to deliver
1. Allenby to MacDonald, May 11, 1924, Tel. No. 129, FO/371/10040.
2. Allenby to MacDonald, May 12, 1924, Tel. No. 133, FO/371/10040.
3. Allenby to MacDonald, May 11, 1924, Tel. No. 130, FO/371/10040.
4. Allenby to MacDonald, May 11, 1924, Tel. No. 129, FO/371/10040.
5. Murray, Minute, 12.5.24, to Allenby to MacDonald, May 12, 1924, Tel. No. 133, 
FO/371/10040.
6. E.A.cUrowei. , Minute, May 12, to ibid. Allenby recognised the hastiness of 
his step and later cabled that he was misunderstood: The letter from MacDon­
ald should not be written on its own but that this was a suitable reply to a 
letter that might come from Zaghlul. Allenby to MacDonald, May 17, 1924,
Tel. No. 146, FO/371/10040.
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Zaghlul1s message, verbal reassurances would be given and the outline of an 
agenda sought.
On May 15, MacDonald met with the Egyptian Minister and gave him an aide 
memoire explaining the British position. He requested an agenda that would give 
the talks some coherent shape. MacDonald elaborated on this point verbally:
I told him I was much too busy to discuss the 'Egyptian ques­
tion’ without an agenda and that the only use I was making of the 
Declaration was that it provided an agenda to which we could 
agree. I handed to him the aide memoire provided by the Foreign 
Office. He said he would telephone it to Egypt and at the same 
time request Zaghlul to state what questions he wished to raise.
I said that without an agreement upon them it was quite useless 
trying to begin negotiations.^-
Izzat Pasha returned with Zaghlul1s reply on May 19. Instead of dealing with
an agenda specifically, Zaghlul stressed 'the fact that the Egyptian Government
does not consider itself bound by the unilateral declaration of the 28th February, 
2
1922.’ The Foreign Office was somewhat discouraged by what was seen as Zaghlul's 
evasiveness. However, while rejecting the validity of the reserved points,
Zaghlul did not rule out their discussion.
In the meantime the Residency continued to reassure London of Zaghlul*s 
willingness to negotiate a settlement despite some dissent within his own party.
It seemed as if Allenby and his advisers were more concerned with London's atti­
tude towards negotiations than with Zaghlul's. On May 17, Allenby cabled Mac­
Donald of his confidence in Zaghlul's desire to negotiate, adding that 'I 
earnestly trust His Majesty's Government will leave nothing undone which could
3
encourage and strengthen that intention.' Allenby confirmed this concern in a 
letter to Selby:
Saad Zaghlul is, I believe,...anxious to arrive at an agreement and 
he is the only man who is capable of carrying it through, if anyone 
can. He is...very suspicious of H.M.G.'s policy, and it is of first 
importance that we deal with him in all sincerity and honesty. There 
must be no finessing, no eye-washing. All must be above board.^
1. J.R. MacDonald, Memorandum, May 15, 1924, FO/371/10041. Also, see: Foreign 
Office, Aide Memoire, May 15, 1924, FO/371/10040.
2. Izzat Pasha to MacDonald, May 19, 1924, FO/371/10041.
3. Allenby to MacDonald, May 17, 1924, Tel. Ho. 145, FO/371/10040.
4. Allenby to Selby, May 17, 1924, MacDonald Papers, FO/800/218.
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Allenby maintained the pressure for a means to reassure Zaghlul. Both
Allenby and Zaghlul still attached great importance to the letter from MacDonald.
Given Zaghlul's anxiety, Allenby questioned the wisdom of pursuing the issue of 
an agenda.
The Foreign Office, however, was now in full charge and Residency advice
carried little weight. Rejection of Residency suggestions over the past weeks
finally led Tweedy to suggest in exasperation that 'we should tend for the time
being to disassociate ourselves from the role of advisors to the Foreign Office.
They have shown signs that they do not like our advice though they have not given
1
us anything which can be called a rebuff.1 The Foreign Office appeared to agree. 
Murray believed that Zaghlul was a master political tactician and that the Resi­
dency and the Foreign office, like Lord Milner in 1920, might be out-manoeuvred:
...from the point of view of H.M.G. early negotiations may be 
desirable, but for Zaghlul they are essential. He is, however,
gradually working round the Residency until in a short time it 
will be the Residency who are the suitors and Zaghlul who is 
coyly hanging back.2
It was, therefore, decided to send a long cable to Allenby repeating London's 
views about the progress of negotiations. MacDonald emphasized his reluctance 
to modify British policy in advance of negotiations simply to give Zaghlul a tac­
tical victory for public consumption. Allenby, in effect, was being cautioned
3
against continuing his unofficial negotiations.
Zaghlul meanwhile kept up the pressure and on May 25 declared to the Chamber
of Deputies that difficulties had arisen between Egypt and Britain. Only after
4
these had been resolved could negotiations proceed. Even Allenby was beginning 
to doubt the seriousness of Zaghlul's difficulties and this was confirmed when 
on June 3 Zaghlul announced in the Chamber that the problems had been overcome
5
and vaguely alluded to the British position on the Sudan.
Discussions between the Residency and Zaghlul continued intermittently
1. OMT[weedy] to Furness, May 23, 1924, FO/141/821(17029). Kerr was in London at
this time so the Residency point of view would be represented in any event.
2. Murray, Minute, 26.5.24, to Allenby to MacDonald, May 25, 1924, Tel. Nos. 158- 
159, FO/371/10041.
3. MacDonald to Allenby, May 27, 1924, Tel. No. 106, FO/371/10041.
4. Allenby to MacDonald, May 26, 1924, Tel. No. 160, FO/371/10041.
5. Allenby to MacDonald, June 8, 1924, Desp. No. 386, FO/371/10041.
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through June. Each time a new text for a Foreign Office letter was proposed by 
the Residency and Zaghlul called for new changes. Foreign Office officials were 
not surprised at Zaghlul's tactics but were increasingly impatient with Allenby. 
MacDonald very sharply noted:
We have gone far enough. Zaghloul knows well enough what nego­
tiations mean and he must make his own explanations to his people.
These repeated requests are weakness on Lord Allenby's part which 
may tie us up. Our simple position is: the four points are not
agreed and we wish to try and come to an agreement. If Zaghloul 
wishes to raise others we are willing to listen. That is all.^-
The matter was finally brought to a close by instructing Allenby that he was
2
to discontinue his talks with Zaghlul on the points at issue.
At the same time that Zaghlul was manoeuvring for position diplomatically, he 
also applied administrative pressure on the British in Egypt. Until the advent 
of the new regime, the Tharwat-Scott proces verbal of January 1922 on the status 
quo served as an interim basis for Egypt's administration. Although there were 
some deviations, these were not major. However, after Zaghlul became Prime 
Minister and a Wafd-dominated Parliament met, matters changed. The status quo 
and previous practices were challenged consistently in areas such as the rights of 
officials, the position of advisers, the Egyptian service of the Ottoman Tribute 
Loans and the subvention for the support of the British Army of Occupation in 
Egypt and the Sudan. This was a logical extension of Zaghlul's view that any 
agreements made or laws promulgated before the meeting of an elected parliament 
were invalid. The British, however, saw the situation differently. Amos believed 
that
So long as the Egyptian government was in the hands of men having 
some powers of cool judgement, that government could be counted 
on to display some awareness of the claims and powers of H.M.G.
There are unfortunately many indications that with the present par­
liament and government the maintenance of the status quo is going
1. J.R.M [acDonald). , Minute, 11/6/24, to Allenby to MacDonald, June 8, 1924, Tel. 
No. 183, FO/371/10041.
2. MacDonald to Allenby, June 13, 1924, Tel. No. 118, FO/371/10041. MacDonald 
expressed the Foreign Office view to Cabinet on June 18: 'Zaghlul Pasha 
appeared to be manoeuvring for position before committing himself definitely 
to come to London.1 Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 38(24), June 18, 1924, CAB/23/48.
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to be increasingly difficult.1
As early as March 16, Allenby warned London that the new Egyptian government
2
mxght not meet its obligations to retiring officials as mandated by Law 28.
As a result of British protests and, more importantly, because of the advice of
3
government law officers, the Ministry did not adopt this course. The position 
of those officials remaining in the Egyptian civil service, however, continued to 
deteriorate. Patterson, the Financial Advisor, soon became their advocate before 
the government. Still pressure on officials and hence on the Residency continued 
throughout the period and was a source of growing concern. A few days before 
Zaghlul's departure from Egypt in July, Allenby sent a long and depressing des­
patch citing numerous examples of British officials being isolated, their integrity
4
questioned and, generally, being made to feel insecure in their positions.
Another area in which this policy was applied was the State Budget. It was
here that the government and the Parliament had their strongest weapon. In April
the Ministry made use of this in an effort to amalgamate the budgets of the
Financial and Judicial Advisers with their respective ministries as opposed to
previous practice. This was protested by the Residency, through Patterson, 'as it
clearly represented an attempt to infringe the special positions of the Judicial
and Financial Advisers which...form part of the agreement backing up to the
5Declaration of the 28th February, 1922,' and the issue was dropped for the mean­
time. Eventually the Residency had to accede to the step but asked 'for formal 
assurance that Egyptian Government has no intention of impairing in any way 
existing powers and privileges of advisers.' There were, however, further attempts 
to weaken the special position of the advisers and to call into question their 
independent status. Amos, most concerned with the issue, was convinced that this
1. Amos to Furness, 17.6.24, FO/141/821(17029).
2. Allenby to MacDonald, March 16, 1924, Tel. No. 72, FO/371/10018. This was 
considered to be particularly serious because the law was registered with 
the League of Nations as an international agreement.
3. For details and the relevant correspondence, see: Allenby to MacDonald,
March 22, 1924, Desp. No. 192, FO/371/10018.
4. Allenby to MacDonald, July 25, 1924, Desp. No. 480, FO/371/10018. For a
detailed unofficial report by Thomas Russell Pasha, Commandant of the Cairo 
Policy, see: Russell to Murray, August 10, 1924, FO/371/10041.
5. Allenby to MacDonald, April 26, 1924, Desp. No. 286, FO/371/10040.
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was a sign of 'the initiation of a campaign of pin-pricks designed to make
their position more difficult.
The difficulties increased in June when the Parliamentary Budget Committee
published its report in the press recommending cancellation of the Egyptian
2subvention for the upkeep of the British Army in Egypt and the Sudan. Zaghlul
refused to modify his government's support for the recommendation because he
believed it would legitimise a situation, the continued presence of British
troops, which he had always opposed. Allenby was therefore instructed on July 3
to protest the action and ’add that this appears to be one of several deliberate
attempts on the part of the Egyptian Government to modify status quo to the
detriment of His Majesty's Government in advance of negotiations the initiation
3of which is consequently rendered more difficult.'
The last serious attempt to alter previous practice occurred in July when
the Egyptian Parliament considered the question of continuing the service of the
Ottoman tribute loans of 1855, 1891 and 1894 as guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty.
Zaghlul rejected the validity of the treaty for Egypt and instead asked in the
4
Chamber of Deputies: '...is it expedient to refuse payment?' This question
was important since a refusal would affect the interests of subjects of major 
powers other than British. Zaghlul, therefore, chose a middle course, namely, to 
meet the next payment due in July 1924 but to pay future installments into a
5
special account in the National Bank until the question was resolved.
The subject of greatest contention, however, remained the Sudan. Both Bri­
tain and Egypt regarded the Sudan with equal concern as is seen from the constant 
public references to its future. Here, too, pressure was exerted on the British.
1. Amos to Furness, June 28, 1924, FO/141/429(5308).
2. Allenby to MacDonald, June 8, 1924, Desp. No. 386, FO/371/10041. For the
correspondence over the A m y  subvention, see: Allenby to MacDonald, June 23,
1924, Desp. No. 412, FO/371/10049. The subvention, which began in 1907, was 
EE. 150,000 out of an estimated cost of EE.747,000 for the British A m y  in 
Egypt and the Sudan in 1924/25. These figures were given by Walsh, the Sec­
retary of State for War in reply to a Parliamentary Question asked on August
6. 1924, FO/371/10049.
3. MacDonald to Allenby, July 3, 1924, Tel. No. 138, FO/371/10049.
4. Allenby to MacDonald, July 11, 1924, Tel. No. 228, FO/371/10057. For details
about the loans and actions taken over them, see: J. Murray, Memorandum:
Ottoman Loans Secured on the Egyptian Tribute, June 10, 1925, FO/371/10895.
5. For the text of the Egyptian government's decision, communicated in a verbal 
note to the British and French governments, see: Allenby to MacDonald, July
11, 1924, Tel. No. 231, FO/371/10057.
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Allenby reported to London on growing Egyptian activity in the region. In May,
Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar {commander) of the 
Egyptian Army, wrote Allenby that there had been a considerable increase in 
Egyptian propaganda, which 'has taken the form of overtures to the younger and
1
more impressionable Soudanese, more particularly those in Government employment.'
In Egypt Zaghlul continued to assert that he sought ’to secure the complete
independence of Egypt and the Sudan,' and there was a great deal of ferment over
2
this issue in Parliament. Egyptian pressure extended to England where the par­
ticipation of the Sudan in the Wembley Commercial Exhibit was protested and Izzat
Pasha told the members of the Manchester Cotton Association on June 4 that
3Egyptian control of the Sudan was 'a question of life and death.1
Matters became more serious with the outbreak of rioting and anti-British
demonstrations in the Sudan on June 22 nearly leading to the declaration of martial
law. In this troubled atmosphere, Zaghlul declared in Parliament that 'We must
proclaim before the whole world before the English as well as others that we have
4
rights over the Sudan and that we hold to realization of these rights.' He then 
sent a provocative cable to the Acting Governor-General of the Sudan implying 
that the British were encouraging an artificial separatist movement and suppres­
sing sincere expressions of loyalty to Egypt by the Sudanese. This same message
5
was transmitted to MacDonald through Izzat Pasha.
1. Stack to Allenby, May 8, 1924 in Allenby to MacDonald, May 23, 1924, Desp.
No. 338, FO/371/10049. This was supported by local intelligence reports 
about the revived League of the White Flag led by a Dinkawi, ex-Egyptian of­
ficer, Ali Abd al-Latif, previously imprisoned for sedition. Sudan Monthly 
Intelligence Report, No. 358, May 1924, FO/371/10039.
2. Zaghlul's statement was made before a meeting of the World Parliamentary
Party on April 27. This was one of many statements made at the time, a num­
ber of which were to English correspondents for British consumption. Daily 
News, April 28, 1924. With respect to pressure in Parliament, see Allenby1s
report on Opposition attempts to discredit Zaghlul over the Sudan: Allenby
to MacDonald, June 1, 1924, Desp. No. 366, FO/371/10041.
3. Manchester Guardian, June 5, 1924.
4. Allenby to MacDonald, June 25, 1924, Tel. No. 205, FO/371/10050.
5. For Zaghlul's cable to the Acting Governor-General, see: Allenby to MacDon­
ald, June 27, 1924, Tel. No. 208, FO/371/10050. For the message to MacDonald 
see: Izzat Pasha to MacDonald, June 27, 1924, in ibid. Just as the Sudanese 
were being encouraged by the Egyptians to support a link with Egypt, there is 
evidence that Britain also encouraged the Sudanese to support the continued
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In an effort to reassure public and political opinion in Britain and the 
Sudan and to reaffirm Britain's position before the negotiations, Lord Parmoor 
told the House of Lords on June 25 that
I want to say in absolutely definite language that His Majesty's 
Government are not going to abandon the Sudan in any sense what­
ever. They recognize the obligations which have been taken towards 
the Sudanese and regard those obligations as of a character which 
this Government could not abandon without a very serious loss of 
prestige in all these eastern countries...I intend my language to 
be quite definite so that there can be no doubt hereafter.1
This programmatic statement by a Labour Minister was greeted in Britain with al­
most universal acclaim and, in some quarters, with relief.2
The response in Egypt to Parmoor's comments was at first moderate and res­
trained. On June 28, however, Zaghlul used the statement as evidence that British 
policy had not changed under MacDonald and announced his resignation in Parliament. 
The Residency was convinced that political manoeuvres were behind the act and 
that 'the ostensible object of Zaghlul's resignation appears to be to free himself 
from that part of his programme which relates to his entering into negotiations 
with His Majesty's Government.'^ In this way Zaghlul could free himself from the 
dilemma whereby negotiations could neither be avoided nor pursued successfully.
British presence in the Sudan. The Sudan government informed the Residency 
that because of Egyptian propaganda in May, the previous restraint imposed on 
matters to be negotiated between Britain and Egypt had been removed and the 
Sudanese 'were invited to express their wishes, with the result that they 
immediately took the opportunity to dissent from the views freely dissemina­
ted by the Egyptian press and officials that natives of the Sudan preferred 
Egyptian to British rule.' Khartum to Kerr, 15.8.24, No. 195, FO/141/805 
(8100). Even the Residency had to comment, 10/8/^41, that 'it is a little 
difficult to resist the impression that this is not quite spontaneous.* Ibid.
1. MacDonald to Allenby, June 30, 1924, Tel. No. 133, FO/371/10050. Parmoor was 
a former Conservative who was brought to the Foreign Office to deal with 
League of Nations Affairs and was Lord President of the Council.
2. The response in the press was enthusiastic. See the leaders in the following 
newspapers: Daily Chronicle, June 26, 1924 - 'Egypt and the Sudan'? Daily 
Mail, July 2, 1924 - 'Why We Mean to Stay in the Sudan'; Daily Telegraph, 
July 2, 1924 - 'Egypt and the Soudan'? Morning Post, June 27, 1924 - 'A 
Turning Point'? Manchester Guardian, 'Cairo and Khartoum'; Observer, June 
29, 1924 - 'Plain Words to Egypt'? Times, June 27, 1924 - 'Egypt and the 
Sudan'; and, Westminster Gazette, June 30, 1924 - 'Zaghlul Pasha and the 
Sudan'.
3. Allenby to MacDonald, June 29, 1924, Tel. No. 217, FO/371/10041.
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A day later, however, Zaghlul relented after having obtained the public support
of the King and Parliament and he withdrew his resignation.
From this point matters moved quickly. MacDonald made a statement on June
30 in the House of Commons which was considerably more moderate than Parmoor's
in tone, if not in content.1 This was followed by a conciliatory telegram to
Allenby for transmission to Zaghlul reviewing recent events. This telegram, which
could be made public if Zaghlul so desired, gave the reassurances sought earlier.
Zaghlul replied in kind on July 6 and only the date for the negotiations remained 
2
to be fixed.
The road to negotiations, however, was not to be cleared this easily. Before 
final arrangements could be made, a would-be Egyptian assassin wounded Zaghlul on 
July 12. Although the wound was not serious, matters were further delayed. In 
the meantime, MacDonald postponed the meeting with Zaghlul because of the forth­
coming Inter-Allied Conference and the pressure of parliamentary business. In 
fact, MacDonald, discouraged by few signs of success, suggested to Allenby that a 
preliminary meeting might be held during the summer in France where Zaghlul was
3
going to take the cure. There some informal agreement could be sought on the 
issue of troops and the Sudan, without which talks in London would be fruitless.
In any event, MacDonald could not meet with Zaghlul in London before late September. 
Thus, when Zaghlul sailed for Marseilles on July 25, there was still no clear in­
dication of where and when talks would be held and whether there was any hope for
success. There was only Zaghlul1s verbal acceptance of late September as a con-
4venrent trme for a meeting between the two Prime Ministers. The success of the 
talks would be known only when the two met.
1. Parliamentary Question (Mr. Hannon), June 30, 1924, FO/371/10041. MacDonald 
informed Cabinet that as a result of his statement 'the doors [to negotiations] 
appear to have reopened.' Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 39(24), July 2, 1924,
CAB 23/48.
2. The correspondence between MacDonald, Allenby and Zaghlul is enclosed in
Allenby to MacDonald, July 7, 1924, Desp. No. 446, FO/371/10041.
3. MacDonald to Allenby, July 14, 1924, Tel. No. 145, FO/371/10041.
4. Allenby to MacDonald, July 25, 1924, Tel. No. 245, FO/371/10041.
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CHAPTER NINE: THE NEGOTIATIONS
Perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of British policy was the formula­
tion of a long-term policy that could serve as a basis for a final settlement.
The need for an agreed upon negotiating position in 1924 emphasised, as it had 
in 1921, the diverse interests within the British establishment. These could be 
bridged only with difficulty.
This, however, was not readily apparent in the months immediately following 
Egypt's independence. Since Britain's short term approach was disengagement, 
long-term views held by different interests within the British government were 
not questioned seriously. Few debated at this time the Service position that 
British troops should remain in the vicinity of Cairo and Alexandria. No one 
seemed to argue against the need to reduce Egyptian influence in the Sudan, and 
some even believed that British annexation of the Sudan might be desirable.1
The Debate Over Policy
Although negotiations were not yet imminent, the mechanics of the British 
presence in Egypt imposed the need for policy decisions. A thorough review of 
policy could not be postponed for long and basic differences among British 
policymakers would again become obvious. Thus in 1923, for instance, when the 
technical question of the construction of troop accommodations arose, this in 
turn raised the political issue of British troops in Egypt. The hutted and 
tented camps used by the 12,000 British troops in Egypt were not suitable for 
further prolonged use. One type of replacement, lasting three to four years, 
could be erected at a cost of LE.144,000, while another, lasting fifteen to twenty 
years, would cost LE.420,000. Any determination would obviously involve a poli­
tical decision on the size of British forces in Egypt, the duration of their stay 
and their location.
1. The main objections to such a course were economic since the British Exche­
quer would have to underwrite the Sudan government's deficits without Egyp­
tian assistance. Murray, Minute on the Future of the Sudan, July 4, 1922, 
FO/371/7734. For attempts to restrict Egyptian influence in the administra­
tion of the Sudan, see Curzon to Allenby, April 5, 1922, Desp.No. 394, 
FO/371/7752.
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In February 1923 Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War, forcefully 
presented to the Cabinet the Service view that troops in Cairo and Alexandria 
should not fall much below their present strength.'*' He believed that this was 
necessary to protect the High Commissioner and his staff, the wireless station 
at Abu Zabal, the R.A.F. stations at Cairo and Alexandria and the fresh water 
canal supplying the Suez Canal Zone. The War Office was concerned that positions 
now abandoned could be reoccupied during a crisis only at great cost and perhaps 
with difficulty. In addition, there was concern about the possible loss of 
troop amenities and training grounds without adequate compensation. Derby there­
fore recommended that the more expensive barracks be built.
The Foreign Office reaction was mixed. Murray felt that of the three alter­
natives to the War Office approach, namely, withdrawal to Alexandria and environs, 
to the Canal Zone alone, or to Alexandria and the Canal Zone, the first was most 
feasible. Despite the disadvantages and loss of prestige involved in any with­
drawal, Murray supported a withdrawal to Alexandria with a force of 3,000, as 
Cromer had recommended in 1883, because Britain controlled the sea and Egypt's 
independence prevented that country's use as a British military clearing house.
Furthermore, he believed that a compact force at Alexandria would be cheaper
2
to maintain than units at Cairo, 150 miles from the nearest port. Crowe dis­
agreed and Curzon, afraid of a battle in Cabinet, ordered Murray's memorandum
3
on the subject suppressed.
The discussion over British strategic and political interests could not be 
so easily resolved. The issues were again debated in the summer of 1923 when 
it was apparent that the internal situation in Egypt was becoming stable. The 
forum for the debate was the inter-ministerial Committee of Imperial Defence 
\j3Id ]. Because of Colonial Office concern over Palestine, Admiralty concern for 
the safety of the Suez Canal, the General Staff's desire to use Egypt as a major 
base for the defence of the Canal and the entire region, the Committee agreed on 
July 12, 1923 that 'the view of the General Staff should prevail that the Suez
1. D[erby^., The Garrison in Egypt, February 9, 1923, C.P. 89 (23), CAB/24/258.
2. Murray, Memorandum, February 13, 1923, FO/371/8960. For Cromer's recommenda­
tions, see: Cromer to Granville, October 9, 1883 in Pari. Papers, Egypt No.
1 (1884) [2C.-3844"], pp. 50-51.
3. E.A.C Ctrowe] ., Minute, February 17, and Cjurzonj., Minute, 18/2, to Murray, 
Memorandum, February 13, 1923, FO/371/8960.
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Canal can best be defended from the Sinai Peninsula with a force based on Egypt 
and with advanced detachments at Rafa and Akaba.''*'
All were agreed that the region was vital to imperial strategy. The ques­
tion, however, was how British interests should be protected. The ensuing 
debates in the CID clearly demonstrated the divergence of strategic perceptions, 
based on departmental functions and interests.
Derby presented a memorandum on July 24 to the Committee carefully outlining
2
the position of the General Staff with its land-based approach. The War Office 
was influenced by fear of the possibility of attack from within Egypt ('caused 
by a sudden uprising of the population, political intrigue on Bolshevik lines
3
or the defection of the Egyptian army’ ), the assumed need to protect the Sudan 
and the Canal through the cooperation of Egypt, as well as general Mediterranean 
strategy, namely, defence of Iraq and British interests in Turkey. In addition, 
the War Office was reluctant to give up training facilities not available in 
Gibraltar and Malta. Derby therefore favoured the retention of large forces in 
Egypt as currently situated.
The Admiralty, however, did not view Egypt as a British place d'armes for 
the Middle East. Instead, it was concerned primarily with the Suez Canal as a 
vital link with Indian Ocean and Australasian shipping. The growth of a possibly 
unfriendly Japan and the shift of strategic centres to distant Eastern waters 
turned their attention to the possibility of a blocking attack on the Canal. As 
a result, Leo Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty, warned the CID that 'While 
recognising the difficulties which would confront us in attaining a recognised 
and explicit power of control in the Suez Canal Zone, the naval staff feel policy
4
should be directed towards this end.'
The Foreign Office adopted a third approach. They opposed the War Office 
call for the more or less permanent occupation of Egypt because of previous
1. CID, Minutes of 174th Meeting, July 12, 1923, CAB/2/3. This view was pre­
sented to the Cabinet in April by Lord Cavan, Commander of the Imperial 
General Staff: D[erby]., Future Size of Our Regular Army, April 17, 1923,
C.P. 200(23), CAB/24/159.
2. D \erbyf. , Military Policy in Egypt, July 24, 1923, CID Paper 439B, CAB/4/10.
3. Ibid.
4* CID, Liability of the Suez Canal to Blocking Attack, Note by the First Lord
of the Admiralty, L.S.A[meryj. , July 24, 1923 , CID Paper 438B, CAB/4/10.
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British disapproval of the long-term occupation of the Ruhr, the fear that Egypt 
would appeal to the League on this issue, and the desire to reach a political 
settlement with Egypt. Murray attacked the War Office contention that Egypt was 
needed to the Sudan: 'The view taken in this department has been the
precise converse...that as long as we control the Sudan, Egypt is at our mercy.'*
Lindsay agreed and this formed the basis for a long Foreign Office rebuttal of
Derby's position to the CID:
A standing defence scheme for the Suez Canal must take into account
political as well as purely military considerations, and it is 
therefore suggested that the basis for such a scheme should be sought 
in the perpetuation of effective British control over the Soudan and 
Palestine and the acquisition of such control over the Sinai penin­
sula, including, if possible, the Port Said-Suez Railway, pari passu 
with the progressive withdrawal of the present garrison from the in­
terior of Egypt.2
Finally, the Colonial Office, sensitive to British responsibilities as
Mandatory Power in Palestine, opposed the use of the mandated territory for the
defence of other British interests in the Middle East. Given the terms of the
Palestine Mandate, 'the utilisation of Palestine as a place d'armes either for
the defence of the Suez Canal or for general British military purposes in the
3
Middle East is more likely to be challenged....'
Thus the divergence in departmental interests and responsibilities meant 
that the General Staff and War Office saw Egypt as the Aldershot of the Middle 
East and called for the control of the interior; the Admiralty was primarily 
concerned with the Suez Canal and sought occupation of the Canal Zone; the 
Foreign Office thought of Egypt in a diplomatic context and, therefore, saw con­
trol in terms of the Sudan, Sinai and Palestine; and, the Colonial Office, re­
sponsible for the administration of Mandatory Palestine, viewed Egypt, the Canal
1. J. Murray, Minute, 30.7.23, to D£erb$. , Military Policy in Egypt, Memoran­
dum by the Secretary of State for War, July 24, 1923, CID Paper 439B, in 
FO/371/8983.
2. Foreign Office Memorandum respecting Military Policy in Egypt, August 9,
1923, FO/371/8983. This document, written by Murray, subsequently became 
CID Paper 446B. Allenby was consulted on its composition and minuted: 'I
am in complete agreement with the memorandum.' Ibid.
3. CID, Colonial Office Memorandum, Military Policy in Egypt, August 31, 1923,
CID Paper 448B, CAB/4/10. The memorandum notes that while the Mandate for
Syria and Lebanon permits the stationing of troops for its defence, no such
provision is included in the Palestine Mandate.
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Zone and Sinai as the basis for defence.
Debate in the CID continued into the autumn. It was temporarily resolved
at a meeting on October 2. Lord Derby stated the War Office position and was
supported by Lord Cavan, CIGS, who had the agreement of General Congreaves,
former GOC of Egypt and the latter1s successor, General Haking.^* Amery now
agreed with the War Office position even though he felt that unnecessary diplomatic
friction with Egypt should be avoided. Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for Air,
agreed with the other Services since 'Egypt was vital to air communications of 
2
the Empire.' Curzon's was the only voice calling for some withdrawal from the 
interior and a reduction in troops.
The Service view generally prevailed and the Committee recommended that:
(i) The vital requirements of imperial defence were the Canal, the aerial estab­
lishments at Heliopolis (near Cairo) and Abukir (near Alexandria) and the wire­
less station at Abu Zabal (near Cairo); (ii) from a military viewpoint, it was 
vital to have a force within striking distance of Cairo and Alexandria; (iii) 
maintenance of troops in Cairo and Alexandria, though desirable, was not vital;
(iv) given military and diplomatic considerations, the best course in negotia­
tions would be to have British troops stationed in barracks near Cairo and Alex­
andria and in return to relinquish the barracks actually in the cities; (v) the 
size and eventual location of the garrison and air force were reserved for 
further consideration.^
The Cabinet that considered the CID recommendations confirmed the isolation 
of Curzon and the Foreign Office on this issue. Conclusions (i) and (ii), affir­
ming the strategic importance of troops in the interior, were adopted, while 
conclusions (iii) and (iv), reflecting Foreign Office concern over diplomatic 
difficulties, were reserved for further consideration. Curzon warned the Cabinet 
that 'he anticipated great difficulty in carrying them into effect in his future
negotiations with the Egyptian Government. The opposition in Egypt might even
4involve a rising against the British troops.'
1. CID, Minutes of the 176th Meeting, October 2, 1923, CAB/2/4.
2. Ibid.
3. This paraphrase of the recommendations is based on: Salisbury}., Military
Policy in Egypt, October 8, 1923, C.P. 414(23), CAB/24/162.
4. Cabinet Minutes, October 15, 1923, Cabinet 48(23), CAB/23/46.
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With the change in government in Britain and Egypt in early 1924, the 
debate on the British position underwent a qualitative change. Consideration 
by the CID of specific proposals, such as troop strengths and locations, was 
irrelevant in the face of Zaghlul' s maximalist demands for indepen­
dence and a total British withdrawal. Zaghlul's attitude simplified matters and 
polarised the issues under consideration. As defined by Zaghlul, it was no 
longer a question of the number of British troops in Egypt, but whether there 
should be any at ally it was not a question of sharing authority in the Sudan, 
but whether or not Britain remained there. The effect of this was to focus 
attention on the general areas of British policy interests rather than on their 
specific content.
Movement in this direction was apparent in the first weeks of MacDonald's 
ministry. On February 4, 1924, the CID once again considered British strategic 
interests in Egypt. Comments by the new Chairman, the Lord Chancellor, Viscount 
Haldane, indicated the changed atmosphere. In contrast with previously detailed 
and sharp statements, 'Lord Haldane expressed doubts as to whether the committee 
could do more than recommend to the Prime Minister that it is essential to pro­
tect the canal, and that Cairo was the most convenient place for the garrison
1
to secure this desideratum.' The Committee produced a conclusion that tenta-
2
tively expressed Haldane's sentiments. The Cabinet, however, only approved a 
minor proposal dealing with troop movements and delayed decision on the more
3
detailed recommendations. Although there was an awareness that the two major
points of friction would be the Sudan and troops, there was no specific position
4
taken beyond no abandonment and no total withdrawal.
A British Negotiating Position
The first serious consideration of a negotiating position came in April 
after the preliminary manouevring over an invitation had ended. In response to 
London's request for suggestions, Kerr, Amos, Furness and Tweedy met and agreed
1. CID, Minutes of the 180th Meeting, February 4, 1924, CAB/2/4.
2. M.P.A. Hankey, Egypt, April 16, 1924, C.P. 260(24), CAB/24/166.
3. Approval was given for the withdrawal from Egypt of one brigade of field
artillery. Cabinet Minutes, February 4, 1924, Cabinet 9(24), CAB/23/47.
4. Tyrrell to Kerr, March 6, 1924, FO/371/10059.
226
that the claim to protect foreigners and minorities would probably be dropped 
and that British interests would centre on the Sudan and troops. On the first 
issue, there seemed to be 'no question of the surrender of that territory to 
Egypt or the recognition of Egyptian sovereignty to the exclusion of British in­
fluence and control', and on the second, Kerr felt that the British government
1
'would agree to a withdrawal in the direction of the Canal.' Allenby summarised
this position in a cable to London on April 6 as 'Effective military control of
the Suez Canal', and 'Maintenance of a predominant political and administrative
control of Soudan', being his understanding of the irreducible requirements of
2
the British government.
At the same time, the Foreign Office was also examining the options open to
the government. On April 7 Murray circulated a memorandum on the four reserved
points, essentially a revised version of his earlier memorandum suppressed by
Curzon. It became clear that if the protection of minorities and foreigners was
dropped, the four points could be reduced to two major areas: the future of
the Sudan and defence of strategic interests or troops.
With respect to the Sudan, there seemed little room for debate as 'the
farthest limit to which His Majesty's Government can safely go to meet Egyptian
demands...consists in a reaffirmation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium...as de-
3fined by the Boutros-Cromer Convention of 1899.' The question of troops, 
however, was far more complex. The results of the 1921 negotiations seemed to 
prove to Murray that no treaty was possible if British troops remained in Cairo 
or the nearby region. Thus, the disadvantages of withdrawal, whether to Alexan­
dria, to the Canal, or to both, had to be weighed against the advantages of 
concluding a treaty. This, however, was a political decision which Murray, with
4
Tyrrgll's approval, left for the Cabinet.
Despite the need for a Cabinet decision to define the specifics of a British 
position, none was forthcoming. When the Cabinet met on May 1 to consider the
1. A.C.KjerrJ. , to H.E. , March 29, 1924, FO/141/821 (17029) .
2. Allenby to MacDonald, April 6, 1924, Tel. No. 88, FO/371/10040.
3. Foreign Office, Memorandum on Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations, April 7, 1924, 
FO/371/10040.
4. Murray, Minute, 8/4/24, to Allenby to MacDonald, April 6, 1924, Tel. No. 88,
FO/371/10040. The Residency felt that Murray overestimated the value of
troops: 'The presence of the troops in Cairo is now really more of an embar­
rassment than anything else.' A.C.K.Herr]., to H.E., April 25, 1924, 
FO/371/821(17029).
situation, they were informed by MacDonald that 'it would not be possible for
Great Britain to evacuate the Sudan and to disinterest herself in that region,'
and 'that a very great military problem arose out of the desire of the Egyptian
1
Government for the evacuation of Cairo by the British forces.' No decision, 
however, was taken on the details of a negotiating position, nor could there be 
one in the current circumstances.
The only area in which there eventually was some movement was the Sudan. 
This, however, was not so much an attempt to establish a viable negotiating posi­
tion. It was more an effort to define through diplomatic means the Sudan's 
status in such a way that Egypt's influence would be diminished. In this connec­
tion, Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General of the Sudan, submitted to Allenby a 
long memorandum on the future of the Sudan. Stack saw three alternatives: the
removal of British control and annexation of the Sudan by Egypt; maintenance of 
the status quo; and, increased British control. In view of recent events and 
uncertainty in the region, Stack argued that 'the predominance of British control
in the actual administration of the country should be defined more clearly and
2established more securely.' Alarmed by increasing Egyptian activity, the
Residency and the Foreign Office both agreed with Stack's approach and there were
suggestions that his proposal might have to be imposed unilaterally if negotia- 
3tions failed.
Support for a firm stand in the Sudan was so widespread that it would have 
been difficult to take any other position. The Treasury, concerned about Bri­
tain's guarantee of Sudan loan totalling LE.8,540,000 in principal and LE.755,200
per annum in interest, favoured stability through Britain's continued control of 
4
the area. The King was concerned because 'His Majesty considers that if there 
is any good in the country it is due to the sacrifice of British lives and
1. Cabinet Minutes, May 1, 1924, Cabinet 29(24), CAB/23/48.
2. Stack to Allenby, May 25, 1924, No. 69, in Allenby to MacDonald, June 1, 
1924, FO/371/10042. Stack followed this highly specific memorandum with a 
note to MacDonald in August. Stack to MacDonald, August 11, 1924, No. 141L, 
FO/371/10045.
3. For responses along these lines by Allenby, MacDonald and Murray, see: Allen 
by to MacDonald, June 29, 1924, Desp. No. 423, FO/371/10050; and, J. Murray 
6/8/24, and J.R.M., 11/8/24, Minutes to Allenby to MacDonald, July 26, 1924, 
Desp. No. 481, FO/371/10051.
4. O.E. Niemeyer (Treasury) to Foreign Office, July 3, 1924, FO/371/10050; and 
Niemeyer to Foreign Office, August 24, 1924, FO/371/10052.
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British m o n e y . T h e  Australian Prime Minister informed MacDonald that 'it is
imperative in order to ensure peace and prosperity in that country that the
2
present predominance should be maintained...' Finally, in the months that pre­
ceded the negotiations there was a constant stream of delegations and petitions
ranging from Lancashire cotton workers to various business interests calling on
3
the government to protect British interests in the Sudan.
A final attempt to summarise a British position was made by Allenby at the 
end of July. Shortly before he left Egypt on home leave, Allenby sent a despatch 
urging a progressive withdrawal from Cairo and then Alexandria towards the Suez 
Canal, on the one hand, and the abandonment of most of Britain's traditional 
rights in Egypt, on the other. In effect, Allenby advocated the abandonment of 
Egypt to her own devices, only securing Britain's vital strategic interests.
This was urged in the belief that Egypt
...is debauched by indiscipline and in its pursuit of liberty is 
oblivious of justice. Its political leaders are men who will have 
great difficulty in steering between excessive oppression and ex­
cessive complaisance to popular sentiment and most of who^are full 
of bitter personal and party hatreds, while even those high offi­
cials who conscientiously wish to carry on an efficient administra­
tion are hampered by an ignorance - in matters, for example, of 
finance and science - of whose depths they are wholly unconscious.
The populace, in spite of a certain affability of temper, is ren­
dered docile chiefly by fear, and when fear is removed, they, like 
their betters, are naturally prone to violence. They are not con­
spicuously fanatical, but easily roused, especially in Alexandria, 
to xenophobia, and when roused they delight in the worst excesses.^
The only thing in which Allenby appeared interested was that Britain be in a
1. Lord Stamfordham to Crowe, March 31, 1924, FO/371/10040.
2. Masterton Smith (Colonial Office) to Foreign Office, June 19, 1924, 
FO/371/10041.
3. In early June a deputation of representatives of Lancashire cotton interests 
attempted to see MacDonald to express the concern of masters and men over 
the Sudan, C.P. Duff (Downing Street) to Selby, June 9, 1924, FO/371/10031. 
Similar expressions of concern were received with great frequency. For ex­
ample: London Chamber of Commerce to MacDonald, June 13, 1924, FO/371/ 
10050; Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to Foreign Office, June 18, 1924, 
FO/371/10050; Keilly (Empire Cotton Growing Corporation) to Murray, June 
18, 1924, FO/371/10049; National Union of Manufacturers to MacDonald, June 
25, 1924, FO/371/10050; Manchester Chamber of Commerce to MacDonald, July 
7, 1924, FO/371/10050; and, Manchester Association of Importers and Expor­
ters, July 25, 1924, FO/371/10050.
4. Allenby to MacDonald, July 28, 1924, Desp. No. 486, F0/371/10042.
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position to intervene as in 1882, if and when the day of reckoning came.
By the time Zaghlul sailed for France and Allenby returned to England, there 
still was no clearly defined negotiating position. Given Zaghlul's claims and 
the uncertainty about the nature of the negotiations, this was not surprising.
Disturbances in the Sudan
The weeks before the Zaghlul-MacDonald conversations were marked by distur­
bances in the Sudan and growing acrimony between the British and Egyptian 
governments. Zaghlul's statements on the Sudan in May and June, on the one hand, 
and Parmoor's and MacDonald's, on the other, were followed by an upsurge of pro- 
Egyptian activity in the region. The Sudan Intelligence Service was particularly 
concerned by the activities of Egyptian troops, officials and the press, linking 
them to agitation by the League of the White Flag in the Sudan. There was sus­
picion, but no proof, of Egyptian support, advice and financing for anti-British 
agitation.^
The threatened outbreak came on August 10 when the cadets of the Khartoum
2
Military School marched through the town brandishing rifles and shouting slogans. 
The mob that gathered was quickly dispersed and the cadets were peacefully dis­
armed and arrested by British troops which had cordoned off the School. A day 
later, a far more serious outbreak of violence occurred at Atbara, where $ne. aoJi 
^Egyptian Railway Battalion rioted and caused much damage. The situation was 
viewed with gravity by the Sudan authorities. British units and a company of dis­
mounted Arab Mounted Infantry were rushed to the scene since Egyptian troops were 
now believed to be unreliable. The Egyptian Railway Battalion was surrounded and 
fired upon after provocation, leaving eighteen rioters wounded and four dead.
The Arab Infantry were the only troops in the area at the time and fired without 
orders.
1. See: Sudan Monthly Intelligence Report, No. 359, June 1924, No. 360, July
1924, and No. 361, August 1924, FO/371/10039.
2. For a general report of events in the Sudan, see: W. Sterry to Kerr, August
21, 1924, in Kerr to MacDonald, August 31, 1924, Desp. No. 557, FO/371/10053. 
For a diary of the outbreaks, see: Account of Events Connected with Pro-
Egyptian Propaganda in Various Parts of the Sudan During August, 1924, in
Sudan Monthly Intelligence Report, No. 361, August 1924, Appendix, FO/371/ 
10039. In addition there were ongoing reports to London, based on reports 
from British officials in the Sudan.
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Muhammad Said Pasha, the acting Prime Minister, reacted initially with con­
cern and disapproval. He became hostile after the local press, Members of 
Parliament, students and urban crowds expressed outrage over the 'bloody measures
of retaliation1 against Egyptians and Sudanese demonstrating for an end to
2
'oppressive and exclusive British control.' Muhammad Said blamed the British
for the deteriorating situation and requested a joint Anglo-Egyptian Commission
of Enquiry into the shootings. On August 15 the Egyptian government issued a
communique which was correct in tone and accurate in detail, with one notable ex-
3ception - there was no mention of any troops in the area other than British.
Kerr protested to the Egyptian government that this 'gross perversion of facts'
gave the impression that it was the British troops who inflicted the casualties,
4
but this was of little use.
In London, sentiment over the Sudan was fast hardening. As early as August 
13 MacDonald told his advisers that 'he felt that the time had come to speak 
plainly to the Egyptian Government'. He instructed Kerr to warn Muhammad Said, 
'in the most explicit manner', that the British saw themselves and the Sudan
5
government responsible for security in the region. MacDonald was convinced that 
'Agitation from Egypt alone is responsible for the trouble and we must do nothing 
to weaken confidence in the Soudan or give away our position t h e r e . A  series 
of notes passed between the Egyptian legation in London and the Foreign Office 
which brought the issue no closer to resolution but left MacDonald outraged at
1. Muhammad Said privately expressed his regret to Kerr over the events. Kerr 
to MacDonald, August 11, 1924, Tel. No. 263, FO/371/10051.
2. Kerr to MacDonald, August 13, 1924, Tel. No. 267, FO/371/10051.
3. For text, see: Kennard (Rome) to MacDonald, August 18, 1924, Desp. No. 718,
FO/371/10052.
4. Kerr to MacDonald, August 15, 1924, Tel. No. 276, FO/371/10051. For the
Egyptian reply, see: Kerr to MacDonald, August 17, 1924, Desp. No. 518,
FO/371/10052,
5. These views were expressed by MacDonald at an emergency conference which was 
attended by Allenby, Stack, Schuster (Sudan government), Selby and Murray. 
Record of Conference Held in the Room of the Secretary of State at the Foreign 
Office on August 13th at 11 a.m., FO/371/10051. Kerr received his instruc­
tions in MacDonald to Kerr, August 14, 1924, Tel. No. 158, FO/371/1005J!-.
6.
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their language and insulting manner of delivery.
2Against a background of anger and growing doubts about negotiations,
MacDonald wrote to Zaghlul on August 23, ostensibly to confirm the latter1s visit 
to London at the end of September. In fact, the letter was a stern rebuke to 
Zaghlul and his government over events in the Sudan and the subsequent statements. 
MacDonald claimed that the violence was 'the direct outcome of persistent propa­
ganda engineered and financed from Egypt and designed to create disorder and
3
embarrass the Sudan Government.' Furthermore, the Egyptian government's ’bad 
faith' and responses 'disappointed any hope that I was dealing with honest men
4
set upon pursuing a peaceful settlement by straightforward and honourable means.'
MacDonald warned that such an approach would not intimidate but instead stiffen
the British government.
The negotiations were again in serious danger of collapse. According to the
Egyptians in London, time and place were the issue and, according to Muhammad
Said, the various British notes to Egypt and MacDonald's letter to Zaghlul were 
5
the cause. In any event, Zaghlul replied on August 29 denying all the charges 
against his government. He concluded by stating that:
The contemplated negotiations cannot take place - but it is neces­
sary to dissipate this thick fog which hinders honest men from 
seeing and recognising other honest men. For this I hold myself 
at your disposition with the object of a full and complete expla­
nation, the result of which will be, I am convinced, to help in 
the re-establishment of that reciprocal good will without which 
nothing just or lasting can be undertaken.6
1. Particularly insulting was a note delivered by the Third Secretary of the
Legation to Crowe. Muhammad Fahmi Husayn Bey to MacDonald, August 16, 1924,
FO/371/10051.
2. For doubts expressed in the press, see leaders in: Times, August 13 and 16,
1924; Manchester Guardian, August 14, 1924; Morning Post, August 14, 1924;
and, Westminster Gazette, August 14, 1924. For MacDonald's doubts, see: 
MacDonald to Kerr, August 23, 1924, Tel. No. 165, FO/371/10052.
3. MacDonald to Zaghlul, August 23, 1924, FO/371/10051.
4. Ibid.
5. For a report on an interview with the Egyptian minister, see: W.T\yrrell). , 
Minute, 27/8,£L924], FO/371/10042. For Muhammad Said Pasha's views, see:
Kerr to MacDonald, August 30, 1924, Tel. No. 294, FO/371/10042.
6. Zaghlul to MacDonald, August 29, 1924, FO/371/10053.
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MacDonald responded positively on September 6 and Zaghlul then informed him 
that he would arrive in London on September 23.^
The Negotiations
The negotiations had come full circle. The early basis for the relationship 
between the two men had been friendship. The hope for successful negotiations 
between their governments rested on that assumed friendship. However, the pre­
liminary stages of the negotiations, events and the opposing positions, had 
destroyed any real possibility of successful talks. Now only informal ‘conver­
sations1 could be held to restore the relationship that had formed the basis for 
negotiations and high hopes of success in the first place. This did not augur 
well for the resolution of the current Anglo-Egyptian difficulties nor for a 
final settlement.
Given this situation, the Foreign Office still made no serious attempt to 
define a negotiating position. On September 20, Murray circulated a memorandum 
indicating the major questions likely to be raised during the conversations: 
the Sudan; protection of imperial communications; service of the Ottoman Tribute 
Loans; foreign officials in Egypt; protection of foreign interests; and, the 
position of the High Commissioner. Murray's intent, however, was to outline areas 
of discussion and not to propose solutions. His advice was that MacDonald await 
Zaghlul's proposals rather than offer any of his own.
Lord Milner in 1920 and Lord Curzon in 1921 were manoeuvered into the 
position of placing proposals before Zaghlul and Adly respectively.
In each case the result was the same. The Egyptians rejected the 
offers, but managed nonetheless to secure the concessions without con­
ceding anything in return. The Department venture to urge that in 
light of these experiences it is most important that Zaghlul should 
be induced to come forward with proposals, and that until he produces 
some that are really adequate we should confine ourselves to the role 
of critic.2
Finally, MacDonald met with Ponsonby, his Under-Secretary of State, Tyrrell, 
Stack, Schuster, Selby and Murray on September 23 to discuss the British posi­
tion. No formal conclusions resulted from the meeting, but the conversation
1. MacDonald to Zaghlul, September 6, 1924, FO/371/10053; and, Zaghlul to 
MacDonald, September 11, 1924, FO/371/10042.
2. J. Murray, Memorandum on the Forthcoming Conversations with Zaghlul Pasha, 
September 20, 1924, FO/371/10042.
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indicated the lines along which MacDonald was thinking. The two major topics
were the security of imperial communications and the Sudan. MacDonald believed
that the present British position in both cases was intolerable. With regard
to the British garrison in Egypt, he felt that it was anomalous that British
soldiers patrolled the capital of an independent state. He, therefore, 'had
been thinking that the time had come for withdrawing from this responsibility and
confining the duty of British troops in Egypt to the protection of the Canal and
1
also of our imperial air communications.' As for the Sudan, MacDonald said that 
the object, if possible, was to find some solution whereby Britain would retain 
control of the area and yet enable him to make concessions to the Egyptians. The 
difficulty was that MacDonald and his advisers were talking of concession in a 
negotiating context, while Zaghlul at first had called for the abandonment of
2
the entire British position, and now agreed only to informal 'conversations'.
The first meeting between MacDonald and Zaghlul was held on September 25
with Selby, Murray, Hamid Mahmud and Kamil Salim Bey present. After agreeing
that the first session would be 'a general and non-committal talk1, the discussion
deteriorated into recriminations about recent events in the Sudan and who bore
3
responsibility for the situation. The meeting ended without any conclusion and 
a further session was agreed upon.
The divergent perceptions of the nature and expected outcome of the conver­
sations indicated the difficulties ahead. Selby reflected the British view that, 
whatever they were called, the meetings were more or less formal negotiations.
In a letter to Kerr, two days after the first session, he reported that:
...We have had one long meeting with himfzaghlu^r at which he showed 
his usual slipperiness, and I am not confident that we shall be able 
to pin him to anything that we can consider. On the other hand, the 
Prime Minister's handling of him is quite admirable, he showed him­
self, at the first interview, firm and very patient. In fact an ad­
mirable negotiator with Orientals. But, of course, his time is too
1. Record of Conference held at 10 Downing Street on Tuesday, September 23rd, 
at 10 a.m., FO/371/10042.
2. In this connection Tyrrell informed the War Office that 'so far as can be fore­
seen, the conversations will be of an informal and purely preliminary nature, 
and it is not proposed to discuss any matters of detail, which will be reser­
ved for formal negotiations later - if they ever materialise.1 Tyfre.ll to
J.B. Crosland (War Office), September 25, 1924, FO/371/10042.
3. Record of a Conference Held at 10 Downing Street on September 25, 1924 at
10.30 a.m., FO/371/10042.
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fully occupied to allow that to continue indefinitely, and I think 
he has made up his mind to clinch matters on Monday, in other 
words, to inform Zaghlul that unless he is prepared to put forward 
proposals as regards the Sudan, which he could regard as reason­
able, there is nothing more to be said and it would be useless to 
discuss the question of Egypt.1
Zaghlul viewed the situation otherwise and later complained that he had 
come to London expecting to have private talks with MacDonald alone. Then
Imagine my surprise...when I found Ramsay MacDonald surrounded by a 
whole host of rigid Foreign Office officials and advisers, indica­
ting that formal conversations were about to be opened. In the pre­
sence of this official atmosphere, I was left no option but to state 
the whole Egyptian case forthwith, and as Ramsay MacDonald had the 
Sudan at the top of his agenda, I knew that the door was immediate­
ly closed on any hope of fruitful discussions. An impasse had 
been reached before we started.2
Still MacDonald persisted and wrote to Zaghlul immediately after the first 
session asking that he, Zaghlul, formulate specific proposals which would re­
concile Egyptian claims with British responsibilities. He added a note warning, 
in this connection, that
It is absolutely impossible for me to agree to any proposal which 
would interfere with the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken 
by the British government towards the inhabitants of the Sudan or 
prevent us safeguarding the continuity of the policy of internal 
development and pacification for which we have been responsible 
for so long and with such success.^
In addition, MacDonald asked the CID for technical advice regarding the strategic
feasibility of a withdrawal to the Canal so that concessions could be offered to 
4Egypt.
Zaghlul, however, balked. He was unwilling to have the talks formalised by
1. Selby to Kerr, September 27, 1924, MacDonald Papers, FO/800/218.
2. Zaghlul made these comments to Delaney after the failure of the talks.
Delaney to Wavell, May 21, 1940, KAP.
3. MacDonald to Zaghlul, September 25, 1924, FO/371/10042.
4. J.R.M. [acDonald]. , Draft Minute by the Prime Minister, September 26, 1924,
FO/371/10042. There were no consultations in Cabinet, and MacDonald only 
reported to Cabinet on the talks and his note to the Committee of Imperial 
Defence on September 29. Cabinet Minutes, September 29, 1924, Cabinet 51(24), 
CAB/23/48.
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an agenda, perhaps out of fear that within such a context he, too, would have 
to make concessions which might be difficult to defend in Egypt. He therefore 
informed MacDonald that these proposals were not in accordance with the terms of 
their earlier correspondence in which 'It was understood between us that nego­
tiations were to be free and unrestricted, and the fact of entering them should 
in no way prejudice Egyptian rights.1^  He stated categorically that 'it will be
absolutely impossible for me to negotiate upon the basis and subject to the
2
restrictions outlined in your letter.'
The second session took place on this note on October 1. Zaghlul claimed 
that MacDonald's request was unfair since he could not honestly formulate pro­
posals and take the British position into consideration at the same time. Once 
this hurdle was overcome, Zaghlul refused to discuss the sensitive issue of the 
Sudan and argued that logically Egypt should be the first point. He outlined 
what he considered an acceptable settlement: withdrawal of British forces from
all of Egypt; withdrawal of the Financial and Judicial Advisers; an end to all 
British control over the Egyptian government and the abandonment of the claim
to protect the Suez Canal. This Zaghlul described as 'an Egypt for the Egypt- 
3
ians.' In return, Zaghlul agreed to a special treaty of alliance with Britain.
After some initial hesitation by Zaghlul, both sides arranged to have Murray
and Hamid Mahmud meet after the third session of the talks to work out details
of a draft treaty that would not commit either side. The Sudan had not been
seriously discussed.
There was an atmosphere of uncertainty after the second session. The lack
of information on the progress of the talks led the Times to complain that
'...Parliament and the nation are as completely in the dark as ever they were
4under the old diplomacy.' MacDonald met the CID on October 2, to discuss Bri­
tain's strategic needs in light of the talks and it was apparent that the un­
certainty was widespread: 'He assured the Committee that there was no need to 
be nervous, as suggested in the newspapers recently; the position was precisely
1. Zaghlul to MacDonald, September 26, 1924, FO/371/10042.
2. Ibid.
3. Record of the Second Conference held at 10 Downing Street on September 29,
1924 at 5:00 .p.m. , FO/371/10042. For another description of this session, 
see: MacDonald to Kerr, October 1, 1924, Tel. No. 185, FO/371/10042.
4. Times, October 1, 1924.
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what it had been before the conversations, and as regards his public declaration
1concerning the Sudan, he had no intention whatsoever of departing from it.1
MacDonald then asked the Committee to consider how British strategic interests
could best be secured if the status quo was abandoned. He was afraid that the
maintenance of the status quo would cause the talks to break down leading
possibly to disturbances: 'Thus very much the same situation might arise in
Egypt as was now occurring in India, where a strike was taking place in the
2Government offices themselves.' Disturbances would, in MacDonald's opinion, 
eventually result in the annexation and some form of Crown Colony status for Egypt.
Despite Allenby's support for a gradual withdrawal to the Canal after an 
agreement was ratified, the Service Chiefs were largely unmoved. They reaffirmed 
the position they took the previous year, namely, that the most that could be
conceded was withdrawal to the outskirts of Cairo and Alexandria. The only con­
clusion reached by the Committee, therefore, was that the Service heads would 
continue to examine strategic needs in Egypt in light of the developing political 
situation. MacDonald still did not have specific details from the CID which could 
be used during his next meeting with Zaghlul.
The final session of the conversations took place on October 3. The discus­
sion centred on whether there was a need for British troops to defend the Canal 
or whether Egypt was capable of defending it alone. This debate went to the heart
of the issue between MacDonald and Zaghlul. It was not a question of how many
and where British troops should remain, but whether or not there should be any 
troops in Egypt. Both side restated their positions and then Zaghlul abruptly 
ended the discussions. He told MacDonald that:
...he saw that the Prime Minister was overwhelmed with work. For 
his part the climate here did not suit his health. He had no wish 
to increase the Prime Minister's labours, and he was thinking of
leaving England in seven or eight days, especially as his own Par­
liament would be opening next month....Zaghlul thanked the Prime 
Minister sincerely and regretted that they had failed to reach a 
definite settlement, but to do so would take a great deal of work
of which the Prime Minister's time would not admit.3
1. CID, Minutes of the 188th Meeting, October 2, 1924, CAB/2/4.
2. Ibid.
3. Record of the Third Conference held at 10 Downing Street on October 3, 1924 
at 10 a.m., FO/371/10043.
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The conversations ended on a final note of mutual recriminations over default 
of the service of the Ottoman Tribute and the conditions of foreign officials 
in the Egyptian Civil Service thus ending the 'great expectations' that had 
been so hopefully entertained in January 1924.
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CHAPTER TEN: ALLENBY'S DECLINE
London's Ascendancy
In retrospect, the failure of the MacDonald-Zaghlul conversations was 
almost inevitable. Zaghlul's maximalist demands and it ° ^
posiWiotO meant that there was little room for negotia­
tion or compromise. Only acceptance or rejection was possible. Within this 
m i n ®c
context,rfconcessions by MacDonald in return for a guarantee of minimum British
interests in Egypt would not work.
Despite the early friendship between the two men and the declared sympathy
between their respective parties, orthodoxy on Egypt, as in many other areas
of foreign affairs, was the basis of MacDonald's policy. This general approach
was apparent from the Labour government's earliest days. Sidney Webb's wife,
Beatrice, wrote as early as January 18, 1924, that 'Sidney came away feeling
that the Cabinet would err on the side of respectability - too many outsiders
1
and too many peers.1 MacDonald was constrained by his government's minority 
position, a desire to prove himself and the need to prove Labour's respectabi­
lity, whether in the selection of his Cabinet or the formulation of foreign 
policy. With the exception of the Labour Party's approach towards Russia, 
MacDonald, the pragmatist, attempted and largely succeeded in maintaining the
continuity of foreign policy rather than making the anticipated radical break 
2with tradition. Equally important, MacDonald reasserted London's primacy in 
policy formulation.
As noted, MacDonald's orthodoxy was apparent in his policy towards Egypt,
1. Margaret Cole (ed.), Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1912-1924 (London, 1952), I, 
263. A few weeks later, on February 8, 1925, Beatrice Webb recorded in 
her diary that 'Of course these Labour men are new brooms and they have no 
"silly pleasures," and, on the whole, they are aware of their own ignor­
ance and desperately anxious to "make good."' Do., Beatrice Webb's Dia­
ries, 1924-1932 (London, 1956), II, 4. Lyman described the Labour govern­
ment as vjust such a mixture. Tories, and some Labourites, though they 
saw a tendency to favour the intellectuals at the expense of the trade 
unionists.1 Lyman, op.cit., p. 103.
2. Apparently Baldwin grew closer to MacDonald, proposed a truce on foreign 
policy and was consulted throughout 1924. During the October 1924 crisis, 
Baldwin told Stamfordham that 'He (Baldwin! likes and trusts the Prime 
Minister and has had from time to time interesting talks with him....' 
Middlemas, op. cit., p. 268.
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Although he was willing to make greater concessions than his predecessors,
MacDonald still refused to concede British control over the Sudan or the basis
of Britain's imperial interests in Egypt. His despatch to Allenby, October 7,
1924, intended for publication, summarised the conversations with Zaghlul and
the British position in such a way as to reassure the British public that their
interests were secure in Labour's hands.^ The overwhelmingly favourable response
2
of the press to this despatch indicated that MacDonald had indeed succeeded.
MacDonald also succeeded in re-establishing London's authority over the 
Residency in Cairo. At the start there was some friction between London and 
Cairo, particularly over the early stages of the negotiations. However, once the 
focus moved from Cairo to London, influence over policy formulation by the al­
ready weakened Residency further diminished.
There were several reasons for these developments. As Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary, MacDonald had a virtually free hand in foreign affairs. Al­
though the Cabinet was informed periodically about general policy, it often had 
little voice in its specific formulation. After the defeat of the Labour govern­
ment in November 1924, Sidney Webb wrote in this connection that the Cabinet
was seldom troubled by MacDonald with foreign affairs. On the 
latter subject, the practice was for the P.M., perhaps every few 
weeks, to take occasion to explain in frank but general terms 
the problems he was dealing with, the difficulties he was encoun­
tering and the prospects of success. His exposition might be 
followed by a few questions and comments, but there was practical­
ly no discussion. This was largely due to the common lack of in­
formation. 3
1. MacDonald to Allenby, October 7, 1924, Desp. No.  , FO/371/10043.
2. A survey of the press shows that there was widespread feeling that the gov­
ernment had behaved responsibly. For examples, see: Daily Chronicle,
Manchester Guardian, Morning Post and Times, October 8, 1924.
3. Webb wrote this memorandum shortly after the fall of the first Labour govern­
ment. Sidney Webb, 'The First Labour Government," Pol.Qly., XXXII, l(Jan.- 
Mar. 1961), p. 20. Webb's view was confirmed by Beatrice who wrote in her 
diary on March 31, 1924, that '...MacDonald remains "the mystery man" to all 
his colleagues - who know little or nothing of his thinkings or doings. Cer­
tainly neither Henderson, Clynes/ Sidney nor any other member of his Cabinet
(possibly Thomas) are in his confidence either with regard to Foreign Affairs 
or Parliamentary or electoral tactics...' Cole, op.cit., II, 20. Lord Mor­
rison later noted that 'Ramsay MacDonald, by the time he became Prime Minis­
ter, was already showing evidence of that remote and defensive attitude to 
those around him which in the end left him with virtually no friends in the 
real sense of the word.' Lord[Herbert^Morrison, Herbert Morrison: An Auto­
biography (London, 1960), p.99.
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The situation was much the same at the Foreign Office. Selby, MacDonald's 
Principal Private Secretary, wrote to Kerr in the midst of the Egyptian nego­
tiations that
In the present state of affairs there is only one director and 
controller of our policy, and that is the Prime Minister. The 
rest look on simply assisting in what they are called upon to 
do. By these methods he has really achieved wonders in Europe 
up to the present, and I cannot help but feel that he may be 
equally successful as regards Egypt.1
MacDonald's control of Egyptian affairs was also made easier by the fact 
that, once his authority was imposed and Allenby returned to Britain in the 
summer of 1924, relations between the two men improved. Selby claims to have 
been responsible for the change. He wrote to Furness on August 7 that
the Prime Minister saw Lord Allenby yesterday, and I am happy 
to say that I think all passed off very well. I have, however, 
had a good deal of trouble in preparing the ground, and it was 
with some anxiety that I awaited the issue. I saw Lord Allen­
by afterwards, and,he seemed delighted on the whole with his 
reception. The disagreeable issue was not raised by the Prime 
Minister.2
Many years later, writing of the relationship between the two, Selby noted
that, 'slightly suspicious the one of the other at first, their relations soon
became very close, jwithj Lord Allenby often observing to me that he had never
had more satisfactory talks about Egypt than with Mr. MacDonald, who manifested
3much understanding and insight.*
Allenby was never an imposing figure in London's world of committees and 
conferences and he now moved even further from the centre of policy formulation. 
While occasionally consulted, his role was peripheral and he rarely attended 
policy conferences or discussions. In the final weeks before the MacDonald- 
Zaghlul conversations, the only major meeting that Allenby attended was the CID 
conference on policy on October 2, and the impression was that he attended more 
in his capacity as Field Marshal than as High Commissioner. There was little 
doubt that as important as the Residency was in determining .short-term Egyptian
1. Selby to Kerr, September 27, 1924, MacDonald Papers, FO/800/218.
2. Selby to Kerr, August 7, 1924, MacDonald Papers, FO/800/218.
3. Selby to Wavell, December 9, 1936, KAP.
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policy, its influence had declined when long-range policy was finally considered.
MacDonald's orthodoxy and control over policy notwithstanding, Egypt's 
affairs were as yet not settled. The only basis for the British position was 
the 1922 unilateral declaration, the unofficial Scott-Tharwat proces verbal, 
and the 'Monroe Doctrine' to the Powers. There remained, therefore, a need to 
adopt a policy which would reconcile British-determined conditions of interest 
with the new realities of Egypt so that stability for the short-term and a final 
settlement in the more distant future was possible. Meanwhile, however, Mac­
Donald, in his few remaining weeks as Prime Minister, continued to mark time.
He was 'waiting for something to turn up,' or, in his words rather than in Mr. 
Micawber's: 'In the absence of such agreement [with Egyp-0 the position of my
Country in relation to Egypt will continue to be governed by the policy adopted
2
when the Protectorate was withdrawn.'
The Stack Assassination and Allenby's Ultimatum
The relative stability anticipated in MacDonald's last statement on Egypt 
did not continue for long. Within days of a new government taking office in 
London, headed by Stanley Baldwin with Austen Chamberlain as Foreign Secretary, 
a violent explosion occurred in Egypt, dramatically altering the framework of 
Anglo-Egyptian relations.
At 1.30 p.m. on November 19, Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General of the Sudan 
and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, was fatally wounded in an attack on the streets 
of Cairo. Suffering wounds in the abdomen, hand and foot, Stack lingered in 
shock for approximately thirty hours and died at 11.45 p.m. on November 20. 
Herbert Asquith, the former wartime Liberal Prime Minister, was Allenby's guest 
at the Residency when the attack occurred and described the events in a letter
1. Even the Residency eventually recognized that the proces verbal was an un­
official document. Furness wrote that 'My view is that the proces verbal
of January 20, 1922 was a binding agreement upon the Sarwat Ministry of 1922 
and that it gave, vis-a-vis that Ministry, bilateral force to a part of the 
1922 Declaration which itself was of course .unilateral: but that it is not
a binding engagement upon subsequent ministries. 1 R.FjjirnessJ. to Henderson, 
26.10.25, FO/141/515 (14382 Pt. I). Percival, the Judicial Adviser, agreed 
with Furness and Henderson and called the proces verbal a 'great moral 
force'. Percival, Minute, October 28 to ibid.
2. MacDonald to Kerr, October 10, 1924, Tel. No. 191, FO/371/10043. MacDonald 
informed Kerr that this phrase would be used in the Speech from the Throne.
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to Chamberlain:
We...had hardly sat down to Lunch when the news arrived 
that the Sirdar, who had just got into his car, had been 
attacked in one of the principal.streets of the City, by a 
gang of from seven to ten young men of the Effendi class, and 
had received three wounds, and that his Aide-de-Camp had been 
shot in the chest. His chauffeur, an Australian, was also 
wounded in the leg and arm, but most gallantly drove on at full 
speed to the Residency, where the Sirdar was already lying on 
a couch in the next room.
The Ministers, with Zaghlul at their head, who for weeks 
past with their henchmen in the Chamber and the Press, have 
been denouncing English rule in the Sudan...came here in the 
afternoon huddled, cowering, and panic stricken, to express 
their sympathy. As Allenby grimly remarked to me, they were 
not ‘genially1 received.^
The mood among the British in Cairo was grim. Despite the formal expres-
2
sions of regret by the Egyptian government, anger ran high and was directed
primarily towards Zaghlul and his followers. Allenby could barely suppress his
fury during a hasty visit to King Fuad, a few hours after Stack succumbed to
his wounds. He denounced Zaghlul’s communique to the press as 'quite inadequate
and almost light hearted in its tone' and implicitly threatened Fuad's position
if the latter would not express his regrets as King and Stack's Commander-in- 
3
Chief. The British community in Egypt, still bitter over the earlier wave of 
attacks and the treatment of foreign officials by Zaghlul's government, was in a 
state of shock. Gerald Delaney, long-time resident and Reuters correspondent 
wrote that
It is almost impossible to describe the bewilderment and indig­
nation caused by the Sirdar crime. Egypt has become a country
1. Asquith to Chamberlain, November 23, 1924, Private and Personal, Chamberlain 
Papers, FO/800/256. For a similar account, see: Asquith to family, Novem­
ber 22, 1924, in Asquith, op. cit., II, 218. Asquith was in Egypt as part 
of a tour of the region with his son, Brigadier Arthur Asquith, who as asso­
ciated with cotton interests in the Sudan. For other accounts, see: Wavell,
op. cit., pp. 109-10; and, Gardner, op. cit., p.247.
2. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 19, 1924, Tel. No. 360, FO/371/10042, des­
cribes regrets expressed by Zaghlul; and, Chamberlain, November 21, 1924, 
Desp. No. 1146, FO/371/10043, for a description of a visit by the Egyptian 
Minister to Chamberlain.
3. A[llenby). , Minute, November 20, 1924, F0/141/514 (17490 Pt. I).
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of sensations, but this outrage has transcended everything 
hitherto and it is impossible to predict what may be the out­
come. The feeling among the British community is impossible 
of expression.1
The anger and bitterness came to a head over the funeral arrangements made 
for Stack. P.K. Campbell, Stack's ADC, also wounded in the attack, described 
the events leading to the Sirdar's funeral.in the Anglican Church of All Saints:
When the seating in the small church was first considered by 
Lord Allenby no mention was made of special accommodation for 
the Egyptian Ministers. Clark Kerr later influenced Lord 
Allenby to direct that a prominent position be given to Egyp­
tian Ministers. Bishop Gwynne with whom Lord A. discussed the 
question did not agree with Lord A. and expressed himself in 
no uncertain terms.2
Asquith described the funeral itself as 'a simple but moving ceremony':
The whole British garrison was turned out and lined the streets:
The Coffin was covered only by the Union Jack, Allenby having, 
very properly, refused to allow the Egyptian flag to be upon it.
There were no demonstrations; the crowd was silent and stupe­
fied; and the moral effect of the spectacle seemed to me to be 
impressive and even imposing.3
1. G.C. Delaney, Egypt, 1924 - Motes for Lt.Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, KAP.
2. P.K. Campbell to Wavell, May 16, 1941, KAP. Some bitterness is seen here to­
wards Clark Kerr, presumed by many in Egypt to be the author of Allenby's
moderate policies in previous years.
3. Asquith to Chamberlain, November 23, 1924, Private and Personal, Chamberlain 
Papers, FO/800/256. With regard to the impact of the Stack assassination in 
Britain, the initial reaction of the press was mixed. All expressed horror 
at the attack on and then death of Stack. Most called for firmness in the 
matter of British control of the Sudan. Beyond this, views were varied.
Papers such as the Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph and the Morning 
Post, were most extreme in their response and called for the open or indirect 
revocation of independence: Daily Express, 'Outrage', November 20, 1924;
Daily Mail, 'The Attack upon the Sirdar1, November 20, 1924, and, 'Revoke 
Egyptian Independence', November 22, 1924; Daily Telegraph, 'The Egyptian 
Outrage', November 20, 1924, and 'Trustees for Egypt', November 21, 1924; 
Morning Post, 'The Shooting of the Sirdar', November 20, 1924, and, 'Murder 
Most Foul', November 22, 1924. Other newspapers, such as the Daily Chronicle,
Daily News, Manchester Guardian, Observer, Sunday Times, Times and Westminster
Gazette condemned the attack but warned against the inopportune imposition of 
a harsh policy. For such views, see: Daily Chronicle, 'The Cairo Outrage,'
November 20, 1924, and 'Crime in Egypt', November 22, 1924; Daily News, 'A 
Warning to Egypt,' November 22, 1924; Manchester Guardian, 'The Egyptian Dan­
ger,' November 20, 1924, and, 'The Murder in Egypt,' November 22, 1924; Obser­
ver , 'The Hand of Anarchy,' November 23, 1924; Sunday Times, 'The Egyptian
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The course that Allenby and his advisers pursued during the initial days
that followed Stack1s murder seemed at first to be a radical departure from the
policies that had been adopted by them since the winter of 1921. In place of
moderation and accommodation, they chose a policy of seemingly harsh retaliation.
Instead of concessions to Egyptian aspirations and withdrawal from the day-to-
day management of Egypt's affairs, the Residency reverted to a policy of sharp
and direct intervention in internal affairs reminiscent of the earlier pattern
of British rule. The only familiar note struck during these early days was the
attempt, once again, by the Residency, in a time of crisis, to re-assert its
authority and to direct policy forcefully - even if that policy was not approved
by London. And yet, Allenby's approach was in a very real sense consistent with
his behaviour since his arrival in Egypt in 1919.
Within hours of the attack on the Sirdar, Allenby cabled London that, in
view of the political bearing of this act on Egypt and the troubled Sudan, he in-
1
tended to 'take immediate vigorous action.' He explained that he intended to 
demand an apology, the vigorous prosecution of the criminals, a large indemnity, 
the withdrawal of Egyptian personnel from the Sudan army, increased irrigation 
in the Sudanese Gezirah beyond the 300,000 acre limit, an improvement in the con­
ditions of service and retirement of foreign officials in Egypt, the maintenance 
of the powers and privileges of the Financial and Judicial Advisers, and, the 
safeguarding of the position of Director-General of the European Departments of 
the Ministry of Interior. Failing compliance by the Egyptian government, Allenby
intended to warn that 'His Majesty's Government will take appropriate action to
2
safeguard their interests in Egypt and the Soudan.'
Allenby further explained that the action he proposed to take, a series of 
demands in the form of an ultimatum that would resolve the major outstanding 
issues, was based on the following considerations:
Spirit of indiscipline and hatred which Egyptian Government have
Crisis,' November 23, 1924; Times, 'The Cairo Outrage,' November 20, 1924, 
and, 'The Death of the Sirdar,' November 21, 1924; Westminster Gazette, 'The 
Outrage in Cairo,' November 21, 1924. The Daily Herald, 'Shall We Make the 
Same Mistake Again,' November 22, 1924, of course, warned the British govern­
ment to 'remember the dignity of the Egyptian State.'
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 19, 1924, Tel. Nos. 362-3, FO/371/10043.
2. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 20, 1924, Tel. No. 368, FO/371/10043.
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incited by public speeches and through activities of their Wafd
cannot but be regarded as contributory to the crime. I should
wish therefore that its effect be brought home to the present 
Government particularly...
...further than this it seems desirable and salutory to 
impress the country as a whole by some signal act of assertion.^-
Allenby's final words indicated his true intent - 'to settle our account with
2the present...Ministry.'
The notion of settling accounts by ultimatum was not a new one, but appears
to have been in the air in Cairo for some time. Hornsby, Governor of the
National Bank of Egypt and one of Allenby's associates, wrote on November 21 that 
'The British Govmt. has allowed the Egyptians to break away from the status quo 
in the last two years, but was contemplating the .presentation of a "friendly 
ultimatum" to the Eg. Govt., summoning them to a strict observance of the status
3
quo.' Allenby confirmed this several weeks later when he wrote to his sister 
that 'Stack's murder merely hurried a line of action, on our.part, which had been 
inevitable. The attitude of Zaghlul would have necessitated my ultimatum any-
4
how. '
The form that such an action might take could perhaps be discerned from 
similar events which occurred shortly after the war when several Turkish generals, 
among them Ali Ihsan Pasha, refused to disband their armies as required by the 
terms of the Armistice. Allenby sailed to Constantinople in February 1919 where, 
as he wrote,
I met the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War.
I gravely told them why I had come, and refusing to hear any 
arguments, I left them the text of my demands in English and
in Turkish. They were quite taken aback; and I do not think
they will forget it while they live.^
There could be little doubt that Allenby would take equally forceful action on
this occasion, when he felt that the stability of the enterprise he and his
associates had constructed was threatened by elements such as Zaghlul and the Wafd.
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 20, 1924, Tel. No. 369, FO/371/10043.
2. Ibid.
3. £sir B. Hornsby], Memorandum (ms.)21/11/24, STAC, Hornsby Papers, Box I, File I.
4. Allenby to Sister (Nell), 23.12.24, KAP.
5. Allenby to Lady Allenby, 5.2.19, KAP.
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London's response to the events in Egypt was immediate. The Cabinet met on
November 20 to consider the situation and approve measures proposed by Chamber-
lain. After considering Allenby1s cables and the draft prepared by Murray and
Chamberlain, it was agreed that 'the crime calls for decisive action with a view
to putting an end to the campaign of hatred which has been stimulated in Egypt
by a long series of attacks on the persons and authority of British officers and
officials in the Sudan, attacks which the public utterances of Zaghloul have 
1encouraged.' Chamberlain's instructions to Allenby were approved, measures taken
to assure military support, and, most important, the requirement that the Cabinet
approve the draft communication prepared by Allenby before its submission to the
Egyptian government.
The Foreign Office cabled urgent instructions to Allenby which reached Cairo
2
shortly after 7.30 a.m. on November 21. Chamberlain concurred with the need for 
decisive action, as well as an apology and the punishment of the attackers. Pay­
ment of an indemnity by the Egyptian government, however, was considered 'the
3
least part of the reparation to be expected.' Chamberlain expanded on the meas­
ures to be taken to end Egyptian influence in the Sudan but with regard to 
increased irrigation of the Gezira, of great concern to Egypt dependent upon the 
Nile waters, he called for
The appointment of an Egyptian member of the commission to be 
set up by Your Lordship to examine a possibility of extending, 
without detriment to Egypt, the three hundred thousand acre area 
to be irrigated by the Blue Nile Dam.^
Finally, Allenby was explicitly instructed to prepare a draft communication for 
consideration by the Cabinet before submission.
5Although there were some calls for dramatic action, Chamberlain and the
1. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 61(24), November 20, 1924, CAB/23/49.
2. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 21, 1924, Tel. Nos. 217-18, FO/371/10043.
The times of despatch and receipt of cables becomes crucial in the develop­
ments. A record of the times cables were despatched, received and decyphered
in Cairo is in FO/141/432 (7946) and FO/141/514 (17490 Pt. I).
3. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 21, 1924, Tel. No. 217, FO/371/10043.
4. Ibid.
5. Cecil suggested the re-imposition of martial law. Cecil to Chamberlain,
November 21, 1924, BM, Cecil Papers, add. 51078. Cecil withdrew his sugges­
tion after critical comments by Murray and Tyrrell. W.T[yrrellj. , Minute, 
November 21, 1924, FO/371/10044.
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Foreign Office took a grave but calm view of matters. On November 21, Chamber- 
lain more clearly than hitherto rejected the demand for the payment of an indem­
nity by the Egyptian government and stressed again that the draft communication 
to the Egyptian government be cabled to London as soon as possible since 'its 
exact terms must be examined and approved by Cabinet before presentation.'^
The differences in approach between London and Cairo over the contents of 
the ultimatum were already becoming apparent. The Foreign Office opposed 
Allenby's demand for an indemnity, moderated the lifting of restrictions in the 
Gezira and insisted on the final approval of any communication to the Egyptian 
government. All these points were known to the Residency in Cairo by the morning 
of November 21.
Allenby responded to Chamberlain's instructions on November 21 and cabled a 
full draft of the text as requested. It was elaboration of the proposals sub­
mitted on November 19, including the proposed fine and increased Gezira irriga­
tion. Allenby admitted that the fine might be undignified, as Chamberlain had
pointed out, but he believed that 'This is the sort of sign of humiliation which
2
is understood here.' With regard to the Gezira and Chamberlain's modifications,
3
Allenby felt that this demand 'would strike in the mind of the whole country.'
His intention was clear -'we must not fail to use fully this opportunity to bring
Egypt to her senses, to assert our power to harm her and to stigmatize regime of
4
present government.' Allenby1s comments during the struggle with London over 
Egypt's independence - 'If you find a man down at your feet...you allowed him to
5get up, with a threat that if he didn't behave himself, you would down him again' - 
give an insight into his behaviour here. In 1922 circumstances called for gener­
osity; now, after the Stack assassination, Allenby, the 'Bull', was prepared to 
'down' his opponent again.
The draft note that Allenby proposed presenting demanded an apology from 
the Egyptian government, the prosecution and punishment of Stack's murderers, a 
fine of £.500,000 to be paid to the British government, the immediate withdrawal 
of all Egyptian officers and purely Egyptian units in the Sudan, increased irri­
gation in the Sudan as the need arose, and, an end to opposition to British wishes
1. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 21, 1924, Tel. No. 220, FO/371/10043.
2. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 21, 1924, Tel. No. 380, FO/371/10044.
3* Ibid. 4. Ibid.
5. Sir B. Hornsby, Notes on a Conversation with Lord A., 2/2/22, STAC, Hornsby
Papers, Box I, File II.
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regarding the protection of foreign interests in Egypt. A second note gave
further details regarding the creation of a Sudan Defence Force and the position
of foreign officials, the advisers and the Director-General of the European
Department. Allenby's text was obviously a combination of his immediate reaction
to events as well as long-standing Residency concerns. In addition, Allenby
sought and received advice and encouragement from Herbert Asquith who was still
his guest. Asquith's family interests in cotton growing in the Sudan no doubt
2
gave him a particular viewpoint in this affair. Allenby requested an immediate 
reply because he was anxious to present the ultimatum shortly after Stack's 
funeral on Saturday, November 22.
Chamberlain reacted quickly to Allenby's cables which reached London shortly 
after midnight on November 22. At 9.20 in the morning a cable was sent infor­
ming Allenby that a decision would be sought that same day. The Cabinet sat from 
noon until 1.30 p.m. and authorized Chamberlain's proposed text for submission
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 21, 1924, Tel. No. 381, FO/371/10044.
2. Asquith's role in the events surrounding the ultimatum is somewhat caooyv .
By his own admission, Asquith encouraged Allenby. He wrote to Chamberlain 
that 'Allenby has kept me informed of the communications which have passed 
between him and the Foreign Office. I need not say that I am in complete 
sympathy with the line which he has taken. It is absolutely essential that 
there should be no wavering or delay.* Asquith to Chamberlain, November 23, 
1924, Private and Personal, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256. This is suppor­
ted by Col. C. Howard of the 16th/5th Lancers who were in Cairo when Stack 
was murdered. Asquith referred to Allenby's actions as 'a very good prece­
dent.' Note by C. Howard to Wavell, March 11, 1937, KAP. Asquith, however, 
was by no means a disinterested party. He was touring Egypt and the Sudan 
with his son, Arthur Asquith, the Managing Director of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate and Chairman of the Kassala Cotton Company. Official Note on the 
Kassala Cotton Company in Empire Cotton Growing Corporation to Curzon, Decem­
ber 8, 1922, FO/371/7746. In addition, Asquith himself had lent his pres­
tige to cotton interests in the Sudan. Balfour, as acting Foreign Secretary, 
met on July 5, 1922, with a delegation representing cotton interests. 'Their 
object was to impress on His Majesty's Government the great importance which 
they attached to the early completion of the Blue Nile dam and Gezira irri­
gation scheme in the Sudan.’ The delegation was introduced by Herbert As­
quith. Balfour, Press Communique, July 6, 1922, FO/371/7754. Asquith, 
whose family interests would benefit from expanded irrigation in the Sudan, 
was not an uninvolved bystander when he advised Allenby. Asquith later did 
claim that 'he would have preferred to keep separate...demands resulting 
directly from the crime and demands which could not logically be regarded as 
justifiable reparation for the crime.' Henderson to Selby, December 5, 1924, 
Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256.
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to the Egyptian government.^ The Foreign Office text again differed from
Allenby's on several important points. There was no mention of a fine or the
conditions of service and retirement of foreign officials, the Gezira irrigation
clause was still in its modified form, and, now, there was a demand for
EE.1,000,000 per annum subvention from the Egyptian government to cover the costs
of the proposed Sudan Defence Force. The same factors giving rise to differences
between the British in London and Cairo in previous years were important here too:
Chamberlain explained to Allenby that 'His Majesty's Government appreciated the
importance of the local considerations which influenced you....They felt, however,
that the importance of taking into consideration public opinion abroad and at
2home were so great that it outweighed the considerations which you urged...'
In the midst of the deliberations in London, Allenby, concerned thatf Zaghlul 
might resign in order to avoid receiving the ultimatum, cabled Chamberlain that
3
’It is essential that I should deliver note before Parliament meet at five o'clock.' 
This was the first instance that a specific time had been set by Allenby and there 
still was no clear reason given for the urgent need to deliver the ultimatum by 
that hour.
Messages crossed each other and the Residency awaited word from London with 
growing impatience. Allenby waited until the last possible moment and at 4.47 p.m. 
Chamberlain's cables arrived. From their length it was apparent that this was not 
a simple approval of Allenby1s text. There was no time to decypher the encoded 
messages and still deliver them to Zaghlul before the reconvening of Parliament at 
5.00 p.m. at which time, so Allenby had been informed, Zaghlul would resign.
Colonel Howard of the 16th/5th Lancers described the scene outside the Residency:
The Regiment was ordered to■parade... at the front of the Resi- 
dency at a certain hour, but there were continued postponements and 
eventually we were ordered to parade just before five o'clock, when 
it would shortly be beginning to get dark. We waited till the 
light was going and then suddenly out came Lord Allenby in his car 
and went off very fast, leaving only time for one or two of the two
1. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 62(24), November 22, 1924, CAB/23/49. Chamberlain's 
authorised text was despatched at 1.55 and 2.00 p.m. Chamberlain to Allenby, 
November 22, 1924, Tel. Nos. 225-6, FO/371/10044.
2. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 22, 1924, Private, Tel. No. 228, FO/371/10044.
3. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 22, 1924, Tel. No. 383, FO/371/10044.
This was received in London during the Cabinet meeting at 12.35 p.m.
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leading squadrons to wheel in front of his car.^ -
Allenby broke with all traditions when he called upon Zaghlul. Ordinarily 
the High Commissioner was accompanied by two motorcyclists when he visited the 
Prime Minister. On this occasion he was accompanied by a full regiment and 
heralded by the Royal Salute. In addition, although Allenby's escort emphasised 
his position, his dress - a lounge suit rather than military uniform - was a 
calculated insult to the person he was seeing, Zaghlul. Allenby, as in his de­
marche with the Turkish ministers in February 1919, sought to make the greatest 
impact possible and, according to Gerald Delaney, succeeded beyond all doubt:
As the cavalry traversed the streets at a slow trot, escorting 
Viscount Allenby in his motor car, onlookers were puzzled at this 
unprecedented sight. When the cavalcade turned into the street 
in which Parliament House and the Prime Minister's Office are situ­
ated, Deputies were commencing to arrive for the sitting of Parlia­
ment. They were held up by the escort....
Viscount Allenby descending from his car, again received the 
Royal Salute. Windows in Parliament House were thrown open and 
disturbed faces appeared, the Deputies at first fearing the Parlia­
ment itself was about to be surrounded. Crowds were now rapidly 
gathering, but the police kept them at a respectable distance.
Allenby read the British Note to the Premier in English, then 
handed it to him with a French translation. The Premier was quite 
calm and with characteristic Oriental courtesy asked the High Com­
missioner if he would take a cup of coffee. Allenby with a curt 
'No, thank you1 took his departure. The whole business had .lasted 
five minutes.
Allenby stood to attention outside the gates of Zaghlul's office 
while the Royal Salute was again sounded, and then returned with 
his cavalry escort to the Residency.2
Allenby thereupon informed London of the events. In the meantime, there remained 
little for Austen Chamberlain to do but note that he had called 'immediate meet-
3
ing of His Majesty's Ministers to consider situation thus created...'
1. Note by C. Howard to Wavell, March 11, 1937, KAP.
2. G.C. Delaney, Egypt, 1924 - Notes for Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, KAP.
The full text of Allenby's two notes are in Allenby to Chamberlain, November 
22, 1924, Tel. No. 385, FO/371/10044.
3. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 22, 1924, Tel. No. 231, FO/371/10044.
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Aftermath; Allenby1s Resignation
News of Allenby's action reached London on the evening of Saturday, Novem­
ber 22, after the Cabinet had dispersed for the weekend. Chamberlain could only 
find five other Cabinet Ministers - one having been fetched out of a Turkish 
bath.'*' There was evident anger over Allenby1 s disregard, yet again, of Cabinet 
instructions. Chamberlain, with the assistance of Tyrrell and Murray, informed 
the Conference of Ministers of the events that had transpired. The Conference 
decided that Allenby had not been justified in acting in defiance of the Foreign 
Secretary's express instructions, but were now forced to support him lest there
be 'the appearance of hesitation and loss of prestige which would be involved
2in disavowing Lord Allenby's action.' After securing Baldwin's agreement, 
Chamberlain was authorised to inform Allenby of the Cabinet's dismay.
Chamberlain immediately sent a sharp message to Allenby stating that 'I 
cannot conceal my concern that you did not wait to receive the decision of the 
Cabinet,' adding that 11 do not at present understand the extreme urgency under
3
which you acted.' He informed Allenby that, although the ultimatum would be 
supported for the meantime, the position might have to be restated after the 
crisis was over. After twenty-four hours had passed and still no detailed ex­
planation had arrived, Chamberlain angrily cabled that 'I must request that you
4
will keep me fully informed of situation and of your intentions.' Although a
1. Amery was found there. Amery, op.cit., II, 305. The others were Churchill, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, 
Steel-Maitland, Minister of Labour, Lloyd Greame, President of the Board of 
Trade, and Hogg, Attorney General. Conclusions of Conference of Ministers 
Held at the Foreign Office on Saturday, November 22, 1924, at 6.00 p.m. in
Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 63(24), November 24, 1924, CAB/23/49.
2. Ibid. With regard to specific reactions, throughout this period Amery was 
concerned about the reactions of the Dominions. Consultation with their
governments was a major issue at this time. This can be seen in Amery's
circular telegrams to the Governors-General of the Dominions on November 21 
and 22, and particularly the letter in which he informed the Dominion govern­
ments that Allenby's ultimatum had not been authorized by the Cabinet. 
FO/371/10044. Churchill, Allenby's critic for years, wrote to Chamberlain 
immediately after the meeting of the Ministers about the 'evil chance & wrong 
conduct1 leading to the crisis. Churchill to Chamberlain, November 22, 1924, 
Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256.
3. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 22, 1924, Tel. No. 232, FO/371/10044. This
was drafted in Chamberlain's own hand.
4. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 23, 1924, Tel. No. 234, FO/371/10044. This
too was drafted by Chamberlain.
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long explanatory message arrived in London a few hours later, the die was cast. 
Allenby, under the pressure of events and confident of his judgement and that 
of his associates, had again taken matters into his own hands. London, thwarted, 
had again reacted wTith anger. This time, however, the Foreign Secretary was a 
powerful figure who enjoyed the firm support of his Prime Minister.
In Egypt events moved quickly. Zaghlul, under incredible pressure, paid 
the £.500,000 fine, apologised under duress for Stack's murder, suppressed public 
demonstrations as demanded by Allenby, and noted that the Egyptian government 
would naturally prosecute the perpetrators vigorously. Zaghlul, however, re­
fused to accede to Allenby's demands on the Gezira, foreign officials, the advi­
sers, and, the removal of Egyptian officers and units from the Sudan. Allenby
therefore informed Zaghlul that the British government would enforce on its own
1
the demands regarding irrigation in the Gezira and the Sudan army.
Allenby was deeply concerned by the developments in Egypt and the possibility
of further outrages. He had been informed that several Wafd supporters, William
2
MakrairijNakrashi and Abd al-R&hman Fahmi, had sworn oaths to murder Englishmen.
As a result of this information and the continued non-compliance by the Egyptian
government with some of the terms of the ultimatum, Allenby proposed a military
and naval display, the formal rupture of diplomatic relations, the occupation of
the Alexandria customs house to secure revenue, and, most ominous, 'Hostages to
be taken if another Englishman or foreigner is murdered and to be shot if murders 
3
continue.' He admitted that 'This is repugnant,' but added that 'It is only
4way of stopping murders.' Although Zaghlul had resigned and been replaced by
Ahmad Ziwar Pasha, known for his 'pred.i 1e ction for European society. . .most friend-
5 K . .
ly to Englishmen,' the evacuation of Egyptian units from the Sudan was already
encountering difficulties and threatened to become more serious.
As soon as Chamberlain received news from Egypt he informed Allenby that he
approved the most recent note to Zaghlul and the military and police measures
1. Zaghlul's response to Allenby's ultimatum is in Allenby to Chamberlain, 
November 23, 1924, Tel. No. 389; Allenby's note to Zaghlul is in Allenby 
to Chamberlain, November 23, 1924, Tel. No. 391, FO/371/10044.
2. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 24, 1924, Tel. No. 396, FO/371/10044.
3. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 24, 1924, Tel. No. 390, FO/371/10044.
4. Ibid.
5. Residency File, Ahmad Ziwar Pasha, November 24, 1924, FO/141/684(9465).
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taken to assure order. Chamberlain, however, felt that the rupture of relations 
would be of no advantage and he was adamantly opposed to the shooting of host­
ages: 'It is a measure so repugnant to British traditions that only in last
extremity if at all would public opinion here and in British Dominions support 
you.'^ Chamberlain was also upset because of the Reuters report that Allenby 
had already informed the Egyptian government that the Alexandria customs house 
would be occupied before he had received Foreign Office approval for this step. 
Fearing a repetition of the events surrounding the November 22 ultimatum,
Chamberlain cabled Allenby that 'I must insist that political measures of grave
2
impact... shall not be undertaken until I have approved them.'
There was growing concern in London in the wake of Allenby's ultimatum and 
the terms in which it was couched. The possibility of difficulties with the
3
League of Nations over the dispute with Egypt, continued anxiety about the Domi­
nions and particularly their reaction to the lifting of irrigation restrictions
4 5in the Gezira, and doubts about Allenby's judgement gave rise to great anxiety.
1. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 24, 1924, Tel. No. 237, FO/371/10044.
2. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 24, 1924, Tel. No. 239, FO/371/10044. This
telegram was also written by Chamberlain. Allenby apologized for the failure 
to await approval of the seizure of the Customs House because Zaghlul was 
about to resign. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 24, 1924, Tel. No. 402, 
FO/371/10044.
3. Salisbury was one of the first to raise this. Salisbury to Chamberlain, Nov­
ember 23, 1924, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256. The Foreign Office shared 
Salisbury's concern about the League of Nations competence to intervene in 
the dispute under Article 21 of the Covenant. See, Minutes by Cecil Hurst, 
November 26, W.. Orchard, November 28, and R.I. Campbell, December 1, 1924, 
FO/371/10046.
4. See Governor-General of Australia to Amery, November 26, 1924, FO/371/10074. 
Chamberlain was particularly worried about the possible paralysis of the Bri­
tish Empire in time of crisis, such as the Egyptian dispute, because of the
requirements of Dominion consultation. A .C[hamberlain}. , 20/12/14, CUL, Bald­
win Papers, Vol. 93. Even a supporter of cotton interests, such as Lord 
Derby, questioned the wisdom of the inclusion of the Gezira demands. Derby 
to Chamberlain, November 26, 1924, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256. This 
issue was also raised in the press. The Daily Express, the strongest suppor­
ter of the ultimatum policy, felt that the fine and the irrigation clauses 
were out of place. Daily Express, 'The Ultimatum and the Reply,' November 
24, 1924.
5. Even Allenby's civilian dress at the time of the delivery of the ultimatum 
was questioned. Chamberlain compared it to 'the action of the little boy who 
puts his thumb to his nose and extends his four fingers in a vulgar express­
ion of defiance and contempt.' Chamberlain to Stamfordham, November 24, 1924, 
Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256.
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Allenby's request to take hostages and execute them, if necessary, appeared to
confirm London's worst fears.
The Cabinet met in this atmosphere on the evening of November 24, the first
full session since the delivery of the ultimatum. Chamberlain expressed the
disapproval and anger felt at the Foreign Office - sentiments based on Allenby's
six years in Egypt.^ The Cabinet approved Chamberlain's rebuke to Allenby,
accepted the terms of the ultimatum as a fait accompli not to be revoked and ab-
2
solutely forbade the shooting of hostages 'in any circumstances.' In order to 
maintain a close watch over developments in Egypt and to assist Chamberlain, in 
case of need, the Cabinet also established a Committee on Egypt consisting of 
Baldwin, Curzon, Churchill, Birkenhead, Worthington-Evans, Amery and Cecil. The 
Committee, especially Curzon, Churchill, Amery and Worthington-Evans, was not 
well-disposed towards Allenby and his previous behaviour and policies. Finally, 
and in the end most important, the Cabinet approved the despatch of an experien­
ced diplomat, Nevile Henderson, ostensibly to strengthen Allenby's staff and to 
explain fully to the High Commissioner the views of the British government.
Chamberlain informed Allenby of the Cabinet's decisions, emphasising the 
absolute ban on hostages, and attempted to portray Henderson's role in as in- 
ocuous a light as possible:
I am impressed with the difficulty of putting you fully in 
possession of the mind and purpose of His Majesty's Government 
by a simple exchange of telegrams. I have therefore decided to 
send Mr. Nevile Henderson to Cairo. He is an official of excep­
tional experience, and I have explained to him verbally with a 
completeness which is not possible in telegraphic communications 
the objects at which His Majesty's Government are aiming and the 
difficulties which they wish to avoid. He has my fullest confi­
dence, and will I am sure make your task easier by the explana­
tions which he will be able to give you. He will join your 
staff with the rank of Minister and will, I hope, lighten a bur­
den which must be excessive with your present small staff.3
1. Amery commented that 'The Foreign Office, as a Department, had long disliked 
the exceptional position enjoyed by our High Commissioner in Egypt, and had 
wished the post to be held by an ordinary member of the Diplomatic Service 
in the due course of. promotion.' Amery, op. cit., II, 306.
2. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 63(24), November 24, 1924, CAB/23/49.
3. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 24, 1924, Tel. No. 245, FO/371/10044.
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Two storms broke over Cairo almost at once: rebellion among Egyptian and
Sudanese troops in the Sudan, and Nevile Henderson's appointment as Minister
Plenipotentiary at the Residency. Each would occupy Allenby and his staff during
the coming days.
For quite some time there had been unrest in the Sudan, to some extent the 
result of British attempts to win the loyalty of the Sudanese to the Sudan gov­
ernment and Egyptian attempts, often through the Egyptian Army, to gain alle-
1
giance for the King of Egypt. The efforts of the British to use the Egyptian 
crisis to implement long-standing plans to end Egyptian influence in the Sudan 
gave focus to this unrest. Egyptian troops being withdrawn from the Sudan very
2
quickly refused to move without orders from King Fuad, their Commander-in-Chief.
At Talodi, Egyptian officers were joined by Sudanese on November 26. Two days
later, the 11th Sudanese Battalion mutinied and heavy casualties had to be in­
flicted to restore order. There were difficulties with embarking Egyptian troops
in Port Sudan. Additional British troops were moved to the trouble spots and the
3
outbreaks were suppressed by the end of November. The situation, however, re­
mained unsettled contributing to the tension in Cairo.
Henderson's appointment as Minister delivered a similar shock to the Resi­
dency. Selby, one of Allenby*s closest advisers in earlier years and now
Chamberlain's Principal Private Secretary, attributed Henderson's appointment to
4a 'wave of suggestion that had swept over London.' Still he maintained that 
Chamberlain 'neither intended nor expected for one moment it would have the effect
5
it did have so far as Allenby was concerned.' There should, however, have been 
little doubt that Henderson's sudden appointment within days of the ultimatum and 
with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, superseding Clark Kerr, would arouse 
strong suspicion and resentment. The >n,nocuous explanations of the appointment and 
Selby's confidence in Chamberlain are not supported by Henderson's background 
and preparation for the mission he was about to undertake.
Henderson was sent as an experienced diplomat who would be able to strengthen
1. For one example of such recent activity at Malaka,* see: Kerr to MacDonald, 
September 29, 1924, Tel. No. 322, FO/371/10053.
2. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 25, 1924, Tel. No. 420, FO/371/10044.
3. For full details of the mutinies and their impact, see.:. Col. Huddleston's 
personal account in Allenby to Chamberlain, December 6, 1924, Desp. No. 708, 
FO/371/10054; and, the Residency file on the mutinies, FO/141/493(17520).
4. Selby to Wavell, December 9, 1936, KAP. 5. Ibid.
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Allenby1s staff and apprise the High Commissioner of London's views. Yet Hender­
son, who had just left his position as Counsellor in Constantinople, himself 
believed that he was chosen to go to Cairo because 11 happened to be available 
and on l e a v e . I n  addition, his preparation for his mission to Egypt also raises 
serious doubts:
I had a long talk with Sir Austen Chamberlain and Crowe that eve­
ning, caught a late train to Sedgwick to collect some clothes, 
had another hour or so's coaching from Chamberlain and Crowe on 
the Monday morning and left that evening for Trieste....As it 
happened, I learned almost more by chance remarks by Will ie
Tyrrell and Selby than I did in several hours conversations with
the Secretary and Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. I had been given the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary 
to strengthen my position in Cairo. Tyrrell said to me, 'It's 
to gild the pill.' Selby's hint to me was, 'For goodness sake, 
do not lose your temper with Allenby.'2
Nevertheless Allenby's initial reaction was mild enough. He welcomed Hender­
son's appointment and assistance but stated that 'I should like to be reassured
that it is not intended to supersede my counsellor in whom as in other members of
3my staff I have complete confidence.' Chamberlain, however, saw this response 
as threatening and asked Baldwin to convene the Cabinet Committee on Egypt because
4
'it is best that they should be consulted.'
A few hours later, a more sharply worded cable arrived from Allenby. The 
full impact of the appointment and its terms of reference had apparently been felt. 
Allenby informed Chamberlain that, as a result of the public announcement, Hender­
son's appointment 'has been taken here as amounting to my practical supersession, 
has seriously weakened my position which will become untenable unless you can see 
your way to correct that impression by making without delay a public announcement 
that Mr. Henderson is coming solely for the purpose of discussing the situation
and facilitating exchange of views between you and myself and that he will leave
5
for London within a week of his arrival.'
1. Sir Nevile Henderson, Water Under the Bridges (London, 1945), p. 133.
2. Ibid., pp. 134-5.
3. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 25, 1924, Unnumbered, Private, Chamberlain
Papers, FO/800/256.
4. A.[c hamberlainj. to Prime Minister, November 26, 1924, Chamberlain Papers, 
FO/800/256.
5. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 26, 1924, Unnumbered, Private, Chamberlain
Papers, FO/800/256.
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Chamberlain responded sharply to Allenby1s first 'private' cable. Allenby's
concern about the impact of Henderson’s appointment on the Residency staff in
a time of crisis was treated as .a minor issue and he was asked 'not to allow any
1personal question to arise among your staff in difficult situation.' Allenby's 
second message, expressing concern over the appointment's impact on Allenby's 
own position in Egypt, was answered with a stern rebuke that Allenby would in­
evitably find offensive:
There is no reflection on anyone least of all you. I have my own 
responsibilities which you must allow me to discharge. In no cir­
cumstances can I allow arrangements which I have deliberately made 
after careful consideration to be questioned. I feel sure that I 
may rely on your receiving Mr. Henderson in the manner to which he 
is entitled in the position I have assigned to him....I am really 
sorry that you should have felt constrained to raise any personal 
question at a moment when as far as I can see your policy is pro­
ving successful.... 2
As in 1922, the stage was set for another clash of wills between the Foreign 
Office and Allenby in Cairo. Chamberlain, who in 1922 had obscured in Parliament 
the governments' defeat over Egypt's independence, prepared his colleagues for 
future developments. He sent the 'private' cables to Baldwin claiming that he 
had 'done everything in my power from first to last to support Allenby...to pre­
sent the new appointment to him in the form most agreeable to him and least dis-
3
agreeable to his present Counsellor Clark Kerr...' Still, he warned the Prime 
Minister, 'you ought to know what has passed and be prepared for what may happen.' 
Although Allenby had not yet mentioned resignation, events were moving rapidly in 
that direction.
Chamberlain's fears were soon realised. On November 26 Allenby sent a 
sharply worded cable which took the conflict beyond the point of no return:
You have missed my point.
I have no personal feeling....Announcement of Mr. Henderson's
1. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 26, 1924, Unnumbered, Private, Chamberlain 
Papers, FO/800/256. This was seen by Tyrell and Crowe.
2. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 26, 1924, Unnumbered, Private, Chamberlain 
Papers, FO/800/256. This was the second private cable of that day and was 
sent before the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Egypt.
3. Chamberlain to Baldwin, November 26, 1924, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256.
4. Ibid.
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appointment is ruinous to position of His Majesty's High Commis­
sioner in Egypt. It has had already a lamentably bad effect.
Under present circumstances obviously I cannot offer my resigna­
tion but I must ask that if my advice given in my private tele­
gram of today is now overruled you will present to His Majesty 
my humble duty with request that so soon as His Majesty can dis­
pense with my services here he will be graciously pleased to do 
so seeing that I no longer have the confidence of His Majesty's 
Government. 3-
Chamberlain consulted with his colleagues on the Cabinet Committee for Egypt and 
received their agreement to a reply. Although the language of this message was 
milder than before, Chamberlain would not be moved. Pointing out that the posi­
tion of Minister Plenipotentiary had existed previously at the Residency, he 
promised to continue to work in a spirit of co-operation. With regard to Allen­
by 's resignation, Chamberlain wrote, 'I beg you not to talk of resignation in
midst of crisis when even the suggestion cannot be made without prejudicing pub- 
2
lie interests.1 This, however, did not mean that Allenby’s resignation could 
not be discussed once the crisis had passed.
Allenby, however, did not relent and quickly replied that his objection was 
not to Henderson's title but to its impact on Egypt. Citing the deteriorating
3
political situation in the country, he re-affirmed his desire to resign. Hender­
son, a few days after his arrival in Egypt, confirmed Allenby’s apprehensions 
about the local effects of the appointment. He wrote to Selby that
...what is absolutely undeniable is that my appointment did create 
an unfortunate impression and effect here. It made most of the 
Egyptians and some others who should know better imagine that I was 
coming out here (a) to supplant and override Lord Allenby and (b) 
to modify the ultimatum policy. The result was (a) to lower the 
High Commissioner's personal prestige and (b) to diminish greatly 
the good effects of the ultimatum and to hamper our policy out here.^
Chamberlain nevertheless appealed to Allenby as a soldier and official of the
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 26, 1924, Unnumbered, Private, Chamberlain 
Papers, FO/800/256.
2. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 27, 1924, Unnumbered, Private and Personal, 
Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256.
3. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 27, 1924, Unnumbered, Private and Personal, 
Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256.
4. Henderson to Selby, December 5, 1924, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256. Also, 
see: Henderson, op. cit., p. 136.
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Crown not to press the government at that time for a decision on his resignation.
The dispute between Allenby and Chamberlain was being pursued from different 
perspectives. Chamberlain obviously considered the issue of Henderson's appoint­
ment to have been resolved, with the question of the government's confidence in 
Allenby and the latter's resignation being a separate matter. Therefore, pro­
tecting his own prerogatives as Foreign Secretary, Chamberlain refused to 
reconsider the appointment and at the same time re-assured Allenby of confidence 
and co-operation. Allenby, however, having to deal with the consequences of the 
appointment in Egypt, clearly believed that the government's future actions on 
the appointment would be a reflection of the attitude they took towards him.
With characteristic bluntness, he made this clear to Chamberlain on November 29:
Either you have confidence in me or you have not. Since you have 
made a striking appointment to my staff in the midst of a crisis 
without consulting me and published it without giving me an oppor­
tunity of expressing my opinion, I presume you have not. It is 
therefore my duty to resign.1
Chamberlain had to accept the inevitable. Unlike Curzon, he could not accept
such a challenge to his authority. He therefore informed Baldwin that 'Allenby
seems to me to leave H.M. Govmt no choice but to accept his resignation for the
2
time being when the public interest allows of a change.' Chamberlain's anger 
was barely suppressed in a letter to Lord Stamfordham, intended for the King's 
information: 'I cannot tell you how profoundly I deplore the, in my opinion, un-
3
reasonable and even improper attitude adopted by Lord Allenby.' Allenby was thus 
informed that the Cabinet would consider his resignation on December 1, the day 
Henderson arrived in Egypt.
The final exchange of cables between Chamberlain and Allenby took place after 
the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on December 1 and merely confirmed Allenby's 
resignation, a development that apparently was unavoidable from the moment Hen­
derson's appointment was announced. Given the recent history of relations between 
the British in London and Cairo, the personalities and perceptions of the pro­
tagonists, and the issues involved, neither side could retreat. This time Lloyd 
George was not available to overrule his Foreign Secretary and ask Allenby to wait
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 29, 1924, Unnumbered, Private and Personal, 
Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256.
2. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 29.11.24, Secret, CUL, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 114.
3. Chamberlain to Stamfordham, November 29, 1924, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256.
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but a few moments more so that the government of the day could beat a hasty but 
dignified retreat.
Allenby's Final Months
Allenby's final months were spent in the shadow of the ultimatum and of his 
resignation as High Commissioner. The days following the delivery of the ulti­
matum saw a return to the 'minister-ing' that Allenby had sought to end with the 
declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922. There was once again daily and close 
involvement in Egypt's political life and in all matters affecting public secu­
rity, concerns which after the adoption of the constitution should have been the 
province of the Egyptian government.
The first issue to be resolved after the appointment of Ziwar Pasha as Prime 
Minister was the release of the Alexandra customs house that had been occupied 
when Zaghlul rejected Allenby's demands over the conditions of service and re­
tirement of foreign officials. Allenby made it clear to Ziwar that a return to 
normalcy would be possible only after public order was assured and the Egyptian 
government accepted the remaining demands contained in the ultimatum, those 
dealing with the foreign officials and the authority and traditional privileges 
of the advisers."^
The Egyptian government eventually moved on the question of security and, 
much to the relief of the Residency, arrested the three Wafd Deputies suspected 
of taking oaths to murder Englishmen. In addition, forty suspects were detained 
in connection with the attack on the Sirdar. This meant that there would be no 
need for the British to become directly involved in the detention of Egyptians, 
a possibility that earlier had led London to fear that the Residency intended to 
re-impose martial law in Egypt.
2The restoration of order in Egypt and the Sudan permitted consideration of
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 26, 1924, Tel. No. 436, FO/371/10045.
2. There was still some concern over the Sudan but this was confined mainly to 
future developments. The Sudan government was eager to implement the sepa­
ration, in practice if not in theory, of the Sudan from Egypt as well as con­
cerned about potential sources of unrest. They therefore proposed the sym­
bolic but significant measure of lowering the Egyptian flag in the Sudan. 
There was some resentment over the Residency's seeming indifference to the 
Sudan government's concerns because of preoccupation with Egyptian affairs. 
Schuster, who was responsible for financial affairs in the Sudan, wrote that 
'As regards the future...it appears that we must rely on the Home Government
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the outstanding clauses of the ultimatum. There were some difficulties in se­
curing Ziwar1s agreement to the details of an exchange of notes, in part a result 
of doubts over Allenby1s position and British policy and, in part, because of 
the legal advice Ziwar received. However, by November 30 this issue was also 
resolved and the Alexandria customs house was evacuated by British troops on 
December 3.
Once these matters were resolved, Ziwar turned to the character and prospects
of his new administration. The Residency reported that the 'Prime Minister having
now had time to think of future is impressed with necessity of endeavouring to
inflict crushing defeat on Zaghloulism if Egypt is to hope for decent Administra-
1
tion, good order and friendly relations with us.' The methods of establishing 
order and assuming electoral victory, namely, replacement of provincial officials 
and the forging of political alliances against the Wafd, indicated that little 
had changed in recent years. The political concerns of the Egyptian government, 
once again, openly supported by the Residency, were much as they had been in 1922.
Residency concern and involvement went beyond the immediate intrigues of 
Egyptian politics. The fact that complete disengagement from Egyptian affairs, as
had been hoped, was not possible had now been made clear with Stack's murder.
Allenby's ultimatum and the enforced restoration of the authority of the Advisers 
was proof of this. If Britain was to remain in Egypt and insist on retaining 
responsibility for foreign and imperial interests, the situation would continue. 
Amos pointed to the dilemma of Britain's presence in Egypt with regard to the 
maintenance of public order:
Recent events have I think made it plain that we are in a false 
position with regard to the maintenance of public order in Egypt, 
particularly in respect to the protection of British and foreign 
lives and property.
On the one hand it is clear that we have a responsibility in
this respect. On the other hand we seem to be seriously ill-pro­
vided with the means of discharging that responsibility.2
and not on the Residency.' Schuster, Memorandum on Events in Egypt and the 
Sudan, December 14, 1924, FO/371/10883. For correspondence on the issue of 
the Egyptian flag, see: Allenby to Chamberlain, November 29, 1924, Desp.
No. 694, FO/371/10054 and Allenby to Chamberlain, December 14, 1924, Tel. 
Nos. 533-35, FO/371/10055.
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, December 5, 1924, Tel. No. 505, FO/371/10022.
2. Amos to Kerr, 4.12.24, FO/141/793.
Amos' solution to this dilemma in the event of a crisis: 'I think, that it would
be necessary, in substance if not in name, to re-establish martial law.1'*' Al­
though Amos feared this possibility and sought to avoid it, the patterns of the 
past had returned.
In London, once the tensions of the events surrounding the ultimatum had
subsided, officials at the Foreign Office began to consider Egypt's prospects in
the light of new circumstances. In this context, there was reference to the need
for a new High Commissioner in Egypt. Tyrrell,, concerned about the future of
Ziwar's government, commented that 'A capable High Commissioner in Cairo is more
2
necessary than ever now for the success of the new venture.1 Crowe echoed these
sentiments in even harsher words: 'I agree with Sir W. Tyrrell that there is an
urgent necessity of installing a stronger and more capable High Commissioner at
Cairo. Under the present regime we are not in safe hands, and a great crisis
3
may face us any day.1 Chamberlain submitted these papers to Baldwin on December 
15.
On that same day the first of two despatches by Allenby describing the
4
recent crisis reached London. It was a reasoned and capable defence of the 
Residency's actions in preceding weeks. Even officials who had been sharply criti­
cal of Allenby admitted that, except for the defence of the irrigation clause, the 
despatch offered 'an excellent opportunity for a temperate and carefully worded
5
reply... suitable for publication in a White Paper.'
As a result of Allenby's able despatch and the desire to maintain public unity 
over Egyptian policy, if and when papers were laid before Parliament, a moderate 
reply was prepared. This only referred to differences 'of a very minor character' 
between Chamberlain and Allenby.6 The bitter dispute over Henderson's appointment
1. Ibid.
2. W.T ^ yKellQ*t December 10, 1924, minute to Foreign Office Memorandum, December 
10, 1924, FO/371/10059.
3. EACi[rowe|, Minute, December 10, 1924, to ibid.
4. Allenby to Chamberlain, December 7, 1924, Desp. No. 721, F0/371/10046. The 
second despatch, Allenby to Chamberlain, December 14, 1924, Desp. No. 736, 
FO/371/10047, reached London on December 22.
5. j. Murray, December 18, 1924, minute to Allenby to Chamberlain, December 7, 
1924, Desp. No. 721, FO/371/10046.
6. Chamberlain to Allenby, December 22, 1924, Desp. No. 1284, FO/371/10046.
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is not mentioned at all.
Chamberlain, apparently intent on preventing a public discussion of the 
differences between London and Cairo when Allenby's resignation was formally sub­
mitted, wrote a conciliatory letter to Allenby asking that he
...let that one small misunderstanding be forgotten; and when 
this crisis has passed let me submit your request for permission 
to resign as the natural desire of a great servant of the Crown 
to take the opportunity offered by the end of one chapter in our 
relations with Egypt and the beginning of another as the proper 
moment to seek relief from the strain of such long and arduous 
service and the natural and most honourable close of your great 
career in the Near East first as soldier then as statesman.!
Allenby, however, showed the same uncompromising qualities that were responsible 
for his success in 1922 and that led to his resignation in 1924. He refused to 
engage in the proposed diplomatic exercise. Allenby replied on January 1 that
I share your regret that any difference should have arisen be­
tween us. I do not, however, attribute it to imperfect under­
standing, nor to a failure on your part to convey to me the full 
sense of mutual obligations.... I cannot agree that the difference 
was merely a momentary misunderstanding. I said, in my telegram 
...that, for reasons I then, gave, my position would become un­
tenable if you did not take steps to correct the impression made 
by the announcement of Mr. Henderson's appointment as Minister 
Plenipotentiary. The word untenable has only one meaning.
...though I thank you for suggesting the solution, I cannot ask 
to be retired with a view to relief from strain which I do not 
feel.
I must, therefore, beg that, when the crisis is passed, you will 
submit my application to be allowed to resign my present appoint­
ment on the grounds given in my telegram...2
The additional questions that arose in Allenby's final months in Egypt were 
dealt with satisfactorily as a result of Britain's powerful position and the 
absence of a strong Egyptian leader able to oppose British interests and wishes.
1. Chamberlain to Allenby, December 22, 1924, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/256. 
Chamberlain's stncexifcy-ls suspect. He wrote to one associate that 'I will 
write direct to Allenby. That appears to be the correct practice in this 
Department - and I am nothing if not "correct"...' Chamberlain to Hamar, 
December 22, 1924 in ibid.
2. Allenby to Chamberlain, January 1, 1925, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/257.
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The resolution of issues was less a matter of negotiation than the acceptance of
British terms that were designed to avoid making Ziwar's position untenable.
One of the most important points that arose was the establishment of a new
order in the Sudan, a goal long cherished by the British but imposed only in the
wake of Stack's murder. The policy was one that would maintain a nominal condi-
minium while at the same time effectively remove Egyptian influence from the
Sudan. The creation of an independent Sudan Defence Force, with its own commander
and owing allegiance to the Sudan government, was the most visible and important 
1development. As a result of Treasury pressure on the Foreign Office, the British
were also able to secure an annual subvention of BE.750,000, to be 'at the dis-
2posal of Sudanese Government for military expenses of the Sudan.1 Finally, the 
question of Gezira irrigation was also resolved and a Commission of three, a 
British representative, an Egyptian representative and a neutral chairman, was 
established on January 27 with a mandate to report by the end of June. The aim of 
the Commission was to examine and to propose 'the basis on which irrigation can 
be carried out with full consideration of the interests of Egypt and without
3
detriment to her natural and historic rights.'
In Egypt, foreign officials took advantage of the new conditions governing
4retirement and this issue also appears to have been resolved temporarily. Per­
haps the most contentious issue to arise during this period was the command of the 
Egyptian Army. Stack had been the Sirdar of the Egyptian and Sudanese forces. As 
a result of his murder and the final separation of forces into two armies, there 
was a need to appoint a Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. Stack's murder did not cause 
Allenby to abandon his earlier view that once the two commands were separated, the
5
Commander-m-Chief of the Egyptian Army should be an Egyptian. Allenby adopted 
this view as consistent with British policy as enunciated in the 1922 declaration. 
Despite acrimonious debate in the British Cabinet, Chamberlain approved in February 
1925 an Egyptian proposal whereby an Egyptian would serve as Sirdar and an Englishman
1. See Allenby's note to Ziwar, January 25, 1925, informing him of the inauguration 
of the force in Allenby to Chamberlain, February 1, 1925, Desp. No. 78, 
FO/371/10879.
2. Allenby to Chamberlain, March 13, 1925, Tel. No. 112, FO/371/10883.
3. Allenby to Chamberlain, January 31, 1925, Tel. No. 49, FO/371/10882.
4. Allenby to Chamberlain, February 8, 1925, Desp. No. 91, FO/371/10890.
5. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 26, 1924, Tel. No.^36, FO/371/10045.
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as Adjutant General. Finally, the perpetrators of the Stack assassination were 
apprehended as a result of an extensive investigation by British police officers 
serving in Egypt.^
Political life in Egypt was also marked by the ultimatum. Zaghlul resigned 
on November 24 after receiving Allenby's note informing him of the intended occu­
pation of the Alexandria customs house. He was succeeded by Ziwar Pasha who, on 
November 25, prorogued the Wafd-dominated Parliament. In many respects, Ziwar 
represented a return to rule by a sympathetic native elite that would represent, 
indirectly, Britain's interests. Allenby later reported that
His '[ziwar1 si first public declaration was to the effect that he had 
become Prime Minister in order to save for Egypt what was left to 
be saved and to serve his Sovereign and his country in their hour 
of need. But in private he would express astonishment that we had 
not taken the occasion to annex Egypt and have done with it.3
Ziwar quickly attempted to build a coalition that would enable him to with­
stand Zaghlul's influence in the country. He gained the tacit support of Tharwat 
Pasha and on December 9, Ismail Sidqi Pasha, a leading member of the Liberal 
Constitutional Party, joined the government as Minister of the Interior. Ismail 
Sidqi, one of the original members of the Wafd that had called on Wingate, became 
one of the most powerful figures in the government and in later years was the 
virtual dictator of Egypt.
During the months that preceded the elections for a new Chamber of Deputies, 
administrative measures were taken by the government to assure success at the polls. 
Mudirs and sub-Mudirs were appointed or replaced with a view to obtaining sympa­
thetic regional and local administrations. Concerned by the government's apparent 
success, Zaghlul made a number of indirect overtures to the Residency in order to 
affect a reconciliation.
The primary elections were held on February 4, 1925 and the results were
1. Chamberlain to Allenby, February 21, 1925, Tel. No. 63, FO/371/10900.
2. For an excellent account of the methods used to solve the crime, see the re­
port prepared by Russell Pasha, Commandant of the Cairo City Police: Allenby
to Chamberlain, March 1, 1925, Desp. No. 159, FO/371/10896.
3. Allenby to Chamberlain, April 26, 1925, Desp. No. 303, F0/371/10887. Details
of political developments in Egypt since the delivery of the ultimatum have 
been taken from this despatch.
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generally seen to favour the government although there were doubts about the 
final outcome. The secondary elections were held on March 12 and the results 
seemed inconclusive. The Egyptian government and the Residency believed that the 
government had won 105 seats and that the Wafd had elected 101 Deputies, 15 of 
whom were ready to defect. The Wafd, on the other hand, claimed that they had 
won 115 seats.^
Parliament opened on March 23. By this time the estimate of party strength 
was that the Chamber was divided between 90 government deputies, 90 Wafd deputies, 
with the rest undecided. The test was to be the election of the President of the 
Chamber. Tharwat Pasha was the government candidate and Zaghlul stood on behalf 
of the Wafd. The vote was secret and heavy pressure was applied to the wavering 
Deputies by both sides. Apparently the Wafd was more successful since Zaghlul 
was elected by a majority of approximately 40 votes. As a result of this resoun­
ding defeat, Ziwar tendered his government's resignation to the King on the 
grounds that the Chamber was hostile. He did this with the foreknowledge that
2
’The King will refuse to accept resignation and Parliament will be dissolved.1
King Fuad, in due course, issued the decree of dissolution and new elections, 
as mandated by the Constitution, were set for May 23. Parliament was scheduled 
to meet on June 1. The government, however, did not intend to permit the elections 
to take place and instead planned to issue by Royal Decree a new electoral law 
based on the pre-war Belgian model. This would effectively delay elections and 
unpredictable parliamentary rule for many months enabling the Ziwar government to 
entrench itself in Egypt. Thus two years after the adoption of a Constitution, 
Allenby's great success, and a little more than a year after the election of 
Zaghlul, Egypt returned to rule by decree, by a government that obviously did not 
enjoy popular support and maintained itself through the support of the Palace and, 
more important, the good will of the Residency.
With the successful resolution of many outstanding issues, Allenby once 
again turned to his resignation tendered months earlier. Expecting a government 
victory in the forthcoming elections in March, Allenby wrote to Chamberlain on 
February 14 that 'If this expectation is justified Tin Marchlj, the time of crisis
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, March 13, 1925, Tel. No. 108, FO/371/10887.
2. Allenby to Chamberlain, March 23, 1925, Tel. No. 126, FO/371/10887.
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will soon have passed; and I trust that you will then decide that the necessity
of retaining me in my present position no longer e x i s t s . H o w e v e r ,  at the end
of February, before the final elections had taken place, reports began to appear
2in the press in England that Allenby had resigned. Allenby immediately cabled 
London about enquiries made by the Morning Post and Reuters correspondents in 
Egypt and informed them that he would issue a denial. He intended to deny the 
resignation because of the commitment made on December 1 not to make this public 
until the crisis had passed and because elections would take place in less than 
two weeks' time. In addition, Allenby issued the denial
Because in a country like this from the moment that it is 
believed that His Majesty's representative is leaving he ceases to 
count and it is of high importance that my authority should not be 
impaired. The forces of order in Egypt at this moment are largely 
leaning on me.3
Despite the denial, the impact of the rumours and increasing attacks on
Allenby by hostile British newspapers was soon felt in Egypt. On March 2, Ziwar,
Sidqi and an emissary from the King visited Allenby and told him that 'Apart from
generally unsettling effect they stated in particular that this attack combined
with report of my resignation was playing, to a disturbing extent, into the lands
£sicT]Zaghloulists. . . '4 Allenby shared their concern and believed that 'these
attacks are harmful to our interests at the present moment and may indeed just
5make the difference between Zaghloul's defeat and victory.'
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, February 14, 1925, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/257.
2. Reports of Allenby's resignation and/or their denial appeared in the Morning 
Post, February 27, 1925, Times, February 27, 1925, and Daily News, February 
27, 1925.
3. Allenby to Chamberlain, February 28, 1925, Private and Personal, Unnumbered, 
Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/257. Willert of the Foreign Office Press Depart­
ment, wrote to Selby that '...the problem we had to meet was a difficult one. 
To have said nothing mysteriously would have added fuel to the flames of 
rumour. It is always a fatal attitude to adopt. To have brushed aside all 
talk of resignation as absurd would have been misrepresentation of a sort in 
which it is impossible to indulge.' Willert to Selby, February 28, 1925, 
FO/371/10907. In the end, the Foreign Office did not issue its own denial, 
but instead referred the press to Allenby's statement. Chamberlain to Allen­
by, February 28, 1925, Private and Personal, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/257.




The attacks on Allenby and his policy were mainly in the Beaverbrook and
Rothermere papers and caused much anger in the Residency. Kerr wrote to Owen
Tweedy that 'We are all disturbed and sad about the Beaverbrook-Rothermere attack
on Lord A. which is doing damage here and if S.Z [aghluij. wins the elections he
will very largely have to thank these two...'^* The most serious attacks came
from the Daily Mail. A series of highly critical articles by Ward Price, the
paper's Egyptian correspondent, began shortly after Stack was murdered and was
2
supported in the Daily Mail's editorials. In view of the still unsettled situ­
ation in Egypt, the attacks in the press and rumours about Allenby's future,
3
Chamberlain decided to suspend action on the announcement of Allenby's resignation.
1. Kerr to Tweedy, March 1, 1925, STAC, Tweedy Papers, Box 4. The reasons for
the attacks in the press perhaps are found in an earlier visit to Egypt by 
Lords Rothermere and Beaverbrook: 'The visits to Egypt of Lords Rothermere &
Beaverbrook have been remarkable in that neither of them have called here & 
neither in consequence was invited to the Residency. I have heard nothing 
which would indicate that Lord Rothermere considered himself aggrieved thereby 
but there is little doubt that Beaverbrook leaves Egypt with a feeling that
he has not been treated with fitting consideration,' QMT^weedyj, to Kerr,
20/3|[l923), FO/141/792 (16484) .
2. For example, see: Ward Price, 'Egypt. Government's Gravest Task,' and, edi­
torial, 'The Test in Egypt Still to Come,' Daily Mail, December 9, 1924; Ward 
Price, 'Egypt in Trousers Too Soon,' Daily Mail, December 18, 1924; Ward 
Price, 'Sudan Mutiny Disclosures,' and, editorial, 'Egypt Trifling With Us,' 
Daily Mail, December 20, 1924. Gardner claimed that, in view of Lord North- 
cliffe's earlier support of Allenby in 1922, these attacks showed the 'fickle­
ness of Lord Northcliffe, that Newspaper's proprietor.' Gardner, op. cit.,
p. 249. However, Lord Northcliffe had died in August 1922 and Lord Rothermere, 
his brother, gained control of all the Northcliffe papers with the exception 
of the Times.
3. Chamberlain to Allenby, March 4, 1925, Private and Personal, Unnumbered,
Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/257. There are indications that the rumours may
have begun in Egypt. However, one possible explanation is that the rumours 
which recurred in April, may have been the result of the activities of Sir 
George Lloyd, later Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, Allenby's successor. Lloyd be­
lieved that Baldwin had promised him the position of High Commissioner in 
Egypt in 1923. In early 1925, after Allenby's resignation had become common 
knowledge in Conservative circles in London, Lloyd feared that he would not 
receive the office despite the fact that 'I have framed all my plans and 
guided all my actions on the assumption that there existed, as there indeed 
did exist, an honourable understanding in the matter.' Lloyd to Chamberlain, 
March 16, 1925, BUL, Chamberlain Papers, AC/18/1/38. As a result, he embar­
ked on an embarrassing campaign of solicitation with senior members of the 
government. Word may have reached the press in this manner. In fact, Cham­
berlain had to write Lloyd: 'I beg you to hold your hand, to exercise pati­
ence, and to be prepared to accept with dignity whatever decision the Govern­
ment may make.' Chamberlain to Lloyd, March 19, 1925, BUL, Chamberlain
Papers, AC/18/1/39.
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On May 2, Allenby finally felt that the time had come when his resignation 
could be safely submitted to the King:
The situation in Egypt is quiescent, under a Ministry which is 
favourably disposed towards His Majesty's Government and which, 
with the support of His Majesty's Government is likely to hold its 
own until the elections which will probably not take place before 
the winter. The murderers of the late Sirdar are laid by the 
heels and will certainly be convicted and hanged. Summer is com­
ing on, and with the advent of the hot weather there is usually a 
lull in Egyptian political activity.!
Allenby therefore suggested that a successor be appointed without delay and that
he be permitted, before the appointment was announced, to assure the Egyptian
leaders of the continuity of British policy. This letter crossed with a similar
letter from Chamberlain informing Allenby that his resignation could be submitted
2
and that Clark Kerr would, at the same time, be transferred and promoted.
Even Allenby's last weeks were marred by misunderstanding. Despite his re­
quest that he receive prior information of the announcement of his successor, 
Reuters carried a news item about the appointment of Sir George Lloyd as the next
3
High Commissioner on May 16. Allenby was assured that the announcement had been 
unauthorized and on May 18 he was informed that, subject to the King's approval, 
Chamberlain would inform the House of Commons on May 20 that
Lord Allenby informed me last autumn of his desire to be relieved 
as soon as the public interest made his retirement possible. I re­
ceived the announcement of his intentions with great regret and at 
my request he has continued to hold the post of High Commissioner 
up till the present time.4
The announcement of Allenby's resignation was a compromise between Allenby's refu­
sal to resign because of strain he did not feel and Chamberlain's desire, which 
Allenby shared, to prevent public discussion of the dispute between the two men 
lest it raise doubts about British policy in Egypt.
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, May 2, 1925, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/257.
2. Chamberlain, apparently, wished to give Allenby's successor a clear field 
upon taking office. Chamberlain to Allenby, April 30, 1925, Private and Per­
sonal, Chamberlain Papers, FO/800/257.
3. Allenby queried this in an urgent cable to Chamberlain. Allenby to Chamber- 
lain, May 16, 1925, Tel. No. 189, FO/371/10907.
4. Chamberlain to Allenby, May 18, 1925, Tel. No. 126, FO/371/10907.
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On June 11 Allenby wrote his final despatch describing the main features of 
developments in Egypt as he saw them on the eve of his departure. After six 
years as High Commissioner all he could write was
I do not see why, with prudence and a reasonable measure of good 
fortune, we should not be enabled to gather tangible fruits from 
six years of patience. I do not look at present for the conclusion 
of an agreement between Great Britain and Egypt, but I hope for a 
period of friendly co-operation.^-
Allenby's departure was described with evident warmth by Henderson who after­
wards wrote that
On the day of Lord Allenby1s departure from Cairo large and 
manifestly friendly crowds lined the streets. The scene at the 
station itself was impressive. The gathering there...was the most 
representative of its kind which has taken place within the memory 
of those present; and the many Egyptians of whom Lord and Lady 
Allenby have by their personal charm made close personal friends 
were ill able to conceal their emotion.2
But after six years, what had changed?
1. Allenby to Chamberlain, June 11, 1925, Desp. Ho. 423, FO/371/10887.
2. Henderson to Chamberlain, June 28, 1925, Desp. No. 474, FO/371/10907.
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CONCLUSION
'Renounce - or monopolize - or share1: Salisbury's dilemma was still unre­
solved. Within that context, the aim of this study has been to understand the 
development of Britain's policy towards Egypt amidst the events and processes 
that occurred during the crucial years of 1922 to 1925 when a serious attempt was 
made to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a permanent basis. This was sought 
in three inter-related areas: in the perceptions and attitudes of the policy­
makers ; in the relations between the British establishment in Cairo and the 
British government in London; and, in the effects of the events of the period. 
Thus there has been an attempt to understand both the environment as well as the 
specific direction in which policy evolved.
The British both in London and in Cairo began with certain common perceptions 
about Egypt, Egyptians and the nature and necessity of maintaining Britain's 
vital interests in the area. Much of this intellectual baggage was the heritage 
of the nineteenth century and was rooted in the decades of Britain's rule of 
Egypt. After the First World War, however, these general attitudes and views 
were often translated into opposing approaches and policies that were determined 
to a great extent by the physical locale and specific concerns of the British 
policy-maker. Administrative stability, the maintenance of public order, and a 
cooperative native elite were the paramount concerns of the Briton in Cairo, 
concerns that coloured his general appreciation of policy towards Egypt. In 
London, however, policy was perceived within the broader framework of considera­
tions such as general imperial policy, domestic politics, and public opinion.
There was, therefore, wide scope for differences in approach, differences that 
were pursued vigourously throughout the period.
A schematic analysis of the events and developments indicates a division into 
two distinct periods. The first is 1922-1923, or 'Cairo’s years', when policy 
can be seen to have been the pursuit of short-term goals. The second, 1924-1925, 
or 'London's years', saw the attempt to establish a long-term policy through 
which Anglo-Egyptian relations would be defined.
'Cairo's years' were marked by a revival of the influence of the British in 
Cairo in the area of policy formulation. They were also characterized by in­
creasingly sharp divergence between Lord Allenby and the Residency in Cairo, and
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Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office in London.
The initial reasons for Cairo's renewed importance were the circumstances 
surrounding Lord Allenby's appointment as High Commissioner in 1919, his position 
and authority in Egypt, and, then, the almost unanimous support he enjoyed 
amongst his staff and advisers. The inability of, first, Lord Curzon and the 
Foreign Office and, then, Lloyd George to impose an Egyptian policy on Allenby 
was due largely to a general pre-occupation after the war, the decline of the 
Foreign Office's position, and the political and imperial context in which the 
government in London functioned. The post-war economy, Ireland, India, the un­
stable coalition, all conspired to weaken the hand of the government in London
when dealing with their representative in Egypt.
The strength of Allenby‘s position and the divergence over policy towards 
Egypt were apparent at the very start of ‘Cairo's years' when the first major 
clash occurred after the breakdown of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of November
1921. The British government faced with concerns that went beyond Egypt, refused 
further concessions. Allenby and his staff, on the other hand, fearing their 
inability to maintain a viable administration in Egypt, pressed for the unilateral 
declaration of Egypt's independence. The conflict that followed and Allenby's
dramatic victory proved that these indeed were 'Cairo's years'.
The next eighteen months and the objectives of policy bore the marks of 
Allenby1s stunning victory. Independence dictated the direction of policy to­
wards Egypt; disengagement from Egypt's internal administration; the enactment 
of a constitution and the Act of Indemnity; and, the end of martial law. All 
this was done in such a way so as to permit the growth of a moderate Egyptian 
elite that would relieve Allenby and the Residency of the burden of administra­
tion and the fear of disorder. Throughout this period, when serious disagreement 
arose, Allenby's position was usually sufficient to carry the day. The perso­
nalities of Lloyd George's successors, Bonar Law and Stanley Baldwin, further 
strengthened Allenby and the Residency.
Allenby's success, however, was the inevitable prelude to his decline in 
influence, just as his forceful personality, a major factor in his victory in
1922, was the cause of his defeat and departure in 1924-1925. The achievement of 
the short-term goals that followed Egypt's nominal independence made the Resi­
dency's retreat from a central role in Egyptian affairs unavoidable and the
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subsequent depletion of the British establishment in Egypt inevitable. The 
nature of the Residency's involvement in Egypt's political life was transformed 
from that of an active participant to a buffer between the Throne and the 
nationalists. Furthermore, the focus of policy moved to the need to define a 
permanent Anglo-Egyptian relationship. All this, together with the election of 
a strong Labour Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Ramsay MacDonald, followed 
by the equally forceful Conservative Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, led 
to London's unquestioned supremacy in its relationship with the High Commissioner. 
The clearest indication of this was the peripheral role played by the Residency 
during the 1924 negotiations between MacDonald and Zaghlul.
After MacDonald's departure from the Foreign Office and the appointment of 
Chamberlain, there was one last clash, precipitated by Allenby's harsh ultimatum 
of November 1924. Allenby again adopted the same forceful approach he had used 
when pursuing a conciliatory policy in earlier years. Although Allenby's 
ultimatum was eventually accepted by Egypt and was never repudiated by London, 
Austen Chamberlain and the members of the Foreign Office, long resentful of the 
High Commissioner's position, exacted a high price for this final gesture of 
independence. The approach that had succeeded so well in Allenby's differences 
with Lloyd George in 1922 was not effective with Chamberlain in 1924. The 
conflict was no longer between equals. Allenby's resignation should be viewed 
within the context of the conflict between the government in London and the 
Residency in Cairo even though it came as a result of the appointment of Nevile 
Henderson to the Residency staff and not because of his disregard of instructions 
from London.
The question raised by Allenby's last despatch must again be asked: Indeed,
what had changed? British post-war policy towards Egypt, particularly from 
1922 to 1925, was marked by irony. This period was apparently one of great 
change and yet in the end, the irony was that little had actually changed. All 
areas were affected: policy perceptions and debates; the implementation of
policy; Egypt's administration; and, the balance of power between the British 
in Cairo and in London.
Perhaps one of the most significant ironies was that of the basic percep­
tions and ensuing debates over policy. The activities of the Milner Mission to
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Egypt in 1919 and 1920 gave rise to intense discussion in Britain about the 
future of policy towards Egypt. Approaches, such as conservative 'Cromerism* 
or 'Neo-Cromerism* and 'Milnerism', perceived perhaps mistakenly as a liberal 
policy, were at the heart of the.policy debates. The discussions, however, 
appeared to come to a sharp close in February 1922 with the unilateral declara­
tion of Egypt's independence.
Yet, less than three years later, the debate over policy was renewed, its 
language and idiom essentially unaltered. Its occasion was the question of the 
Sirdarship of the Egyptian Army, but it went beyond the immediate issue, revealing 
the deep feelings that still existed barely concealed beneath the surface.
Winston Churchill, who never accepted what he believed to be the loss of Egypt, 
renewed the discussions at the end of 1924. His position, unchanged by the 
experiences of the recent past, was thee 'So far from agreeing that "Cromerism" 
is impossible, I regard it as inevitable.*^
The strongest opposition to a revival of 'Cromerism' came from Austen
Chamberlain and members of the Foreign Office who sought * to concentrate atten-
2
tion on the reasons for which a return to "Cromerism" is not now possible.1 
Responding in Cabinet to Churchill's advocacy to just such a reversion, Chamber- 
lain argued that this was '"Cromerism" with a vengeance and carried to a point 
which even in the heyday of his authority would, I think, have been repudiated
3
by Lord Cromer.* Instead, he argued, 'my policy is to avoid annexation - not
to govern Egypt, but to leave the Egyptians to govern it whilst securing suffi-
4
crent power to protect those interests of which we are guardians.'
Although Chamberlain was supported by most of his colleagues on the specific 
issue of an Egyptian Sirdar, the debate of 1919-1920 was still unresolved in 
1925. Before Allenby*s departure from Egypt, Murray wrote unofficially to 
Henderson, with the knowledge and direction of Chamberlain and Crowe, that it was 
probably correct 'that the stable equilibrium jin Egyptian affairs] can only be
1. W.S.C(hurchillj, , Egypt, Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 
30, 1924, C.P. 555(24), CAB/24/169, p. 1.
2. AC JJiamberlairTJ, January 9, 1925, Minute to J. Murray, Draft Memorandum, 
January 7, 1925, FO/371/10889.. -
3. AC Jlj amber lain]. , Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 
Egypt, January 9, 1925, C.P. 20(25), CAB/24/171, p.l.
4. Ibid.
275
obtained immediately in clearing out altogether or annexing Egypt, and that both 
these courses are altogether outside the sphere of practical politics.'^
The second irony was in the implementation of policy. The period began 
in the shadow of the failure of negotiations between Britain and Egypt in 1921. 
This was followed by the resignation of the Egyptian Prime Minister, Adli Pasha, 
on the one hand, and the sharp British Note of December 3, on the other. In 
the midst of this stalemate, Allenby demanded and received approval for a policy 
of unilateral independence. Anglo-Egyptians relations were organized unilater­
ally in the hope that Tharwat Pasha, as the next Prime Minister, would be 
amenable to a resolution of the four reserved points.
Allenby's final months in Egypt were marked, in a similar fashion, by the 
failure of the MacDonald-Zaghlul negotiations, the Stack assassination and 
Zaghlul*s resignation. Once again Anglo-Egyptian relations were established by 
fiat - Allenby*s ultimatum. It was hoped, yet again., that the consequences of 
this unilateral act would be dealt with by another moderate Egyptian, Ziwar 
Pasha, who would be amenable to agreement on some of the issues outstanding be­
tween Britain and Egypt.
A corollary to the unilateral structuring of relations was the nature of 
Egypt*s internal administration. From 1883 until 1914 Egypt was controlled by 
British officials supported by British bayonets. The 'veiled protectorate* was 
based on the premise that Britain would rule Egypt through a cooperative native 
elite. The formal-protectorate further entrenched this principle. In 1921 and 
1922 Allenby was concerned that this system was no longer viable and advocated 
the unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence. One of the first conse­
quences was the immediate and dramatic withdrawal of Britain from Egypt’s 
adminis tration.
At the end of the period, Allenby, the author of the policy of Egyptiani- 
zation, was largely responsible for its reversal through the ultimatum of November 
192 4. The general implication of this action was that, if it did not signal a 
reversion to the formal protectorate, it moved in the direction of a ‘veiled 
protectorate*. Zaghlul, Ziwar or whoever succeeded as Prime Minister, would have 
to abide by the will of the Residency, supported by British officials in the 
Egyptian administration, in all matters of importance.
1. Murray to Henderson, Private, June 16, 1925, FO/371/10889.
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The final irony was the shifting balance of power between the Residency in 
Cairo and the government in London. Lord Allenby was appointed Special High 
Commissioner to Egypt because Sir Reginald Wingate was thought too weak to 
control events in that country. In fact, Allenby was believed by some to be 'too 
fierce1 even for riot-torn Egypt. Allenby's early actions indicated that he 
indeed possessed the firmness necessary to impose his will. He imposed that will 
most clearly, however, when he forced the government in London to adopt a policy 
of conciliation that went beyond anything hitherto contemplated. Allenby and 
the British in Cairo had become a major force in the formulation of policy 
towards Egypt.
By the end of 1924, Allenby was no longer central to this process and he 
stood at the head of a weakened official and unofficial establishment. Thus, 
Allenby, at first 'too fierce' for Egypt and then too conciliatory for London, 
was compelled by the excesses of native violence and the pressures of resurgent 
nationalism to adopt a policy of harsh retribution. Allenby, the firm concilia­
tor, was replaced because resentful British officials in London feared what they 
believed was his weakness and vacillation and opposed what they perceived was 
his unnecessary harshness.
Perhaps the greatest irony of all was the fact that Allenby, responsible for 
Egypt's nominal independence, was now also responsible for creating conditions 
that permitted his successor, the imperialist Lord Lloyd, to re-establish a 
degree of British control over Egypt's affairs unknown since the 'palmy days' of 
Lord Cromer.
The final question that remains to be asked: Given British interests and
Egyptian aspirations, could it have been otherwise?
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